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This dissertation examines the role, function and adequacy of public international law to deal with 
civilians’ access to, enjoyment and progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural rights 
(ESC rights) as controversially affected during and in the aftermath of contemporary scenarios of 
armed conflict, other situations of massive violence, and contexts of occupied territories. Over the 
course of the past three decades the nature of armed conflicts, their causes and consequences have 
undergone major changes. Similarly, current-day military occupations have assumed polymorphic 
features, including forms of prolonged occupation or forms of interim administrations to carry out 
“regime change” in the occupied territory.  
It is argued that relevant implications against civilians’ vulnerability may derive from a more 
integrated and holistic approach of international law to issues pertaining to the respect, protection, 
and fulfilment of ESC rights. In particular, the position taken is that certain branches of 
international law have progressively come to represent valuable legal tools enabling to delineate and 
clarify the core substance and uncertain boundaries of outstanding connections emerging between 
civilians’ ESC rights and conflict-affected or occupation-related settings.  
The evolution of the international legal framework invites, indeed, a reconsideration of the 
normative responses advanced under international humanitarian law in tandem with the functional 
development of other applicable international legal regimes, such as international criminal law and 
international human rights law. Through an extensive review of legal instruments and practice, this 
study investigates the following: which international norms have progressively supported 
developments in the normative content of ESC rights and favour a more precise understanding of 
the nature and scope of ensuing obligations to be addressed for the imperative of civilian protection; 
which international norms have tackled questions of accountability for their violations as committed 
during the conduct of hostilities and its aftermath or the administration of occupied territories; 
which international norms have also advanced the availability of remedies to ensure the basic right to 
effective remedy and reparation for the violations concerned. Accordingly, emerging trends 
alongside relevant gaps, weaknesses and limits in the legal branches concerned are addressed by 
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1. The context of the study  
Over the course of the past three decades the nature of armed conflicts, their causes and 
consequences have undergone major changes, such as those in the Balkans region and in the 
Persian Gulf or in the cases of Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Syria, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Similarly, current-day 
military occupations have assumed polymorphic features, including forms of prolonged occupation, 
such as in the case of the Palestinian territories, or forms of interim administrations to carry out 
“regime change” in the occupied territory, such as in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. These 
(r)evolutions have favoured the perception that the international community must assume and 
arrange itself for “new protection needs” of civilian victims of such complex scenarios.1  
In this context, issues pertaining to the respect, protection, and fulfilment of economic, social 
and cultural rights (ESC rights) ever more constitute unavoidable components of any 
comprehensive appraisal of the evolving legal framework for the protection of civilians in 
international law. The ESC rights as enshrined in various international instruments essentially 
provide guarantees to individuals of their fundamental rights to physical and mental health, to an 
adequate standard of living for oneself and one’s family (comprising water, food, clothing, housing, 
and the improvement of living conditions), to education, to work, to protection and assistance to the 
family, and to take part in cultural life. 
Contemporary conflict-related situations are indeed acknowledged among the major obstacles to 
the progressive realisation of the ESC rights of civilians, particularly these of vulnerable categories 
such as children, women, members of racial, ethnic or religious groups, minority communities, 
refugees and internally displaced persons.2 For instance, all human nutrition phases (i.e. production, 
                                                
1 See J. Kellenberger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, “Strengthening legal protection for 
victims of armed conflicts”, Official Statement, 21 September 2010. 
2 For instance, issues related to the enjoyment of ESC rights were considered fully relevant to the Chechen conflict, see 
CESCR, List of issues to be taken up in connection with the consideration of the fourth periodic report of the Russian Federation concerning 
the rights referred to in Articles 1-15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/C.12/4/Add.10), UN 
Doc. E/C.12/Q/RUS/2, 14 January 2003, para. 7 (“What is the position of the State party regarding the self-determination of all 
the peoples of the Russian Federation and what measures are being taken by the State party to ensure that all those people affected by conflict, 





procurement, preparation, distribution, consumption, and biological utilisation of food) are likely to 
be impaired in such situations, resulting in malnutrition, disease and death. Then, collapsed health 
care systems are aggravated by delays or denials of access to basic health services as caused, for 
instance, by restrictions on movement imposed during the conduct of military operations or by 
military checkpoints, curfews, blockades and other methods and means of warfare employed. 
Additionally, not only the vast majority of dead and injured are civilians, but also the bulk of 
damage produced by warfare, military occupations and aftermath contexts mainly affect 
infrastructures vital for civilian well-being: pertinent examples concern the demolitions of houses and 
forced evictions or the destruction of schools.  
Conversely, failures to realise ESC rights as well as violations of these rights may be - and 
generally are - among the root causes of conflict-affected situations, principally in respect to gross and 
systematic discrimination and inequality vis-à-vis access to natural resources, to land tenure and 
distribution, to housing, to work, limited access to education, identity conflict, corruption.  
In this regard, the importance of safeguarding ESC rights as core elements of post-conflict justice 
mechanisms in the pursuance of social justice and sustainable peace based upon the rule of law has 
started to be emphasised in the light of largely neglected inclusion of serious abuses of economic and 
social rights within post-conflict criminal prosecutions as well as truth and reconciliation processes.3 
In this vein, a sort of “marginalization” of ESC rights has been addressed within the transnational justice 
discourse4 and practice.5 On the one hand, the “omission” of crimes concerning systemic violations of 
ESC rights, despite their strategic role in maintaining regimes of abuse, has been critically noticed in 
the prosecutorial strategies developed in international, hybrid and regional tribunals. On the other 
hand, few truth and reconciliation commissions have engaged with ESC rights violations, and 
                                                                                                                                                            
the State party to ensure that Chechens who have been displaced from Chechnya, especially to Ingushetia, enjoy all economic, social and 
cultural rights under the Covenant?”); CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Russian Federation, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.94, 12 December 2003, paras. 10, 28, 30, 56, 58. 
3 See C. Chinkin, “The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Post-conflict”, paper series commissioned by the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009, available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/Paper_Protection_ESCR.pdf. The author’s contention is that 
“the failure to deliver economic, social and cultural rights through national legal frameworks in accordance with international standards 
undermines the sought-after stability and human security post-conflict, which in turns lessens the ability or willingness of victims and witnesses 
to participate in the formal processes of post-conflict justice”. See also S.C. Agbakwa, “A Path Least Taken: Economic and Social 
Rights and the Prospects of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Africa”, 47 Journal of African Law, 2003, pp. 38-64; 
M.A. Drumbl, “Accountability for Property Crimes and Environmental War Crimes, Prosecution Litigation, and 
Development”, International Centre For Transitional Justice, 2009. 
4 See Report of the Secretary General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 23 August 
2004, S/2004/616, para. 8, which defines transitional justice as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation”. 






sometimes even with “economic crimes”: 6  the Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and 
Misappropriations Committed by the ex-President Habré, his Accomplices and/or Accessories in 
Chad,7 the Commission for the Historical Clarification of Human Rights Violations and Acts of 
Violence which Caused Suffering to the Guatemalan People,8 the Commission for Reception, 
Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste,9 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Liberia,10 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, 11  and the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission in Kenya.12 
Hesitation displayed by these bodies has been interpreted as an extension of the old and larger 
ideological dichotomy in human rights discourse.13 Whereas civil and political rights violations have 
been deemed as justiciable and susceptible to being redressed through transitional justice initiatives, 
                                                
6 See Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Vol. 2, sect. 9.9.1, which defines “economic crimes” as (1) 
any forbidden action directed to create economic gain by a State or non-State actor whose economic activities fuelled 
the conflict, or contributed to gross human rights and/or humanitarian law violations, or who benefited economically 
from the conflict; or (2) public or private person’s actions directed to create illicit profit by engaging in certain conduct 
(e.g. money laundering, looting, tax evasion, human trafficking and child labour). Various economic crimes and 
perpetrators (especially companies) were considered within diverse economic sectors (i.e. timber, logging and mining; 
and also looked at the role of corruption). Significantly the Commission concluded that “the appalling number and scale of 
economic crimes in Liberia … grossly deprived Liberia and Liberian citizens of their economic rights and … obstructed the economic 
development and policy of the State”, see ibid., para. 138. 
7 See Chad: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by ex-President Habré, his Accomplices 
and/or Accessories: Investigation of Crimes Against the Physical and Mental Integrity of Persons and their Possessions, 7 May 1992.  
8 See Acuerdo sobre el Establecimiento de la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico de las Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos y los 
Hechos de Violencia que han Causado Sufrimientos a la Población Guatemalteca, 23 June 1994. It focused on violations of civil and 
political rights, but it observed that acts of genocide occurred against the indigenous Mayan communities, affecting their 
traditions, and accordingly it investigated violations of cultural rights and their impact, including on the Mayan 
population’s enjoyment of adequate standards of living. See Guatemala: Memoria del silencio, Vol. III, Chap. XVIII, 1994, 
paras. 2866-2950. A noteworthy conclusion was that, during the internal conflict, their survival and culture was 
impacted by the State, as they were forced into conditions of extreme poverty, deprived of traditional economic 
activities, and forced to displacement, see ibid., paras. 2887-2901 and 2904-2909.  
9  See Chega! The report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR), 2005. On its 
considerations on ESC rights violations as well as recommendations on ESC rights, see paras. 7-12. 
10 The 2005 Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia mandated it to investigate gross 
human rights violations, violations of international humanitarian law and “economic crimes, such as the exploitation of natural or 
public resources to perpetuate armed conflicts”, and determining those responsible. See Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Liberia, Vol. I: Findings and Determinations. Its report is the first of any truth commission to extensively explore 
“economic crimes” as a key factor in fuelling conflict. Furthermore, violations of ESC rights were deemed the principal 
causes of the war in Liberia. It also provides historical information about Liberia’s socio-economic, cultural, and 
political past, and how certain practices generated the conflict.  
11 It studied the role of mineral resources, in particular diamonds, in fuelling the conflict, see Witness to Truth: Report of the 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 3 B, Chap. 1. The categories of violations adopted in order to carry 
out its human rights mandate also included “economic violations” (i.e. looting, destruction of property and extortion); 
further, the economic, social and cultural dimensions of some violations were explored as affecting women and children. 
See Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 3 A, Chap. 4, paras. 14 and 19.  
12 See Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, 2013, Vol. II B. The three chapters of this volume 
focus on certain aspects of the Commission’s mandate regarding, respectively, government policy of economic 
marginalization and violations of socio-economic rights, historical injustices related to land, economic crimes and grand 
corruption.  
13 See R. Carranza, “Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic Crimes?”, 2 





ESC rights have generally been perceived as “aspirational policy goals” rather than legal entitlements 
by governments, donor agencies and practitioners. In this sense, the misconception of socio-
economic abuses as non-justiciable has been reflected in their references in “catch-all” development 
programs. However, a move away from this narrow view has been long advocated.14 In making this 
move, at least two aspects must be considered. The first one concerns the extent to which ESC rights 
should be integrated in post-conflict justice settlements, so underpinning the concept of transitional justice. 
The importance of this aspect is linked to the potential enhancement of human security after conflicts, since 
failures of such an integration could otherwise exacerbate tensions, contribute to renewed conflict, 
and result in further violations of civil and political rights. Furthermore, its significance is linked to 
the potential of facilitating the debate on how to substantially redress complex and interrelated violations of past 
conflicts as well as on how to prevent their recurrence in the future.15 Conversely, a second aspect concerns 
the implications that may derive under international law from a more integrated and holistic approach to 
such contexts, which would take into account different dimensions of conflict by incorporating more 
seriously the full range of violations committed.  
2. The scope of the study and the significance of the research topic 
The present dissertation positions itself within the current wave of scholarship attempting to address 
the aforementioned aspects, albeit in a much more focused manner. In the present study, ESC 
rights during and in the aftermath of contemporary scenarios of armed conflict, other situations of 
massive violence, and contexts of occupied territories are explored through the lens of public 
international law. The purpose is to determine whether and how its evolution has allowed for them 
to be addressed in relation to civilians’ vulnerability. In other words, this thesis aims at discussing the 
evolution of the international legal order and examining the suitability of existing international law to deal 
with several controversial ways affecting the access to, enjoyment and progressive realisation of, ESC rights by civilians. 
The proposed inquiry on the relevance and adequacy of international law for handling the 
                                                
14 See also L. Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition”, (Second Annual Transitional Justice 
Lecture, New York University School of Law Center for Human Rights and Global Justice and the International 
Center for Transitional Justice, New York, 25 October 2006), CHRGJ Working Paper No. 10, 14, emphasising that 
“Transitional justice should take up the challenge that mainstream justice is also reluctant to rise to: acknowledging that there is no hierarchy of 
rights and providing protection for all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights … A comprehensive transitional justice 
strategy would therefore want to address the gross violations of all human rights during the conflict and, I suggest, the gross violations that gave 
rise or contributed to the conflict in the first place”. 
15 In the case of Liberia, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission did not address ESC rights sufficiently in its legal 
analysis and recommendations, despite its innovative and broad mandate (i.e. addressing all gross human rights 





protection of civilians in the area of ESC rights will be conducted under a preventive alongside 
remedial perspective. It will offer the chance to analyse a number of significant developments that 
have occurred in the last decades in different branches of public international law in relation to ESC 
rights. The applicability of various legal regimes will be investigated in view of the practice emerged in 
conflict-affected situations, shedding light on the role played by a plurality of international norms that 
interact with one another and gradually reshape the interpretation of the rules representing the 
traditional point of reference for assessing such practice. This gives the opportunity to examine 
whether the latter has confirmed, enhanced, weakened or challenged what international law 
provides for as it stands. Accordingly, emerging trends alongside existing gaps and limits in the 
international legal protection afforded to civilians’ ESC rights regarding particular dimensions of 
their realisation will be addressed. In the same regard, the potential for further clarification and 
appropriate elaboration of the norms concerned will be highlighted, with a view to contributing to 
greater coherence within the international law system (rather than to fragmentation resulting from 
its expansion). 
Specifically, the present thesis inquires the normative responses advanced under international 
humanitarian law along with the contributions developed from other applicable international legal 
regimes, such as international human rights law and international criminal law. Indeed, the thesis 
takes the position that each of these branches has progressively come to represent valuable legal tools 
enabling to delineate the core substance and clarify the uncertain boundaries of outstanding 
connections emerging between civilians’ ESC rights and conflict-torn or occupation-related settings.  
This approach is pertinent to the wide acknowledgement in legal doctrine and jurisprudence 
that contemporary patterns of armed conflict as well as modern forms of belligerent occupation 
have growingly impacted the law applicable in these scenarios, the institutions competent to monitor 
the implementation of existing norms to be complied with, the mechanisms appropriate to ensure 
accountability for violations of binding legal obligations incumbent upon relevant actors and to 
possibly contribute to prevent them in the future, and the requirements of remedial justice suitable to provide 
reparation to victims of such violations.  
All the just mentioned points are taken into due account in the present study. They offer 
important insights for assessing the extent to which public international law has progressively provided 
for rules that (i) support developments in the normative content of ESC rights and favour a more 
precise understanding of the nature and scope of ensuing obligations to be addressed for the 





committed during the conduct of hostilities and its aftermath or the administration of occupied 
territories, and (iii) advance the availability of remedies to ensure the basic right to effective remedy 
and reparation for the violations concerned.  
This approach to international law relies on the assumption that the protection of civilians in the 
field of ESC rights requires reliance on a legal framework that recognises the many facets of each right that has 
to be considered comprehensively. Therefore, questioning the role and function of international law means 
investigating no longer only - or mainly - the adequacy of basic principles and values that have 
guided the elaboration of the law of war and the law of occupation, primarily to handle the 
humanitarian consequences of such scenarios. Rather, it turns out to be also a matter of reflecting 
on functional development of other branches of international law capable of addressing the 
direct/indirect and short/long-term detrimental effects of such scenarios for ESC rights. Indeed, 
they have present and future serious implications for preserving the human dignity and securing the 
human development of individuals who do not take part in hostilities or “find themselves, in the case of a 
conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”. In 
other words, a primary question arises as to whether and if so how the applicable international law takes into 
account such effects and contributes to their mitigation. 
Another basic consideration justifies the proposed inquiry on the evolving legal framework 
addressed in the course of this study. The partial evolution of the traditional notion of State sovereignty  - 
mainly consequent to the progresses in the protection of the human being as favoured under United 
Nations auspices - has led to emphasise the discourse about the legal obligations of the State which is 
regarded as an entity functionally organised to protect the individuals under its jurisdiction.16 Although the relevant 
State obligations may vary under the different applicable branches of international law, and 
notwithstanding the growing involvement of other entities such as international organizations and 
transnational corporations, that basic understanding of State’s function will shape the present 
research on the ESC rights of civilians in contexts of armed conflict and military occupation. 
3. Defining the approach to the research focus 
It will be primarily argued that the contributions of customary law and treaty-based law as set forth 
in international humanitarian law (IHL) no longer exclusively base the existing international 
legal framework relevant to deal with the protection of civilians in the area of ESC rights. 
                                                
16 Conversely, the traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty put emphasis on the nation-state’s ‘right’ to dominate 





Nevertheless, the normative responses progressively provided under this branch of international law 
represent the starting point of the present study. Relevant IHL rules are mostly enshrined in the 
1949 Fourth Geneva Convention and the 1977 Additional Protocols17 and they basically respond to 
two distinct situations.  
On the one hand, these rules aim at protecting the civilian population or individual persons under the control 
of the enemy against violent or arbitrary actions. These are rules against the misuse of power. Some of them 
refer to all civilians,18 but most of them are set for “protected civilians” only (i.e. those who fall into the 
hands of the enemy19); precisely, according to a tripartite framework, the rules on the treatment of 
protected civilians apply to those who find themselves on enemy territory,20 then to those whose 
territory is occupied by the enemy,21 and finally to those in the enemy’s own territory as well as 
occupied territories.22  
On the other hand, these rules aim at protecting the civilian population against the effects of military 
operations and individual acts of hostility. These are rules limiting admissible methods and means of 
warfare.23 They are mostly set forth in the 1977 Additional Protocol I and customary law (in part 
grounded on the 1907 Hague Regulations);24 they apply to all civilians who are on the territory of 
the parties to the conflict.25 
Such an extensive IHL regime set down several obligations for those into whose hands civilians 
have fallen as well as for the belligerents opposing the party in whose hands civilians are. 
                                                
17 The adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols have blurred the borders between two subsections of the laws of 
armed conflict: the “Law of the Hague” concerning the means and methods of warfare, and the “Law of Geneva” or 
“Red Cross Law” concerning the protection of victims of war (i.e. wounded and sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of war, 
civilians, persons hors de combat). As corroborated by the International Court of Justice, “these two branches of the law 
applicable in armed conflict have become so closely interrelated that they are considered to have gradually formed one single complex system, 
known today as international humanitarian law. The provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocols give expression to the unity and complexity 
of that law”, see ICJ, Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, para. 
75. Nonetheless, important differences are noteworthy: e.g., while the “Law of the Hague” applies also in enemy 
territory, the “Law of Geneva” only applies in the belligerents’ own territory and occupied territory; further, the notion 
of “protected persons” features only the “Law of Geneva” (Article 4 GC IV). 
18 Articles 13-26, Part II, GC IV; Articles 72-79; Article 4 AP II. 
19 Consistent with the inter-State structure of international humanitarian law, this term in Article 4 GC IV does not 
protect those in the hands of a belligerent party of which they are nationals; the rules on the treatment of protected 
civilians cover only enemy civilians who are on the territory of a belligerent party or on an occupied territory. 
20 Articles 35-46 GC IV. 
21 Articles 47-78 GC IV, which contain further detailed and protective rules. 
22 Articles 27-34 GC IV. 
23 In treaty law the rules on the conduct of hostilities goes back to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, the 1899 and 
1907 Hague Conventions, the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1977 
Additional Protocols, the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its five Protocols, the 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 1997 Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines. The 1954 
Hague Convention and its two Protocols regulate the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. 
Then, the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court include a list of war crimes subject to its jurisdiction. 
24 Articles 48-71 AP I; Article 13 AP II. 





Conversely, they ultimately protect individual or collective interests of civilians. This aspect is more 
evident when terms such as “rights”, “benefits” and “entitlements” occasionally appear in the treaties 
concerned, mainly in provisions defining the treatment of civilians;26 nonetheless, this is also 
illustrated in certain provisions regulating the methods and means of warfare.27 In indicating them 
as subjects entitled to protection and specifying the ways in which it shall be provided, IHL rules 
inevitably address certain aspects of ESC rights relating to health, food, relief assistance, work and 
employment, family, education, culture, resources, environment. Actually, not only these rules are 
of primary relevance for ensuring that civilians are not denied, or have access to, basic needs, but also 
they contribute to generate positive conditions for peace as well as restoration of the affected 
situation, so supporting more generally the progressive realisation of civilians’ ESC rights. 
In this regard two main areas covered by ius in bello - namely the legal regime governing the 
conduct of military hostilities (in international and non-international armed conflicts) and the law of 
belligerent occupation - will be critically appraised in light of the practice of presen-day warfare and 
administration of occupied territories in relation to the protection of civilians, the civilian population 
as such, and civilian objects. In doing so a comprehensive question is explored as to whether and to 
what extent normative developments of international humanitarian law have marked, thanks to gradual 
codifications or evolutionary interpretations, adequate steps forward in the sphere of ESC rights against the 
effects of military operations as well as against civilians’ mistreatment when in the hands of the enemy, which may 
include a party to a conflict or an occupying power. Therefore, two sub-questions may be 
articulated as follows: first, whether and to what extent IHL has come to deal with the ESC rights of civilians; 
second, whether violations of its norms have resulted in a loss of their enjoyment or other related consequences. 
 
While the traditional reference to international law and armed conflicts primarily focused on 
international humanitarian law as regulating the use of force in such contexts, other legal regimes 
have been gradually taken into consideration to cover situations controversially classified as armed 
conflicts. Legal scholarship has especially examined the use of international human rights law, 
international criminal law as well as environmental law in order to regulate warfare or interfere with 
certain IHL norms by, for instance, “humanising”,28 “criminalising”,29 or “greening”30 them. Each of 
                                                
26 In addition to direct references, several provisions of the Law of Geneva indirectly refer to the notion of ‘rights’: e.g. 
Article 30 GC IV provides for all protected persons the right to file a complaint with the Protecting Powers, the ICRC 
or National Red Cross Societies concerning breaches of this Convention. 
27 Article 51 AP I (which is one of the cornerstones of the Hague Law); Article 54 AP I, prohibiting starvation as a 
method of warfare; Article 53 AP I protecting cultural objects and places of worship from the effects of hostilities. 
28 See T. Meron, “The Humanization of Humanitarian Law”, American Journal of International Law (AJIL), 2000, pp. 239-





these branches of international law have a potential to advance ESC rights and represent avenues of 
specific character that could offer further solutions to conflict-related issues. However, 
environmental law is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
In this regard it will be posited, in the first place, that human rights law have ended up 
constituting an integral part of international law (rather than an autonomous and self concluded 
branch of the law). They are enshrined in treaties at a global and regional level, a certain number of 
customary norms, general principles of law and peremptory norms of jus cogens. In this sense the 
normative concept of human rights - understood as establishing legal entitlements for one or more 
beneficiaries and imposing legal obligations for one or more duty bearers - has increasingly acquired relevance 
in looking at public emergencies induced by armed conflict, military occupation or post-conflict 
collapse. This use as an essential lens through which framing relevant behaviours/conducts 
occurring in such contexts relies on the idea that human rights are fundamental standards to preserve 
the dignity of human beings as well as functional tools to develop the human person at any time as a 
matter of principle.  
Moreover, it will be considered that the relevance gradually acquired by the normative concept 
of human rights has concerned either traditional vertical relationships of individuals vis-à-vis States 
or horizontal relationships between private actors, 31  although the state-centric approach still 
remains the main rationale of the existing international legal order. 
Then, it will be taken into account that international human rights law has progressively become 
part of the academic studies against the backdrop of complex contemporary conflict-related 
situations, especially when debating its relationship with international humanitarian law. This has 
been done by questioning whether it continues to apply and how the two regimes interact when 
they are simultaneously applicable, or by focusing on the role played by human rights bodies to seek 
                                                                                                                                                            
29 See A. Cassese, “On the Currents Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International 
Humanitarian Law”, European Journal of International Law (EJIL), 1998, pp. 2-17; Y. Beigbeder, Judging War Criminals. The 
Politics of International Justice, Basingstoke, Palgrave McMillan, 1999, pp. 1-26. 
30 See E.F.J. Yuzon, “Deliberate Environmental Modification Through the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons: 
‘Greening’ the International Laws of Armed Conflicts to Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime”, AUJILP, 
1996, pp. 793-846. 
31 See N. Rodley, “Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?”, in K.E. Mahoney et al. (eds.), Human 
Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A Global Challenge. 1993, p. 297 ff.; A. Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere, 1996; 
M. Gibney and D. Emerick, “Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable to Domestic and 
International Standards”, 10 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 1996, p. 123 ff.; S. Ratner, “Corporations 
and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility”, 11 Yale Law Journal, 2001, p. 443 ff.; F. Francioni, “Four Ways 
of Enforcing the International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations”, in M.A. 





remedies against States which violate the laws of war.32 The hitherto conducted academic analysis 
supporting its applicability has primarily tended to explain why it should apply during armed conflicts 
as well as how in such situations the two international law branches may concur and complement or at 
times converge towards each other on specific issues.33 Subsequently, scholars’ focus has shifted to 
exploring how human rights law applies, addressing certain issues encountered in its application 
regarding the extraterritorial scope of ensuing legal obligations, regarding the mandate and expertise of human 
rights monitoring bodies, and the terminological and conceptual distinctions between legal regimes having different 
paradigms. However, these studies have generally focused more on civil and political rights, especially 
dealing with arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty, torture, and the use of force. Conversely, 
internationally recognised economic, social and cultural rights have been mostly and undeservedly 
reduced to a silent role.34  
In view of all these points, the present thesis will look at international human rights law to 
inquire either limits or opportunities to upholding socio-economic and cultural justice in 
contemporary public emergencies prompted by situations of armed conflict, military occupation 
and post-conflict collapse. It will be argued that the challenges for the imperative of civilian protection in the 
socio-economic and cultural spheres may be better addressed under international law even in light of this 
developing regime. In particular, it is its potential as twofold normative and accountability framework that 
has been mostly underestimated. This matters either for contemporary understanding of civilians’ 
needs in such complex situations and the elaboration upon legal validity and content of obligations 
resulting from ESC rights, or the provision for effective and adequate remedies to civilian victims of 
corresponding violations. Moreover, the potential of international human rights law gains specific 
                                                
32 On the renewed interest for the interactions between international humanitarian law and human rights, see O. Ben-
Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford, 2011; R. Arnold and N. Quénivet 
(eds.), International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008; C. Green, “Human Rights and the 
Law of Armed Conflict”, in L.C. Green (ed.), Essays on the Modern Law of War2, Transnational Publishers, 1999. 
33 See Draper, “The relationship between the human rights regime and the laws of armed conflict”, 1 IYHR, 1971, p. 71 
ff.; L. Doswald-Beck and S. Vité, “International humanitarian law and human rights law”, International Review of the Red 
Cross (IRRC), 1993, p. 94 ff.; R.E. Vinuesa, “Interface, correspondence and convergence of human rights and 
international humanitarian law”, 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (YIHL), 1998, pp. 69-110; R. Provost, 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, 2002; H. Heintze, “On the relationship between human 
rights law protection and international humanitarian law”, 86 IRRC, 2004, p. 789 ff.; A. Orakhelashvili, “The 
Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence?”, 
19 EJIL, 2008, p. 161 ff. 
34 Few scholars have noticed this issue, see N. Lubell, “Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict”, 
IRRC, 2005, pp. 751-3; I. Schobbie, “Principle or Pragmatics? The Relationship between Human Rights Law and the 
Law of Armed Conflict”, JCSL, 2009, pp. 449-457. For some further exceptions in discussing their relevance, see M. 
Dennis, “Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military 
Occupation”, AJIL, 2005, pp. 139-141; S. Vité, “The interrelation of the law of occupation and economic social and 
cultural rights: the examples of food, health and property”, IRRC, 2008, pp. 629-651; E. Mottershaw, “Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict: International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian 





relevance from the perspective of articulating its manifold relationship with the law of armed 
conflict as well as the laws of occupation in the area of ESC rights. 
With regard to such a potential and its various dimensions, it is noted that modern dynamic 
contexts of armed conflicts and military occupation, in which a multiplicity of actors may play 
various roles affecting ESC rights, raise open questions on a number of aspects.  
The applicability regime of human rights treaties setting out ESC rights and the implications of ensuing 
obligations deserves primary scrutiny, in particular for the rationale behind omitted derogation 
clauses or included specific and general limitation clauses. In the same vein, the concept of 
justiciability of ESC rights may affect (enabling/favouring) both compliance with, and enforcement of, 
international norms enshrining ESC rights when breached in such contexts. Then, the availability of 
remedies, both judicial and non-judicial,35 before an independent authority for violations of civilians’ ESC rights 
may be difficult: the enjoyment of the right to an effective remedy36 and the corresponding state 
obligation to provide appropriate remedies may be challenged regarding possible mechanisms to 
holding relevant actors (e.g. governments, insurgents, corporations) to account for involvement in 
such violations, especially in view of existing underdeveloped accountability mechanisms under 
international law. These include the accountability gaps to respond to “international interdependent 
structures” (States as parties of intergovernmental institutions and private international actors) that 
may impair the enjoyment of human rights beyond national borders in conflict-related settings. 
Furthermore, the legal effect of applicable international human rights law is examined in relation to 
international humanitarian law. A major question is whether and how such relationship positively affects the 
imperative of civilian protection in the socio-economic and cultural spheres. Relevant aspects include its impact 
on the appraisal of applicable IHL rules as well as its ability to afford further normative content of 
the ESC rights which civilians are entitled to. The function of IHL in understanding the ESC rights and 
ensuing human rights obligations is also important to define such relationship. 
Conversely, in light of the absence of provisions specifying the general scope of application of 
treaties on ESC rights, the extraterritorial scope and applicability of ensuing human rights obligations gain 
relevance for situations in which State parties’ conduct (whether carried out wholly beyond their 
sovereign territory or producing effects overseas) could impair the access to, and enjoyment of, ESC 
                                                
35 Non-judicial remedies may include access to complaints mechanisms established under the auspices of international 
organizations, national human rights institutions and ombudspersons; other accountability measures available at the 
national level (i.e. access to parliamentary bodies tasked with monitoring governmental policies) and international level. 
36 It is widely recognised that remedies, to be effective, must be capable of leading to a prompt, though and impartial 
investigation; to the cessation of the violation if it is ongoing; and to adequate reparation, including, as necessary, restitution, 





rights of civilian individuals, groups and peoples (non-nationals) located in foreign territories 
affected by armed conflicts or periods of occupation. In other words, relevant acts or omissions may 
put to question whether and under which conditions they entail obligations on States due to their 
international commitments in the area of ESC rights (so giving rise, possibly, to state international 
responsibility).  
Nonetheless, due account will be given also to the contentious issue that the recognition of, and 
compliance with, human rights extraterritorial obligations pose theoretical challenges to the 
approaches conventionally assumed in international law. In debating on the phenomenon of 
globalisation and the ever-greater interactions between various actors having considerable 
imbalanced powers within the international community, legal scholarship has addressed the need to 
revise some key concepts in order to “operationalise” extraterritorial human rights obligations. 
Particularly, the notions of State jurisdiction,37 State responsibility and accountability have been at stake of 
the debate over the obstacles to recognise extraterritorial obligations.38 In considering such attempt 
to “re-conceptualise” the basic tenet of international human rights law that places obligations primarily 
on the territorial State, two recent soft-law norm-setting efforts elaborating principles, policy and 
regulatory options to develop a multi-duty-bearer framework will be examined.  
In the same vein, the issue of corporate liability for breaches of international law that directly or 
indirectly may inhibit the exercise of, or adequate access to, ESC rights will be explored. This is 
functional to highlight existing limits of international law. 
 
A further perspective for research presents itself if we considers that certain violations of ESC rights 
may be interpreted to amount to certain dimensions of international crimes that are defined in treaties and in 
customary international law and give rise to individual criminal responsibility. 39  Therefore, 
                                                
37 The notion of jurisdiction in the provisions of human rights treaties relates to the issue of whether a State (that was or 
not entitled to exercise jurisdiction under international law) is to be held accountable for a human rights violation resulting from its 
conduct. If referred to the interstate relationships then it relates to the issue of which State has, pursuant to international law, 
sovereign jurisdiction over a certain subject or area.  
38 See M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin, and W. van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties: the extra-
territorial scope of economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Cambridge University Press, 2012. F. Coomans, “The 
Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Work of the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Human Rights Law Review (HRLR), 2011, pp. 1-
35. S. Skogly and M. Gibney (eds.), Universal Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2010. M. Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, 
Intersentia, 2009, pp. 56 and 168. R. Higgings, Problem and Process - International Law and How We Use It, Clarendon Press, 
1994, p. 146. 
39  The principle of individual criminal responsibility forms the basis of international criminal law. This was 
acknowledged by the International Military Tribunal in the context of the issue of criminal accountability of some Nazi 
organizations, holding that “one of the most important (legal principles) … is that criminal guilt is personal, and that mass punishments 





international criminal law will be considered inasmuch as it can highlight if and how 
international law de lege lata includes violations of ESC rights within the substantive definitions of 
international crimes, in doing so providing additional instruments for the enforcement of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law addressing the rights in question. Thus, 
pertinent references will be made to the extent of its potential according to the purposes of the 
present research.  
This choice also relies on two significant aspects of the relationship between these three legal 
regimes.40 On the one hand, “cross-fertilization” between them has strengthened possible interactions 
and complementarity of relevant norms. On the other hand, increased attention to accountability 
for human rights and humanitarian law violations at the national and international level has 
produced a wealth of case law in which elements of the three regimes can be recognised. Both these 
aspects concern not only international supervisory bodies such as courts and tribunals, but also 
United Nations agencies such as the OHCHR, United Nations organs such as the Security Council 
and the Human Rights Council and its procedures, and several human rights treaty bodies. 
4. Methodology  
In order to answer the research question(s) discussed above, the thesis adopts a method of positive 
law and an integrated approach, examining all the primary sources relevant for ESC rights in war-
torn situations (including treaties and resolutions, judgments, decisions, reports, travaux préparatoires) 
as well legal doctrine on the topic. The relevant practice will be considered with a critical approach 
that aims at identifying gaps and limits in international law alongside ways to overcome them.  
The evolution of the international legal framework in relation to civilians’ vulnerability in the 
socio-economic and cultural spheres is investigated under a preventive alongside remedial 
perspective. The normative responses advanced under the aforementioned legal regimes are initially 
examined separately so as to appraise their specific relevance and adequacy for affording effective 
protection to civilians in view of the emerging practice. This allows shedding light on their 
divergence in nature and purposes, the testing of which is basically important to evaluate their 
applicability and inter-operability to enhance legal protection. Then, this multi-layered approach 
                                                                                                                                                            
Nuremberg, 30 September and 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International 
Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 (1950), p. 469. See also A. Cassese, International Criminal Law2, 2008, 
p. 33 ff.  
40 See “Report of the Office of the High Commissioner on the outcome of the expert consultation on the issue of 





contributes to greater coherence within the new international legal frame concerned.  
5. Roadmap  
The present thesis is divided into six chapters crowned with a conclusion. 
Chapter I will investigate the role of international humanitarian law as a restraint on armed violence 
having economic, social and cultural implications for civilian persons and objects. The scope of civilian 
immunity enshrined in the principles and rules aimed at protecting civilians against the effects of 
hostilities in international and non-international armed conflict is explored in the light of 
controversial cases emerged in the practice that have severely affected specific dimensions of ESC 
rights. This is functional to assess their adequacy and effectiveness to deal with the threats and 
challenges posed by warfare to ESC rights, especially in view of the basic fact that contemporary 
conflicts are not always foreseen as such by IHL. In the same vein, it contributes to identify gaps or 
weaknesses in the existing regime, which have required or might demand further clarification and 
elaboration even in light of other developed branches of international law.  
 
Chapter II will deal with the existing normative framework regulating humanitarian assistance 
and access in situations of armed conflict as well as within an occupied territory. 
 
Chapter III will consider the phenomenon of occupation as defined and regulated by 
contemporary international law and focus on the traditional concept of “welfare of the civilian 
population” narrowly in the sphere of ESC rights. Since modern practice has included both classical 
and atypical situations of exercise of effective control/authority over a foreign territory, the protective 
purpose of the laws of occupation is inferred not only as an intrinsic function of the existing regime but also 
as an evolving function of the challenged regime. On the one hand, the scope and adequacy of IHL to 
meet the occupied civilian population’s socio-economic and cultural entitlements are examined, also 
questioning the contingency of relevant obligations placed on the occupant to contextual factors. 
The rules and institutions of occupation law are investigated by addressing the intensity and 
modalities of application to contentious issues that arise in impacting ESC rights in practice, so as to 
gain a better understanding of its role in newly emerging realities and policies in occupied 
territories. On the other hand, in view of changed international expectations following several 
developments consolidated in international law, normative as well as factual aspects challenging the 





international human rights law gains significance in inquiring the safeguarding of the socio-economic 
and cultural entitlements of the civilian population. Similarly, the time factor of prolonged occupation 
deserves consideration for its implications on the enjoyment of ESC rights as functional to preserve 
or pursue civilian welfare.  
 
Chapter IV will firstly clarify the theoretical and practical grounds funding the importance of 
exploring the role of modern international human rights law as further normative regime 
contributing to safeguard civilians in the area of ESC rights under international law. These include 
elaborating upon legal preservation of civilians’ human dignity, approaching coherently the integral 
and holistic vision of human rights, taking seriously the evolution of the international protection of 
ESC rights, and inquiring the interconnection with other branches of international law.  
Before considering the significant relationship with international humanitarian law in the sphere 
of ESC rights, basic procedural issues on the applicability regime of human rights treaties on ESC 
rights will be inquired. The question of general derogability from such treaties alongside the issue of 
admissible limitations on ESC rights enshrined therein will be examined, particularly reflecting on 
the implications of the rationale behind omitted derogation clauses or included specific and general 
limitation clauses for States affected by times of public emergency induced by situations of armed 
conflict, military occupation and post-conflict collapse.  
 
Chapter V will look at the extraterritorial dimensions of the protection of civilians’ ESC rights 
under human rights treaties, mostly exploring on the basis of what criteria and to what extent the 
obligations ensuing from States’ international commitments in this area can apply to foreign 
territories as well as to civilians (non-nationals) placed therein as affected by situations of armed 
conflict and periods of military occupation which involve non territorial States parties to such 
treaties. Key soft law norm-setting efforts, as recently emerged on the subject of extraterritorial 
obligations of States in the area of ESC rights, will be preliminarily considered. The aim is exploring their 
potential implications and actual relevance for the protection of civilians within the evolving 
practice of war-torn situations, including also their weight in shaping the legal discourse on effective 
and adequate remedies in favour of civilian victims of related violations.  
 
Chapter VI will examine a number of recent lawsuits about companies’ involvement in serious 
breaches of international law norms that directly or indirectly inhibit the exercise of, and adequate 





the legal determinations of corporate liability for such breaches will inquire whether and to what 
extent national and international judicial mechanisms have started to translate the theoretical 
corporate legal liability into tangible accountability for wrongs regarding ESC rights. Accordingly, 
looking at the ways courts have handled corporate liability will allow assessing which realistic 
prospects exist for legal redress at national or international level, whether action on the part of 
criminal prosecution and law enforcement bodies is attractive, or whether the possibility of civil 
liability towards affected persons is effective, and whether the scope of basic liability concepts has 

















CHAPTER I: CIVILIAN IMMUNITY UNDER THE LAW ON THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES AND ESC RIGHTS 
 
1. Introduction 
Consistent with one of its main purposes, namely minimising human suffering in times of armed 
conflict, modern international humanitarian law comprises general principles and specific rules that 
have been progressively developed for the protection of civilians. Indeed, besides the principles of 
humanity and military necessity,41 the fundamental tenets of this body of norms include the 
principle that the parties to the conflict are not entitled to choose and adopt unlimited means and 
methods of warfare,42 and the principle of civilian immunity from being the target of offensive or 
defensive armed attacks - with its corollary, namely the principle of distinction.  
The clearest codification of the norm on civilian immunity is found in Protocol I of 1977, which 
reaffirms the customary law principle obliging the parties to an international armed conflict to 
distinguish between civilians and combatants as well as between civilian objects and military targets 
at all times (and to direct their operations only against military objectives).43 Originally set forth in 
the Preamble of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, this principle represents a cornerstone of the 
codification of the laws and customs of war. As emblematically recognised in the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2444 of 1968, its scope entails that “the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means 
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such; a 
distinction must be made at all times between persons taking an active part in the hostilities and members of the civilian 
                                                
41 In the words of one of its distinguished commentators, “International humanitarian law in armed conflicts is a compromise 
between military and humanitarian requirements. Its rules comply with both military necessity and the dictates of humanity”, see C. 
Greenwood, “Historical Development and Legal Basis”, in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law2, 
2008, p. 37. See M.N. Schmitt, “Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the 
Delicate Balance”, 50 Virginia Journal of International Law, 2010, pp. 795-839.  
42 It was stated in the first comprehensive code on the laws of armed conflict, i.e. the 1874 Brussels Declaration (although 
never ratified), and in the 1880 Oxford Manual; it was formally codified in the 1899 Hague Regulations, and reaffirmed 
in the 1907 version thereof (Art. 22). It was subsequently expressed in 1977 Protocol I (Art. 35(1)) and in other 
instruments (e.g. the Preamble of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention). 
43 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) 





population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible”.44 In the same vein, the entire system 
designed in The Hague in 1899 and 1907 and in Geneva from 1864 to 1977 has been deemed 
“founded on this rule of customary law”.45 Nevertheless, the change of modern warfare during the 
course of the twentieth century and the growing frequency of collateral casualties and damage have 
led to renewed attention on non-combatant immunity. In this sense, the International Court of 
Justice has authoritatively recognised the principle of distinction as a “cardinal” principle of 
international humanitarian law as well as one of the “intransgressible principles of international customary 
law”,46 despite the fact that it was only codified in Protocol I (which itself has not been adopted by 
every State47).  
The present chapter is intended to examine the scope of civilian immunity for the safeguarding of ESC 
rights against the effects of military operations and individual acts of violence in warfare. Accordingly, it questions 
not only whether and to what extent the law on the conduct of hostilities has dealt with the ESC rights of civilians, 
but also whether violations of its norms have resulted in a loss of their enjoyment or other related consequences. In 
other words, international humanitarian law is explored as a restraint on armed violence which has 
economic, social and cultural implications. The development of governing principles and rules is 
analysed in view of international practice that have significantly affected specific dimensions of ESC 
rights. In this regard the assessment by several recent fact-finding missions and commissions of 
inquiry will be taken into account in particular. 
In order to determine the field of analysis, it is essential to first clarify the legal categories of 
conflicts envisaged in international humanitarian law and to briefly reflect on the special nature of 
contemporary conflicts as they are not always foreseen as such in IHL rules. Subsequently, an 
                                                
44 See GA Res. 2444 (XXIII), Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, para. 50, UN Doc. A/7433, 19 
December 1968. This resolution was adopted unanimously and borrowed its provisions from a resolution adopted in 
1965 by the International Red Cross (see 20th International Conference of the Red Cross, Resolution XXVIII, Protection 
of Civilian Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare, Vienna, Austria). It represented a turning point and a 
milestone for the activities of UN and ICRC. It contained a request to the General Assembly to invite the Secretary 
General to undertake a study, in concert with the ICRC and other international organizations, to discuss “the need for 
additional humanitarian international conventions or for other appropriate legal instruments to ensure the better protection of civilians, prisoners 
and combatants and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means of warfare” (see Report of the Secretary 
General on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, UN Doc. A/8370, 2 September 1971, para. 5). 
45 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmerman (eds.), op. cit., paras. 1863-1866. For the historical antecedents of the 
principle and its status prior to adoption of the Additional Protocols, see also L. Doswald-Beck, “The value of the 1977 
Geneva Protocols for the Protection of Civilians”, in M.A. Meyer (ed.), Armed Conflict and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 
Geneva Protocols and the 1981 Weapons Convention, London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1989, p. 
137. See J.G. Gardam, Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp. 16-
27. 
46 See Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, at 257, paras. 78-
79, where the prohibition of unnecessary suffering is viewed as the other cardinal principle. For the recognition of the 
customary nature of the principle of distinction, see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškic (IT-95-14), Appeal Chamber, 29 July 
2004; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galic (IT-98-29), Trial Chamber, 5 December 2003. 





overview of the historical developments of the IHL framework dealing with the protection of 
civilians is necessary for a comprehensive appraisal of its role concerning ESC rights. In the same 
vein, a brief focus on the definition of civilians and civilian objects, followed by a consideration of 
some controversial aspects of the definition of military objectives, will precede the aforementioned 
inquiry into the scope of civilian immunity. 
Since the development of international criminal law has the potential to play a decisive role for 
the implementation and enforcement of international humanitarian law norms, the analysis 
undertaken in this chapter will also make some pertinent references to this legal regime, even 
though individual criminal responsibility does not influence the normative discourse on States’ 
responsibility to comply with their obligations under the laws of war.  
2. The binary qualification framework in the twenty-first century 
The legal categories envisaged in international humanitarian law refer to armed conflicts having an 
international48 or non-international nature.49 Notably, with regards to the latter, the 1977 Protocol 
II applies only to “conflicts of a certain degree of intensity”50 and it does not have the same scope of 
application as common Article 3 GCs (which requires the existence of a sufficiently organised non-
State armed group and a minimum level of intensity of hostilities, which are to be determined on a 
                                                
48 The definitions of international armed conflicts are set out in common Article 2 GCs and Article 1(4) API. The situations 
referred to are, respectively, inter-State conflicts and wars of national liberation between governmental armed forces 
and non-governmental armed groups fighting in the exercise of their right to self-determination. As regards customary 
international law, the definition of an international armed conflict reflects the one contained in the Geneva 
Conventions, while there is no customary rule regulating the conflicts defined according to Article 1(4) API, since the 
scenario defined in this article has not been recognised officially (and the States potentially concerned did not ratify 
Protocol I. 
49 The category of non-international armed conflict falls either within the definition of Article 1 APII (which covers conflicts 
taking place in the territory of a Contracting Party, between governmental armed forces and organised armed groups 
intended to take power over the whole State or a part of it, so excluding the fighting that involves only rebel groups) or 
within the scope of common Article 3 GCs (which applies to conflicts occurring in the territory of a Contracting Party, 
either between its armed forces and armed insurgents or between rebel groups). In both cases certain criteria must be 
fulfilled. 
50 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., paras. 4447 ff. The criteria required for the application 
of APII include: continuous confrontation between governmental armed forces and “opposing” armed forces who have to 
be under a responsible command and control part of the territory of the State in question, so as to be able to “carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations” and implement Protocol II. See ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Trial 
Chamber Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 626 (“operations must be continuous and planned”; a non-state entity able to 
“dominate a sufficient part of the territory” and “impose discipline in the name of a de facto authority”). For the control criterion, see 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Boskoski (IT-04-82-T), Trial Chamber II Judgment, 10 July 2008, paras. 242-249 (“indicative factors” of 
territorial control have been considered the setting up of alternative structures of authority and liberated territories, 






In recent legal scholarship on the application of IHL treaties to contemporary conflicts, two 
basic limitations have been highlighted. Firstly, IHL treaties are applicable to belligerent States that have 
ratified them. In this regard, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 have been endorsed by almost all 
States, although this is not the case with Protocol I, the consequent limited efficacy of which can 
only be counteracted by recognising its rules as custom. The same logic is followed in relation to 
Protocol II, which is applicable to non-international armed conflicts occurring on the territory of a 
State that has ratified it, since it has not been endorsed universally (some 167 States have ratified it). 
In this regard, common Article 3 GCs may in fact be the sole applicable treaty provision. 
Conversely, legal norms that may fill the gap may also come from other branches of international 
law (which apply as either general law or as the relevant lex specialis). 
The second aspect commonly discussed is that IHL treaties do not cover a broad spectrum of 
contemporary armed conflicts in sufficient detail. In fact, there has been a proliferation of internal armed 
conflicts, which are covered by treaty rules that are less numerous and less detailed in terms of 
definitions and requirements in comparison to those provided for in relation to international 
conflicts. In the following section this issue will emerge in relation to the IHL protection of civilians. 
Modern conflicts do not easily fit within the aforementioned legal categories since they are often 
characterised by weaken formality at the initial and final phases of conflict, or they are difficult to 
classify due to the existence of a combination of international and internal elements. As such, 
difficulties arise in identifying the applicable law and questions emerge as to the ability of IHL to 
regulate every kind of contemporary conflicts. Furthermore, some lesser forms of armed violence 
                                                
51 For indicative factors set out in the ICTY jurisprudence, see Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment, 
1 May 1997, para. 70 (“protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State”) and para. 562; Prosecutor v. Limaj (IT-03-66-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment, 30 November 2005, para. 84; 
Prosecutor v. Boskoski and Tarculovski (IT-04-82-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment, 10 July 2008, paras. 175, 177 (sufficiently 
serious attacks and increased and spread armed clashes over territory and over time), para. 199 (existence of a 
command structure), paras. 200-203 (capability to perform military operations in an organized way and control 
territory; logistics and communications capabilities; level of discipline and ability to implement common Article 3; 
ability to “speak with one voice” in the political negotiations to conclude agreements). Both criteria have been examined 
extensively, see S. Vité, “Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concept and actual 
situations”, 91 IRRC, 2009, pp. 76-77; Sivakumanaran, “Identifying an armed conflict not of an international 
character”, in Stahn and Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, 2009, pp. 363-380; La Haye, 
War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 9-13; J. Pejic, “Status of Armed Conflicts”, in Wilmshurst 
and Breau (eds.), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 85-86.  
On the distinction between international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts, see L.C. Green, The 
contemporary law of armed conflict2, Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 54 ff.; N. Ronzitti, Diritto Internnazionale dei conflitti 
armati5, Giappichelli, 2014, pp.139-142; R. Kolb and R. Hyde, An introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts, Hart 
Publishing, 2008, p. 65 ff., in which the unreasonable approach emerging from the traditional distinction is underlined 
regarding situations of “mixed armed conflicts” where both rules apply, since it often determines diverse standards of 
protection, especially for civilians; to the author, the process of “bridging the gap between the two types of conflict” is supported 





mentioned as “internal tensions”, “internal disturbances”52 or “banditry, unorganised and short-lived insurrections, 
or terrorist activities” do not meet the threshold for IHL to apply, and often fall instead within the 
scope of other normative frameworks (such as municipal criminal law and applicable international 
human rights law). 
Such difficulties have been deemed partly related to the imprecise content of the dual legal 
categories in IHL treaties. If this is indeed the case, international practice becomes increasingly 
important since it allows such categories to be progressively and substantially articulated by 
measuring them in view of concrete situations.53  
In the same vein, the notion and typology of armed conflict have been called into question. 
Commentators have questioned the determinative criteria for international armed conflicts and the 
adequacy of the traditional dichotomy to encompass new factual scenarios.54 In view of prevalent 
internal armed conflicts, the expansion of their typology, as governed by common Article 3 GCs, 
has been discussed by commentators who have examined the application or applicability of 
international humanitarian law to contemporary forms of armed violence. For instance, two “conflict 
environments” increasingly pose challenges for the implementation of rules on the protection of 
civilians, namely urban and asymmetrical warfare. 
It is worth mentioning, however, the widely-held opinion that the innumerable breaches of 
international humanitarian law are not a matter of inadequacy of its rules, but rather result from a 
lack of inclination to respect the rules, the scarcity of ways and means to address their violations and 
to enforce them, the ambiguity as to their application in certain circumstances, or ignorance on the 
part of relevant actors (including commanders, combatants, political leaders and people in general).  
Despite the apparent reasonableness of this opinion, the IHL framework on the protection of 
civilians raises questions in the area of ESC rights with regard to either the implementation of IHL 
principles and rules or their adequacy with respect to contemporary conflicts. In this sense, there is a 
clear need, on one hand, to clarify those principles and rules and elucidate how they apply in 
                                                
52 This term is interpreted by the ICRC as serious acts of violence carried out by “more or less organized groups” and that 
“call upon extensive police forces, or even armed forces, to restore internal order”, see Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann 
(eds.), op. cit., paras. 4475-4477. 
53 On this point and in general on the IHL qualification of armed conflicts, see S. Vité, “Typology of armed conflicts in 
international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations”, 91 IRRC, 2009, pp. 69-84. See also R.S. 
Schondorf, “Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is there a Need for a New Legal Regime?”, 37 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, 2004, pp. 61-75; G.S. Corn, “Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Conflict: 
The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict”, 40 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2007, pp. 295-
355; M.J. Hopkings, “Regulating the conduct of urban warfare: lessons from contemporary asymmetric conflicts”, 92 
IRRC, 2010, pp. 470-493. 
54 See the ICRC report of the 31th International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, December 2011, 





practical circumstances. However, on the other hand, there is also a clear need to clarify the 
applicable legal regimes and to define the relationship between IHL and other relevant branches 
such as human rights law. Indeed, IHL applicable to the main form of conflict, namely internal 
conflicts, may appear to be of little relevance to economic, social and cultural rights, being 
presumed to pertain to the governmental functions of the territorial State. 
3. The evolution of the IHL protection of civilian persons and objects 
Looking at the codification process of international humanitarian law from an historical perspective, 
the emphasis on protection of civilians as victims of armed conflict has represented a relatively 
recent development, as the oldest rules codified in this regard were elementary in nature. Most of 
the early codifications were primarily concerned with the treatment of combatants rather than 
civilians whose term emerged gradually.55 Although during the period between 1846 and 1907, the 
term “civilian” entered the laws of war as opposed to “soldier”,56 it did not appear with an intact 
identity and clear legal protection. The 1907 Hague Conventions,57 which applied through the First 
and the Second World Wars,58 provided for some relevant rules on means of combat as well as 
detailed, though isolated, rules on certain aspects of the occupation of enemy territory,59 without 
affording civilians general protection against the effects of hostilities and the risks arising from 
warfare.60  
Specifically, more attention was given to the protection of objects than persons during the 
                                                
55 The term “civilians” was not used in the first Geneva Convention drawn up on 22 August of 1864, which focused on 
the wounded and linked the term “inhabitants” and of medical personnel to their human conduct. Then, the 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration on explosive projectiles implicitly supported the view of leaving out of war most members of 
society in affirming: “That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military 
forces of the enemy”. Even in the 1880 Oxford Manual Article 7 states “it is prohibited to maltreat inoffensive populations”. 
56 See ICRC, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 
Geneva, 2009, n. 11, p. 20. 
57 Hague Convention No. IV of 18 October 1907, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2227, 
T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Convention No. IV] and the Annex thereto, embodying the Regulations Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2295 [hereinafter Hague Regulations or HRs]; Hague Convention No. 
V of 18 October 1907, Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 36 
Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540 [hereinafter Hague Convention No.V]; Hague Convention No. IX of 18 October 1907, 
Respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, 36 Stat. 2351, T.S. No. 542 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention No. IX]. 
58 The provisions of the Hague Regulations annexed to Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 served as the customary law 
basis for the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg to convict those responsible for atrocities committed during 
the Second World War. 
59 No distinction was drawn between different categories of civilians by the Hague Regulations, which simply addressed 
“inhabitants of occupied territory” or the “population” in general, rather distinguishing between private and State property, see 
Articles 44, 45, 46, 50, 52, 53 and 56 HRs. 
60 The actual term civilian is used only in Article 29 (2) about spies: “… the following are not considered spies: soldiers and 





conduct of hostilities. The Hague Regulations recognised as unnecessary (and thus prohibited) the 
attack or bombardment of undefended “towns, villages, dwellings or buildings” such as places open 
to occupation without resistance (Art. 25). The officer in command of an attacking force was 
required to warn the authorities before bombarding - unless the element of surprise was necessary - 
so that civilians might leave or take shelter (Art. 26). For sieges and bombardments of defended 
towns, precautions were required to spare buildings either “dedicated to religion, art, science” or existing 
for “charitable purposes”, “historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded were collected” 
(Art. 27). The pillaging of a place or town was prohibited even if seized by assault (Art. 28).61 In the 
same vein, the Hague Convention IX concerning Bombardment of Naval Forces in Time of War 
prohibited naval bombardment of undefended ports, town, villages, dwelling and buildings (Art. 1), 
and urged that precautions be taken to avoid or minimise collateral civilian casualties that might 
result (Art. 2). Conversely, aerial bombardment “for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population” was 
prohibited in the Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Times of War and Arial 
Warfare,62 which never entered into force. Similarly, a statement on the illegality of intentional 
bombing of civilians and civilian objects was contained in a resolution passed in 1938 by the 
Assembly of the League of Nation.63  
The heavy bombardments and destructions perpetrated during World War II, however, showed 
the inadequacy of those provisions for the protection of civilians against widespread atrocities, 
strategic requirements and extreme ideologies of belligerents, revealing in a very real way that the 
existing prohibitions did not exclude that the morale of the enemy could become a military 
objective. This led to a broad international consensus on the need to refine and elucidate the rules 
of warfare to afford suitable respect for and protection of civilian populations. 
A step forward was taken in the 1949 codification of international humanitarian law. The 
Fourth Geneva Convention was adopted to protect “persons taking no active part in the hostilities” and 
“who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the 
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”.64 Nonetheless, the rules 
                                                
61 Arts. 25, 26, 28 HRs. The Hague codification was inspired by the Final Protocol of the Brussels conference on the 
Rules of Military Warfare of 27 August of 1874, which dealt with sieges, bombardments as well as military occupation, 
but which never enter into force. 
62 Arts. 22, 24, 25, which were drafted at the Hague (December 1922 - February 1923), used the expressions “air 
bombardment” and “bombardment by aircraft” for the first time. 
63 See Protection of Civilian Populations against Bombing From the Air in Case of War, Resolution of the League of Nations 
Assembly, 30 September 1938, reproduced in D. Schindler and J. Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts4, Leiden/Boston, 
2004, p. 329. 
64 Articles 3-4 GC IV. As already noted, Article 4 GC IV defines in detail the categories of persons protected by this 





embodied in Part II provide for general protection against certain consequences of war to “the whole 
of the civilian populations of the countries in conflict”, regardless the nationality, race, religion or political 
allegiance.65 Notably, the protected persons were deemed entitled to be treated humanely at all 
times, “to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their 
manners and customs”; this was explicitly affirmed along with the entitlement to be protected 
particularly “against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity”.66  
While the main purpose is protecting civilians under the control of an enemy authority against 
its offensive and arbitrary action, very few of its rules offer protection to the civilian population residing in enemy 
territory against the perils of warfare.67 For instance, it provided for the conclusion by the belligerents of 
local agreements for the evacuation, “from besieged and circled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged 
persons, children and maternity cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and medical 
equipment on their way to such areas” (Art.17). Further, it provided for the possibility to establish (either 
before or after the beginning of hostilities) hospital and safety zones and areas to protect “wounded, 
sick and aged persons, children under fifteen, expectant mothers and mothers of children under seven” (Art. 14). 
A further attempt to fill this lacuna was undertaken in the context of the Diplomatic Conference 
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed 
Conflicts, which took place in Geneva between 1974 and 1977. As anticipated, the customary 
principle obliging belligerents to distinguish between civilians and combatants as well as between civilian objects 
and military objectives at all times, and then to direct their operations only against military objectives, was codified 
in Protocol I (Art. 48).68 A number of provisions embodied in Part IV set down rules on the methods 
and means of warfare intended to protect civilian persons and objects against the risks and effects of hostilities 
(Arts. 51 to 60). In particular, by prohibiting certain attacks (i.e. direct and deliberate, 
indiscriminate, or by way of reprisals)69 these rules essentially rely on the principles of distinction, 
proportionality, and precaution. Subsequently, a special regime of protection is set down for certain 
                                                                                                                                                            
occupied territory. However, nationals of a neutral State or nationals of a co-belligerent State are not deemed protected 
persons by this Convention while their own State has diplomatic relations with the State that exercises control over 
them. 
65 See Articles 13-26 GC IV.  
66 See Article 27(1)(2) GC IV. Article 27(3) grants special protection to women. Under Article 27(4), “without prejudice to 
the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons are entitled to be treated with the same consideration by the 
Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion”. 
Nonetheless, Article 27(5) established that “the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard to 
protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war”. 
67 See N. Ronzitti, Diritto internazionale dei conflitti armati5, Giappichelli, 2014, p. 260. 
68 In 2005, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission found this provision reflected customary international law, see 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Western front, Aerial Bombardment and related Claims, Eritrea’s 
Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 and 26 (2005), 45 ILM 396, 417, 425, (2006). 





property (e.g. “cultural property”, “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population”, 
“installations containing dangerous forces”) as well as certain areas such as non-defended localities 
and demilitarised zones.70 Further rules focus on the relief of the civilian population (Arts. 68 to 71) 
or afford protection to all civilians against arbitrary treatment (Arts. 72-79).71 
Remarkably, the field of application of all these provisions is established to cover “any land, air or 
sea warfare which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land” as well as “all 
attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land”, but specifying that they “do not otherwise affect the 
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air”.72 
As for the protection of the civilian population in non-international armed conflicts, a basic step was 
common Article 3 GCs. Setting out a general obligation on the parties to a non-international armed 
conflict, followed by specific prohibitions, common Article 3(1) primarily requires them to treat 
humanely in all circumstances, without any adverse distinction, all persons taking no active part in 
hostilities.73 Next, Article 3(2) specifically binds parties to “collect and care” for the wounded and sick 
of the belligerent parties as well as the civilian population. While it represented a “convention in 
miniature”, Article 3 does not contain an explicit prohibition of attacks against it or rules on the 
conduct of hostilities aimed at sparing it, nor regulates relief operations during such conflicts; it 
nevertheless encouraged the parties to the conflict to stipulate “special agreements” bringing into force 
all or parts of the Geneva Conventions.74  
Conversely, ‘general protection’ for the civilian population and individual civilians against 
threats stemming from military operations, alongside the prohibition of attacks on civilians, were 
provided in the 1977 Protocol II.75 The latter supplemented and advanced the norms outlined in 
common Article 3 GCs. In particular, the fundamental guarantees included in Article 4 AP II are 
more detailed about the human treatment of all persons who do not or no longer take part in 
                                                
70 For the former, see Arts. 53, 54, and 56 AP I; for the latter, see Arts. 59 and 60 AP I. 
71 Fundamental guarantees are provided in Art. 75, Section II of Part IV, AP I. See also Art. 78 (2) (“Whenever an 
evacuation occurs … each child’s education, including his religious and moral education as his parents desire, shall be provided while he is 
away with the greatest possible continuity”). 
72 Article 49 (3) API. 
73 Without defining what constitutes “human treatment”, specific prohibitions are provided in sub-paragraphs (a)-(d) at all 
time and anywhere: “(a) violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of 
hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out 
of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised 
as indispensable by civilized peoples”. 
74 The ICRC is granted to offer services to them, and their legal status is not affected by the application of these rules. 
75 Article 13 (1) and (2) AP II. As highlighted in legal scholarship, “pre-existing rules of conventional international law applicable 
in non-international armed conflict did not provide explicit protection for the civilian population against attacks or the effects of attacks”, in 
M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf (eds.), New rules for victims of armed conflicts: Commentary on the two 1977 Protocols Additional 





hostilities, also providing special protection for children and women.76 Further, Part IV of Protocol 
II contains few rules prohibiting the starvation and attacks on “objects indispensable to the survival 
of the civilian population”, attacks on places of worship and cultural objects, attacks on “works and 
installations containing dangerous forces”, and the forced movement of civilians.77 However, apart 
from the absence of provisions on the general protection of civilian objects,78 persistent deficiencies 
in Protocol II result form the removal of rules that had been proposed on methods and means of 
warfare (such as the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks) and on activities of humanitarian 
organizations.79 Similarly, no enforcement mechanism equivalent to the grave breaches norm in 
Protocol I is provided.  
However, an expansion of treaty law (i.e. common Article 3 GCs and Protocol II) and the 
customary rules applicable to non-international conflicts has occurred over the last century. To 
elaborate, the former follows from amendments to old instruments80 or new treaties altogether,81 
                                                
76 Article 4 (1) and (2) AP II reads: “1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or 
not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors. 2. Without 
prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at 
any time and in any place whatsoever: (a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well 
as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) collective punishments; (c) taking of hostages; (d) acts of 
terrorism; (e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of 
indecent assault; (f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; (g) pillage; (h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts”. Further, 
Article 4(3) provides specific protection for children (e.g. (a) “Children … shall receive an education, including religious and moral 
education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of those responsible for their care”). 
77 Articles 14-17 AP II. 
78 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, op. cit., paras. 4759, 4794, 4817.  
79 For full accounts of the drafting process of Protocol II, especially the concerns behind those removal, namely States’ 
concern to see their armed forces becoming legitimate targets in non-international armed conflicts and to be abused for 
interventions into their internal affairs, see M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf (eds.), New Rules for Victims f Armed Conflicts, 
op. cit.,1982, pp. 406-703; Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, op. cit., paras. 4410-4418; Moir, The Law of Internal 
Armed Conflicts, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 89-96; D. Momtaz, “Le droit international humanitaire applicable aux conflits 
armés non internationaux”, Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye, 2001, p. 95. 
80 See Article 1 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention, adopted on 10 
October 1980, entered into force on 2 December 1983), which was amended at the second review conference on 21 
December 2001, also making its existing protocols applicable to non-international armed conflict: Protocol I (that 
prohibits weapons leaving undetectable fragments in the human body) and Protocol III (that restricts the use of 
incendiary weapons) and Protocol IV (that prohibits the use and transfer of blinding laser weapons). Conversely, the 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to the 1980 
CCW Convention) was amended at the first review conference on 3 May 1996, see Article 1(2) “This Protocol shall apply, 
in addition to situations referred to in Article 1 of this Convention, to situations referred to in Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts 
of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts”). 
81 See Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the CCW Convention) adopted on 13 October 1995. See 
Article 1 of the Ottawa Convention, which bounds all State parties to “never under any circumstances” use, produce, acquire, 
stockpile anti-personnel mines. See Article 22(1) of the Second Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property 
of 1999. See Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions of 30 May 2008, which hold that each State party 
undertake “never under any circumstance” to use, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or 





while the latter has been supported in the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals82 (and 
also in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law83).  
While such expansion has certainly narrowed the gaps between the IHL rules applicable to the 
two legal categories of conflicts, factual differences persist and their relevance has been cautiously 
addressed in legal scholarship.84 A substantive difference is surely that the rules applicable to 
international conflicts apply to States and national liberation movements, while the rules applicable 
to non-international conflicts also apply to - and have to be respected by - armed groups. However, 
a number of treaty law rules still apply only to international conflicts; for instance important 
provisions of Protocol I without any equivalent in Protocol II relate to the methods and means of 
warfare as well as to the protection of civilians.85  Crucially, Article 8 of the Rome Statute 
distinguishes war crimes applicable in one or the other type of conflict, with the list applicable to 
international armed conflicts being far more extensive than the other one.86 
                                                
82 The ICTY and the ICTR have recognised that at least the core Protocol II is part of customary international law; see 
the detailed explanations given by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in its first decision, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-
96-I), Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, paras. 100-118; the ICTY also held that the “general essence” of the rules 
applicable in international armed conflicts have become applicable to non-international armed conflicts as a matter of 
custom (ibid., paras. 98 and 126). In its practice, the ICTY has applied IHL governing the conduct of hostilities in both 
categories of conflicts without distinction: see, for instance, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Martić (IT-95-11-I), Trial Chamber I, 
Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, 8 March 1996, paras. 8-14; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. (IT-95-16), 
Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 23 October 2001, paras. 525-536. As for the ICTR, see Prosecutor. v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-
T), Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998, para. 608. 
83 According to this Study, 136 (possibly even 141) rules out of 161 were found to apply to both international and 
internal armed conflicts. Among them, the majority of customary rules relating to means and methods of warfare (66 
rules out of 72) were found to apply similarly to all types of armed conflicts; of the residual six rules that have not yet 
reached customary status, two apply only to international conflicts (Rule 49 on seizure of military equipment of the 
enemy, and Rule 51 on treatment of public and private property in occupied territory); four rules were found to apply 
contentiously to internal conflicts: Rule 44 (on precautions to prevent or minimise incidental damage to the natural 
environment), Rule 45 (on prohibition to cause severe, long-term and widespread damage to the natural environment), 
Rule 62 and 63 (on prohibition of “improper use” of flags, emblems, uniform of the enemy or of a State not party to the 
conflict). However, the ICRC conclusions remain controversial either for the methodology used or the content of the 
rules; for instance, it did not take into account the practice of armed opposition groups in order to evaluate the 
formation of customary law, as clearly results from the formulation of these rules as rather State-centred. 
84 For critics on the rejection of the traditional distinction, see Cryer, “Of custom, treaties, scholars and the gavel: the 
impact of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC customary law study”, 11 JCSL, 2006, pp. 253-254; 
Turns, “Weapons in the ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law, 11 JCSL, 2006; M. Bothe, 
“Customary international humanitarian law: some reflection of the ICRC Study”, 8 YIHL, 2005, pp. 174-176; Bellinger 
and Haynes, “A US government response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law”, 89 IRRC, 2007, p. 448; Wilmshurst and Breau (eds.), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 401-414. For scholars arguing for the elimination of the 
differences, see Crawford, “Unequal before the law: the case for the elimination of the distinction between international 
and non-international armed conflicts”, 20 LJIL, 2007, p. 441 ff.; MacLaren and Schwendimann, “An exercise in the 
development of international law: the new ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law”, 6 German Law 
Journal, 2005, p. 1230; Willmott, “Removing the distinction between international and non-international armed conflict 
in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2004, p. 196 ff. 
85 E.g., Article 35 AP I and Article 59 AP I. 
86 Notwithstanding the absence of a criminal law enforcement mechanism under AP II or common Article 3 GCs, 






As has implicitly emerged from this overview (and as we will see in greater detail in the following 
sections), subsequent treaties that are relevant for the protection of civilians include the 1954 Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two 
Protocols, the 1980 CCW Convention and its five Protocols, the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the 
Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Landmines, the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
and the 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. 
4. The definition of civilians under AP I and AP II 
For the purpose of the law governing the conduct of hostilities in an international armed conflict, a 
civilian is any person who is not a combatant. As clearly highlighted in the negative definition laid 
down in Article 50(1) API, what counts in protecting civilians against the dangers of military actions 
is the inoffensive nature of both the persons to be spared and the situation in which they find 
themselves. More precisely, it is provided that civilian is any individual who does not fall into one of 
the categories indicated in Article 4 (A)(1)(2)(3) and (6) GC III87 and in Article 43 API88; in this 
sense, civilians have been defined as “persons who are not, or no longer, members of the armed forces”.89 
This definition covers civilians collectively, when referred as “the civilian population”, as well as 
individually.90 It is also presumed that in case of doubt about a person’ status, the latter should be 
viewed as civilian.91 Furthermore, the presence of combatants does not transform the civilian 
character of a population.92 As discussed below, since Article 50 does not prevent civilians’ 
                                                                                                                                                            
international law and deemed to give rise to criminal individual responsibility firstly in the jurisprudence of the ICTY 
(while Article 3 ICTY Statute empowered it to prosecute grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and “violations 
of the laws or customs of war”, in Tadic Article 3 was recognised applicable to both international and internal armed 
conflicts, see para. 94), in Article 4 ICTR Statute, then in Article 8(2)(c) ICC Statute (i.e. violations of common Article 3 
GCs) and Article 8(2)(e) ICC Statute (i.e. other serious violations of the law of internal armed conflict). 
87 Article 4 GC III refers to those who, upon capture, have prisoner of war status (POW) as they are lawful combatants 
(members of regular armed forces or members of resistance movements) and it includes the levée en masse. 
88 Article 43 AP I defines the armed forces of the parties to a conflict, whose members are entitled to POW status if they 
fall into the hands of the enemy. As addressed in the ICRC study on customary IHL, “the armed forces of a party to the 
conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units, which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its 
subordinates”, see J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., pp. 14-17, Rule 4. 
89 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Chamber, 2000, para. 751. 
90 No reservations have been made to Article 50. As addressed in the ICRC Study on Customary IHL, this definition is 
included in many military manuals, and it is reflected in reported practice, including “that of States not, or not at the time, 
party to Additional Protocol I”, see J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 18, Rule 5. 
91 Article 50 (1) API. However, some countries have declared that this presumption cannot override the commander’s 
obligation to protect his subordinates’ safety. 
92 Article 50 (3) API. In the same vein, Article 58 prescribes belligerents to take away “from the vicinity of military objectives” 





exposition to the hazard of a military action against combatants, the principle of proportionality 
plays the uncertain but important role as the point of reference for assessing collateral damage 
suffered by civilians.93  
 
As for a non-international armed conflict, a definition of civilians or the civilian population is 
not included in Protocol II, despite the fact that it employs these terms in a number of provisions.94 
As aptly stated in legal scholarship, civilians can be all persons who are not members of “dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups … under responsible command” indicated in Article 1 APII.95 
Equally, later treaties applicable to non-international armed conflicts have employed those terms 
without defining them.96  
 
Beyond negatively defining who can be classified as civilians, international humanitarian law 
focuses on certain members of the civilian population who are seriously affected by the conduct of 
hostilities without taking part in fighting and so without threatening the enemy. In this regard, special 
protection is granted to selected subjects like women and children in view of their exceptional 
vulnerability in both international and non-international armed conflicts.  
A number of provisions are designed to give civilian women a preferential treatment in certain 
circumstances.97 Special protection is granted to pregnant women and maternity situations against 
the consequences of war under Articles 14, 16, 21 and 22 GCIV. Then, Article 27(2) GCIV affords 
specific protection “against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form 
of indecent assault”.98 A reiteration is contained in Article 76(1) API. However, the latter provision 
                                                
93 Suffice it here to mention three implications of being combatants in an international armed conflict: i) they have the 
privilege to fight and a consequent immunity from prosecution for fighting according to the laws of armed conflict; ii) 
they benefit from the status of prisoners of war if captured by the adversary; iii) the adversary may legitimately target 
them unless they are hors de combat. 
94 Articles 13-15 and 17-18 APII.  
95 See M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf (eds.), New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts, op. cit., 1982, p. 672.  
96 E.g., Article 3(7)-(11) amended Protocol II to the CCW; Article 2 Protocol III to the CCW; the Preamble of Ottawa 
Convention; Article 8(2)(e)(i), (iii) and (viii) Rome Statute. 
97 Overall, see Articles 14, 16, 21-27, 38, 50, 76, 85, 89, 91, 97, 124, 127 and 132 GC IV; Articles 70 and 75-76 API; 
Articles 5(2) and 6(4) AP II.  
98 The list of acts constituting grave breaches of the Convention (Art. 147 GC IV) includes “wilful causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health”. Rape is the most serious form of sexual violence against women during hostilities; the list of 
war crimes provided in the Statutes of the ICTR and the ICC also include also rape and other forms of sexual violence: 
Article 4(e) ICTR Statute; Article 8(2)(b)(xxi) Rome Statute brands as a war crime outrages upon personal dignity, while 
Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) defines as war crimes the perpetration of sexual slavery, rape, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, enforced prostitution “or any other forms of sexual violence”. Conversely, rape is not explicitly mentioned as a 
war crime in the ICTY Statute, but in the Celebici case it was affirmed that rape could qualify as torture, so being equal 
to a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions (see also Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Judgment (IT-96-21-T), Trail Chamber, 





covers all women without exception, while the former clause applies only to civilian women who are 
“protected persons” in the sense of the Geneva Convention.99 Conversely, Article 4(2)(e) APII forbids 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any 
form of indecent assault”.100 Notably, the special protection accorded to women has been acknowledged 
to have customary status.101 
As for children, certain rules aim at affording them special protection from the effects of 
hostilities, any kind of offensive attack, or any further threat stemming from the conflict. In 
particular, seventeen provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention are of specific concern, although 
the principle on which they rely is not explicitly established.102 This gap is filled by Article 77 AP I, 
providing that “children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any form of indecent 
assault. The parties to the conflict shall provide them with the care and aid they require, whether because of their age or 
for any other reason”.103 Similar protection for children is established under Article 4(3) APII.104 
Conversely, certain rules aim at impeding the participation of children in hostilities. Belligerents 
are bound not to recruit persons under the age of fifteen years into their armed forces as well as to 
take all feasible measures to guarantee that they “do not take a direct part in hostilities”.105 The threshold 
of fifteen, which is established in both the 1977 Protocols and in Article 38(2) CRC,106 has been 
                                                                                                                                                            
Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic (IT-96-23 IT-96-23/1-A), Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, paras. 127-186); 
notably, the young age of victims was found to be an aggravating circumstances in the sentencing of rape (see Prosecutor 
v. Kunarac et al., Appeals Chamber, 2002, para. 355). 
99 See W.A. Solf, “Article 76”, in M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf (eds.), op. cit., pp. 469-470. 
100 See, e.g., F. Krill, “The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law”, IRRC, 1985, pp. 337-363; J. 
Gardam and H. Charlesworth, “Protection of Women in Armed Conflict”, Human Rights Quarterly (HRQ), 2000, pp. 148-
166; C.R. Carpenter, Innocent Women and Children: Gender, Norms and the Protection of Civilians, Ashgate, 2006.  
101 See also Rule 134 and Rule 93 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL. 
102 See Articles 14, 17, 23, 24, 38(5), 50, 51, 68, 76, 82, 89, 94 and 132 GC IV. 
103 See Articles 70, 77 and 78 AP I. See, e.g., D. Plattner, “Protection of Children in International Humanitarian Law”, 
24 IRRC, 1984, pp. 140-152; G. van Bueren, “The International Legal Protection of Children in Armed Conflicts”, 
ICLQ, 1994, p. 811; J. Kuper, International Law concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict, 1997. 
104 Article 4(3) AP II reads: “Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular: (a) they shall receive an 
education, including religious and moral education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of those responsible 
for their care; (b) all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated; (c) children who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities; (d) the special 
protection provided by this Article to children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take a direct 
part in hostilities despite the provisions of sub-paragraph (c) and are captured; (e) measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible 
with the consent of their parents or persons who by law or custom are primarily responsible for their care, to remove children temporarily from 
the area in which hostilities are taking place to a safer area within the country and ensure that they are accompanied by persons responsible for 
their safety and well-being”. 
105 See Article 77(2) API; Article 4(3)(c) AP II. Under Article 77 API, when children participate in hostilities, they 
nevertheless benefit from preferential treatment if they are captured. Conversely, when children are members of armed 
forces (notwithstanding the aforementioned prohibitions), they benefit from the status of combatant or prisoner of war. 
106 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, at 1470. On the interaction among the two texts, see 
A.J.M. Delissen, “Legal Protection of Child Combatants after the Protocols: Reaffirmation, Development or a Step 
Backwards?”, in A.J.M. Delissen and G.J. Tanja, Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honour of 





raised to eighteen in its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict, but it is 
also provided that States may consent voluntary recruitment of persons under the age of eighteen 
into military schools, so producing a difference between governmental armies and non-State armed 
groups.107 Notably, the recruitment of child soldiers, whether compulsory or not, is criminalised 
under the Rome Statute in Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi), which includes “conscripting or enlisting children under the 
age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities” among war 
crimes.108  
5. Civilian objects and the definition of military objective 
According to the negative formulation laid down in Article 52(1) AP I civilian objects include all the ones 
which are not military. Guidance for the attacker is provided to distinguish between the two concepts 
via an explicit broad definition of military objective set out in Article 52(2) AP I.  
Despite the failure of earlier efforts, given that such a definition was mainly deemed 
inappropriate in a humanitarian instrument,109 it is worth briefly considering the evolution of the notion 
“military objective” to better understand the subsequent codified criteria. Notably, this is important not 
only for grasping the meaning of the rule prohibiting attacks against civilian objects, but is also 
necessary in light of contemporary warfare where objects normally considered to be of a civilian 
nature turn into legitimate military targets due to their role in the conduct of hostilities. While some 
targets have an inherent military character, most objects turn into military objectives as a result of 
the circumstances of their location, use by the adversary or possible use by the attacking party, and 
purpose. 
An operational definition dates back to 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare.110 The distinction 
between civilian objects and military objectives was not clarified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
                                                
107 See Articles 1, 2, 3 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict, 25 May 2000. Under Article 2 the States parties guarantee that children under the age of 
eighteen years must not be “compulsorily recruited into their armed forces”. Article 3 obliges to take all feasible measures to 
ascertain that members of the armed forces below the age of eighteen years “do not take a direct part in hostilities”. 
108 See M. Cottier, “Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi)”, in O. Trieffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court2, 2008, pp. 466-472. While conscription involves compulsory mustering, enlistment implies any form of signing up 
for military service; failure to refuse the voluntary enlistment of children to the armed forces is a war crime. 
109 Some of the moral difficulties to codify “a valid object of attack” are described in ICRC commentary to Protocol I: 
“[S]hould a humanitarian treaty describe objects which may be attacked? After a great deal of thought it seemed impossible to ensure effective 
protection for the civilian population without indicating what objectives could legitimately be attacked”, see Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. 
Zimmerman (eds.), op. cit., para. 2015. 
110  According to Article 24 (1), this is the object “of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to 
the belligerent”. The non-binding 1923 Rules of Air Warfare was drawn up at The Hague by a Commission of Jurists set 





for the protection of war victims, even though two provisions make an explicit reference to the risks 
to which medical establishments may be subjected by being situated near “military objectives”.111 
Furthermore, the drafters of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict partially developed the list of legitimate military objectives (as discussed 
below) in granting special protection to certain cultural property. The 1954 Hague Convention 
provides that the latter must be “situated at an adequate distance from any large industrial centre or from any 
important military objective constituting a vulnerable point”.112 However, this reference to “military objective” 
became relatively significant since it lacked the criteria for defining what convert an object into a 
lawful target or for establishing how other objects might be exposed to attack.  
Conversely, a specific definition was proposed in the ICRC “Draft Rules for the Limitation of 
Danger Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War” of 1956,113 which attempted to clarify 
the principle of distinction and followed the efforts to encourage the adoption of treaty rules 
safeguarding civilian populations from the effects of bombardment, in view of new advanced 
methods and means of warfare since 1920.114 A further definition was included in a resolution of the 
                                                
111 Article 19 (2) GC I requires the “responsible authorities” to guarantee that medical establishments and units are, to a 
feasible extent, positioned in a way that the targeting of military objectives cannot endanger them; similarly Article 18(5) 
GCIV protects civilian hospitals, see Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., para. 1999. 
112 Article 8 (1)(a) of the 1954 Hague Convention. This convention makes examples of “vulnerable points” (e.g. “aerodrome, a 
broadcasting station, an establishment engaged upon work of national defence, a port or railway station of relative importance or a main line of 
communication”). The term is contained in Articles 6(a), 8, 13(1)(b) of its 1999 Second Hague Protocol. The term is also 
present in the Rome Statute, see Article 8(2)(b)(ii), (v), (ix). 
113 Article 7 ICRC Draft Rules reads: “In order to limit the dangers incurred by the civilian population, attacks may only be directed 
against military objectives. Only objectives belonging to the categories of objective, which, in view of their essential characteristics, are generally 
acknowledged to be of military importance, may be considered as military objectives. […] However, even if they belong to one of those 
categories, they cannot be considered as a military objective where their total or partial destruction, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers 
no military advantage”.  
According to Article 7 (2) ICRC Draft Rules, the categories of military objectives (as reprinted in the Commentary to the 
Additional Protocols, op. cit., para. 2002) are: “[…] (1) Armed forces, including auxiliary or complementary organisations, and persons 
who, though not belonging to the above-mentioned formations, nevertheless take part in the fighting. (2) Positions, installations or constructions 
occupied by the forces indicated in sub-paragraph 1 above, as well as combat objectives (that is to say, those objectives that are directly contested 
in battle between land or sea forces including airborne forces). (3) Installations, constructions and other works of a military nature, such as 
barracks, fortifications, War Ministries (e.g. Ministries of Army, Navy, Air Force, National Defence, Supply) and other organs for the 
direction and administration of military operations. (4) Stores of arms or military supplies, such as munitions dumps, stores of equipment or 
fuel, vehicles parks. (5) Airfields, rocket launching ramps and naval base installations. (6) Those of the lines and means of communication 
(railway lines, roads, bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military importance. (7) The installations of broadcasting and 
television stations; telephone and telegraph exchanges of fundamental military importance. (8) Industries of fundamental importance for the 
conduct of the war: (a) industries for the manufacture of armaments such as weapons, munitions, rockets, armoured vehicles, military aircraft, 
fighting ships, including the manufacture of accessories and all other war material; (b) industries for the manufacture of supplies and material 
of a military character, such as transport and communications material, equipment for the armed forces; (c) factories or plant constituting other 
production and manufacturing centres of fundamental importance for the conduct of war, such as the metallurgical, engineering and chemical 
industries, whose nature or purpose is essentially military; (d) storage and transport installations whose basic function it is to serve the 
industries referred to in (a)-(c); (e) installations providing energy mainly for national defence, e.g. coal, other fuels, or atomic energy, and plants 
producing gas or electricity mainly for military consumption. (9) Installations constituting experimental, research centres for experiments on and 
the development of weapons and war material. […]”. 
114 In order to “protect civilian populations efficiently from the dangers of atomic, chemical and bacteriological warfare”, Draft Rules 





Institut de Droit International in 1969.115  
Instead, Article 52(2) API overcomes the traditional objections to codifying the distinction 
between civilian and military objects116 by providing a relatively broad definition of “military 
objective”. It is constructed around carefully negotiated standards allowing interpretations in view of 
the conditions present at the time, in searching of a balance between military considerations and 
humanitarian exigencies. Under the so-called two-pronged test, legitimate military targets are 
circumscribed to those which by use, nature, purpose or location “make an effective contribution” 
to the enemy’s military action and whose partial or total neutralisation, capture or destruction - “in 
the circumstances ruling at the time” - “offers a definite military advantage”.117  
Notably, Article 52(2) integrates an element of The Hague Air Rules definition, namely the 
determination of a military advantage, plus elements of the definition set forth by the Institut de Droit 
International, namely the criteria of use, nature, and purpose. Nonetheless, the characterization of the 
expected military advantage as “definite” establishes a higher threshold than the term “distinct” 
proposed in 1923, but it is less strict than the adjectives “substantial, specific and immediate” preferred in 
1969. Besides, Protocol I introduces two new elements, namely the “location” for ascertaining that an 
object effectively contributes to the military action of the enemy and the concepts of “capture” and 
“neutralisation”. Moreover, whereas according to former definitions “the destruction or injury” of the 
object118 or “the partial or total destruction” of the object119 constituted the conduct to gain a military 
advantage, more broadly Article 52(2) covers the acts that do not produce destruction but that 
exclude the use of an object by the adversary.120  
                                                                                                                                                            
subsequent Governments’ failure to follow up on these Draft Rules was mainly due to the reference to nuclear weapons 
(Chapter IV of the Draft Rules circumscribed the use of “weapons with uncontrollable effects”). 
115 According to Article 2 of the Resolution (entitled “The Distinction between Military Objectives and Non-Military 
Objectives in General and Particularly the Problems Associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction”), adopted in 
Edinburgh on 9 September 1969, “[…] only those objects which, by their very nature or purpose or use, make an effective contribution to 
military action, or exhibit a generally recognised military significance, such that their total or partial destruction in the actual circumstances 
gives a substantial, specific and immediate military advantage to those who are in a position to destroy them”. 
116 See also Robertson, “The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of Armed Conflict” in M.N. Schmitt, ed., 
The Law of Military Operations - Liber Amicorum Professor Jack Grunawalt, vol. 72, U.S. Naval War College International Law 
Studies, 1998, p. 208, noting: “Since this approach was a departure from the traditional practice of writing prohibitory rules specifying 
which objects were to be spared, it met considerable opposition at the outset of the negotiations in the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts”. 
117 Article 52(2) API was adopted by 79 votes in favour, 7 abstentions, and none against. No reservations have been 
made to it. 
118 See Article 24 (1) of the 1923 Hague Rules. 
119 See Article 7 ICRC Draft Rules; Article 2 Edinburgh Resolution. 
120 See W. Solf, “Article 52”, in M. Bothe, K. Partsch, W.A. Solf (eds.), op. cit., para. 2.4.5. The author’s example 
concerns an area of land that effectively contributes to the military action of the enemy; “mining the area and denying its use 
to the enemy” might give a military advantage, but the attacker might use landmines only under the obligation to “minimise 
their indiscriminate effects, to record their placement, and, at the end of hostilities, to render them harmless to civilians, or facilitate their 





It is worth also referring to the declarations formulated by a number of States and aimed at 
interpreting the concept of “military objective” defined in Article 52(2). Besides providing that 
“(a)ttacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives”, several States have affirmed that the first sentence 
of paragraph 2 only proscribes direct attacks against civilian objects and is not meant to sort out the 
issue of collateral or incidental damage arising from an attack against a military target.121  
5.1. Some remarks on military objectives under AP I 
It is commonly agreed that the dual conditions under Article 52(2) must be satisfied cumulatively. However, 
some authors believe that in practice duplication may emerge to a certain extent: once a party to a 
conflict has determined that an attack has a “definite military advantage”, not much effort is needed to 
argue that finally the objective effectively contributed to the enemy’s military action, and vice 
versa.122 However, the logic of presuming that the target made an effective contribution insofar as the 
definite military advantage was fulfilled through its capture, destruction or neutralisation risks 
reducing the two conditions into one, and in doing so making the demonstration of such “effective 
contribution” by virtue of its use, location, nature or purpose merely abstract.  
Notably, the importance of preserving the distinction between them, even if it may often be 
slight, clearly arises if the military status of an object is uncertain but the neutralisation, capture or 
destruction of the same object would provide a definite military advantage. An important case has 
been cited regarding an empty factory located on a hill overlooking the enemy’s quarters, so 
implying that controlling it would give the attacker a definite advantage. In this example whereas 
one prong of the text is fulfilled, the attacker has nevertheless to ascertain that the factory 
contributes to the military action of the enemy. This point becomes relevant to the civilian workers 
who may be in the factory and may lose their status if the attacker assumes that the building is a 
lawful target.123  
                                                
121 The first one was formulated by Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain 
and the United Kingdom, adding that: “In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”. Except Australia, they have also stated 
that “a specific area of land” can be a military objective within the meaning of Article 52(2). The second declaration was 
made by Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. See ICRC Commentary to the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, paras. 1955 and 2025-2026. 
122 In the words of two commentators, “[O]ne cannot imagine that the destruction, capture, or neutralization of an object contributing to 
the military action of one side would not be militarily advantageous for the enemy; it is just as difficult to imagine how the destruction, capture, 
or neutralisation of an object could be a military advantage for one side if that same object did not somehow contribute to the military action of 
the enemy”, see M. Sassòli and A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on 
Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law2, ICRC, 2006, p. 152.  
123 See A. Bouvin, “The legal regime applicable to targeting military objective in the context of contemporary warfare”, 





The significance of the twofold condition also stems from the commander’s need to explain any 
resulting damage to persons and property in view of a correct application of proportionality and 
precautionary measures, as detailed in the following sections. 
 
Remarkably, although Article 52(2) deals with what can be attacked, it has been aptly stressed 
that limiting damage to what is militarily necessary appears a function included in the two-pronged test.124 In this 
regard, the seizure and destruction of the enemy’s property are prohibited “unless imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war” in the 1907 Hague Regulations125. Even though the drafters could 
have made this point more explicit, Protocol I builds on the prevention of unnecessary destruction as a 
fundamental paradigm of the laws of armed conflict in the light of its underlying purpose, namely 
protecting persons and objects not engaged in military action should the latter relate to those 
militarily involved. An instance of how the principle of military necessity contributes to any understanding of a 
lawful military objective is found in the context of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Specifically, the coalition 
forces avoided attacking an Iraqi military aircraft located next to the archaeological monuments at 
the ancient Sumerian site of Ur, since it would have disrespected the cultural property unlawfully 
exploited to shield that aircraft as well as because an attack was not deemed militarily necessary. 
The United States Department of Defense alluded to a lack of military necessity, emphasising the 
limited value of the target and its ineffective contribution to the action of the Iraqi armed forces, so 
determining an unfulfilled first condition of Article 52(2), without recognising that the aircraft was 
not a legitimate target.126  
 
According to several reliable sources, the 1977 definition of military objective has reached the status of 
customary international law,127 implying that all States are bound by both the rule allowing attacks only 
                                                                                                                                                            
and from which it fires against the attacker, so presenting evidence that its use effectively contributes to the enemy’s 
action and that its neutralisation, capture or destruction may afford a definite military advantage. 
124 E. David, Principes de droit des conflits armés4, Bruyland, 2008, p. 311, para. 2.49: “Le principe de l’immunité des biens de 
caractère civil peut donc aller au-delà de son objet spécifique qui est la protection des seuls biens civils: il implique l’illicéité de toute destruction 
inutile, même si celle-ci porte sur des biens qui ne sont pas civils stricto sensu”. 
125 Article 23(g) HRs. The prohibition has reached customary status applicable in both types of armed conflict (see ICRC 
Study on Customary IHL, Vol. I, Rule 50, p. 175); Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) Rome Statute codifies its breach among the “serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflicts”.  
126 See U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, in International Law 
Materials, 1992, p. 623, in which it is stated that: “The central command (CINCCENT) elected not to attack the aircraft on the basis 
of respect for cultural property and the belief that positioning of the aircraft adjacent to Ur (without servicing equipment or a runway nearby) 
effectively had placed each out of action, thereby limiting the value of their destruction by Coalition air forces when weighed against the risk of 
damage to the temple”.  
127 See ICC, Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 8 February 2012, paras. 
85-89; Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and related Claims, 





against military objectives and the criteria for determining a legitimate target, regardless whether or 
not they ratified Protocol I.128 Despite its customary nature, Article 52(2) is one of the most 
discussed provisions of this treaty.129 Legal scholarship has critically considered it to be “abstract and 
generic”,130 less than constructive131 and “so sweeping that it can cover practically anything”.132 Conversely, 
that definition has been deemed to offer the possibility of a “flexible and future-oriented interpretation”133 
that may result ever more essential as warfare has surpassed traditional battlefield, although the 
codified definition amplifies the value of good faith implementation.  
Some of the criticisms and interpretations concerning the notion of military objective emphasise 
certain limits of the definition that are particularly relevant for the purpose of the present thesis. They 
are discussed below. 
5.1.a. The condition of effective contribution to the enemy’s military action 
As observed above, a legitimate military target is the one making an effective contribution to the 
enemy’s military action by virtue of the use, location, nature, or purpose of the objective in 
question.134 As underlined in legal scholarship, this requirement “relates to military action in general” 
without the need for “a direct connection with any specific combat operations”.135 However, the actual relation 
of the targeted objective to the enemy’s military action remains of greater concern: its irrelevance 
would excuse the view that civilian persons and objects which financially, politically (or even 
                                                                                                                                                            
Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., pp. 29-32, Rule 8, which, inter alia, counts on the practice of States not, or not 
at the time, parties to Protocol I. See also T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, Clarendon 
Press, 1989 pp. 64-65; Robertson, “The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of Armed Conflict”, in M.N. 
Schmitt (ed.), The Law of Military Operations - Liber Amicorum Professor Jack Grunawalt, vol. 72, U.S. Naval War College 
International Law Studies, 1998, p. 204. Furthermore, the definition contained in Article 52(2) was deemed part of 
customary law in the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, reprinted in A.E. Wall, p. 504, para. 42. For an advanced line of reasoning on 
the customary nature of the criteria in Article 52(2), see M. Sassòli, “Targeting: Scope and Utility of the Concept of 
‘Military Objectives’ for the Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflicts”, in D. Wippman and M. 
Evangelista (eds.), New Wars, New Laws?, Transnational Publishers, 2005, p. 187. On the customary character of the 
same definition, see also M. Sassòli and L. Cameron, “The Protection of Civilian Objects”, in N. Ronzitti and G. 
Venturini, The Law of Air Warfare. Contemporary Issues, Eleven International Publishing, 2006, pp. 49-50. 
128 This is important for States such as the United States of America, Israel, Iran, which are not parties to Protocol I. 
129 S. Oeter, “Methods and Means of Combat”, in Fleck D. (ed.), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, 
Oxford, 1995, para. 442.5.  
130 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, p. 90. 
131 E. Rosenblad, “Area Bombing and International Law”, The Military Law and Law of War Review, 1976, p. 90. 
132 A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford, 2001, p. 339.  
133 O. Bring, “International Humanitarian Law after Kosovo: Is lex lata Sufficient?”, Nordic Journal of International Law, 
2002, p. 42. 
134 A restrictive interpretation was given in the Galić case. According to the ICTY Trial Chamber, a civilian object “shall 
not be attacked when it is not reasonable to believe, in the circumstances of the person contemplating the attack, including the information 
available to the latter, that the object is being used to make an effective contribution to military action”. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galić (IT-
98-29), Appeals Chamber, 2006, para. 51. 
135 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, p. 95, quoting and 





psychologically) strengthen an armed conflict should be deemed military targets. Indeed, the issue of 
dealing with military strategies using the legal fiction of considering “immaterial goals” (e.g. “civilian 
morale” and “political will”) as military objectives and striking doubtful military targets (e.g. ministries, 
radio and television stations), in order to break down civilians’ support, has not been so rare in 
recent conflicts. Regrettably, targeting theories seeking to include objectives having political, 
financial or psychological influences do result in increased risks for civilian persons and properties. 
In any case, as emphasised in the ICRC commentary to the 1977 Protocols, only tangible and material 
objects may become military targets; it is well documented how the intent to exclude immaterial objectives 
such as victory inspired the use of the term “object” in Article 52(2).136 It is worth emphasising that 
belligerents, when drawing up their list of targets, are indisputably required to consider the two-
pronged test in its entirety. At the same time, the justification under which civilian objects are 
included into the category of military objectives seems to acquire more importance. 
Notably, the required connection of the effective contribution of a certain target to the enemy’s 
conduct was challenged by the United States’ attempt to substitute the term “military action” with the 
expression “war-fighting or war sustaining capability”.137 Nevertheless, the “war-sustaining” portion has 
been deemed to go too far and to be too lax; according to the generally accepted view “for an object to 
qualify as a military objective, there must exist a proximate nexus to military action or ‘war-fighting’”, being the 
latter equivalent to military action.138  
In this regard, one of the largest partial awards of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, in 
which Ethiopia was held responsible for looting, burning, and destroying private and public 
buildings (including police stations) and livestock, is noteworthy. In particular, the majority in the 
Claims Commission decided that an Eritrean power station under construction in Hirgigo “to provide 
                                                
136 See M. Sassòli, “Targeting: Scope and Utility of the Concept of ‘Military Objectives’ for the Protection of Civilians 
in Contemporary Armed Conflicts”, in D. Wippman and M. Evangelista (eds.), New Wars, New Laws?, Transnational 
Publishers, 2005, p. 185. See also M. Sassòli and A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents, and Teaching 
Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law2, ICRC, 2006, p. 161, highlighting that “It is the basic idea 
of International Humanitarian Law that political objectives may be achieved by a belligerent with military force only by directing the latter 
against material military objectives”. 
137 In the US Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, it is sustained that “economic targets of the enemy 
that indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability may also be attacked”. It gives as example the 
destruction of raw cotton within Confederate territory by Union forces in the American Civil War on the ground that 
sale of cotton provided funds for purchasing arms. See A.R. Thomas, J.C. Duncan (eds.), Annotated Supplement to the 
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Vol. 73, Naval War College’s International Law Studies, 1999, para. 
8.1.1; US Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 2, 30 April 2003, Section 5 (D), available on 
www.decefenselink.mil. 
138 See Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 95-6, quoting 
J.J. Busuttil, Naval Weapons System and Contemporary Law of War, 1998, at 148; additionally, the author notes that the San 
Remo Manual rejected an attempt to insert into the text the wording “war-sustaining effort”, see L. Doswald-Beck (ed.), 





power for an area including a major port and naval facility certainly would seem to be an object the destruction of 
which would offer a distinct military advantage”139 and, as such, the Ethiopian aerial bombing against it 
was lawful. The Commission supported an apparently contrary position by upholding the lawfulness 
of such attack against the power plant because it was, inter alia, “of economic importance to Eritrea”: this 
fact was “evidence that damage to it, in the circumstances prevailing in late May 2000 when Ethiopia was trying to 
force Eritrea to agree to end the war, offered a definite advantage”.140 A further view expressed by the majority 
of the Commission was that “the infliction of economic losses from attacks against military objectives is a lawful 
means of achieving a definite military advantage, and there can be few military advantages more evident than effective 
pressure to end an armed conflict that, each day, added to the number of both civilian and military casualties on both 
sides of the war”.141  
In light of this finding, legal scholarship has observed that such a decision does not constitute a 
precedent to accept the “war-sustaining” as a companion to “war-fighting”.142 Indeed, striking a 
military objective of economic importance to the country’s military capacity (e.g. war-supporting 
economic installations or industries) is allowed under international law, but attacking an object on 
account of the effect its neutralisation might have on the enemy’s economy is not permitted; the 
general industrial and agricultural potential of the enemy is excluded from the definition of military 
objectives. 
Remarkably, the dissenting opinion by the President of the Claims Commission expressed 
disagreement with the majority’s view that the power plant was certainly of great importance and its 
legitimate destruction was confirmed by the fact that it led Eritrea to accept the cease-fire. 
According to his more restrictive position, since the power plant under construction could not 
effectively contribute to the military action, its destruction had no definite military advantage at a 
moment of the war, when Ethiopians were advancing into Eritrean territory and the end of the war 
was in sight; if power supply was a military target, the actual operating power plant (and not the one under 
construction) could have been bombed. The fact that, because of the economic damage caused, its 
destruction contributed to the cease-fire, did not change his opinion.143 
 
                                                
139 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and related Claims, 
Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 and 26, 2005, (19 December 2005), 45 I.L.M. 396 (2006), para. 121, p. 936. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, p. 96. 
143 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and related Claims, 
Eritrea’s Claim No. 112-121 and Separate opinion of the President in fine of Award. See also Hans Van Houtte, “The 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission and International Humanitarian Law”, in Venturini and Bariatti (eds.), Liber 





Focusing on the criteria established in Article 52(2) to ascertain that an object contributes 
effectively to the enemy’s military action, it is worth giving some details. “Use” concerns its present 
function, “nature” concerns the intrinsic character of the object,144 “location” concerns an object that 
can turn into a military objective if it is placed in an area recognised as a lawful target,145 and 
“purpose” concerns the party’s envisioned use of an object.146 Furthermore, the present tense 
employed to require that the object must effectively contribute to military action (rather than the 
conditional ‘would’ or ‘could’) delineates to what extent a party may count on the “purpose” of an 
object in determining its military status, as “an intended future use may be sufficient, but not a possible future 
use”.147 However, the concept of “intended use” poses the intrinsic difficulty that it is based on the 
knowledge of the defender’s intention, whose existence has to be demonstrated. The level of proof is 
that of “reasonable belief in the circumstances ruling at the time”, but caution is required given that so much 
depends on the reliability of obtainable intelligence.148 
 
Whilst every object may potentially be a lawful military target on account of use, location or 
purpose, certain objects benefit from special protection. The regime in question aims, inter alia, at prohibiting or 
limiting attacks against them even when they turn into military objects, besides prohibiting their use for 
military purposes. This is detailed in subsequent sections, taking into consideration some of the 
                                                
144 The ICRC Commentary includes in this category any object that is directly used by the armed forces, such as 
“weapons, equipment, transports, fortifications, depots, buildings occupied by armed forces, staff headquarters, communication centers, etc.”, 
see Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmerman (eds.), op. cit., para. 2020. For a non-exhaustive list of military objectives by 
nature, see Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 96-97. 
145 A central issue has been linked to the fact that a certain land can be deemed per se a military objective “due to its special 
location, regardless even of use or purpose”, see Y. Dinstein, ibid., p. 101. According to Rogers, “[d]enying land to enemy forces is 
often a principal consideration in military operations” and “[i]f an area of land has military significance for whatever reason, it becomes a 
military objective”, see A. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 39. Even the ICTY agreed 
that a specific land could constitute a military target, noting that “the Grbavica hill had a certain strategic importance, which 
enabled the AbiH, if it occupied it, to block the HVO and the Croatian civilians’ access to the main Travnik-Busovača road”, see ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic (IT-95-14-T), Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 551. 
146 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmerman (eds.), op. cit., para. 2020. 
147 M. Sassòli, “Targeting: Scope and Utility of the Concept of ‘Military Objectives’ for the Protection of Civilians in 
Contemporary Armed Conflicts”, in D. Wippman and M. Evangelista (eds.), New Wars, New Laws?, Transnational 
Publishers, 2005, p. 199. See also E. David, Principes de droit des conflits armés4, Bruyland, 2008, para. 2.52, p. 312-313, in 
which the author addresses how “Prise à la lettre, la definition de l’objectif militaire est extre mement restrictive car ell interdit toute 
destruction préventive: tant qu’un bien n’apporte pas une réelle contribution à l’action militaire de l’aversaire, il ne peut, en principe, 
etredétruit”.  
148 The dilemma raised by the “purpose” criterion in Article 52(2) has been debated in legal scholarship. For instance, if 
the intelligence obtained by a commander indicates the enemy’s intention of utilise a school as munitions depot, Adam 
Rogers suggests that the school would not become a lawful military target until the weaponries were inside it. However, 
it seems controversial that the only possibility is attacking the school. Inasmuch as the commander’s belief is reasonable, 
his troops can primarily arrange themselves to avoid that the school being used by the adversary as intended. Instead, 
according to the author a preventive attack would be lawful and less damaging than avoiding it until the school has 
made by the enemy expose to be fully attacked. See A. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, Manchester University Press, 1996, 





specially protected objects in light of their basic significance for the safeguarding of civilians’ ESC 
rights. 
5.1.b. The negative presumption in favour of immunity from armed attack  
Article 52(3) API establishes a negative presumption in favour of immunity from armed attack for 
certain objects that are “normally dedicated” by their intrinsic nature to civilian purposes, such as 
schools, hospitals, places of worship, houses or other civilian residences.149 In cases of doubt whether an object 
devoted to civilian purposes is actually employed to effectively contribute to the military action, it is 
to be assumed that the object is not used for military purposes by the adversary, and as such it 
cannot be treated as a military target.  
Although the customary character of this presumption is contentious, a higher standard of 
verification based on the intrinsically civilian nature of such objects is widely deemed to be imposed 
under Article 52(3).150 Only very strong signs that a school, a place of worship, or a house is effectively 
contributing to military action may raise doubts about their civilian character. In such cases, a duty 
to do everything feasible to obtain information and “verify the target” seems to derive from the 
principle of distinction.151  
Nonetheless, a controversial implementation of Article 52(3) has emerged the context of combat 
in urban environments, where the attacker is faced with a particularly difficult task in trying to 
establish the military character of a target with certainty because civilian and military objects tend 
to “commingle”. In fact, it may be that the defender alters the purpose of buildings such as key 
ministries and communication centres to prevent the enemy from launching an attack. In such cases 
any failures to implement the principle of distinction may result in violation of the defender’s 
obligations to take precautions against the effects of attack, as examined in one of the following 
sections. However, such a violation does not alter the attacker’s customary obligation to do 
                                                
149 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmerman (eds.), op. cit., paras. 2031-2038. This presumption was extensively 
discussed during the negotiation of Protocol I. According to some delegations, its inclusion did not reflect the case of 
“civilian buildings situated on the front line” and used as defensive areas, which should be assumed to be military objectives. 
Notwithstanding such a critical view and even the proposed exception for objects situated in “the area where the most 
forward elements of the armed forces of both sides are in contact with each other” (ibid., para. 2268), the presumption of civilian use in 
case of doubt was favorably voted.  
150 In the ICRC Study on Customary IHL, the “rule of doubt” was not found to be customary in nature, but it is stated: 
“[…] it is clear that, in case of doubt, a careful assessment has to be made under the conditions and restraints governing a particular situation 
as to whether there are sufficient indications to warrant an attack. It cannot automatically be assumed that any object that appears dubious 
may be subject to lawful attack”, see J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 36, Rule 10. 
151 In this last regard, see W.G. Schmidt, “The protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts: Protocol I 





everything feasible to verify the use for military purpose of the intended target.152 Furthermore, in 
case the status of the object in question cannot be properly clarified, the presumption of civilian use 
is deemed to prevail.  
In this context, debatable positions have been expressed by some States with higher intelligence 
capabilities. According to them, an unfair burden on the attacker is be imposed by Article 52(3) 
since doubt may still subsist even after in-depth investigation.153 This view has led these States, 
which are not parties to Protocol I, to dispute the customary nature of the rule.154 However, 
contrary to what such an argument would seem to imply, the drafters of Protocol I did not intend 
Article 52(3) to claim certainty by the attacker. As the ICTY confirmed in the Galić case, a 
“reasonable belief” that the target is a military objective is required.155 In line with this interpretation, a 
truthful (though incorrect) belief by a military commander about the status of a military objective is 
possible, without (wrongly) arguing that the defender would have the burden of explaining the status 
of controlled objects or introducing new adjectives (e.g. “significant”) in the interpretation of Article 
52(3). 
Finally, the significance of the presumption of civilian use in case of uncertainty lies in the fact that the 
status of an object is dynamic and any civilian object may in effect turn into a military objective 
because of its military use,156 with its subsequent exposure to lawful attacks regulated and limited 
according to the principles of proportionality and precaution. 
5.1.c. The condition of definite military advantage 
Legitimate military objectives are only those whose “destruction, capture or neutralization” also give the 
                                                
152 Article 57(2)(a)(i) AP I. See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 55, Rule 16. 
153 In responding to claims that the U.S. attack on the Al-Firdus Bunker in Baghdad violated “the rule of doubt”, the 
United States mantained that the latter was not in line with the traditional law of war since it transferred from the 
defender to the attacker the burden of verifying the exact use of an object. In particular, it was argued that: “This 
imbalance ignores the realities of war in demanding a degree of certainty of an attacker that seldom exists in combat. It also encourages a 
defender to ignore its obligation to separate the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects from military objectives”, see U.S. 
Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 1992, p. 627. For a critical view, see E. 
David, Principes de droit des conflits armés4, Bruyland, 2008, pp. 315-316, paras. 2.55-2.56. 
154 Israel has understood the presumption of civilian use to apply only “when the field commander considers that there is a 
‘significant’ doubt and not if there is merely a slight possibility of being mistaken”, see J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., 
p. 36. 
155 The ICTY confirmed this standard of proof, see Prosecutor v. Galić (IT-98-29-T), Judgment of 5 December 2003, para. 
51 (“[…] an object shall not be attacked when it is not reasonable to believe, in the circumstances of the person contemplating the attack, 
including the information available to the latter, that the object is being used to make an effective contribution to military action”). 
156 See M. Sassòli and A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents, and Teaching Materials on Contemporary 
Practice in International Humanitarian Law2, ICRC, 2006, p. 201; P. Rowe, “Kosovo 1999: The air campaign - Have the 
provisions of Additional Protocol I withstood the test?”, IRRC, 2000, pp. 151-152, warning about the risk of considering 
that “merely because the military may make use of an object (and they are unlikely to do so unless it is necessary) that object becomes a 
military objective and, as such, a legitimate target. Were this argument to be taken to its logical conclusion, every civilian object that could 





attacker a definite military advantage, which has been identified as “concrete and perceptible” (instead of 
“hypothetical and speculative”).157  
As discussed below, the provisions dealing with the principle of proportionality similarly refer to 
the military advantage anticipated, but this is evaluated against the probability of civilian losses and 
damage,158  and in doing so introduces an additional element of specificity. 159 As commonly 
explained, at the stage of target selection an attacker has to establish if the object can generate such 
an advantage, but in the evaluation of proportionality more certitude is required to determine the 
military advantage anticipated along with probable collateral damage. However, in both 
formulations the use of “definite” or “concrete and direct” indicates a high standard, practically requiring 
the responsible commander’s ability to formulate the type of the military advantage predictable 
from the attack and to attest such an expectation.  
 
As for the definition of “definite military advantage”, Protocol I relies on a precise concept of 
“attack” in Article 49(1) whereby “‘Attacks’ mean acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in 
defence”. In this regard, a controversial point is whether such an advantage must result from a 
specific attack; it is uncertain whether it is necessary to verify that destroying, capturing or 
neutralising the targeted objective provided for a definite military advantage, or, instead, whether it 
is enough to verify that attacking the objective contributed to gain such advantage. In reality a 
number of States have declared that they regard the advantage to be anticipated from an attack 
deemed as a whole.160 It has been observed that a rather restricted interpretation of “definite military 
advantage” derives from considering as necessary that the advantage arise from a specific military 
operation constituting the “attack” under Article 49. As significantly stressed, however, “[s]uch a 
construction […] would ignore the problems resulting from modern strategies of warfare, which are invariably based on 
                                                
157 See W.A. Solf, “Article 52”, in M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch and W.A. Solf (eds.), op. cit., p. 326, para. 2.4.6. 
158 The proportionality concerns the collateral damage that “would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated”, see Article 51(5)(b) AP I and Article 57(2)(a)(iii) AP I. 
159 There is no indication about why different expressions were chosen, see Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmerman 
(eds.), op. cit., para. 2027. 
160 To elaborate, States including Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom have declared that “military advantage” used in Article 51 (protection of the civilian 
population), Article 52 (general protection of civilian objects) and Article 57 (precautions in attack) refers to “the advantage 
anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack”. In clarifying the legal 
standard in relation to the rule on proportionality, Australia, like New Zealand, has added that: “[...] the term ‘military 
advantage’ involves a variety of considerations including the security of attacking forces. It is further the understanding of Australia that the term 
‘concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’, used in Articles 51 and 57, means a bona fide expectation that the attack will make a 





an integrated series of separate actions forming one ultimate compound operation”.161 Nonetheless, following the 
view that “attack” may cover a sequence of acts increases the risk of making it so wide as to weaken 
the notion of “definite military advantage” and the duties stemming from it. 
5.1.d. Dual-use objects 
The definition embodied in Article 52(2) deserves particular attention for certain contentious targets 
which potentially widen the category of legitimate military objectives but whose impact on the 
access to, and enjoyment of, ESC rights of civilians may turn to be substantially severe, above all 
concerning the rights to health, food, and safe and drinking water. 
International humanitarian law identifies certain civilian objects that may be attacked insofar as 
they have a dual-use nature, in other words they can be used for civilian aims besides serving military 
purposes. Instances include manufacturing yards, petrochemical facilities, oil-refining facilities, 
electricity-generating installations, transportation infrastructures, telecommunications and computer 
networks, insofar as belligerents used them during hostilities, in addition to the civilian population. 
Accordingly, if any such an object effectively contributes to the enemy’s military action, the 
“secondary military use” turns it into a potential legitimate military objective.162  
However, such attacks remain extremely controversial. In particular, a basic issue is whether the 
dual-use nature modifies or not the applicability of Article 52(2), since the targeting of such objects inevitably 
affects the civilian population being the double purpose served in an indivisible manner. An 
example may be a power station that is crucial for the functioning of water systems and sewage 
treatment, hospitals, food-producing factories (and consequently vital for civilian access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation, health care, adequate food) but which also serves the war industry.163 
Indeed, a number of aspects are thorny. Firstly, it is difficult to calculate the extent of the “effective 
contribution to military action” by the facility concerned in view of the concurrent use by civilians. 
Equally, it is complicated to evaluate the “definite military advantage” resulting from its neutralisation, 
capture or destruction. Then, assessing the consequences of its damage or destruction on civilians is 
                                                
161 S. Oeter, “Methods and Means of Combat”, in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, 
Oxford, 1995, para. 444. To the author, although States’ interpretation aimed to explain the legal standard in the rules 
on the principle of proportionality, it also applies to Article 52(2) API. 
162 See M. Sassoli, Legitimate targets of attacks under international humanitarian law, p. 7. 
163 For instance, this concerned the Iraqi electricity grid in the context of the Gulf War, see Rogers, Law on the Battlefield2, 
2004, pp. 71-76; C. Greenwood, “Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf 
Conflict”, in Rowe (ed.), The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law, Routledge, 1993, pp. 63 and 73; Kuehl, 
“Airpower vs. Electricity: Electric Power as a Target for Strategic Air Operations”, 18 Journal of Strategic Studies, 1995, 
pp. 251-252. E.g., see U.S. Department of Defence Office of General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues In 
Information Operations, 1999, at 8-9, discussing the controversy surrounding the bombing of Baghdad power plants in the 





complex; while the harm may seem unpredictable and incidental case-by-case, there is a high 
probability that the cumulative effect of attacks against such facility have medium and long-term 
negative consequences that are foreseeable.  
Nevertheless, as stressed in legal scholarship,164 dual-use facilities are not identified as a distinct 
group and are covered by Article 52(2) irrespective of potential challenges of determining the 
effective contribution to military action. Thus, once the two-pronged test has been passed, IHL rules 
limiting collateral damage become of fundamental importance.165 In essence, the legality of its distruction is 
subject to the prohibition of causing disproportionate collateral damage. In particular, the principle 
of proportionality has a significant role to play when an attack on a dual-use object is highly likely to 
origin extensive and long-term damage to the civilian population. This may occur when it serves the 
military while it is vital for civilians, so raising the issue as to whether proportionality should be 
applied by taking into due account the indirect effects of such an attack or, in other words, whether 
and to what extent medium and long-term damage connected to such an attack should flow into the 
assessment of “excessive” collateral damage. Even rules on precautionary measures do play a very 
useful role for dealing with dual-use objects.  
Notably, such basic conditions of legality were made clear in several examinations of bombings 
of big cities which put power grids out of use, such as the attack causing the inability of hospitals to 
continue to function in Baghdad in 1991, so resulting in civilian suffering and deaths. More 
recently, during the hostilities that took place in Lebanon from 12 July to 14 August 2006, these 
aspects were emphasised by the high-level Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon concerning major 
attacks on civilian infrastructure and other objects, including the destruction or damage of the land 
transportation network (with a huge impact on humanitarian assistance and on the free movement 
                                                
164 See A. Bouvin, op. cit., p. 24. 
165 In this vein, a critical observation has been raised in relation to the lawfulness of the attack on the Serbian radio and 
TV station in Belgrade, as analysed in the report of the Committee established by the Prosecutor of the ICTY to review 
the NATO air campaign in 1998. Specifically, only the question of whether the radio and TV station was a military 
objective was reviewed and the Committee concluded, although with caveats and caution, that the building was a 
legitimate military target, stating in para. 15: “If the media is the nerve system that keeps a warmonger in power and thus perpetuates 
the war effort, it may fall within the definition of a legitimate military objective”. However, it has been criticised that, given that the 
NATO bombing caused the death of civilian persons, even assuming that the radio and TV station was a military 
target, the Committee had to examined whether the death of civilians had to be considered collateral damage within the 
meaning of Article 51(5)(b) API (i.e. damage which would not be “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated”), see N. Ronzitti, “Is the non liquet of the Final Report by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acceptable?”, IRRC, 2000, pp. 1017-1027. The views 
on the legality of targeting the Belgrade TV and radio station have differed, see G. Aldrich, “Yugoslavia’s television 
studios as military objectives”, International Law FORUM du droit international, Vol. I, No. 3, 1999, pp. 149-150; H. 
McCoubrey, “Kosovo, NATO and international law”, International Relations, Vol. XIV, No. 5, 1999, p. 40; P. Rowe, 
“Kosovo 1999: The air campaign. Have the provisions of Additional Protocol I withstood the test?”, IRRC, 2000, pp. 
156-157; Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, “Collateral Damage” or Unlawful Killings? Violations of 





of displaced civilians), water facilities, transmission stations, economic infrastructures, and 
agricultural lands. According to the Commission, Israel’s justification for such attacks by invoking 
“their hypothetical use by Hezbollah” could not be put forward “for each individual object directly hit during this 
conflict”.166  
Another recent contentious case regards the shutdown of Gaza’s sole electrical power plant on 
29 July 2014 during a heavy Israeli bombardment of the Al-Nusseirat area, where it was located, in 
the context of Operation Protective Edge. This has worsened the ongoing humanitarian crisis 
involving close to 1.8 million people, in particular causing hospitals and other essential civilian 
infrastructure to intensify their reliance on precarious generators as well as curtailing the pumping 
of water to households and the treatment of sewage. In view of the predictable devastating knock-on 
effects of the lack of electricity - especially given the chronic shortage of fuel, the absence of 
sustainable alternative power supplies, the lack of material for repair which could take at least 
twelve months, and the ongoing closure of the territory - it is highly unlikely that such an attack 
could be deemed lawful and proportionate even if that power plant also served a military 
purpose.167 In other words, the expected harm to civilians was greater than the military gain 
achieved.  
5.2. Civilian objects under AP II 
Neither common Article 3 GCs nor Protocol II contain a definition of military objectives or include 
rules on the general protection of civilian objects. Nonetheless, additional treaties applicable to 
internal conflicts include the principle of distinction as well as the aforementioned definition (as set 
forth in Article 52(2) API), also containing the prohibition on directing attacks against civilian 
                                                
166 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1, A/HRC/32, 23 November 
2006, paras. 136-148. In para. 147 it noticed: “Even if some claims were true, the collateral harm to the Lebanese population caused 
by these attacks would have to be weighed against their military advantage, to make sure that the rule on proportionality was being observed. 
For example, cutting the roads between Tyre and Beirut for several days and preventing UNIFIL from putting up a provisional bridge cannot 
be justified by international humanitarian law. It jeopardized the lives of many civilians and prevented humanitarian assistance from reaching 
them. Injured persons needing to be transferred to hospitals north of Tyre could not get the medical care needed”. In paragraph 148 it 
concluded: “By using this argument, IDF simply changed the status of all civilian objects by making them legitimate targets because they 
might be used by Hezbollah. The principle of distinction requires the Parties to the conflict to carefully assess the situation of each location they 
intend to hit to determine whether there is sufficient justification to warrant an attack. Further, the Commission is convinced that damage 
inflicted to some infrastructure was done for the sake of destruction”. The commission’s mandate comprised, inter alia, “… (b) to 
examine the types of weapons used by Israel and their conformity with international law; and (c) to assess the extent and deadly impact of 
Israeli attacks on human life, property, critical infrastructure and the environment”. See also Report of four UN Special Rapporteurs on their 
Mission to Lebanon and Israel, UN Doc. A/HRC//2/7, 2 October 2006, paras. 62-64. 
167 See ICRC, “Gaza: power plant destroyed, electricity and water supplies collapse”, 30 July 2014; Human Rights 






objects, as detailed hereafter.168  
Therefore, every civilian object (even a hospital, church, school or cultural object) may become 
a military objective as a result of use (or abuse) by the enemy for military purposes, but any attack 
against it will be qualified by proportionality; or as far as its location, nature or purpose effectively 
contributes to the adversary’s military action. However, the advantage anticipated from an attack 
must be military in character, while a purely psychological, economic, social, political, or moral advantage 
would not meet the test. 
In the case of dual-use objects, the proportionality principle should guide attacks on them and so 
prohibit attacks whose expected collateral effects causing injury or death to civilians as well as 
damage or destruction to civilian objects are “excessive” with regard to the military advantage 
anticipated. Moreover, although it is commonly said that extensive consequences do not 
automatically mean “excessive” ones, the issue of substantial medium and long-term effects 
(reverberating) on civilians remains even in non-international armed conflicts. As mentioned above, 
a basic aspect is whether they are foreseeable in view of the information reasonably available to the attacker, it 
being somewhat problematic and unrealistic to expect the planner or executer to consider all likely 
future consequences.169  
6. The scope of civilian immunity against the effects of hostilities 
Several provisions aim at implementing civilian immunity. Civilian casualties and damage to 
civilian objects may result from non-compliance with IHL rules on prohibited attacks against civilian 
persons and objects or from an overly broad definition of military objectives. This may occur from a failure 
to respect the principle of distinction or two other basic standards: the principle of proportionality 
whereby expected “collateral damage” to non-combatants as a result of an attack on a military 
target must be proportional to the expected military gain; and the principle of precaution, which 
requires attention to the options that would guarantee a military advantage while preventing or 
reducing civilian harms and damages “in the circumstances ruling at the time”. 
In other words, international humanitarian law frames the protection of civilians according to a 
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Cultural Property.  
169 This position is detailed by Schmitt, Garraway, Dinstein, Manual on the Law on Non-International Armed Conflict, the 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2006, pp. 24-25, noting that this question “can only be decided on a case-by-case 





threefold rationale: military objectives can be targeted; attacks against the latter are prohibited 
inasmuch as the foreseeable incidental effects on civilians are excessive; and all feasible measures 
must be taken in order to minimise the effects of legitimate attacks.  
6.1. The prohibitions of direct and deliberate attacks  
In the contexts of international armed conflict, directly and deliberately attacking civilians and 
civilian objects is prohibited under Articles 51(2)(6) and 52(1) API respectively. Notably, Article 
85(3)(a) API regards as a grave breach making the civilian population or individual civilians (if their 
status is known) the object of an attack when the latter was wilfully directed against them and when 
it caused death or severe injury to health or body. 170  From an international criminal law 
perspective, notably the Rome Statute labels as a war crime the “intentionally directing attacks against the 
civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” and the “intentionally 
directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives”.171 The absolute nature 
of the prohibition was affirmed in the Blaškić case172 and then reiterated in the Galić judgment173 by 
the ICTY, which held that no exceptions to this prohibition exist and that military necessity is 
invocable as a justification.  
With regard to these war crimes, the crucial element of “intention” to target civilian persons or 
objects and the related concept of “lawful collateral damage” deserve further consideration. Since 
belligerents are required to limit attacks to strictly military targets, civilian casualties are likely to 
emanate from an attack directed against a lawful target not intended to injured civilians or civilian 
objects, or they are likely to derive from “a human error or a mechanical malfunction” - which would 
prevent the attack be categorised as “direct”.174 Nonetheless, the significance of the absence or 
presence of the “intention to attack civilians or civilian objects” can be assessed regardless of whether any 
damage has occurred or not. In particular, some commentators have construed Article 8(2)(b)(i) as 
meaning that any premeditated attack directed against civilians or civilian objects would constitute a 
war crime under the ICC Statute, regardless of whether the attack was successful or not.175 
                                                
170 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinrski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., paras. 3475-6. 
171 Article 8 (2)(b)(i) and Article 8 (2)(b)(ii) of the ICC Statute. 
172 In 2004 the Appeals Chamber pointed out that “there is an absolute prohibition on the targeting of civilians in customary 
international law”, see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić (IT-95-14) Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 29 July 2004, para. 109. Such 
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civilians or civilian property is an offence when not justified by military necessity”, see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Chamber, 
Judgment of 3 March 2000, para. 180. 
173 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galić (IT-98-29), Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 30 November 2006, para. 130. 
174 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, p. 125. 





Conversely, in the Kordić case the ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that, under Protocol I and 
customary international law, there is no grave breach unless the act was carried out in practice with 
the result of “causing death or serious injury to body or health”.176  
 
Article 51(2) API specifically prohibits “acts and threats of violence” whose major purpose is spreading terror 
among the civilian population. This provision sheds light on how the intention behind the commission of 
an attack (rather than its outcome) matters. In this sense, not only has this second paragraph been 
regarded to reflect customary international law,177 but also the aim of spreading terror among civilians 
has been deemed more critical than the actual infliction of terror.178 Significantly, the view that the 
morale of the enemy is no longer a military objective has emerged in contrast to the utilitarian 
argument that was fashionable during World War II, which supported the possibility of launching 
attacks (mainly aerial bombardments) to frighten the civilian population and shatter the enemy’s 
morale and its determination to carry on hostilities. This view has only occasionally been repeated 
since then as military operations directed exclusively at civilian morale have been deemed 
unproductive and inefficient179 and, more significantly, the prohibition of deliberate attacks against 
civilians has been progressively considered applicable without utilitarian compromises. 180 
Furthermore, the terminology used in Protocol I makes clear that only a tangible, visible and 
material object may be a legitimate target of attack,181 thus excluding intangible things like public will, 
victory or morale.  
With regard to the same proscription, legal scholars have also questioned whether under the 
terms of Article 51(2) the prohibition of intimidating or causing panic is applicable only when this is 
the “primary purpose” of the attack. If this is the case, then large-scale aerial bombardments striking 
military objectives are not prohibited by this norm, although they may cause panic in civilians and 
shock the civilian population, so leading to the collapse of civilian morale.182 Conversely, the 
aforementioned requirement of “a definite military advantage” seems to imply the unlawfulness of 
attacking a military objective when the main purpose is affecting the morale of the civilian 
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Punishable Offense”, DJCIL, 1996, pp. 547-8.  
181 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinrski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., paras. 2007-2008. 
182 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, p. 126; Greenwood, 





population without reducing the military strength of the enemy.183 
 
In exploring IHL as a restraint on armed violence causing economic, social and cultural harm 
for civilians, the issue of belligerent reprisals is also relevant. It was a UN General Assembly Resolution 
that in 1970 primarily banned them against civilians during the conduct of hostilities as a basic 
principle for the protection of populations in armed conflict.184 Subsequently, Protocol I strictly 
prohibited reprisals against the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, medical and religious personnel (Art. 
20), as well as civilians (Art. 51(6)) - affording general protection as opposed to the one provided for 
civilians in the hands of a party of which they are not nationals and for their property under Article 
33(3) GCIV. Notably, both the original and amended versions of Protocol II to the 1980 CCW 
Convention also ban reprisals against civilians (Art. 3(2)).  
Despite States’ general commitment not to make civilians the object of reprisals, 185  the 
unambiguous and widespread practice in favour of a specific ban on the use of reprisals against all 
civilians is not yet uniform. Indeed, Article 51(6) API has been the object of several declarations and 
reservations by NATO members upon ratification of Protocol I, even though subsequent practice 
appears to support the prohibition.186 Crucially, on numerous occasions the United States has 
emphasised that it does not accept the overall prohibition, although it voted in favour of Article 51 
API (to which is not a party) and ratified Protocol II to the CCW Convention without making a 
reservation on this issue. In the 1980s a noteworthy series of reprisals were made by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Iraq, neither party to Protocol I, against each other. 
                                                
183 In the case of Kosovo, this view was expressed by Meyer, see J.M. Meyer, “Tearing down the Façade: A Critical 
Look at the Current Law on Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine”, The Air Force Law Review, 2001, 
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185 Article 51 API as a whole was adopted by 77 votes in favour, 1 against (France), and 16 abstentions (Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Cameroon, Colombia, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Madagascar, Mali, 
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proscribe reprisals against civilians, referring Article 51(6) API; the Italian military code recites that “reprisals cannot be 






Remarkably, the emergence of a customary rule prohibiting any form of reprisal against 
civilians was acknowledged in the Kupreškić case.187 According to the ICTY, the intrinsic brutality of 
reprisals, their absolute incompatibility with fundamental human rights, the contemporary 
establishment of national and international systems of repression of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, and State practice “seem to support the contention that the demands of humanity and the dictates of 
public conscience, as manifested in opinio necessitatis, have by now brought about the formation of a customary rule 
also binding upon those few States that at some stage did not intend to exclude the abstract legal possibility or resorting 
to reprisals [against civilians]”.188 
It is worth anticipating that Protocol I also introduced a series of strict prohibitions on taking 
reprisals against: civilian objects (Art. 52(1)); “historic monuments, works of art or places of 
worship” which are the spiritual or cultural heritage of peoples (Art. 53(a)); “objects indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population” (Art. 54(4)); the natural environment (Art. 55(2)); and “works 
and installations containing dangerous forces” (i.e. “dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations”) 
(Art. 56(4)).189 States’ general commitment to not take reprisals against all these objects has been 
affirmed in light of a very limited contrary practice.190  
 
The general protection and immunity from attacks enjoyed by civilians applies “unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities”.191 As noted above, civilian objects may lose their protection 
when an effective contribution to enemy military action derives from their use, purpose, location, or 
nature, and when a definite military advantage is offered by their destruction, capture, or 
neutralisation.192 Thus, belligerents are allowed to target only those civilians who are directly 
participating in hostilities or those civilian objects that have become military objectives as long as 
they do so.  
Conversely, attacks not directed against dual use or military objectives contravene international 
humanitarian law, without regard to how “favourable” the attacker evaluates them from a strategic, 
economic or political perspective. In fact, the rationale behind the limitation on military objectives 
                                                
187 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (IT-95-16-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment of 14 January 2000, para. 513. 
188 Ibid., paras. 526-536. 
189 Article 52 API (adopted by 79 votes in favour, none against and 7 abstentions), Article 53 API (adopted by 
consensus), Article 54 API (adopted by consensus), Article 55 API (adopted by consensus), and Article 56 API (adopted 
by consensus). 
190 See ICRC Study in Customary IHL, Rule 147, at 525, albeit indicating that “it is difficult to conclude that there has yet 
crystallised a customary rule specifically prohibiting reprisals against these civilian objects in all situations.” 
191 Article 51(3) AP I. See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., Rule 6. In 2009 the ICRC released the 
Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law. 





is anchored in the principle of military necessity, which acts as a restraint on warfare and limits “total 
war”.193 As pertinently pointed out in legal scholarship, although in theory more efficient to seized 
the adversary, “acts of violence against persons or objects of economic, political, or psychological importance … are 
never necessary, because any enemy can be overcome by weakening sufficiently its military forces”.194  
This latter consideration has acquired novel weight in relation to recent practice. It has been 
discussed in similar terms by the UN Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Mission mandated “to 
investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been 
committed at any time in the context of the military operations conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 
2008 to 18 January 2009, whether before, during and after” (i.e. “Operation Cast Lead”), and launched by 
Israel in response to continuing rocket attacks on Israeli towns from the Gaza Strip.195 In particular, 
the Mission considered the strikes on government buildings (i.e. the Legislative Council building and 
the principal prison in Gaza)196 as attacks on civilian objects in breach of customary international 
humanitarian law. It was rejected the Israeli officials’ analysis that the principle of distinction was no 
longer applicable to the conflict against Hamas (considered as a terrorist organization as opposed to 
an insurrectional movement) as well as the argument of “putting pressure” on Hamas by targeting 
civilian political infrastructure for military purposes.197 Notably, the cardinal relevance of the 
principle of distinction was emphasised by referring to a meaningful scholarly consideration on 
whether “new wars” require “new laws”: if attacks on financial, political, or even psychological targets 
were definitively argued to be more effective than those against dual-base or military objectives, 
then “in some societies - in particular in democracies - it may be hospital maternity wards, kindergartens, religious 
shrines, or homes for the elderly whose destruction would most affect the willingness of the military or of the government 
to continue the war”.198  
Regrettably, these observations appear to be challenged even by the latest developments of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the context of “Operation Protective Edge” as a response launched 
                                                
193 G. Venturini, Necesssità e proporzionalità nell’uso della forza militare in diritto internazionale, Milano, 1988, pp. 45-150. 
194 M. Sassòli and L. Cameron, “The Protection of Civilian Objects”, in N. Ronzitti and G. Venturini, The Law of Air 
Warfare. Contemporary Issues, Eleven International Publishing, 2006, p. 52. 
195 See “Human Rights in Palestine and other occupied territories”, Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, para. 1. 
196 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter VII, paras. 365-438. 
197 In this regard, the generic statement that the targeted political infrastructures was part of Hamas’ mechanism of 
control of the area is not sustainable and it seems to refer to the dubious thesis aimed at expanding the notion of military 
objective also to those contributing “to the opposing force’s war fighting and war-sustaining capability”. On the principle of 
distinction, see also N. Ronzitti, Diritto Internazionale dei conflitti armati5, 2014, pp.187-188; G.E. Bisharat et al., “Israel’s 
Invasion of Gaza in International Law”, 38(1) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 2010, pp. 70-71; L.R. Blank, 
“The Application of IHL in the Goldstone Report: a Critical Commentary”, 12 YIHL, 2009, pp. 354-356. 
198 The reference was to M. Sassòli, “Targeting: the scope and utility of the concept of ‘military objectives’ for the 
protection of civilians in contemporary armed conflicts”, in D. Wippman and M. Evangelista (eds.), New Wars, New 





since 8 July 2014 to stop Hamas’ rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip, the latter has been heavily 
subjected to bombardments of civilian areas from the air, sea and land - with wanton destruction of 
homes, schools, medical facilities and other public properties - which seemingly lacked acceptable 
military justification and, instead, terrorised the civilian population.199  
In this regard, it is worth addressing the following issue. While Hamas’s methods have tended to 
be deliberately and openly designed to affect the Israeli civilian population with the aim of 
spreading terror, the Israeli response has tended to be characterised by a sort of “representation and 
acceptance” of the possibility that the same effect is produced. This raises the issue as to whether the 
acceptance of systematic involvement of the civilian population of Gaza in the conflict constitutes a 
conduct in radical contrast to the rationale underlying the IHL system,200 as Israel’s military reaction is 
somehow symmetrical to Hamas’s direct attacks against its civilians. Beyond the quantitative 
disproportion between the losses inflicted by its bombings and those resulting from Hamas’ military 
actions, such symmetry may be seen as a disturbing trend in the adoption of conduct contrary to 
IHL on a reciprocal basis. Indeed, this trend - justified by the parties according to the peculiarities 
of the theatre of the conflict (e.g. overpopulation, reduced extension of the Strip, promiscuity 
between military sites and civilian settlements, the presence of underground tunnels) - remains far 
from the objective character of relevant IHL obligations. 
 
In any case, it is worth looking more at the investigation undertaken by the UN Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Gaza conflict in 2009 to review the two main phases (the air phase and the air-land 
phase) of Operation Cast Lead. For the purpose of the present thesis, three aspects are noteworthy 
in the context of this section. 
1. Multiple incidents under investigation were characterised by serious allegations of direct and 
deliberate, fatal attacks against civilians. The major conclusions were that no justifiable military 
objectives were pursued in any of them,201 thus implicating the delicate issue of accountability for possible 
breaches of international law, including State responsibility202 and individual criminal liability.203  
                                                
199 See Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council, Ensuring respect for international law in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, including East Jerusalem, UN Doc. A/HRC/Res/S-21/1, 24 July 2014, particularly para. 2. 
200 Thus, not simply compatible or not with the principle of military necessity, which in any case gives way to the need 
to respect binding IHL principles, including the prohibition of grave breaches, see L. Condorelli and L. Boisson de 
Chazourness, “Quelques remarques a propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit 
international humanitaire en ‘toutes circonstances’”, in Swinarski (ed.), Etudes and essais sur le droit international humanitaire at 
sur les principes de la Croix Rouge, en l’honneur de Jean Pictet, Genève, 1984, p. 23.  
201 See UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XI, paras. 704-885. 
202 Article 91 AP I reads: “[a] Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case 





In particular, the incidents concerned alleged attacks against houses in the al-Samouni 
neighbourhood of Gaza during the initial ground invasion, alleged shelling with white phosphorous 
which killed or injured civilians, allegedly intentional attacks against a mosque during the early 
evening prayer and subsequent death of fifteen civilians, alleged denial to evacuate wounded 
civilians or medical emergency services.204 It was highlighted that wilful killings and wilfully causing 
great suffering to protected persons are grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Furthermore, a violation of the right to life was stressed in relation to the direct targeting and 
arbitrary killing of civilians. Of note, in reviewing an incident on the bombing of a family house and 
the subsequent death of 22 family members, Israel was at pains to argue that this was an “operational 
error” as the planned target was an adjacent house storing weapons. If this case was a mistake, it 
could not amount to wilful killing, but the issue of State responsibility for an internationally 
wrongful act would be relevant.205 In this regard, the silence of the ILC’s Draft Articles on such a 
                                                                                                                                                            
Rules 149, 150 and 158 of ICRC Study on Customary IHL; particularly, according to Rule 149 “[a] State is responsible for 
violations of international humanitarian law attributable to it, including: (a) violations committed by its organs, including its armed forces; (b) 
violations committed by persons or entities it empowered to exercise elements of governmentality; (c) violations committed by persons or groups 
acting in fact on its instructions, or under its direction or control; and (d) violations committed by private persons or groups which it 
acknowledges and adopts as its own conduct”. Then, Rule 150 provides that responsible States are required to make 
reparations for injury or loss caused. Finally, Rule 158 imposes a duty to investigate and prosecute war crimes 
committed by their own nationals or armed forces, or those that occurred upon their territory.  
203 See UN International Law Commission, Principles of International Law Recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and 
in the Judgment of the Tribunal, Principle 1, A/1316 (1950), stating that “[a]ny person who commits an act which constitutes a crime 
under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment”. See also Arts. 7, 8, 25 ICC Statute, although its 
application to the conflict in Gaza is still not possible. The Palestinian Authority issued a declaration under Article 12(3) 
accepting the ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed on “the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002”; in deeming Palestine’s 
status at the United Nations as “observer entity” crucial to the issue of the Court’s jurisdiction (the entry into the Rome 
Statute system is through the UN Secretary General acting as treaty depositary), on April 2012 the ICC Prosecutor 
concluded that its status at that time meant Palestine could not either join the Statute or validly lodge the 
aforementioned declaration. Apparently he did not consider Palestine’s acceptance as a full member in the UNESCO in 
October 2011. After the upgraded status to “non-member observer state” by GA Res. 67/19 of 29 November 2012, the legal 
implications of such development were examined by the OPT, concluding for a non retroactive validation of the 2009 
declaration as well as for the ability of Palestine to accede to the Rome Statute. See OTP, Report on Preliminary 
Examination Activities for 2013, November 2013, paras. 234-238, finally highlighting that “at this stage, the Office has no legal 
basis to open a new preliminary examination”. Notably, the customary nature of rules on individual criminal liability has been 
acknowledged in the ICRC Study of Customary IHL; see Rule 151 for perpetrated war crimes, Rule 152 on command 
responsibility for crimes “committed pursuant to their orders”, Rule 153 on command responsibility for “failure to 
prevent or punish with knowledge of a war crime”, and Rule 155 on subordinate responsibility if the unlawfulness of an 
act is knowledged (irrespective of the superior order). 
204 See UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XI, paras. 732-735. Under Article 10 (2) API, which reflects customary 
international law, “in all circumstances (the wounded) shall be treated humanely and shall receive, the fullest extent practicable and with 
the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required by their condition”. The Mission recalled Rule 110 of the ICRC 
Study on Customary IHL, according to which “the obligation to protect and care for the wounded ... is an obligation of means” and it 
applies whenever circumstances permit; however, “each party to the conflict must use its best efforts to provide protection and care for the 
wounded, … , including permitting humanitarian organizations to provide for their protection and care”. 
205 The obligation concerned was to guarantee to the civilian population general protection against the threats stemming 
from hostilities (Article 51(1) API). According to the Mission, the firing was deliberate as it was arranged (by Israel’s 
admission) to attack the al-Daya house, although the selection had gone wrong at the preparation stage and the effects 





mistake was referenced whilst stressing the controversial status of the requirement of fault in 
international law.206 
It is worth underlining that the alleged violations just mentioned highlight at least three basic 
dimensions, including the State responsibility for conduct taken by State officials and armed forces, 
the State obligation to investigate and prosecute any crimes perpetrated by its own nationals or its 
officials and military force or those that occurred upon their territory, and the State obligation to 
make reparations for loss and injury caused. 
 
2. Another aspect critically emphasised in Operation Cast Lead regards the concrete difficulty in 
reaching acceptable equilibrium between respecting the principles of distinction, precautions and proportionality 
and conducting urban warfare according to lax rules of engagement. Indeed, the employment of overly-liberal 
rules of engagement was viewed as one the main failures to which reconnecting the violation of the 
duty of distinction.207 This serious issue was referred to in the reported investigations on alleged 
direct attacks against civilians. According to the reviewed incidents, the instructions provided to the 
armed forces moving into Gaza allowed “a low threshold for the use of lethal fire against the civilian 
population”.208 Although they faced clear risks in the context of conducting urban warfare and 
Hamas’s conduct of hostilities was often in breach of the rule of distinguishing itself from civilians (as 
the Mission also noted), the controversial flexibility of the employed rules of engagement underlines 
the necessity of more strict standards in context of urban warfare to guarantee military conduct which 
respect the cardinal principle of distinction.  
Despite Israel’s rejection of the Mission’s report, the international criticism it provoked and the 
severe scrutiny that followed led the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to issue a new document defining 
rules of engagement in urban warfare in May 2010. For instance, it deals with the efforts to induce 
civilians to evacuate areas where combat is expected and some non-combatants stay behind: after 
efforts have been made to warn the civilian population to leave, the incoming troops are firstly 
required to fire warning shots and give the remaining civilians a chance to leave safely. Then, in 
                                                                                                                                                            
obligation” to protect civilian life, it was concluded that, “although a fault element is needed”, existing information 
proved “substantial failure of due diligence”, see UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XI, paras. 861-866. 
206 J. Crawford and S. Olleson have noted how “if a State deliberately carries out some specific act, there is less room for it to argue 
that the harmful consequences were unintended and should be disregarded. Everything depends on the specific context and on the content and 
interpretation of the obligation said to have been breached”, see J. Crawford and S. Olleson, “The nature and forms of 
international responsibility”, in M. Evans (ed.), International Law, Oxford, 2003. 
207 See G.E. Bisharat, “Israel’s Invasion of Gaza in International Law”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 2009-
2010, pp. 70 and 75-77. 
208 A solid confirmation of this trend was found in Israeli soldiers’ testimonies found in two publications reviewed by the 
Mission, noting that the instructions to the soldiers convened two “policies” aimed at eliminating any risk to their lives, 





order to minimise casualties among civilians who nevertheless choose to stay, IDF fighters and 
commanders are required to use the most accurate weapons at their disposal and choose munitions 
that have a relatively low impact. Broadly, the number of changes in policy and doctrine for fighting 
in built-up areas include not only modifying the way soldiers fight in urban areas, but also teaching 
relatively low-level combat officers the nuances in the laws of war, attaching humanitarian liaison 
officers to active forces and making media relations a priority.209  
Regrettably, the hostilities in the context of Operation Protective Edge have been still 
controversial in this regard. Significantly, the warnings issued before air strikes against targets in 
Gaza (e.g. text messages, phone calls, and “knocks on the roof”), having a central relevance in Israel’s 
claim to obey the bounds of international law,210 raise significant concerns. It is worth highlighting 
that a warning before an attack does not affect the status of persons or objects as civilian; in 
addition, it does not have any legal implications for the attacker’s other legal obligations. In 
particular it does not weaken the obligation to weight envisaged collateral damage against the 
anticipated military advantage and to ensure the former is not “excessive”. Although the IDF has not 
maintained that warnings reduce further legal requirements upon the attacker, during Operation 
Protective Edge the significant amount of civilian residences attacked and the high percentage of 
civilian casualties211 appear to suggest a misunderstanding of Article 57 API, as detailed hereafter, 
                                                
209 These steps were reported as follows. Firstly, detailed study of international law with special reference to the rules of 
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Military Advocate General’s Office and the Foreign Ministry consult regularly with foreign governments and 
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follows: “While the IDF goes to extraordinary lengths to avoid civilian casualties, Hamas deliberately puts civilians in the line of fire. The 
terrorist organization bases command centers, weapons storage facilities and concealed rocket launchers inside civilian neighborhoods, sometimes 
even inside houses. Lt. Or and Lt. Omer are two pilots in the Israel Air Force whose work reduces harm to civilians in Gaza”, official blog 
available at http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/20/exclusive-interview-iaf-pilots-limit-casualties/  
211 Human Rights Watch estimates around 77%, see “Israel/Palestine: Unlawful Israeli Airstrikes Kill Civilians. 
Bombings of civilian infrastructures suggest illegal policy”, 16 July 2014, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/15/israelpalestine-unlawful-israeli-airstrikes-kill-civilians; the UN estimates 
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or at least an incorrect use of warnings as a mean to justify disproportionate victimisation of civilians 
in urban warfare.  
 
3. A further aspect investigated in the two main phases of Operation Cast Lead offers the chance to 
reflect on the role of the principle of distinction as an effective restraint on military action causing 
devastating impact on civilians in the sphere of ESC rights. It concerns cases of alleged “deliberate 
attacks on the foundations of civilian life”.212 In particular, several of the reported incidents involved the 
destruction of industrial infrastructures, water installations, farms, food production, sewage 
treatment plants, and private houses. The legal analysis elaborated in such cases deserves attention 
for several reasons.  
3.a. Firstly, it sheds light on the pressing need to inquire into military operations carried out in 
the context of urban warfare from the perspective of the serious implications it could have for specific ESC 
rights of the civilian population. In fact, such conduct in urban environments cannot be classified per se as 
a violation of the basic IHL principles, even if the latter are easily breached in cases of attacks in the 
vicinity of civilians or protected buildings. In addition, analysis from this perspective has the 
potential to favour a more sensitive evaluation of collateral effects of hostilities against several basic 
dimensions of civilian life, leading to a better articulation of the ways to prevent or repair them.  
3.b. Secondly, the relevance of this type of attack is directly linked to the IHL meaning of 
civilian immunity. Alleged violations of Article 147 GCIV were found since the destruction in 
question was deemed to be carried out without any military justification or any further effective 
contribution to military action, and as such was unlawful and wanton, amounting to war crimes.  
Specifically, in a series of air strikes on the el-Bader flourmill on 9 January 2009 the Mission 
concluded that “no plausible military justification for the extensive damage to the flourmill” had appeared “if the 
sole objective was to take control of the building”.213 In addition to considering those strikes as wanton and 
unlawful, their nature (particularly the targeting of key machinery) suggested the purpose of disabling the 
productive capacity of that flourmill in the Strip. A related query addressed in the report was “whether such 
a destruction of the sole remaining local capacity of producing flour” could be explained as being “done for the purpose 
                                                                                                                                                            
“Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Emergency. Humanitarian Snapshot”, 24 July 2014, available at 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/humanitarian_Snapshot_24July2014_oPt_V1.pdf  
212 See UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XIII, paras. 913-1031. 
213 In this regard, the Mission considered that apparently the owners were not a threat for the Israeli authorities before 
or after the military operations, in light of “unrestricted issuance of their Businessman Cards and their ability to travel to Israel 
afterwards”; further, if the flour mill was attacked to gain control of it “for observation and control purposes” then bombing the 
principal machinery and destroying the upper floors did not make sense; thirdly, there were no suggestions to consider 





of denying sustenance to the civilian population”. The affirmative answer led the Mission to recognise a 
violation of customary international law as reflected in Article 54(2) API and a possible 
configuration of a war crime. The irrelevance of the motive for denying the sustenance value of the 
flourmill was emphasised, as expressed in Protocol I;214 a comment on this aspect will be laid down 
below in discussing the IHL special protection of certain objects (next section 6.7). 
Similar legal findings related to the destruction of other civilian infrastructures. In relation to the 
Sawafeary chicken farms in the Zeytoun neighbourhood south of Gaza City, the absence of a 
military objective was linked to the fact that the area was controlled in a few hours and “the 
destruction of the land was not necessary to move tanks or equipment or gain any particular visual advantage”.215 
Still, no justification was found for the striking of “a wall of one of the raw sewage lagoons of the Gaza 
wastewater treatment plant” with a missile sufficient to produce “a breach 5 metres deep and 22 metres wide” 
causing “the outflow of more than 200,000 cubic metres of raw sewage onto neighbouring farmland”.216 In the 
same way, the Mission deemed questionable that “a target the size of the Namar wells could have been hit by 
multiple strikes in error given the nature of the deployment systems and the distance between the wells and any 
neighbouring buildings”; they occurred the first day of the aerial attack and destroyed this complex 
comprising “two water wells, pumping machines, a generator, fuel storage, a reservoir chlorination unit, buildings 
and related equipment”.217 
Furthermore, the destruction of residential housing “by air strikes, mortar and artillery shelling, missile 
strikes, the operation of bulldozers and demolition charges” was reviewed. In view of soldiers’ testimonies and 
several reports different phases were identified,218 such as those carried out for “operational necessity” 
of advancing armed forces in the areas concerned. 219  Other neighbourhoods were allegedly 
destroyed systematically during the last three days of operations, when the ground forces were 
                                                
214 See also J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., Rule 54. 
215 To the Mission, the destruction of the plant and machinery of the farms (in addition to the coops with the chickens) 
was deemed “a deliberate act of wanton destruction not justified by military necessity”, see UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter 
XIII, paras. 956-961. 
216 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XIII, paras. 962-974. 
217 See UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XIII, paras. 975-986. 
218 In some cases residential neighbourhoods were reportedly “subjected to air-launched bombing and to intensive shelling 
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military action” (paras. 994-995). In the last three days, Israeli forces reportedly engaged in “systematic destruction of civilian 
buildings” in view of the imminent withdrawal (paras. 996-997), see UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XIII, paras. 990-
1007. 
219 See UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XIII, para. 1000. “Operation necessity” reportedly embraced two different 
destructions: first, the deliberate destructions of “houses from which fire had been opened on Israeli soldiers or which were suspected of 
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arranging their withdrawal;220 such conduct was deemed to amount to the grave breach of “extensive 
destruction … of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” under 
Article 147 GCIV.  
3.c. Thirdly, another reason for looking at the legal analysis in the Fact-Finding Mission to 
evaluate alleged “deliberate attacks on the foundations of civilian life” in Gaza concerns the comprehensive 
approach adopted in reviewing the incidents. Its legal findings on the conduct of military operations 
indicated a meaningful interest in identifying violations of fundamental provisions of human rights law, in addition 
to those relating to international humanitarian law. In doing so, its report appears to propose - 
although implicitly - the characterisation offered by the International Court of Justice of the 
relationship between these two branches of international law in the context of armed conflict. In 
particular, an overlap becomes apparent, with parallel violations arising from the same conduct, 
even though international humanitarian law plays a predominant role in this analysis. Indeed, in the 
final legal findings the simultaneous violation of similar provisions of human rights tended to be 
merely noted, without a further examination of the facts in light of the principles set by such norms.  
In particular, a violation of the right to adequate housing of the families concerned was found in 
the last cases analysed above, and Article 11 ICESCR was referenced by highlighting that it “requires 
the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself, and his family, including adequate … housing”.221 
A denial of the right to have adequate access to water was acknowledged in respect of the people 
served by the Namar wells;222 taking the view that the right to drinking water is a dimension of the 
right to food, the Mission reached similar legal findings concerning the destruction of the e-Bader 
flourmill. A number of norms were deemed to have been violated as a result of the military action 
carried out to destroy food and water supplies and infrastructures such as: Article 1 ICCPR stating 
that “in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence”, Article 11 ICESCR, and Article 12 
                                                
220 See UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XIII, para. 1001. According to the reports by the Operational Satellite 
Applications Programme (UNOSAT) of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), “in al-
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homes in violation of international humanitarian law, and subsequent displacement, amounted to forcible eviction, 
called into question numerous international human rights requirements and, as stated by the Commission on Human 
Rights in Resolution 1993/77, constituted gross violations of human rights, particularly the right to adequate housing. 
See Report of four UN Special Rapporteurs on their Mission to Lebanon and Israel, UN Doc. A/HRC//2/7, 2 October 2006. 





(2) CEDAW requiring States parties to ensure to women “adequate nutrition during pregnancy and 
lactation”. In relation to the destruction of the local capacity to produce flour, the right to food was 
understood to require the right to food security (“through either self-production or adequate income”) and the 
right to be free from hunger.223  
 
Definitively this analysis on alleged cases of attacks on the foundations of civilian life confirms 
the great importance of taking the long-term consequences of military operations carried out in urban warfare and 
affecting ESC rights of the civilian population more seriously. Crucially, the lasting effects of the 
aforementioned destruction of el-Bader flourmill were considerable. As noted by the Mission, it 
made its entire personnel unemployed and critically reduced the production capacity of milled flour 
(the primary ingredient of the local diet) in Gaza; it also increased the population’s dependence on 
the authorizations for the entrance of flour and bread into the Strip. In the same vein, the 
Sawafeary chicken farms, whose destruction occurred for several days through the armed forces’ 
armoured bulldozers, reportedly supplied “over ten per cent of the Gaza egg market”. Besides, 5.5 hectares 
of land, including agricultural land, were damaged by the strike against the raw sewage lagoons of 
the Gaza wastewater treatment plant. 
Further implications may be expected to derive from subsequent analysis at the end of this part 
of the report. Particularly, all those investigated attacks were deemed part of “an overall deliberate and 
systematic policy” of economic infrastructural targets,224 including the only cement-packaging plant of the 
Atta Abu Jubbah, the ready-mix concrete factories of Abu Eida,225 more than a third of chicken 
farms, the al-Wadiyah Group’s factories226 and water installations.227 In all investigated cases both 
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224 In UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, at 218, the Mission also concluded that “the systematic destruction of food 
production, water services and construction industries was related to the overall policy of disproportionate destruction of a significant part of 
Gaza’s infrastructure”. 
225 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XIII, paras. 1012-1017. The Mission used the expression of “a very deliberate 
strategy of attacking the construction industry”, as nineteen of the twenty-seven factories reportedly were destroyed, namely the 
eighty-five percent of the productive capacity. It noted that “the ability to produce and supply concrete in a context where external 
supplies are entirely controlled by Israel is a matter not only of economic importance but arguably one of human necessity to satisfy the basic 
need for shelter. In fact, although the population can get by in makeshift accommodation or by living in cramped conditions with their extended 
families, the capacity to repair the massive damage done to buildings without internally produced concrete is severely reduced. To the extent that 
concrete is allowed to enter at all, it is significantly more expensive than domestically produced concrete”. 
226  UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XIII, paras. 1018-1022. The al-Wadiyah Group’s factories employed 
approximately 170 people and produced food and drinks since 1954. The Mission estimated the demolition of over 30 
hectares of greenhouses, and the destruction of 11.2 hectares in Gaza City and 9.5 hectares in north Gaza. 
227 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XIII, paras. 1022-1025, reporting that “all types of water installations appeared to have 
been damaged to some extent during the Israeli military operations”, but noted that “in some areas, particularly Beit Lahia, Jabaliyah, Beit 
Hanoun, part of Zeytoun, south of Rafah and the villages in the east, buildings, water and wastewater infrastructures and other facilities have 
been totally destroyed”. It also stressed that “the strikes on plants, pipes, wells and tanks had put considerable pressure on the sanitation 





acts and consequences were found to be being intended. In relation to such military operations, the 
general obligation enshrined in Article 52 API to ensure that civilian objects are not attacked as well 
as the obligation to protect objects indispensable to the population’s survival were considered. The 
customary norms expressed in Article 54(2) API were also mentioned. Having recognised that “Israel 
displayed a premeditated determination to achieve the objective of destruction”, the Mission found that it was 
“responsible for the internationally wrongful acts it perpetrated in breach of the duties specified above”. 
 
As far as non-international armed conflicts are concerned, lawful direct attacks are limited to 
“persons taking active/direct part in hostilities” and against military objectives provided the following 
considerations are met.  
The parties to the conflict are bound to distinguish between civilians and persons who are taking 
an “active/direct part in hostilities”. 228  The specific prohibition of directing attacks against the 
population as such as well as individual civilians is embodied in Article 13(2) APII.229 In the same 
vein, common Article 3(1) GCs requires parties to treat humanely all “persons taking no active part in 
hostilities” in every circumstance. For the purpose of the present thesis, it is worth underlining that 
directing attacks against civilians is also prohibited under other treaties applicable to non-
international armed conflicts, including the Amended Protocol II to the CCW,230 Protocol III to the 
CCW on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons,231 the Ottawa Convention 
banning anti-personnel landmines.232 Remarkably, under the Rome Statute “intentionally directing 
attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” is a 
war crime in non-international armed conflicts under Article 8(2)(e)(i). 
Conversely, State parties to internal conflicts are bound to distinguish between civilian objects 
and military objectives (so including the definition of the latter) and are prohibited from directing 
attacks against civilian objects as a matter of customary international humanitarian law.233 As for 
non-state armed groups, it seems reasonable to argue that, as a minimum, they may be expected to 
                                                
228 Article 3 GCIV refers to “persons taking no active part in hostilities”; Articles 4(1) and 13(3) AP II refer to civilians who 
“enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”. 
229 Article 13(2) APII also provides that “Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited”. 
230 Article 3(7) of the Amended Protocol II to the CCW. 
231 Article 2(1) of Protocol III to the CCW, which become applicable to non-international armed conflicts with an 
amendment of Article 1 of the Convention approved by consensus in 2001. 
232 See its Preamble (“the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants” is one of those founding the 
Convention). 





be able to adhere to the core of the principle of distinction in relation to objects.234 Nevertheless, 
directing attacks against civilian objects is also prohibited under other treaties applicable to non-
international armed conflicts, including the Amended Protocol II to CCW Convention and the 
Protocol III to the CCW.235 In addition, in the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property the principle of distinction is used as a basis to define the protection 
due to cultural property in non-international armed conflicts.236 
Notably, support for the application of distinction between civilian objects and military 
objectives as custom has emerged in the jurisprudence of the ICTY,237 and also in the findings of 
the 2005 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 238  the 2011 Panel of Experts on 
Accountability in Sri Lanka,239 and the 2012 International Commission of the Inquiry on Libya.240 
In legal scholarship the principle of distinction and the prohibition on directing attacks against 
civilian objects in non-international armed conflicts have been understood as being applicable as 
                                                
234 Their obligation to apply the principle of distinction was supported in the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, 25 January 2005, see para. 166 (vi) in conjunction with para. 172. This 
obligation has been recognised by non-state armed groups, see e.g. the Code of Conduct of the National Liberation 
Army in Colombia and the Code of Conduct of the National Transition Council in Libya, reprinted in 93 IRRC, 2011, 
p. 490 and p. 500. 
235 Article 3(7) of the Amended Protocol II to the CCW; Article 2(1) of Protocol III to the CCW. 
236 Article 6(a) of the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property. 
237 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (IT-94-1-AR72), Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, paras. 100-119 and 127; 
Prosecutor v. Kupreskić (IT-95-16-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 521; Prosecutor v. Martić (IT-95-11), 
Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, Trial Chamber, 8 March 1996, paras. 10-18; Prosecutor v. Galić (IT-98-29-T), 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 5 December 2003, para. 57. 
238 See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, 25 January 2005. In para 166 (vi), it explicitly deemed the customary rule on the 
prohibition of attacks against civilian objects as relevant and applicable to the internal armed conflict in Darfur; in note 
it referred to para. 5 of GA Res. 2675 (XXV) of 9 December 1970 that was adopted unanimously and paragraphs 15-
16.2 of the 2004 British Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict whereby can be regarded as evidence of State practice 
“dwellings and other installations that are used only by the civilian population should not be the object o military operations”. 
239 See Report of the Secretary General`s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 31 March 2011, para. 196, confirming, 
inter alia, that “parties may not direct an attack against a zone established to shelter the wounded, the sick and civilians from the effects of 
hostilities” (as Rule 35 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL).  
240 See Report of the International Commission of the Inquiry to Investigate all Alleged Violations International Human Rights Law in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/44, 12 January 2012, paras. 146-147, referring in detail to “escalating 
attacks against journalists and media professionals”. In this first report, in relation to attacks on civilians, civilian objects, 
protected persons and objects (see paras. 162-179), the Commission laid down the following conclusions: that it did not 
have “access to full information allowing it to definitively evaluate allegations of these violations of international humanitarian law”; that 
there were “at least indiscriminate attacks against civilians by Government forces and a failure to take sufficient precautionary steps to 
protect civilians” but that “further investigation” were necessary to determine if there was intentional targeting of civilians; 
that protected objects such as mosques and cultural objects definitely were damaged during conflict but it was unable to 
determine if attacks on such objects were intentional; that there were certainly “instances of the deliberate destruction of objects 
indispensable to the civilian population”; that some attacks on medical transports and facilities appeared to have been “targeted 
attacks”, along with some other instances requiring further investigation; that Libyan authorities failed to facilitate access 
for humanitarian agencies to address the needs of civilian populations in Libya; that “attacks on humanitarian units” 
occurred but it was not able to establish whether intentional or not; and that “a failure to take precautionary steps to minimise 
damage to civilian/protected objects” was recognisable (see para. 180). In the second phase of the Commission’s work, over 75 
interviews were conducted to look at this issue and destruction in towns across Libya was inspected. See also Report of the 





custom241 or by implication from the concept of “general protection” in Article 13(1) AP II being it wide 
enough to include the same principle.242 
Notwithstanding that under the Rome Statute deliberate attacks on civilian objects do not 
directly constitute a war crime in relation to non-international armed conflicts, Article 8(2)(e)(xii) 
criminalises the seizure or destruction of the property of an adversary unless it is “imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of the conflict”. Further, Article 8(2)(e)(iii) defines as a war crime as “attacks against … 
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the UN Charter” provided that these objects “are entitled to the protection given to … civilian objects under 
the international law of armed conflict”. 
Remarkably, in the evaluation of the deliberate and massive destruction of whole villages by 
deliberate demolitions as well as burning by the Janjaweed and the Government forces, on the basis 
of international humanitarian law and international criminal law, the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur deemed such a “devastation” not justified by military necessity despite the 
presence of some rebels therein.243 It also affirmed that those attacks against property may have 
amounted to persecution as a crime against humanity if done on discriminatory grounds, besides 
constituting a war crime. In view of the fact that the major villages destroyed belonged to African 
tribes and that such destruction had “a detrimental effect on the liberty and livelihood of those people, being 
deprived of all necessities of life in the villages”, it concluded that it was carried “unlawfully, wantonly and 
discriminatorily”.244 
6.2. The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks  
Protocol I strengthens the basic principle of distinction by forbidding the indiscriminate targeting of 
military objectives. Therefore, the lack of intention to harm civilians or civilian objects does not 
excuse the attacker when the relevant military action is in wanton disrespect of the duty of 
distinction. In particular, Article 51(4) defines indiscriminate attacks as (a) those which are not aimed at a 
                                                
241 E.g., see M. N. Schmitt, C. H. B. Garraway and Y. Dinstein, Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts: With 
Commentary, San Remo, 2006, p. 6 (para. 1) for the definition of military objectives and p. 11 (para. 3) and 19 (para. 3) 
for the principle of distinction between civilian objects and military objectives. See D. Fleck, “The law of non-
international armed conflicts”, in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian law, OUP, 2008, p. 614; La 
Haye, op. cit., 2008, pp. 57-67; M. Sassoli and L. Cameron, “The protection of civilian objects - current state of the law 
and issues de lege ferenda”, in N. Ronzitti and G. Venturini (eds.), The Law of Air Warfare - Contemporary Issues, Eleven 
International Publishing, 2006, pp. 45-46, arguing the difficulty to expect the respect of the prohibition of direct attacks 
against the civilian population and individual civilians without limiting attacks to military objectives. 
242 M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch and W.A. Solf (eds.), op. cit., p. 677.  
243 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, op. cit., paras. 318-321.  
244 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, op. cit., paras. 305 and 320-
321. In paragraph 148, the Commission listed several affected ESC rights: the rights to adequate food and water, the 





precise military objective,245 (b) those which use a means or method of combat that cannot be aimed at a 
precise military objective,246 or (c) those which use a means or method of combat whose consequences cannot 
be restricted as required by this Protocol (so in line with the various restrictions on the use of force).247  
Notably, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks has evolved with particular reference to the use 
of explosive weapons (e.g. bombs, rockets, mortar and artillery shells) in cities, towns, villages or other 
populated areas.248 This prohibition is also included in Protocol II and Amended Protocol II to the 
on CCW Convention.249 Conversely, the frequent use of cluster munitions, namely “area weapons” 
raising serious problems of accuracy and reliability, led the ICRC to call upon States to prohibit 
directing such weapons against military targets placed in inhabited areas.250 Indeed, cluster weapons 
are prohibited by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, whose preamble addresses them as causing 
“unacceptable harm” to the civilian population, although this treaty is not considered as declaratory of 
customary international law. However, this prohibition does not apply if the sub-munitions released 
after the blast contain a self-destructive mechanism or are aimed at hitting a single military target.251 
                                                
245 For instance, it is prohibited “firing blindly” into enemy territory or “releasing bombs over enemy territory” when 
the target originally choosen has been missed, see S. Oeter, “Methods and Means of Combat”, in Fleck D. (ed.), The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts3, Oxford, 2013, para. 457.2, p. 192. 
246 The drafters aimed to forbid the use of “remotely controlled weapons” characterised by very low target accuracy. Examples 
concern the missiles launched on Iranian and Iraq cities in the Gulf War and the scud missiles fired by Iraq against 
Israel during the Kuwait War of 1991; these imprecise weapons were pointed in the general direction of the 
metropolitan area of Tel Aviv, thus rendering the attacks indiscriminate under Article 51(4)(a). In this regard, a 
prohibited method of combat would be attacking when visibility inhibits precise targeting, see S. Oeter, “Methods and 
Means of Combat”, in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts3, Oxford, 2013, para. 457.3, p. 
193; Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, p. 128.  
247 Article 51(c) refers to cases “where the attacker is unable to control the effects of the attack […] or where the incidental effects are 
excessive”, see A. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, op. cit., p. 21. They can concern the objects targetted (e.g. installations having 
dangerous forces), the means used (e.g. weapons whose effects spread over an extensive area, such as cluster bombs), or 
the methods applied (e.g. poisoning wells). In particular, several weapons that can origin indiscriminate attacks are banned 
by the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 10 October 1980 and its Protocols; 
nevertheless, the possible extent for invoking Article 51(4)(c) as a general principle to prohibit the use of weapons not covered by the 
1980 CCW Convention remains to be determined. 
248 For a survey and reference work of existing legal and policy standards on explosive weapons, see M. Brehm, 
“Protecting Civilian from the Effects of Explosive Weapons. An Analysis of International Legal and Policy Standards”, 
UNIDIR - United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 2012, pp. 1-185. 
249 Article 3(3) of the 1980 Protocol II to the CCW on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices; Article 3(8) of 
the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the CCW on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices. 
250  See ICRC, Official Statement, 6 November 2006, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/cluster-munition-statement-061106.htm  
251 See N. Ronzitti, Diritto Internazionale dei conflitti armati5, Giappichelli, 2014. The treaty banning cluster weapons was 
agreed in Dublin in May 2008 and it was opened for signature on 3 December 2008; according to Article 1(1) of the 
Convention on Cluster Weapons: “Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: (a) Use cluster munitions; (b) 
Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions; (c) Assist, encourage or 
induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention”. Notably, the Preamble draws a connection 
between cluster munitions generally and economic and social development in areas that have seen armed conflict that 
included the use of cluster munitions (para. 3). The Preamble makes repeated reference to creating and protecting rights 





As to nuclear weapons, although highly indiscriminate by their very nature, it remains to be seen 
whether their use is lawful or forbidden in circumstances of extreme necessity of self-defence.252 
Regarding the customary nature of the rule in question, in its advisory opinion on nuclear 
weapons, the prohibition of weapons unable to distinguish between civilian and military targets was 
acknowledged to be an “intransgressible” principle of customary international law. As the ICJ stated, 
in line with this principle, at a very early stage international humanitarian law banned certain types 
of weapons “because of their indiscriminate effect on combatants and civilians”. Similarly, the ICTY looked at 
the legitimacy of the use of cluster bombs under customary international law, taking account of the 
prohibition of indiscriminate attacks engaging a method or means that cannot be aimed at a precise 
military target.253 
 
Two types of attacks are mentioned as indiscriminate under Protocol I. The first one is “an attack 
by bombardment which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives 
located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects”;254 
therefore, this is per se contrary to the principles of proportionality and distinction.  
Further, any attack which “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated” is also deemed to be indiscriminate. As commonly underlined in relation to 
Article 51(5)(b), where the concept of proportionality is clearly laid down, any evaluation focuses 
very much on what is expected and what is initially anticipated (rather than on what the outcome of the 
attack will be). If an attack is indiscriminate, any resulting losses of civilians or destruction to civilian 
property cannot be justified as collateral damage. Therefore, what makes an attack indiscriminate is 
the “state of mind” of the attacker,255 rather than the number of resulting casualties. Conversely, its 
lawfulness will be evaluated in view of the principle of proportionality if the methods (e.g. 
inaccurately aimed missiles) or the means (e.g. biological weapons) used do not indicate an 
                                                
252 See ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 105. 
253 In reviewing the indictment in the Martić case, the ICTY examined the use of a cluster munitions type (i.e. the M-87 
Orkan rocket) in relation to attacks on the city of Zagreb (specifically, it “was fired on 2 and 3 May 1995 from the Vojnić area, 
near Slavsko Polje, between 47 and 51 kilometres from Zagreb”). It noted that “the area of dispersion” of the rocket’s submunitions 
on the ground was about two hectares; it termed the rocket a “high dispersion weapon” incapable of hitting specific targets 
and concluded that “the M-87 Orkan is an indiscriminate weapon, the use of which in densely populated civilian areas, such as Zagreb, 
will result in the infliction of severe casualties”. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Martić (IT-95-11-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment of 12 
June 2007, para. 463.  
254 Article 51(5)(a) API; before the adoption of this rule, a prohibition of “target area” bombings was not clearly accepted 
in the practice. Such attacks may also fall within the prohibition on targeting that is not aimed at a precise military 
objective, as expressed in paragraph 4(a), see Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmerman (eds.), op. cit., para. 1973. 





irresponsible state of mind.256 
 
Focusing on recent relevant practice, the indiscriminate firing of rockets and mortars by Hamas 
and other Palestinian armed groups into Israeli civilian areas were repeatedly condemned.257 
Similarly, the use of certain weapons constituting indiscriminate attacks aimed at centres heavily 
populated during the three-weeks Operation Cast Lead was also criticised.258 In this vein, the air 
strikes against the Rafah refugee camp, even when allegedly targeting militants, caused 
“indiscriminate death and destruction” to the civilian population, including many women and children hit 
in their own homes.259  
Further, with regard to the 33 day international armed conflict that took place in Lebanon, “a 
significant pattern of excessive, indiscriminate, and disproportionate use of force by the IDF against Lebanese civilians 
and civilian objects”, which failed to respect the principle of distinction and also went “beyond reasonable 
arguments of military necessity and of proportionality”, was highlighted by the Commission on Inquiry on 
Lebanon.260 This referred specifically to the destruction or damage of civilian houses and residential 
buildings in southern Lebanon, South Beirut, and civilian convoys.261 Remarkably, it also found 
ample evidence of indiscriminate use of cluster munitions, underlining that “many towns and villages 
were littered with the bomblets as well as large tracts of agricultural land” (which turned into “no go” areas for 
the civilian population) and that “Tibnin, Nabatiyeh, Yahmor, Ain Ibel, Yaroun, Bent J’beil, Qfar Tibnit and 
Swane were also deliberate targets of cluster bombings”. Consequently the use of such cluster weapons was 
deemed excessive and not capable of being justified by military necessity “in the absence of any 
reasonable explanation from IDF”; in view of the foreseeable ineffective rate, it was also considered as 
                                                
256 The primary nature of the principle of proportionality as founded by a joint reading of Articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)-(b) 
and 85(3)(b) AP I, is stressed by A. Bouvin, op. cit., p. 34. 
257 See, e.g., the statement by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in respect to the hostilities carried out since 13 
June 2014, “Human Rights Council 21st special session: Human Rights Situation in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including East Jerusalem”, 23 July 2014. 
258 According to Marc Garlasco, Senior Military Analyst at Human Rights Watch, “Firing 155 mm shells into the center of 
Gaza City, whatever the target, will likely cause horrific civilian casualties”, adding that “by using this weapon in such circumstances, 
Israel is committing indiscriminate attacks in violation of the laws of war”, see Human Rights Watch, “Israel: Stop shelling in 
crowded Gaza City”, 16 January 2009. These shells have “a margin of error of thirty meters” and a blast radius of 300 meters”, 
see B. Hubbard and A. de Montesquieu, “Rights Groups says Laws of War violated in Gaza”, The Associated Press, 4 
February 2009. The choice of less precise weaponry has raised the question of intent: “When you have an alternative that is 
GPS-guided and very accurate, why would you use a shell that is much less accurate and has a much larger kill radius?”, see Fred 
Abrahams of Human Rights Watch, ibid. 
259 See Human Rights Watch, “Israel/Hamas: Civilians must not be targets”, 30 December 2008. 
260 Report of the Commission on Inquiry on Lebanon, UN Doc. A/HRC/32, 23 November 2006, paras. 13, 25 (in which it 
openly expressed the view that, “cumulatively, deliberate and lethal attacks by the IDF on civilians and civilian objects amounted to 
collective punishment”), para. 110. 





amounting “to a de facto scattering of anti-personnel mines across wide tracts of Lebanese land”.262  
 
As noted above, indiscriminate attacks are not expressly prohibited in Protocol II, although two sections of 
the definition contained in Article 51(4) API have been deemed to fall within the prohibition on 
making the civilian population the object of attack under Article 13(2) APII: attacks carried out 
without identifying specific military objectives and attacks treating several visibly separate military 
targets placed together with civilians or civilian objects as a single entity.263 Amended Protocol II to 
the CCW Convention, which is applicable to non-international armed conflicts, prohibits these 
attacks as other relevant instruments do.264  
Looking at recent practice, in the findings by the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Syria Arab Republic in the context of the non-international armed conflict between 
government forces and pro-government militia and non-State armed groups, unlawful 
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks - mostly shelling and aerial bombardments - were 
reported to cause mass civilian death and injuries as well as large-scale arbitrary displacement.265 
With regard to government forces and pro-government militia, civilian areas were shelled with 
artillery, mortars and tank fire; highly imprecise and lethal barrel bombs were dropped into urban 
areas from helicopters at high altitudes and such use was deemed indiscriminate. Contested civilian-
inhabited areas of strategic importance such as Aleppo, Damascus, Dara’a, Idlib and Ar Raqqah 
governorates were brutally bombarded and came under intense and sustained, often daily, attacks 
that were not directed at distinct military objectives and spread terror among civilians. Conversely, 
armed groups besieged and indiscriminately shelled civilian neighbourhoods, using mortars, artillery 
shells and home-made rockets in a manner that made no distinction between civilian and military 
objectives.266 
Therefore, it is worth stressing that it would be illogical to admit that what is provided for in the 
context of international armed conflicts is not applicable also in internal armed conflicts. 
                                                
262 Report of the Commission on Inquiry on Lebanon, ibid., para. 253. It is reported that they were both ground-based (M483A1 
155mm artillery shells, M 395 and M 396 155 mm artillery shells and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)) and 
air-dropped (CBU-58 munitions), that 90 per cent of them were fired into South Lebanon during the last seventy-two 
hours of the armed conflict, and that many of them “littered the ground with the potential to explode at any time”, see paras. 249-
256. 
263 M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf (eds.), op. cit., p. 677.  
264 Article 3(8) of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the CCW, on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices; Y. 
Dinstein, C. Garraway and M. Schmitt, Manual on the Law on Non-International Armed Conflict, the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law, 2006, pp. 20-21, para. 2.1.1.3. 
265 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/65, 12 
February 2014. This report covers investigations conducted from 15 July 2013 to 20 January 2014. 





6.2.a. Some remarks on the principle of proportionality 
The relevance of this principle lies in the fact that it measures the lawfulness of any armed attack 
causing incidental civilian casualties, so expressing the constant and delicate exigency of the law on 
the conduct of hostilities to “equitably balance” between humanitarian requirements and military 
necessity.267 According to the rationale of this principle, an attack against a legitimate target may 
provoke “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof”, but 
remain lawful. Specifically, collateral damage that “may be expected” to be caused by such attack must 
not be “excessive” in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage intended, otherwise it 
must be suspended or cancelled on account of being it prohibited. Therefore, “even a legitimate target 
may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military advantage to be 
gained from the attack”.268  
While the origins of proportionality date back to the principle forbidding superfluous injury and 
unnecessary suffering,269 Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)270 API contain the primary codifications of 
proportionality, even though it is not specifically mentioned.271 Some controversial implications 
have been outlined for the way through which Article 51(5)(b) prohibits disproportionate collateral 
damage under the heading of indiscriminate attacks. In fact, proportionality is emphasised as an 
interpretative criterion to assess the indiscriminate nature of a military attack; conversely, the view 
that a violation of this principle cannot be assimilated to an indiscriminate attack or that a 
proportionate attack is not inevitably selective is not fully supported.272 In favour of such a position, 
                                                
267 See Articles 14-16 of the 1863 Lieber Code, see Francis Lieber, U.S. War Department, General Orders No.100: 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, reprinted in D. Schindler and J. Toman 
(ed.), the Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions; Resolution and Other Documents4, 2004; see M. McDougal and F. 
Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion, 1961, pp. 525-530; see M. 
Bothe, K.J. Partsch, and W.A. Solf (eds.), op. cit., pp. 194-5. 
268 ICJ, Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, Dissenting Opinion of Judge R. 
Higgins, para. 20, at 587. 
269 The concept of maux superflus was not formulated as such until 1899 in Article 23(e) HRs. However, it may be traced 
back to the Preamble of the Declaration of St. Petersburg. The 1977 Protocol I broadened its scope of application to 
include methods of warfare and significantly narrowed the definition of military objectives that may be lawfully 
attacked, see H. Meyrowitz, “The principle of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering: From the Declaration of St. 
Petersburg of 1868 to Additional Protocol 1 of 1977”, IRRC, 1994, pp. 98-122. 
270 In Article 57, the concept of proportionality occurs twice: subparagraph 2(a)(iii) instructs “those who plan or decide upon 
an attack” to refrain from launching an attack that is likely to produce excessive casualties, and subparagraph 2(b) 
requires to cancel or suspend an attack if it seems that it does not respect proportionality. Then, Article 85(3)(b) API 
labels the launching of an indiscriminate disproportionate attack as a “grave breach”, also referring to Article 57(2)(a)(iii). 
271 In these provisions the terms ‘proportionate’ and ‘disproportionate’ are absent, so attesting the difficult negotiations 
of Protocol I regarding the concept of proportionality, see Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., 
paras. 2204-2218; W.A. Solf, op. cit., pp. 309-310. 
272 The opposite view that an attack giving rise to proportionate collateral damage can never be regarded as 
indiscriminate is supported, see F. Kruger-Sprengel, “Le Concept de Proportionalité dans le Droit de la Guerre. 
Rapport présenté au Comité pour la protection de la vie humaine dans les conflits armés, VIIIe Congrès de la Société 





it has been noted that the use of a biological or chemical weapons with undetermined consequences 
may harm a whole civilian population or no one at all, but their use is considered indiscriminate 
regardless of the concrete effect on civilians.273 
 
Focusing on the interpretation of a legitimate military advantage, the terms “concrete and direct” 
under Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) highlight the need to measure the intended advantage from any single 
attack:274 especially the textual references to ‘attack’ which apparently imply that the intended 
advantage and collateral damage cannot be determined from the whole military operation 
concerned. In this regard, the ICRC commentary has been called into question. 275  As a 
consequence of supporting a contrary interpretation, the proportionality principle would start to 
play a role only at the end of the conflict,276 risking being evaluated ex ius ad bellum, which is 
conceptually distinct from a principle that operates durante bello.  
A wide interpretation of proportionality was adopted in the report of the Committee set up by 
the Prosecutor of the ICTY to review the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia and to advise whether there was sufficient basis to start an investigation. The 
Committee refused to adopt the doctrine favoured by the Trial Chamber in the Kupreskic judgment, 
which found that the pattern of cumulative effects of “repeated attacks, all or most of them falling within the 
grey area between indisputable legality and unlawfulness” “may turn out to jeopardise excessively the lives and assets of 
                                                                                                                                                            
192. See also A. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, op. cit., pp. 21-23. The significance of considering an attack as 
indiscriminate is questioned in case civilians are not killed: “This is a curious provision because it takes no account of the actual 
consequences of an attack. On a strict construction, if the attack were indiscriminate by its nature it would seem to matter not whether any 
civilians are actually killed as a result. It is suggested that this would be an absurd and unintended result of the drafting. Certainly, to amount 
to a grave breach the indiscriminate attack must affect the civilian population” (ibid., p. 21). Nevertheless, the British Manual of the 
Law of Armed Conflict provides that “an attack can be indiscriminate even if no civilians are killed or injured by it, but a grave breach 
only occurs if the civilian population or civilian objects are knowingly and actually affected”, see United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 
The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford, 2004, p. 69, para. 5.23.3.  
273 A. Bouvin, The Legal Regime applicable to targeting military objectives in the context of contemporary warfare, 2006, p. 34. 
274 Under Articles 51 and 57 API, the notion of ‘attack’ is more restrictive than the notion contained in Article 49, since 
it does not referred to any act of violence against the enemy, but it requires a certain level of preparation and extension, 
see W. Fenrick, “The rule of proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare”, Military Law Review, 1982, at 
102. For another interpretation of “concrete and direct” as requiring to assess proportionality for a singular attack or 
military operation (rather than cumulatively) see J.G. Gardam, “Proportionality and Force in International Law”, AJIL, 
1993, p. 407. 
275 According to the ICRC, “The expression ‘concrete and direct’ was intended to show that the advantage concerned should be substantial 
and relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appear in the long term should be 
disregarded”, see C. Pilloud and J. Pictet, “Article 57”, op. cit., at 684. However, this paraphrase has been deemed 
questionable by some scholars, because “substantial” is not synonymous with “concrete” and because long-term effects may 
be direct and concrete, see Y. Dinstein, op. cit., p. 134, quoting K. Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, Sources and Commentary, Cambridge, 2003, at 161 n. 36. 
276 For an evaluation of the interpretation of the military advantage to be calculated against the whole military 
operation, see L. Vierucci, “Sulla nozione di obiettivo militare nella guerra aerea: recenti sviluppi della giurisprudenza 





civilians, contrary to the demands of humanity”. 277 Rejecting such a conclusion, the Committee argued 
that, under the rule of proportionality, the lawfulness of the attacks should be determined in view of 
an “overall assessment of the totality of civilian victims as against the goal of the military campaign”.278 Notably, 
this is evocative of the interpretative declarations made by the majority of NATO members ratifying 
Protocol I, according to which the military advantage anticipated concerns the one gained from a 
whole attack (and not from separated or specific portions of it).279  
However, these findings have not been completely accepted in legal scholarship. In particular, a 
portion of the attack may result in more victims than others, although the number of victims and 
the military advantage anticipated should take into account the attack in its entirety, as the military 
advantage is expected by the military commander while the actual accomplishment of the operation 
as well as the extent of collateral damage may only be ascertained a posteriori.280 In this regard, the 
approach undertaken by the Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza conflict assessed the existence of 
proportionality281 as well as precautionary measures282 for every single incidents and every single 
                                                
277 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al. (IT-95-16-Y), Trial Chamber, Judgment of 14 January 2000, para. 526. 
278 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, para. 52. To the Committee, the victims of the bombing of the radio TV station in Belgrade 
should have been assessed against the total civilian losses caused during the entire military campaign. 
279 See A. Roberts and R. Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War3, Oxford, 2000, for the text of the declaration, e.g. by 
Belgium (at 501), Germany (at 504), Italy (at 506), the Netherlands (at 508) or the United Kingdom (at 510). Canada 
Australia, France, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Spain made analogous statements; the declarations and reservations by 
signatory States are available at the ICRC IHL Database. The States concerned have not officially explained the 
meaning of “attack as a whole”, see K. Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Sources and Commentary, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 170-171. 
280 See N. Ronzitti, “Is the non liquet of the Final Report by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acceptable?”, IRRC, 2000, pp. 1017-1027; N. Ronzitti, “Civilian 
Population in Armed Conflict”, Max Plank Encyclopedia of Public International Law online. 
281 E.g., see UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter X, paras. 687-703, reviewing the shelling in al-Fakhura Street in view of 
two key issues: the proportionality in the military advantage gained and the weapons used. In stressing that the military 
advantage was to stop the claimed firing of mortars posing a risk to the lives of Israeli forces, the Mission noted that, 
“even if there were people firing mortars near al-Fakhura Street, the calculation of the military advantage had to be assessed bearing in mind 
the chances of success in killing the targets as against the risk of firing into a street full of civilians and very near a shelter with 1,368 civilians 
and of which the Israeli authorities had been informed” (para. 696). It considered this case not among the ones in which 
proportionality decisions present very genuine dilemmas. It concluded that “the deployment of at least four mortar shell to 
attempt to kill a small number of specified individuals in a setting where large numbers of civilians were going about their daily business and 
1,368 people were sheltering nearby cannot meet the test of what a reasonable commander would have determined to be an acceptable loss of 
civilian life for the military advantage sought” (para. 703). 
282 See UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter IX, paras. 499-652, examining the precautions taken in three attacks 
launched on 15 January 2009. Regarding the fact that the field office compound of the UNRWA for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East in Gaza City “came under shelling with high explosive and white phosphorous munitions”, the Mission concluded 
that “the Israeli armed forces violated the requirement under customary international law o take all feasible precautions in the choice of means 
and method of attack with a view to avoiding and in any event minimising incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects as reflected in article 57 (2) (a) (ii) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions” (para. 595). Further, Israeli 
forces were allegedly found to attack “directly and intentionally” the al-Quds hospital in Gaza city and the adjacent 
ambulance depot with white phosphorus shells, violating Article 18 GCIV and customary international law on 
proportionality, as they knew that the hospital was dealing with a big number of injured and wounded and was 
sheltering several hundred civilians (para. 926). Moreover, the recklessness of the use of white phosphorous in and 





attack. If the events described in the report did in fact occur, particularly the incidents dealing with 
inaccurate gunfire and the use of white phosphorus against hospital or humanitarian assistance 
structures in which reserves of fuel were located, for purposes of obscuring the areas or for the 
alleged presence of militants in the structures or in their proximity, are critical.  
The need for an “overall assessment” of the military advantage, without confining the appraisal to 
an isolated attack, has been reaffirmed in view that “military advantage cannot be seen through the eyes of an 
individual soldier, tank crew or aviator”.283 Nonetheless, it may be emphasised that the adjective “direct” 
appears not to exclude the option of examining the broader context of a tactical operation, but the 
“concrete” advantage needs to be “causally connected” to the particular operation or attack. With 
regard to the related individual criminal responsibility, the ICC Statute lessens the significance of 
“concrete and direct” criteria by establishing that the excessive nature is to be assessed on the basis of 
the “overall” military advantage.284 
 
The customary nature of the proportionality principle has been recognised only285 in recent decades286 
and confirmed in the ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law.287 The debate on 
the customary nature has featured those who view proportionality as inherent in the principle of 
                                                                                                                                                            
term care) was considered and its inadmissibility for any military advantage sought in the specific circumstances was 
underlined (paras. 648-650).  
283 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict2, Cambridge, 2010, p. 134. 
284 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) ICC Statute. At the Rome Conference, the ICRC clarified that the term “overall” added to the 
definition of the crime could not be understood to amend existing law (Statement of 8 July 1998, 
A/CONF.183/INF/10). According to a footnote to the Elements of Crimes accompanying Article 8(2)(b)(iv), “the 
expression ‘concrete and direct overall military advantage’ refers to a military advantage that is foreseeable by the perpetrator at the relevant 
time. Such advantage may or may not be temporally or geographically related to the object of the attack”. See T. Stein, “Collateral 
Damage, Proportionality and Individual International Criminal Responsibility”, in W. Heintschel von Heinegg, V. 
Epping (ed.), International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges: Symposium in Honour of Knut Ipsen, Springer, 2007, pp. 
158-161. 
285 In the past, an attack against an unquestionable military objective was deemed to imply any incidental injury or 
damage to civilian persons or objects as “acceptable” collateral damage, see S. Oeter, “Methods and Means of Combat”, 
op. cit., p. 198. On proportionality in attack as not recognised in customary international law, see also A.P.V. Rogers, 
“The Principle of Proportionality”, in H.M. Hensel (ed.), The Legitimate Use of Military Force: The Just War Tradition and the 
Customary Law of Armed Conflict, 2007, pp. 189-218. 
286 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (IT-94-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction of 2 October 1995, para.127; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al. (IT-95-16-Y), Judgment of 14 January 
2000, para. 524; for a comment, see E. Cannizzaro, Il principio della proporzionalità nell’ordinamento internazionale, Milano, 
2000, pp. 310-11. For recent case law in which its customary character has not been contested, see also HCJ 2056/04, 
Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel et al., Judgment of 30 June 2004, para. 37; HCJ 5100/94, The Public 
Committee against Torture in Israel et al. v. The Government of Israel et al., Judgment of 13 December 2006, paras. 41-43.  
287 J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 46, Rule 14. On the customary nature of the principle, see G. 
Venturini, Necessità e proporzionalità nell’uso della forza militare in diritto internazionale, Giuffré, 1988, pp. 127-132; W. Solf, in 
M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch and W.A. Solf (eds.), op. cit., p. 309; L. Doswald-Beck, “The Value of the Geneva Protocols for 
the Protection of Civilians”, in M. Meyer, Armed Conflict and the New Law: Aspects of 1977 Geneva Protocols and 1981 Weapons 





distinction288 and those who contest that a consensus exists with regard to its meaning.289 However, 
this appears to be without significance to the extent that proportionality remains a “necessary part of 
any decision making process which attempts to reconcile humanitarian imperatives and military requirements during 
armed conflict”.290  
Nevertheless, the difficulties in the evaluation of the military advantage were discussed by the 
Committee instituted to review the NATO bombing campaign of 1999. In relation to unsettled 
issues on the implementation of the proportionality principle,291 the Committee reflected on the 
necessity to explain them case-by-case, expecting different solutions according to the values and 
background of the commander. It noted how “it is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an experienced 
combat commander would assign the same relative values to military advantage and to injury of non-combatants. 
Further, it is unlikely that military commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and differing degrees of combat 
experience or national military histories would always agree in close cases”. 292 Its consequent suggestion that 
“the determination of relative values must be that of the ‘reasonable military commander’” is in line with its 
consideration of proportionality in attack as a principle dictating “an acceptable relation between the 
legitimate destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects” of an attack.  
 
This latter perspective sheds light on the complications of interpreting proportionality in 
practice, especially because the balance between divergent values that cannot be easily measured  
                                                
288 The ICTY acknowledged the customary nature of the proportionality principle as codified in Articles 57 and 58 API, 
considering these provisions as “part of customary international law, not only because they specify and flesh out general pre-existing 
norms, but also because they do not appear to be contested by any State, including those which have not ratified the Protocol”, see ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al. (IT-95-16-Y), Judgment of 14 January 2000, para. 524. In the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion, Judge Higgins referred to the customary nature of the proportionality principle, highlighting that this 
principle, “even if finding no specific mention, is reflected in many provisions of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
Thus even a legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain from 
the attack”, see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 20.  
289 For a critical view of the customary status of the principle of proportionality, see W.H. Parks, “Air War and the Law 
of War”, 32(1) Air Force Law Review, 1990, p. 168 ff.  
290 W.J. Fenrick, “The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare”, Military Law Review, 1982, p. 
125. See also J.F. Murphy, “Some Legal (And A Few Ethical) Dimensions of the Collateral Damage Resulting from 
Nato’s Kosovo Campaign”, in A.E. Wall (ed.), Legal and ethical lessons of NATO’s Kosovo campaign, vol. 78, U.S. Naval War 
College International Law Studies, 2002, p. 248, stating: “In my view, it is not necessary to decide whether ‘proportionality’ is part 
of customary international law or simply a policy consideration or a ‘principle’ that commanders should take into account during the course of 
armed conflict”.  
291 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, paras. 47-50. The following four questions were outlined by the Committee: 1. “What are the 
relative values to be assigned to the military advantage gained and the injury to non-combatants and / or the damage to civilian objects?”; 2. 
What do you include or exclude in totalling your sums?”; 3. “What is the standard of measurement in time or space?”; 4. “To what extent is 
a military commander obligated to expose his own forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects?” (ibid., at 
508, para. 49). They are explored by W.J. Fenrick, “The Law Applicable to Targeting and Proportionality After 
Operation Allied Force: A View from the Outside”, YIHL, 2000, p. 75 ff. 
292 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 





(such as humanitarian considerations and military advantages) implies a broad margin of 
appreciation. The vagueness inherent in this principle has been well illustrated by the Public 
Committee against Torture, according to which “proportionality is not a standard of precision. At times there 
are a number of ways to fulfil its conditions. A zone of proportionality is created. It is the borders of that zone that the 
Court guards. The decision within the borders is the executive branch’s decision”.293  
Indeed, the required assessment of any attack in order to compare the military advantage with 
damage to civilian objects or civilian losses remains complex and variable for each concrete case. In 
this regard, honesty and proficiency are needed in the decision-maker’s action in light of the 
prevailing circumstances.294 Further, the idea that “the attacker has to act reasonable and in good faith” 
without simply turning “a blind eye on the facts of the situation”, being obliged to evaluate all available 
information, is commonly supported in legal scholarship.295 Similarly, rules of engagement are 
expected to be reasonably adapted to the situation in the battlefield and the related training is 
expected to take into due consideration possible alterations to the proportionality calculation. As 
one scholar has suggested, belligerents’ choice to record and make public their proportionality 
assessment after a certain time would support the conduct of potential war crimes trials as well as 
generally strengthening the role played by the laws of war in the targeting process.296  
Remarkably, in dealing with attacks against civilians and framing how to evaluate whether the 
proportionality estimation of the attacker respected legal bounds, the ICTY set forth a helpful 
minimum standard that is slightly higher than a mere “reasonable person” test. The Trial Chamber 
noted that “in determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-
informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to 
him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack”.297 In pointing this out, the 
Trail Chamber also held that the proportionality rule refers to “expected” damage and “anticipated” 
advantage (instead of actual damage produced or military advantage attained) from an attack. 
Furthermore, it considered that “certain apparently disproportionate attacks may give rise to the inference that 
civilians were actually the object of the attack. This is to be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the available 
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Regrettably, highly controversial patterns of action seemingly violating the principle of 
proportionality have been reported in the context of the 2014 Operation Protective Edge. The 
attacks concerned were carried out on densely populated residential areas of the Gaza Strip (e.g. 
Shuja’ia neighbourhood) both through the use of precision weaponry (such as drone-fired missiles) 
and artillery that cannot be aimed accurately and whose power derives from the quantity of fired 
shells and their massive impact. In addition, direct attacks included thousands of houses occupied as 
residencies by entire families but deemed legitimate targets because of the presence of several 
members of Hamas’ military wing. Further, numerous school institutions, medical facilities and 
non-military governmental buildings were seriously damaged or destroyed; in particular, six UN-
operated schools acting as civilian shelters for thousands of internally displaced people in the al-
Maghazi refugee camp in central Gaza, in Beit Hanoun, in Zaitoun, in Jabalia, and in Rafah were 
critically reported to be hit by direct shelling at least seven times.299 Thus, an important issue arises 
as to whether contemporary IHL requires States with well-funded and equipped armies an arsenal 
of precision weapons at least to use them exclusively, since broad and general use of weaponry that 
is not precise tends to show a controversial animus of the attackers. 
6.2.a.i. The issue of long-term and indirect effects of attacks 
Broadly, proportionality has been labelled as the “true guarantee of robust civilian protection for effects of 
attacks in wartime”.300 While the intended military advantage must be limited to what is “concrete” and 
“direct”, however, the damage is only described as produced by the attack. This raises the issue of how to balance 
such advantage against incidental harm to civilian persons and objects. Notwithstanding that a 
direct connection between a certain action and its effects is entailed in the legal concept of causality, 
de facto certain kinds of damage become manifest over time or occur beyond the field of military 
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operations. In this regard, substantial debate remains about whether and to what extent medium 
and long-term civilian damage connected to the attack on a certain military objective flow into the 
assessment of “excessive” collateral damage (in addition to the direct effects).301 As mentioned above, 
this is especially important in relation to attacks on dual-use objects. 
 
The suggestion of considering proportionality as a dynamic requirement302 has been helpful in 
dealing with certain practice regarding attacks on dual-use infrastructure as crucial to successful war 
campaigns.303 Indeed, scholars have increasingly argued that the actual or latent possibility for long-
term damage following from targeting certain types of objects (e.g. electricity) necessitates the 
contemplation of including “reverberating effects” in the proportionality calculation.304 By arguing that 
“derivative harm” is a necessary part of such computation, the possible predictability of medium and 
long-term civilian casualties within the action of targeting certain key facilities of the enemy has 
been maintained. Notably, “foreseeable effects of attack” must be taken into account by commanders 
under the British Manual on the Law of Armed Conflicts.305 
In this regard, since the Gulf War the risk that neutralising the national power grid as well as 
targeting sewage plants or water treatment facilities results in the collapses of basic health services, 
so weakening the exposed civilian population, has been stressed.306 However, the Eritrea Ethiopia 
Claims Commission did not generally find indiscriminate or disproportionate bombing where it was 
foreseeable that civilian losses would be excessive relative to the military advantage anticipated. This 
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was the case even though in one instance the Claims Commission condemned the bombing of a 
reservoir that was vital to the water supply for a city in an extremely hot and dry area: the belief that 
this water would also serve the military, so becoming a legitimate military target, was dismissed.307 
What seems important in fact is that the causal link between attack and damage, as codified in Protocol I, 
limits the consideration of “derivative damage” into the proportionality calculation by requiring 
that it be foreseeable or may be reasonably expected. 
 
Nonetheless, when long-term civilian casualties result from a sequence of strategic operations 
against State infrastructure (rather than resulting from one single attack) the cumulative criterion in 
the proportionality calculation has turned out to be still more problematic in view of the 
requirement codified in Protocol I (i.e. evaluation for each attack individually). For instance, this has 
been debated in relation to the modern U.S. Air Force doctrine whereby the military advantage 
pursued from targeting a national infrastructure was gained through “the cumulative effect of parallel 
strikes”.308 As stressed in legal scholarship, even though this approach of “effects-based targeting” is 
distant from traditional military operations as intended by the drafters of the rules on 
proportionality, it seems reasonable to assume that, if such an approach is deemed more effective in 
warfare and able to prevent direct casualties, it should be applied with the aim of limiting “derivative” 
harm and damage, which should be also computed on a cumulative basis.309 In fact, it is likely that a State 
having the capacity to neutralise a power plant without damaging adjacent dwellings or injuring 
civilians not far from this facility will appeal to such abilities to support its assertion that this object 
was a legitimate military target. Since challenging such a claim may be very difficult given the rising 
intermingling of civilian and military activities, the option of introducing greater humanitarian 
considerations through the proportionality principle may be more valuable. In particular, as far as the 
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technology enabling highly precise strikes against a power plant can reduce reverberating effects, the 
reasoning on “derivative damage” to medical or water treatment facilities seems all the more relevant, even in spite of 
the harm to the civilian population is intended or not. An example concerns Operation Allied Force 
conducted by NATO; the Yugoslav electrical grids and conversion yards were neutralised by 
employing a new weapon that spread “chemically treated carbon wires” causing short-circuits and 
related disruption, so as to cut off seventy per cent of the electricity for over a day. 310  
 
The issue of medium and long-term consequences or damage connected to attacks on dual-use 
objects remains particularly relevant in relation to the access to, and the enjoyment of, ESC rights 
by civilians. For instance, a pertinent question arises as to what extent respecting the proportionality principle 
runs beyond the battlefield and entails a duty to minimise further casualties after the end of hostilities possibly with 
positive impacts on the progressive realisation of ESC rights.  
In this regard, ‘adaptations’ of the principle of proportionality to the targeting of certain dual-
use facilities have emerged in legal scholarship. A proposal has referred to “protective proportionality” 
and relies on the idea of establishing a special protection regime for certain dual-use facilities 
performing vital civilian functions.311 More precisely, an analogy has been drawn between the facilities 
supplying the power required for fundamental needs of life and those objects which cannot be attacked “for 
the specific purpose of denying” them the “sustenance value” to civilians or the adversary under 
Article 54 API. Indeed, basic infrastructures contributing to the survival of civilians are hardly 
attacked with the exact purpose of starving them, rendering it unfeasible to cover such objects by 
Article 54. Therefore, in light of the serious potential harm connected to the targeting of 
indispensable dual-use objects, a more stringent proportionality test has been called for; in 
particular, attacks against basic infrastructure should be treated as “impermissible unless the expected 
incidental civilian harm would not be excessive in relation to an anticipated military advantage that was compelling, 
                                                
310 Apparently he “CBU-94” or “graphite bomb” was offered up by the U.S. because of France’s refusal to regard the 
Serbian electrical network as a legitimate target for NATO, see D. Priest, “Bombing by Committee; France Balked at 
NATO Targets”, The Washington Post, 20 September 1999. See A. Boivin, “The Legal Regime Applicable to Targeting 
Military Objectives in the Context of Contemporary Warfare”, 2006, p. 52, noting that similar effect is achieaveble by 
“computer network attacks” without using aircrafts; such means would prevent material damage and limit potential long-
term harm to civilians; according to the author, available technology should be employed according to the “principle of 
minimum feasible damage”. 
311 See H. Shue and D. Wippman, “Limiting Attacks on Dual Use Facilities Performing Indispensable Civilian 
Functions”, 35 Cornell International Law Journal, 2002, pp. 559-579. The authors’ concern derives from the permissive 
reading of the definition of military objective in Article 52(2) API concerning a dual-use facility since no attention is paid 
to its contribution to civilian life and “its civilian function does not figure into whether the object is a ‘military objective’”, stressing 






not simply concrete and direct”.312 However, such an additional criterion is not generally deemed 
applicable. 
A second policy-oriented proposal - relevant especially in cases of an “interventionist conflict” 
such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq - has focused on the importance of committing the 
winning States and their allies to reduce the long-term damage resulting from their attacks, 
especially by supporting the economy of those countries and the reparation of relevant 
infrastructures at the conclusion of hostilities. 313  Such a post-conflict assistance does not 
retroactively excuse conduct that violated jus in bello. However, the perspective highlighted in this 
proposal may be useful when considering the developing role of international law in defining the 
requirements of remedial justice even for violations of ESC rights committed in such contexts. 
 
Conversely, greater humanitarian considerations in the application of the proportionality principle 
may have some positive implications in the targeting process on certain core dual-use facilities 
which is highly likely to cause incidental long-term impacts on civilians’ ESC rights and their 
progressive realisation. In particular, proportionality could be applied with a view to preventing 
“derivative damage”, also estimated on a cumulative basis, which influences access to and enjoyment of ESC rights. 
This could entail a duty to minimise casualties which significantly impact on these rights and extend 
beyond the combat zone. Accordingly, an application of proportionality as a real guarantee of 
civilian protection from armed attacks may require taking into account the resonant effects of attacking an 
object that serves the military while it simultaneously plays a vital role for civilians, according to a twofold 
meaning. Firstly, ‘vital’ may refer to what is necessary to the survival of the civilian population, in doing so 
indicating the urgency of protecting the realisation of minimum level of ESC rights. Secondly, ‘vital’ 
may refer to what is functional to the sustainable human development of the civilian population, in doing so 
indicating the value of protecting civilians’ opportunity to engage in economic, social and cultural 
activities.  
Indeed, the relevance of taking into account the concept of “sustainable human development” relies 
on its evolution under international law, particularly under the normative framework of human 
rights law,314 as the primary development paradigm, and its inevitable implications even in the way 
                                                
312 See H. Shue and D. Wippman, ibid., p. 574. 
313 See R. Wedgwood, “Propositions on the Law of War after the Kosovo Campaign”, in A.E. Wall (ed.), Legal and 
Ethical Lessons of NATO’s Kosovo Campaign, Newport, Naval College 2002, p. 440. 
314 The relevant normative framework includes UN resolutions adopted in the form of declarations: the UDHR (1948), 
the Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights and Programme of 
Action (1993), the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Social Rights (1997), the Millennium Declaration and Millennium 





of looking at conflicts. This concept has emerged under the rights-based approach to development as 
advocated and increasingly put into practice by the UN development programmes and agencies. In 
particular, the proclamation of the right to development by the General Assembly315 has been 
strengthened by the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights (alongside various world 
conferences and summits under United Nations auspices during the 1990s316) which culminated 
with the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals that were based on an 
integrated and interdependent set of human rights and were acknowledged as founding the process 
of economic and social development.317 A redefinition of the process of development as such has led 
to shifting away from the entirely “economic” approach to development towards its definition as 
concerning “human development” (i.e. a comprehensive, people centred, economic, social, cultural and political 
process through which all the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals and entire populations can be 
realised).318 Conversely, the concept of sustainability, originally formulated in the Brundtland Report 
(i.e. “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs”319), has been further defined in the final declaration of the “Earth Summit” setting 
Agenda 21 for its implementation.320 In its gradual expansion, the concept of sustainability no 
longer covers solely environmental considerations under an intergenerational perspective; 321 
                                                                                                                                                            
Declaration of the Barbados World Conference on SIDS (1994), the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
Development and its Plan of Implementation (2002), and the Mauritius Strategy for the further implementation of the 
Programme of Action for the sustainable development of Small Island Developing States (2005). 
315 Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development (GA Res. 41/128, 4 December 1986), reading “The right to 
development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, 
and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realised”.  
316 For a brief analysis of the UN Summits of the 1990s, see The World Conferences: Developing Priorities for the 21st Century, 
UN Briefing Papers, DPI, 1997. 
317 UN Millennium Declaration, A/55/L.2, 8 September 2000. It sets out the key challenges facing humanity at the 
threshold of the new millennium, outlining a response to them and establishing concrete measures for judging 
performance through a set of inter-related commitments, eight goals and eighteen targets on development, governance, 
peace, security and human rights. The MDGs have been considered “the quantified targets for addressing extreme poverty in its 
many dimensions (i.e. income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter, and exclusion) while promoting gender equality, education, and 
environmental sustainability”. Since their endorsement by the General Assembly in 2001, the MDGs have risen to the top of 
the development agenda and constitute the common focus of priorities for the development community. 
318 For the conceptual evolution of the human development paradigm, see Cornia G., Jolly R. Stewart F. Adjustment with 
a Human Face, vol. II and II, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1986. See also the annual Human Development Reports 
published by UNDP since 1990, particularly The Human Development Report 2000 on the relationship between human 
rights and human development. 
319 World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), Our Common Future, Oxford, 1987, 
at 43. 
320 See “Report of the United Nations conference on Environment and Development”, A/CONF.151/26, 12 August 
1992. For an explanation of the lengthy preparatory process to Rio and “disentangles the complex web of UN resolutions and 
other official documentation” that emerged from the “Earth Summit”, see S.L. Halpern, Environment and Development: Process 
and Documentation, 1992. For a summary of the outcomes of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 
de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992), see UN Briefing Papers, at 21-27. 
321 In the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, see Resolution 1, Political Declaration, and 





accordingly, the basic idea of sustainable development has encompassed other essential requirements 
such as “clean water and sanitation, adequate shelter, energy, health care, food security and the protection of 
biodiversity”.322 Significantly, the human dimension in the pursuit for sustainable development has 
come to constitute the main vector and core element. In this sense, “sustainable human development” has 
been deemed achievable through enduring integration and realisation of basic human rights and 
fundamental human freedoms. It seems that for countries affected by armed conflicts these concepts 
do assume increasing significance in the light of special vulnerabilities affecting civilians during and 
in the aftermath of hostilities. 
 
Finally, it is worth referring to existing instances of constructive approaches undertaken by the 
law to hold the parties to a conflict accountable for conduct posing long-term risks to civilians.  
A first example relates to damage inflicted on the environment. The long-standing consequences of 
particular weapons or of certain methods of combat on the ecosystem have been progressively 
acknowledged. In advancing environmental considerations States agree on the necessity to balance 
military and humanitarian considerations in view of the latent damage to the environment that is 
not directly evident.323 In this vein, belligerents are required to exercise care in attacks to protect the 
environment; attacks that may produce “widespread, severe and long-term damage to the natural environment” 
are prohibited regardless of military necessity or potential proportional collateral damage.324 
Notably, attacks deliberately carried out in the awareness that they origin “widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated” may give rise to individual criminal responsibility under the Rome 
Statute.325  
Another example relates to risks posed by unexploded remnants of war. The latter may be 
antipersonnel landmines, anti-vehicle mines, cluster bombs sub-munitions and other unexploded 
ordnances. The risks of post-conflict damage, ensuing from their failure to explode on impact (as 
they are planned to do), exist notwithstanding that antipersonnel landmines are widely 
                                                
322 Article 18, WSSD Resolution 1, Political Declaration and Resolution 2, Plan of Implementation, A/CONF.199/20, 
Johannesburg, 4 September 2002. 
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prohibited.326 The 2003 Fifth Protocol to the 1980 Convention deals with the use and clearance of 
unexploded munitions,327 by providing as one of its core principles that States employing such 
munitions are responsible to assist in clearance. Significantly, the underlying reasoning is that the 
duty to respect the principle of proportionality continues beyond the battlefield and requires minimising future 
casualties after the end of the conflict.328 This approach to avoiding downgrading the peril to 
civilians posed by unexploded ordnances appears powerful and useful, even in light of the less 
effective arguments that stress the indiscriminate nature of sub-munitions against the insistence by 
the military on the related ability to be aimed at a specific military objective.  
6.3. The obligation to adopt precautionary measures in attack and in defence  
Despite the fact international humanitarian law does not clearly guide on the evaluation of 
proportionality in attack, a comprehensive regime of precautionary measures exists with the 
purpose of avoiding or minimising the risk of collateral damage. This regime has a certain relevance 
to assessing the evolution of the protection afforded to civilian persons and objects under 
international humanitarian law in the area of ESC rights against the effects of military operations. 
As we will explore in detail, specific considerations in this regard may be addressed in relation to the 
protection of adequate housing and shelter, healthcare, and education. 
A comprehensive list of precautionary measures in attack was laid down for the first time in a 
treaty with the adoption of Article 57 API. In fact, “no express rules existed […] and the need to take 
precautions could only be inferred from customary law and treaty language, especially the principles of proportionality, 
identification of the target (or the rule of distinction), warning and the choice of methods and means”.329 A duty to 
take precautions, in order to prevent damage to protected objects, was initially codified in the 1923 
Hague Air Rules330 and then in the 1956 Draft Rules by the ICRC.331  
The general precept underlying precautionary measures in attack consists of taking constant 
                                                
326 See Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
(Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention) of 3 May 1996. See Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
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care to spare civilians and civilian objects; it is an integral part of customary international law.332 
More specific obligations include: taking all feasible measures to verify that the targets are military 
objectives;333 choosing methods and means that avoid and “in any event” minimising “incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof”;334 and refraining 
from any attack that may be “expected to cause” collateral civilian casualties or damage to civilian 
objects “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage”.335  
These codified precautions are designed for “those who plan or decide upon an attack”. It has been 
noted how this “should be understood to address primarily commanders and staff officers who are directly 
responsible for specific operations, and only to a lesser degree the individual soldiers participating directly in the 
attack”.336 However, the level at which targeting decisions are taken is influenced by the nature of 
combat or the proportions of armed forces engaged in a certain conflict; as far as individual soldiers 
are employed to organise and execute attacks, they may be expected to comply with Article 57. 
Finally, the obligations concerned apply at all levels in which such functions are being exercised.337 
The required feasible precautions are commonly deemed restricted to the ones “that are practicable 
or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military 
considerations”.338 Conversely, the duty of due diligence and acting in good faith exists339 and applies 
to all those involved in the targeting phase.340 If it becomes evident that an attack is prohibited - for 
possible excessive collateral damage or the civilian status of the object concerned or the special 
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protection in force for it - such an attack must be cancelled or suspended341 (this includes the case of 
a pilot incapable to distinguish a target with sufficient accuracy).342  
Those making targeting decisions are required to take feasible precautions based on means and 
information existing at the relevant time, and a commander who disregards such information is 
considered at fault. The way in which the aforementioned ICTY Review Committee substantiated 
such obligation is extremely significant. 343  However, controversial situations may arise if 
information is inconsistent or scarce, or time is limited, or the most technologically higher and 
available means are not used. Indeed, feasibility implies a factual assessment of existing 
circumstances.  
Nonetheless, among multiple military objectives from which would produce a similar advantage, 
a careful selection of targets is also required in order to choose the option that is estimated “to cause the 
least danger” to civilian lives or objects.344  
Importantly, in evaluating the destruction or damage of civilian infrastructures and finding 
frequent violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Commission of 
Inquiry on Lebanon deemed the attack on the Jiyyeh power plant leading “to a massive oil spill that 
polluted most of the Lebanese coast” as an IHL violation based on the failure to take precautionary 
measures as well as “human rights obligations to protect the natural environment and the right to health”. This oil 
spill particularly damaged the Byblos archaeological site, included in the UNESCO World Heritage 
list, similarly contravening the same international obligation.345 
 
An additional precautionary measure concerns “effective advanced warning”,346 which is required 
when an attack against a military objective may affect the civilian population “unless circumstances do 
not permit” and is aimed at minimising harm to civilians. This precautionary requirement is 
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342 For instance, during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, “[a]ircrews attacking targets in populated areas were directed not to 
expend their munitions if they lacked positive identification of their targets. When this occurred, aircrews dropped their bombs on alternate 
targets or returned to base with their weapons”, see Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, op. cit., p. 622. 
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customary in nature.347 This obligation is not applied when the military target is located in a remote 
area. Nonetheless, the circumstances that make a warning not possible may be controversial.348 In 
this regard, it is commonly noted that whether the circumstances allow for a warning must be 
determined in good faith in order to minimise injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects. A limit on the 
application of the rule may be considered when the military advantage to be achieved by surprise 
would be challenged by a warning. Thus, making a computation of proportionality, the issue 
becomes whether the damage or injury to civilian objects or persons by not giving a warning is 
“excessive” in respect to the advantage concerned. However, Article 57 sets up an undisputable 
obligation (although not absolute) to warn before attacks that involve the civilian population, such as air 
strikes against a highly populated territory. In other words, warnings do not constitute acts of 
charity. 
In order to meet the effectiveness of a warning in case of attacks various means are commonly 
viewed as appropriate, such as dropping leaflets, radio broadcasts or by internet, but it is also 
necessary to give the warning in advance to allow the civilian population to evacuate the area or to 
take safe haven. On this issue, a high standard was used in the aforementioned report mentioned 
above on the military operations conducted in Gaza during December 2008 and January 2009. The 
requirement of “effective advanced warning” was deemed satisfied only if “it must reach those who are likely to 
be in danger from the planned attack, it must give them sufficient time to react … it must clearly explain what they 
should do to avoid harm and it must be a credible warning. The warning also has to be clear so that the civilians are 
not in doubt that it is indeed addressed to them. As far as possible, warnings should state the location to be affected and 
where the civilians should seek safety. A credible warning means that civilians should be in no doubt that is intended to 
be acted upon, as a false alarm of hoax may undermine future warnings, putting civilians at risk”.349 On this basis, 
in examining Israeli armed forces’ discharging of the obligation to take all feasible precautions to 
protect the population of Gaza, the Fact-Finding Mission acknowledged their significant efforts via 
phone calls, radio broadcasts and leaflets, but also noted certain factors that weakened the efficacy 
of the warnings issued or diminished the reliability of instructions to move to city centre for safety 
(e.g. the lack of specificity of pre-recorded text messages and leaflets; the intense attacks which city 
centres were subjected to during the military air operations; the practice of “roof knocking”, which was 
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deemed a form of attack against the civilians residing in the buildings concerned).350 
Similarly, the practice of evacuation warnings issued as part of Operation Protective Edge have 
been central in the critical narrative that Israel has not regularly complied with international law in 
its care for civilians in Gaza city during the hostilities throughout July and August 2014. In 
particular, a constant ineffectiveness of the warnings has been put into question as 
counterproductive to avoid spreading terror among the civilian population. This seems especially 
associated with missing key elements of effective warning, such as “timeliness, informing civilians where it 
is safe to flee, and providing safe passage and sufficient time to flee before an attack”.351 Indeed, the controversial 
circumstance in which civilians had no means to leave, to get to safety and to flee to neighbouring 
countries has followed the enduring military blockade on the Gaza Strip and the closure of the 
Rafah crossing by the Egyptian authorities.  
Notably, in the 2009 report referred to above, the reading of the effectiveness of the warning 
was more advanced than the traditional interpretation of the concerned provision, which refers to 
“warnings … made by radio or by means of pamphlets” and underlines how “warnings may also have a general 
character. A belligerent could, for example, give notice by radio that he will attack certain types of installations or 
factories. A warning could also contain a list of the objectives that will be attacked”.352 Similarly, the ICRC study 
refers to the general nature of warnings. 
 
As far as passive precautionary measures are concerned, Article 58 AP I also requires the warring 
parties to adopt certain precautions to protect the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects, which are under 
their control, against the effects of attacks by the adversary. Specifically, the party is required to discharge 
three obligations “to the maximum extent feasible”: the evacuation of civilians and removal of civilian 
objects “from the vicinity of military objectives”; the avoidance of positioning military objectives “within or 
near densely populated areas”; and any additional precautions, such as providing for shelters and civilian 
defence programs, to protect civilian persons and objects “against the dangers resulting from military 
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Although this provision reflects customary international law,353 the nature of recommendations 
(rather than obligations) has been questioned.354 However, as explained by the authoritative ICRC 
commentary on this provision, the use of the term “feasible” is used to illustrate “the fact that no one 
can be required to do the impossible. In this case it is clear that precautions should not go beyond the point where the 
life of the population would become difficult or even impossible”; it is further posited how “a Party to the conflict 
cannot be expected to arrange its armed forces and installations in such a way as to make them conspicuous to the 
benefit of the adversary”.  
Notably, in the recent armed conflict in Georgia, the obligation upon the defender to minimise 
civilian losses and casualties or damage to civilian objects was specifically underlined in relation to 
the houses located in Tskhinvali, where South Ossetian forces reportedly violated international 
humanitarian law by firing from residential buildings at Georgian ground troops, using them as 
defensive positions and putting at risk the life of civilians who were sheltering in the basements of 
the same buildings.355 
 
The ability to respect the obligations on feasible precautions in attack is affected by an infinite 
number of variables to be evaluated by the planner and decision maker of the attacks so as to 
minimise the risk of collateral damage. These factors include the position of the military objectives, 
the presence civilians, the nature of the surrounding terrain and the meteorological conditions, the 
accuracy and kind of weapons, the technical training of combatants, their mental and physical 
condition.356 For instance, when military operations occur in urban populated areas the obligations 
regarding feasible precautions in attack play a very important role especially to take all possible steps 
to minimise harm to civilian and not damage civilian objects. However, the fact that in such urban 
contexts hostilities involve very mobile forces makes highly problematic compliance with these 
rules.357 
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Among those variables, the requirement of being attentive to the potential impact of diverse available 
weapons358 seems extremely relevant from the perspective of their indirect effects on the civilian 
population, in particular for the protection of the right to health of civilians. The focal point seems not 
the State duty to employ the means of warfare enabling accurate targeting.359 Rather, there is a 
practical perception that the progress and the use of weapons represent areas where the interface between the law 
and issues of health and safety of civilians result growingly important.  
It is worth underlining that, while some weapons are prohibited regardless specific categories of 
individuals (e.g. biological or chemical weapons), other types are prohibited exactly because they 
may affect civilians (e.g. antipersonnel land mines),360 whereas the use of other kind of weapons is 
permitted by belligerents except if there is the risk of hitting the civilian population (e.g. in the case of 
the prohibition of booby-traps when directed against the civilian population).361 Regrettably, the use 
of incendiary weapons - including white phosphorus, napalm and flamethrowers - against military 
targets is not proscribed under international law provided that the rules established by the Protocol 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons362 are respected. However, the 
practice of recent military operations challenges the sense of permitting its use without further 
degree of control. In this regard, it appears that the customary international law obligation that is 
                                                                                                                                                            
on Tskhinvali and other villages in South Ossetia, it is reported that Georgian forces raised serious concerns in relation 
to their obligations to take the precautions required under international humanitarian law. While the identification of 
legitimate limitary targets and the efforts made to minimise those located in the city or near populated areas were 
viewed as respectful of such rules, some controversial issues included the choice of artillery for conducting the attacks, 
the list of targets “identified during hostilities”, the intelligence used to select targets, the presence of the civilian population 
in Tskhivali at the time of the offensive. Nevertheless, in several cases the Russian forces also reportedly failed to comply 
with their IHL obligations with regard to precautions before attacks.  
358 Oeter, “Methods and Means of Combat”, in Fleck D. (ed.), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, 
Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 209. 
359 On the use of precision weaponry, it has been argued that the duty to use precision-guided munitions in urban 
warfare is emerging as a customary norm, see S.W. Belt, “Missiles Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary 
Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas”, Naval Law Review, 2000, pp. 115-174, noting the 
ambiguity of Article 57 for imposing such a duty and so turning to customary law to prove its existance. For a critical 
analysis, see J.F. Murphy, “Some Legal (And Few Ethical) Dimensions of the Collateral Damage Resulting from Nato’s 
Kosovo Campaign”, in A.E. Wall, op. cit., pp. 229-243. Conversely, it has been pointed out that “the availability of 
precision-guided munitions by no means foreclose recourses to precautionary options”, see Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the 
Law of International Armed Conflict2, Cambridge, 2010, p. 143. 
360 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfers of Anti-Personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction, concluded 18 September 1997, entered into force on 1 March 1999, 2056 UNTS 211. The 
prohibition is absolute as States parties undertake to “never” use them “under any circumstances”; such a prohibition is 
reinforced by the prohibition of reservations to the provisions of the Convention. 
361 Article 7 (1) of Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices (Amended Protocol II) (as amended on 3 May 1996), Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 
Indiscriminate Effects. 
362 Article 2 of Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (10 October 1980), 
additional to the 1980 UN Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 





reflected in Article 57(2)(a)(ii) API (i.e. the duty to take “all feasible precautions” in the selection of means and 
methods of warfare so as to avoid and “in any event” minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects) does deserve great attention in relation to the serious consequences of using 
weapons with incendiary properties in proximity of civilian persons and objects.  
The reportedly misuse of white phosphorus in the practice of recent military operations has 
been criticised as a specific violation of that rule, and it raises the outstanding need for re-
consideration of the use of such especially hazardous materials. In general, white phosphorus is used 
in grenades and shells to mark targets, to provide smokescreens for troop movement, to “trace” the 
path of bullets, and as an incendiary.363 For instance, the choice of deploying it during the ground 
phase of Operation Cast Lead in build-up areas, in and around zones reserved to civilian health and 
safety, has been deemed systematically “reckless and not justifiable for any military advantage sought in the 
particular circumstances”.364 This issue received great scrutiny on account of analysis by various 
organizations.365 A particular concern about such a use was linked to the caused damage, since 
white phosphorus keeps burning until it is in contact with oxygen; medical experts who treated 
wounded patients were “impressed by the severity and sometimes untreatable nature of the burns caused by the 
highly toxic substance”; further, an actual health threat to doctors dealing with patients was posed by its 
extensive use in civilian settings.366  
As far as white phosphorus is not prohibited by international law as it stands, its use can be 
evaluated only in light of the principles of proportionality and precautions. However, the very 
substantial risks carried from its repeated misuse by armed forces calls into question the absence of 
further degree of control. Indeed, its military capabilities might be supplied by “other screening and 
                                                
363 For an explanation of the uses and effects of white phosphorus in weapons, see Federation of American Scientists, 
“White Phosphorus Fact Sheet”, available at: 
http://www.fas.org/biosecurity/resource/factsheets/whitephosphorus.htm 
364 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter IX, paras. 587-595, paras. 624-629, paras. 648-652. In some recounted incidents 
the Mission had specific concern about “the choice to use white phosphorous in the proximities of civilian premises”. These incidents 
regarded the field office compound of the UN Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East of Gaza 
City, the attacks on al-Quds and Wafa hospitals with “vulnerable patients receiving long-term care and suffering from particularly 
serious injuries”, and its use “in the attack on the Abu Halima family to the north of al-Atatra and in Khuz’a”.  
365 Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, Report of the Independent Fact Finding Mission into violations in the Gaza Strip during the 
period 27.12.08-18.01.09; Human Rights Watch, Rain of Fire: Israel’s Unlawful Use of White Phosphorous in Gaza, March 
2009; Amnesty International, Fuelling conflict: Foreign arms supplies to Israel/Gaza, February 2009; Report of the 
Independent Fact-Finding Committee on Gaza, “No safe place …”, paras. 206-207; UNRWA, Summary of the Report of the 
United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry, paras. 46-56. See I.J. MacLeod and A.P.V. Rogers, “The use of white 
phosphorous and the Law of War”, in T.L.H. McCormack (ed.), Yearbook of International Humanitaria Law, Asser Press, 
2009, 123-139. 
366 See UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XII, paras. 895-900; inter alia, it is reported how several doctors “believed they 
had dealt with a wound successfully only to find unexpected complications developing as a result of the phosphorous having caused deeper 
damage to tissue and organs than could be detected at the time”. According to doctors, several patients died because of organ 
failure resulting from the burns. According to medical staff, “even working in the areas where the phosphorus had been used made 





illuminating means which are free from the toxicities, volatilities and hazards that are inherent in the chemical white 
phosphorus”.367 In this vein, banning its use as an obscurant has been called into question. 
An additional detrimental effect on the enjoyment of the right to health, “beyond the impact 
generally associated with being affected by anti-personal weapons in an armed conflict”, has been stressed in 
relation to the use of other weapons, such as Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME) munitions or 
flechette missiles, and the use of depleted uranium.368 Nonetheless, the use of these weapons was not 
expressly qualified as a violation of Article 12 ICESCR. 
6.4. Prohibitions or limitations on use and attacks on certain objects 
During the conduct of hostilities civilian immunity is further enhanced by a special protection 
regime provided for certain objects, most of which are civilian in any case. Essentially, those who 
control such objects cannot use them for military purposes; even if they were somehow manipulated 
to be used in this way, they can only be attacked under limited circumstances. Furthermore, 
rigorous evidence of their modified status and a higher degree of precautionary measures apply. As 
will be shown, this special protection regime may have a basic importance in safeguarding certain 
dimensions of civilians’ ESC rights against the effects of warfare. Accordingly, an in-depth reflection 
on the suitability of the rules in question as an adequate response to relevant challenges posed by 
contemporary warfare will be conducted.  
 
In relation to some of these objectives the special protection regime is strongly connected to their 
inherent humanitarian value to society, as attacking them would correspond to harming the civilian 
population, which the law seeks to prevent. The prohibitions on targeting medical transports369 or 
medical units370 are pertinent examples; such protection may cease only when the concerned vehicles 
                                                
367 See UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter IX, para. 901. 
368 See UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter IX, paras. 902-912. Particularly, materials on specific health concerns for 
the survivors of DIME weapon injuries were submitted by the expert witness Lt. Col Lane; it is reported that “the tungsten 
alloy particles are suspected to be highly carcinogenic and so small that they cannot be extracted from the patient’s body. Dr. Mads Gilbert 
noted that there had been no follow-up studies on the survivors of this type of amputation observed in Gaza and Lebanon since 2006 following 
Israeli military operations. Some research suggests that these patients might be at increased risk of cancer. These concern apply equally to 
missile”. 
369 They refer to military or civilian means of medical transportation, whether temporary or permanent, controlled by a 
competent authority of a belligerent party (e.g. means of transportation by air, land, or water, like medical aircraft 
ambulances, or hospital ships). See Art. 21 GCIV; Art. 21 API; Art. 35 GCI. See also J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-
Beck, op. cit., p. 98, Rule 29. 
370 They refer to military or civilian establishments and units arranged for medical purposes, whether temporary or 
permanent, mobile or fixed (e.g. hospitals, preventive medicine centres and institutes, blood transfusion centres, medical depots, 
pharmaceutical stores). See Art. 18 GCIV; Art. 8 (e) API; Art. 19 GCI; Art. 23 GCII. See also J.M. Henckaerts and L. 





and facilities are utilised to execute “acts harmful to the enemy”.371 Illustrations of the activity that 
removes protection include their use as military observation posts, as ammunitions dumps, as 
shelters for fugitives or combatants, as impediments to the enemy’s conduct,372 or the use of a 
medical unit or vehicle to “shield” a military objective from an attack.373 Nevertheless, the loss of 
such protected status through the adversary’s misuse does not negate the fact that the principle of 
proportionality must be respected and a warning issued as an explicit safeguard to ensure humane 
treatment of both patients and medical staff.374 Notably, in the context of the Cast Lead military 
operation, the serious IHL violations referred to in several reports reviewing those events also 
included firing upon medical units and medical personnel (which made the collection of and care of 
the wounded more difficult) as well as failing to allow access to the wounded.375  
A similar special regime provides for the protection of medical transports and units in armed 
conflict of non-international character.376 This regime has been blatantly disrespected in war-torn 
Syria, which was recently declared as “an enduring and underreported trend” of attacks on hospitals in 
certain areas by anti-Government armed groups and the denial by the Government of “medical care 
to those from opposition-controlled and affiliated areas as a matter of policy”.377 The multiple accounts detailed 
by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry include attacks on medical units, the 
destruction of hospitals or their use for hostile purposes, the targeting of medical personnel and 
                                                
371 For medical units and transport on land, see Art. 19 GCIV; Art. 13(1) API; Art. 21 GCI; for medical ships, see Art. 
34; for medical aircrafts, see Art. 28(1) API. The meaning of “acts harmful to the enemy” is limited by providing the acts that 
do not remove protection: for medical units and transport on land, see Art. 19 GCIV; Art. 13(2) API; Art. 22 GC I; for 
medical ships, see Art. 35 GC II; for medical aircrafts, see Art. 28(3) API. 
372 See J. Pictet (ed.) Commentary to the First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, 1952, pp. 200-201. However, commentary to Article 21 GCI specifies that during the negotiations of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions “it was considered unnecessary to define ‘acts harmful to the enemy’, whose meaning is self-evident and 
which must remain quite general”. The alternative and more explicit expression set by the ICRC was “acts the purpose or effect of 
which is to harm the adverse Party, by facilitating or impeding military operations”. 
373 Pursuant to Article 12(4) API, “Under no circumstances shall medical units be used in an attempt to shield military objectives from 
attack. Whenever possible, the Parties to the conflict shall ensure that medical units are so sited that attacks against military objectives do not 
imperil their safety”. This prohibition is deemed applicable to medical vehicles (Art. 21 API) and medical aircrafts; the 
latter cannot be employed “to acquire any military advantage over the adverse party”, “to collect or transmit intelligence data” and they 
cannot carry any armament (apart from small arms gained from the sick, wounded or shipwrecked) (Art. 28 API). 
374 Art. 21 GCI; Art. 19 GCIV; Art. 13(1) API. The warning is required “where appropriate”, covering cases when it is not 
possible to establish a “time-limit” (e.g. heavy fire from a hospital or an ambulance), see Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. 
Zimmerman (eds.), op. cit., para. 556. 
375 Press Release, ICRC, “Gaza: ICRC Demands Urgent Access to Wounded as Israeli Army Fails to Assist Wounded 
Palestinians”, 8 January 2009; Press Release, ICRC, “Gaza: Life-Saving Ambulances Must be Given Unrestricted 
Access to the Wounded”, 8 January 2009. 
376 Art. 11 AP II.  
377 See “Assault on medical care: a distinct and chilling reality of the civil war in Syria”, 8 October 2013. See Report of the 
independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/65, 2 February 2014, paras. 
107-115. See Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. 





transport,378 and the interference with the care of patients believed to support the opposition. In the 
words of the chair of the Commission, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, an alarming feature of this conflict 
has been “the discriminatory denial of the right to health as a weapon of war”. As explicitly noted by the 
Commission, intentional attacks directed against medical transports and units using the Red Cross 
or Red Crescent emblem or against hospitals and places sheltering the wounded and the sick 
constitute war crimes.  
Indeed, regarding the numerous primary IHL norms protecting health, which have been 
transposed to international criminal law and codified as war crimes in the ICC Statute, specific 
provisions criminalise the “intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, 
and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law” as well 
as the “intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to … hospitals and places where the sick and 
wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives”.379 Notably, in the context of preliminary 
examinations on the situation of Afghanistan, attacks on hospitals and Medevac helicopters as 
perpetrated since May 2003 by armed groups were included among attacks on protected objects.380 
 
Conversely, in other situations the intrinsic value of the object determines a shift in the law, whose 
aim becomes protecting it for what it is and represents to future generations. This may be the case 
of cultural property, but also of the natural environment.381 In this sense, some treaty rules 
supplement the customary norms and principles that regard the natural environment as a “civilian 
object” and prohibit the parties to a conflict from causing it disproportionate damage. They require 
to “take care in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage”, 
specifically prohibiting means or methods of conduct of hostilities which are aimed or estimated to 
produce such damage and “to prejudice the health or survival of the population”.382 Additional rules prohibit 
                                                
378 This has been declared as one of the most “insidious trends” of the war, with incidents in which ambulance drivers, 
nurses, doctors and medical volunteers have been attacked, arrested, unlawfully detained, and disappeared. According 
to the Commission, “the clearly established pattern indicates that Government forces deliberately target medical personnel to gain military 
advantage by depriving the opposition and those perceived to support them of medical assistance for injuries sustained”; the situation is so 
awful that the general populace often elected not to seek help for “fear of arrest, detention, torture or death”. 
379 Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiv) and Art. 8(2)(e)(ii) as well as Art. 8(2)(b)(ix) and Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) ICC Statute are identical for both 
international and non-international armed conflicts. 
380 ICC OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2011, 13 December 2011, para. 28; ICC OTP, Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities 2012, 22 November 2012, para. 31. Since Afghanistan deposited its instrument of 
ratification to the Rome Statute on 10 February 2003, the ICC has jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes committed on 
its territory or by its nationals from 1 May 2003 onwards. 
381 The ICJ confirmed the indissoluble relation between the natural environment and human beings by stating that “the 
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations 
unborn”, see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, at 241, para. 29.  





the use of the environment as a weapon.383  
As anticipated, special protection is set down for certain property. For instance, in the case of 
works and installations containing dangerous forces, attacks on these objects as well as attacks on military 
targets found in their vicinity (when these would cause enough damage and risk of great casualties to 
endanger the civilian population) are prohibited and a higher threshold for targeting is provided.384 
Cultural property and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population deserve more detailed 
scrutiny for the purposes of the present research. In the following sections, they will be considered in 
tandem with the protection afforded to an additional element; namely education.  
6.5. Cultural property 
Since the earliest codifications of the laws of war, the protection of culture has been recognised both 
in its physical manifestations as cultural heritage and cultural property and in its practice and 
enjoyment as cultural rights in contexts of armed conflict alongside military occupation.385 Focusing 
on the conduct of hostilities, the special regime progressively providing for civilian objects falling 
within this category essentially prohibits the targeting of cultural property as well as its use for 
military purposes, allowing immunity to be waived on account of imperative military necessity.  
One of the main challenges remains, however, the determination of what precisely constitutes cultural 
property. Indeed, as the scrutiny of the scope of application of the relevant ius in bello framework will 
show, two aspects significantly influence that challenging determination: the spiritual and cultural value 
of certain objects are often established according to subjective criteria, and, additionally, within a given 
community the relative importance of an object may change over time as well as under certain circumstances. A 
typical example may be the case of a school having little historic or artistic value, but whose 
destruction is part of a campaign aimed to damage places of education so as to eliminate the 
opportunity for a people to study its own history and language. In light of the function served by 
schools in preserving the identity of a “targeted” group, such acts may be considered as an attack on 
                                                
383 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 2 
September 1976. 
384 Their special protection ceases only under limited circumstances, see Art. 56 (2) API. See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. 
Zimmerman (eds.), op. cit., pp. 665-675. See M. Sassòli and L. Cameron, “The Protection of Civilian Objects”, in N. 
Ronzitti and G. Venturini (eds.), The Law of Air Warfare. Contemporary Issues, Eleven International Publishing, 2006, p. 47. 
385 A.F. Panzera, La tutela internazionale dei beni culturali in tempo di guerra, Torino, 1993; F. Francioni, “Patrimonio culturale, 
sovranità degli Stati e conflitti armati”, in G. Feliciani (ed.), Beni culturali di interesse religioso, Bologna, 1995, p. 149 ff.; A. 
Gioia, “La protezione dei beni culturali nei conflitti armati”, in F. Francioni, A. Del Vecchio, P. De Caterini (eds.), 
Protezione internazionale del patrimonio culturale: interessi nazionali e difesa del patrimonio comune della cultura, Milano, 2000, p. 71 ff.; 
R. O’Keefe, The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2006; L. Zagato, La protezione dei beni culturali 
all’alba del secondo protocollo 1999, Torino, 2007; C. Forrest, “Cultural Heritage and Armed Conflict”, in International law 





cultural property. Thus, subjectivity as well as contextual analysis appear inevitably involved 
establishing when an object may constitute cultural property. This makes it extremely important to 
reflect on the extent to which these two aspects influence the ability of the law to be predictable and to 
be capable of elevating certain objects to a higher realm of protection according to emerging 
exigencies in connection to the changing nature of warfare.  
 
Conversely, for the purpose of the present research, another basic issue to consider is that the 
targeting, destroying, plundering or any other form of damage to cultural heritage and cultural 
property during the conduct of hostilities may be deemed to impair the enjoyment of the cultural 
rights of civilians, particularly the right of everybody to take part in cultural life as enshrined in Article 
15(1)(a) ICESCR and Article 27(1) UDHR.386 In this vein, the contribution deriving from the 
protection of cultural property during armed conflicts to the full enjoyment of cultural rights has 
been emphasised by the Human Rights Council.387 Significantly, the normative content of the right 
of everyone to take part in cultural life has been interpreted as entailing States’ obligations to respect 
and protect cultural heritage in times of war, including “the care, preservation and restoration of historical 
sites, monuments, works of art and literary works, among others”.388 Furthermore, the same right has been 
interpreted as being closely related to the other cultural rights set out in Article 15, as intrinsically 
linked to the right to education enshrined in Articles 13 and 14, and as interdependent on other 
rights guaranteed under this Covenant, including the right of all peoples to self-determination 
(Article 1) and the right to an adequate standard of living (Article 11).389  
In actual fact, several human rights instruments may afford protection to cultural rights of 
civilians and cultural heritage in the context of armed conflict or belligerent occupation. In addition 
to the right to education and full development of human personality of Article 26(2) UDHR, they 
                                                
386 ICESCR, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 16 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976. In its 
revised reporting guidelines, the CESCR requires States Parties to advise of “[T]he measures taken to protect cultural diversity, 
promote awareness of the cultural heritage of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and of indigenous communities, and create favourable 
conditions for them to preserve, develop, express and disseminate their identity, history, culture, language, traditions and customs”, see 
“Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents to be Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 13 January 2009, E/C.12/2008/2, at 14, para.68. 
387 In 2007 the Human Rights Council recognised the mutually reinforcing protection afforded to cultural rights and 
cultural heritage by international humanitarian law and human rights law, see UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/1, 27 
September 2007, “Protection of cultural rights and property in situations of armed conflict”. See also 
E/C.12/1/Add.90; see A/HRC/RES/6/19, 28 September 2007, “Religious and cultural rights in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem”. 
388 CESCR, General Comment No. 21: Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (Art. 15, para. 1 (a)), 21 December 2009, UN 
Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, para. 50 (a). 





refer to the right to equal participation in cultural activities,390 the right to participate in all aspects 
of social and cultural life,391 the right to participate fully in cultural and artistic life,392 the right of 
access to and participation in cultural life,393 and the right to take part on an equal basis with others 
in cultural life.394 Important provisions are also included in instruments on political and civil 
rights,395 on the rights of individuals belonging to minorities to enjoy their own culture, to use their 
own language, to practise and profess their own religion, in private and in public,396 and to 
participate effectively in cultural life,397 on the rights of indigenous peoples to their cultural 
institutions, ancestral lands, natural resources and traditional knowledge,398 and on the right to 
development.399  
 
It is in view of these considerations that the following two sub-sections look at the international 
legal regime protecting cultural property during the conduct of hostilities and discuss its ability to 
address and mitigate their adverse affects. 
6.5.a. Remarks on the scope of the protective regime  
The conventions on the laws and customs of war concluded at The Hague Peace Conferences in 
1899400 and 1907401 codified primary formal rules affording a certain degree of protection to 
                                                
390 Article 5 (e) (vi) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
391 Article 13 (c) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
392 Article 31 (2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
393 Article 43 (1) (g) of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families. 
394 Article 30 (1) of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
395 E.g. Articles 17, 18, 19, 21 and 22 ICCPR. 
396 Article 27 ICCPR. 
397 Article 2 (1) and (2) of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities. See also Article 15 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(Council of Europe, ETS No. 157). 
398 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, principally Arts. 5, 8, and 10-13 ff. See also ILO Convention 
No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, principally Arts. 2, 5, 7, 8, and 13-15 ff. 
399 Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development (GA Res. 41/128). See CESCR, General Comment No. 4, 
para. 9, in which the Committee considers that rights cannot be viewed in isolation from other human rights contained 
in the ICCPR and the ICESCR and other applicable international instruments. 
400 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, 32 Stat. 1803. Although the 1907 Hague Convention 
was intended to replace the 1899 Hague Convention, eighteen State parties to the latter (e.g. Turkey) did not ratify the 
former. See particularly Articles 23, 28, and 47 which prohibit pillage and seizure by invading forces, and Article 27 
which requires belligerents to take “all necessary steps” in sieges and bombardments “to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to 
religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected” as long as they are not used for 
military purposes, marked with the distinctive sign, and notified to the enemy. 
401 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, TS 539, in A. Roberts and R. Guelff, (eds.) 
Documents on the Laws of War, 1989, at 46. In addition to relevant provisions on civilian private property (Art. 23(g) and 





cultural objects. They were applicable to international armed conflicts only according to the si omnes 
clause. Protecting cultural heritage was nonetheless a mutual concern of the international 
community, as shown by preceding provisions such as those contained in the Lieber Code of 
1863402 or in the Brussels International Declaration of 1874 concerning the Laws and Customs of 
war.403  
Although the Hague Regulations proved not sufficient to avoid the destruction and the loss of 
cultural property during the First World Word, it was not until the large-scale cultural looting and 
indiscriminate destruction of art during the Second World Word that thoughtful considerations was 
given to the shortcomings of international law.404 The significance of the protection of cultural 
heritage as a value related to the international community as a whole was then proclaimed in the 
Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (the 1954 
Hague Convention).405 This set up the first international comprehensive protective regime moving 
beyond the nature and purpose approach of earlier instruments.406 Several of its sections have been 
clarified by the 1999 Second Hague Protocol, which is explicitly applicable to both international 
and civil armed conflicts and which provides the possibility of increasing the protective regime by 
raising the threshold for military use of cultural objects, as well as significantly setting out a list of 
                                                                                                                                                            
specifically drawn to protect cultural heritage: Article 27 (“1. In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to 
spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where 
the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes. 2. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate 
the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand”); Article 47, which 
prohibits pillage during belligerent occupation; and Article 56, which regards cultural heritage (movable and immovable 
property) in occupied territory as private property. 
402 It was the first codification of provisions governing the protection of cultural property during armed conflict. These 
army regulations were drafted at the request of President Abraham Lincoln in the context of the Civil War. They 
provided for a determination of ownership of cultural property by treaty after the war in situations where the code 
allowed seizure of art objects.  They also provided additional protection from damage for art and libraries. 
403 Adopted in the context of an intergovernmental conference sponsored by Russia, it contained Articles VIII and 
XVII which prohibited belligerents from attacking and looting the property and the buildings dedicated to religion, 
education, art and science, and which influenced the evolution of successive practice and law, although it remained not 
legally binding. Article 34 and 53 of the Oxford Manual on Land Warfare of 1880 confirmed similar prohibitions. 
404 A notable earlier initiative was the Roerich Pact, namely the Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific 
Institutions and Historic Monuments (Washington, 15 April 1935), available at www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf. It was a regional 
treaty between the United States and other American countries, which acknowledged for the first time cultural property 
as the common heritage of all peoples’ culture (according to its preamble, “immovable monuments ... form the cultural treasure of 
peoples”). Another noteworthy project was undertaken by the League of Nations to adopt a general Convention on the 
protection of cultural objects in view of the Spanish Civil War, but it was never implemented.  
405 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. (1954) 215, in force 7 August 1956. The Convention is accompanied by a Regulation for its 
execution that form an integral part of it, and by a First Protocol aimed at impeding the export of cultural objects from 
an occupied territory as well as assuring their return when they are in protective custody abroad. 
406 It applies to international and non-international armed conflicts. Each of the parties to the internal conflict is bound 
to the convention’s obligations “as a minimum”, see Article 19(1). This application of the Convention has been recognised 
to form part of customary international law, see Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (IT-94-1-A), Interlocutory Appeal Judgment, 2 





serious violations of the Protocol itself.407  
According to the Preamble of the 1954 Hague Convention, “ … damage to cultural property belonging 
to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution 
to the culture of the world” and “the preservation of the cultural heritage is of great importance for all peoples of the 
world and [...] it is important that this heritage should receive international protection”.408 The language of such a 
“universalist message”409 visibly highlights that in the context of armed conflict cultural property is 
protected for what it symbolises and represents, against incidental damage arising from the 
exigencies of war as well as against intentional destruction harming the population whose identity is 
bound to its preservation. As has been stated, the systematic destruction of such objects during 
hostilities inflicts damage on existing generations so as “to orphan future generations and destroy their 
understanding of who they are and from where they come”.410  
Notably, this Convention has been applied to Contracting Parties involved in several armed 
conflicts in the past sixty years. Regrettable practice has emerged in the Levant region since the 
1960s, particularly in Afghanistan after to the Soviet invasion, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in 
the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s with the significant damage to the eleventh-century Jomeh Mosque, 
in the Persian Gulf Wars and during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait,411 in the Israeli-Lebanese war 
of 2006; in the conflict in Cambodia in the early 1980s and in the Vietnamese occupation; and in 
the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea with the considerable deliberate damage caused by explosion 
at the 2,500 year old Stela of Matara.  
A deplorable instance of deliberate destruction of cultural property as part of the identity-based 
violence can be seen in the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s and early 2000s, where belligerents 
often directly attacked the enemy’s cultural property without the justification of military necessity. 
The most extensive attacks committed against such property during the 1991-1995 armed conflicts 
were those that destroyed the Mostar Bridge in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Old Town of 
Dubrovnik in Croatia. Other instances of cultural aggressions as tools to erase the manifestation of 
the enemy’s identity concerned, inter alia, the Croatian city of Vukovar, where ancient and medieval 
                                                
407 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, The Hague, 26 March 1999, in force 9 March 2004, 38 I.L.M. (1999), at 769. 
408 A.F. Panzera, La tutela internazionale dei beni culturali in tempo di guerra, Torino, 1993, pp. 30 and 72. See A. Gioia, “La 
protezione dei beni culturali nei conflitti armati”, in F. Francioni, A. Del Vecchio, and P. De Caterini (eds.), Protezione 
internazionale del patrimonio culturale: interessi nazionali e difesa del patrimonio comune della cultura, Milano, 2000, p. 76. 
409 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, p. 175. 
410 H. Abtahi, “The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict: The Practice of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 2001, p. 2. 
411 P. Gerstenblith, “From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of Cultural Heritage at the Beginning of 





sites and the eighteenth-century Eltz Castle (with its museum) were vandalised by Serb-controlled 
Federal troops; the city of Split, where Roman villas were attacked and the sixteenth-century 
Fortress of Stara Gradiška overlooking the Sava River was damaged by the same troops; the city of 
Osijek, where the Assumption and St. Dimitrius Churches were attacked; in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
also Baščaršija and Stari Most, the historic centres of Sarajevo and Mostar were targeted; and in 
Croatia the Jasenovac memorial complex came under attack.412  
As will be highlighted hereafter, the recent armed conflicts in Libya, Mali, and Syria have 
further raised specific concern in relation to cultural property. 
 
The 1954 Hague Convention and the 1999 Second Hague Protocol do not cover the entire 
scale of cultural property.413 According to three legal criteria laid down by this Convention to define 
cultural property, it includes publicly or privately owned, movable and immovable property that is 
considered of “great importance to the cultural heritage of every people”, buildings preserving or exhibiting 
cultural objects, and historical centres containing a huge quantity of cultural heritage.414 The textual 
reference to a subjective concept like “great importance” is counterbalanced by the subsequent phrase 
“of every people” which has been interpreted as referring to “each respective people”.415 Accordingly, 
protection does not extend to every object deemed of cultural significance or part of the national 
heritage by the country location; instead, those items considered part of the inherent cultural value and 
heritage of each people (because they are a representative part of the heritage of the entire world) are covered.416  
The use of a universally recognised distinctive emblem is required to ensure the identification of 
                                                
412 J. K. Detling, “Eternal Silence: The Destruction of Cultural Property in Yugoslavia”, Maryland Journal of International 
Law and Trade, 1993, pp. 66-68. 
413 See Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict: Commentary on the Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its Protocol, signed on 14 May 1954 in The Hague, and on other instruments of 
international law concerning such protection, 1996, pp. 45-56; R. O’Keefe, The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, 
Cambridge, 2006, pp. 101-111.  
414 These three categories of properties are detailed in Article 1 of the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, 
which recites: “(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of 
architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic 
interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections of 
books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above; (b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the 
movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to 
shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a); (c) centres containing a large amount of 
cultural property as defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as ‘centres containing monuments’”. This definition is also 
applicable to its Protocols, see Article 1 of the 1954 First Protocol and Article 1 (b) of the 1999 Second Protocol.  
415 R. O’Keefe, The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2006, p. 103. Dinstein agrees to such 
interpretation in light of the explanation contained in the Preamble and previously mentioned, see Y. Dinstein, The 
Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, p. 175.  
416 See L. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, Melland Schill Studies in International Law3, Manchester University 
Press, 2008, p. 179, making some examples: the Taj Mahal, the Sphinx, the Colosseum, Picasso’s “Guernica”, the 





such privileged status during armed conflicts and to favour international control.417 However, this 
system has been abused to a certain extent and, ironically, has enabled belligerents to target cultural 
property deemed valuable to the enemy much sooner. One example is Croatia’s report about the 
deliberate targeting by the then Yugoslav people’s army of its immovable cultural heritage which it 
had marked with the blue shield prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1991, including the old town 
of Dubrovnik. 418  States’ reluctance to employ the emblem for fear of experiencing similar 
consequences in other armed conflicts has been noted.419 
The protection afforded to all objects falling under the aforementioned definition entails a 
twofold obligation to safeguard and respect cultural property. The forms for safeguarding such 
property located within the States parties’ own territory against the foreseeable effects of warfare are 
not specified, Article 3 of the 1954 Hague Convention only requires to take “such measures as they 
consider appropriate” in time of peace.420 In this regard, Article 5 of the 1999 Second Protocol 
elucidates the concept in question: States may take preventive measures such as preparing 
inventories, removing movable cultural property, and providing protection in situ. Further, related 
precautions to safeguard it against the effects of hostilities are established in the 1999 Second 
Protocol.421 
Conversely, the forms for respecting cultural property situated in the territory of all States parties 
are more detailed in Article 4 of the 1954 Hague Convention; they include the obligation to desist 
“from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes 
which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict”, the obligation to refrain 
“from any act of hostility directed against such property”, and the obligation to “prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, 
put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural 
property”. Moreover, States must refrain “from requisitioning movable cultural property situated in the territory 
of another High Contracting Party” as well as “from any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural 
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418 Sulc, B. “The Protection of Croatia’s Cultural Heritage During War 1991-95”, in R. Layton, P. G. Stone, and J. 
Thomas (ed.), Destruction and Conservation of Cultural Property, Routledge, 2001, pp. 161. 
419 J. Hladik, “Marking of Cultural Property with the Distinctive Emblem of the 1954 Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict”, 86 IRRC, 2004, p. 383. 
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O’Keefe, The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 113.  
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property”.422 Further measures are required as precautions in attack against damage and destruction 
in the Second Protocol.423  
In line with the rationale of affording protection to cultural property as a higher collective 
interest of the international community - rather than exclusively in favour of the territorial State - 
any breach of the duty to safeguard it does not automatically release States parties from their 
required compliance with the duty to respect such property. 
 
Nonetheless, the comprehensive regime laid down in these treaties creates two categories of 
protected cultural objects and sites. To elaborate, the line drawn between them makes a restricted 
category of cultural property of the greatest importance to humankind benefiting from enhanced protection as long 
as it is marked and registered as such.424 The registration of an object has been viewed as analogous 
to “an internationally recognised declaration establishing a non-defended locality”.425 Essentially, the property 
                                                
422 Article 4 (1) and (3) of the 1954 Hague Convention. Article 4 (2) reads (emphasis added): “The obligations mentioned in 
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deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental damage to cultural property protected under Article 4 of the Convention 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; and d. cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes 
apparent: i. that the objective is cultural property protected under Article 4 of the Convention; ii. that the attack may be expected to cause 
incidental damage to cultural property protected under Article 4 of the Convention which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated”. It is based on Art. 57(2)(b) AP I. 
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addressed by a State party. The property concerned will be inserted in the “International Register of Cultural Property under 
Special Protection”. However, the abject failure of this special regime is well known: just the Vatican City and four place of 
safety for movable cultural property (one in Germany and three in the Netherland) have been registered. 
As regards the changed procedure of registration, under Article 10 of the 1999 Second Protocol, enhanced protection is 
granted as long as three criteria are met: (i) the object concerned is cultural heritage “of the greatest importance for humanity”, 
(ii) it is covered by national administrative and legal measures which recognise its “exceptional” historic and cultural value, 
and (iii) it is not used for shielding military sites or for military purposes (the Party which controls the object concerned 
must declare that it will not be so used). A Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict is 
competent for forming, maintaining and promoting the “List of Cultural Property under Enhanced Protection”, and it can grant, 
suspend or cancel such enhanced protection. See particularly Arts. 11, 24, 27 of the Second Protocol. 
425 See J.M. Henckaerts, “New Rules for the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict: The Significance of the 
Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict”, IRRC, 1999, p. 611, referring to Article 59 AP I. While no differences emerge in the level of protection and in 
the manner in which cultural property can become a military target, the author highlights that the main difference 
between enhanced protection and general protection concerns the duties upon the holder of cultural property included in the 
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holder of cultural property included in the List “certifies” a commitment not to convert it into a 
military objective by using it for military purposes or shielding military sites under any 
circumstance, so indicating to potential adversaries the need to be aware about such immunity.  
Although other States parties may recommend the inclusion of potential properties on the List, 
the actual request of the nomination for enhanced protection cannot be imposed on an unwilling 
territorial State,426 which might engage in destroying cultural property located within its borders. 
This may be regarded a regrettable gap in the law in view of the universal significance of certain 
sites and objects; it tragically allows events such as the devastation of the Buddhas of Bamiyan by 
the military and paramilitary forces of the Taliban government in March 2001.  
However, as extensively analysed in legal scholarship, an obligation “to prevent acts of systematic 
destruction of cultural heritage” exists upon the government that effectively controls the territory; it stems 
from two norms shaped by the international practice concerning the protection of cultural heritage. 
In particular, the customary principle that cultural heritage is in the common and general interest of 
the international community as a whole alongside the customary principle according to which acts 
of violence against cultural heritage are prohibited in times of armed conflict.427  
Following this tragic event - in which the vulnerability of invaluable cultural property was 
mostly due to ideologically driven and bellicose actors (going beyond the bounds of an armed 
conflict) - a reiteration of the expanding international norms encompassing the necessity for all 
States to protect the common cultural heritage of mankind has been made by the 2003 UNESCO 
Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, which has also 
encouraged States to take “appropriate measures to prevent, avoid, stop, and punish any acts of (such) intentional 
destruction”.428 Notably, in applying this Declaration, States have been considered to acknowledge 
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427 See F. Francioni and F. Lenzerini, “The destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law”, EJIL, 
2003, pp. 619-651. This devastation was considered a very dangerous precedent, not only for its discriminatory intent as 
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well as criminal liability of the individuals who materially order and/or perform the acts of destruction”. See also F. Francioni and F. 
Lenzerini, “The obligation to Prevent and Avoid Destruction of Cultural Heritage: From Bamiyan to Iraq”, in B.T. 
Hoffman, Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 28-40. 
428 Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, Paris, adopted by the thirty-second session 
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“the need to respect international rules related to the criminalization of gross violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law, in particular, when intentional destruction of cultural heritage is linked to those 
violations”.429 
The significance of these considerations has recently emerged in relation to the military 
operations involving Libya, which is not a party to the 1954 Hague Convention, and the coalition of 
States involved in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) imposing a 
no-fly-zone and other necessary measures to protect civilians.430 In keeping with Article 23(g) of the 
Hague Convention, UNESCO issued an appeal to all sides to respect the country’s cultural heritage 
by refraining from committing any damage to its heritage sites, keeping military operations away 
from them, and preserving the country’s ancient treasures, given that “from a cultural heritage point of 
view, Libya is of great importance to humanity as a whole”.431 Particular concern emerged for at least three 
sites due to their proximity to Tripoli and other strategic areas. Among the five Libyan sites on the 
World Heritage’s list,432 the Roman ruins of Leptis Magna and the ancient Phoenician trading post 
of Sabratha, within 130 km (80 miles) west of the Libyan capital Tripoli, were principally 
threatened. Another vulnerable site was the ancient mountain of Cyrene, which faces the 
Mediterranean Sea east of Benghazi. Conversely, since October 2011 attacks on and destruction of 
Sufi religious sites in Tripoli continued across the country in 2012 and 2013, including prominent 
Sufi shrines such as the Sidi Abdul-Salam al Asmar al-Fituri Mosque in Zliten and the al-Shaab 
Mosque in central Tripoli,433 in addition to the desecration of tombs of Sufi leaders and the 
targeting against libraries. 
                                                                                                                                                            
an unjustifiable offence to the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience, in the latter case in so far as such acts are not already 
governed by fundamental principles of international law”. 
429 Ibid., point IX of the Declaration, entitled “Human rights and international humanitarian law”. 
430 Of the ten States in the coalition involved in military operations in Libya (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, 
Qatar, Spain, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States), eight are party to the Hague 
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two protocols, except of the 
United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. 
431 This was stated by Irina Bokova, Director-General of the Paris-based UNESCO, in a letter to the Permanent 
Representatives to UNESCO of each of the countries concerned. See Reuters News online, “UNESCO urges all sides to 
preserve Libyan treasures”, 23 March 2011; Earthtimes online, “Prolonged conflict a threat to Libyan heritage sites - 
Feature”, 25 March 2011. 
432 The World Heritage sites include the Old Town of Ghadames, one of the oldest pre-Saharan cities; the Rock-Art 
Sites of Tadrart Acacus, which features thousands of cave paintings dating from 12,000 B.C. to A.D. 100; the 
Archaeological Site of Cyrene, ruins of what was once a province of the Roman Empire; the Archaeological Site of 
Leptis Magna, which represents an early artistic realisation of urban planning; and the Archaeological Site of Sabratta, 
a Phoenician trading post that was once part of the Numidian Kingdom of Massinissa. See HolaVerde online, “Libya must 
refrain from endangering cultural heritage”, 30 March 2011. 
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The armed violence in the ongoing non-international armed conflict in Syria has also taken a 
heavy toll on the Ancient Cities of Aleppo and Damascus, particularly since August 2012. Other 
sites of archaeological or cultural importance, which have suffered “considerable and sometimes 
irreversible damage” in the words of UNESCO Director General, include the Site of Palmyra, the 
Ancient City of Bosra, and Raqqa. The 12th century crusader castle located near Homs, the Crac des 
Chevaliers, was occupied by Syrian rebel forces and bombarded by Bashar forces in the summer of 
2013, and most of its towers have been destroyed. Additional properties in which looting has been 
extensive include Apamea, Ebla Dura-Europos, and Mari, which are on the Syrian Tentative List of 
world heritage.434 At the beginning of 2014, Resolution 2139 of the UN Security Council called on 
all parties to the conflict to “save Syria’s rich societal mosaic and cultural heritage, and take appropriate steps to 
ensure the protection of Syria’s World Heritage Sites”.435 
It is worth noting that, already in 2013, the World Heritage Committee decided to inscribe all 
the six Syrian world heritage properties on the List of World Heritage in Danger, after having 
expressed “its utmost concern at the damage occurred and threats facing these properties”.436 Already at that 
time, all parties associated with the situation in Syria were urged “to refrain from any action that would 
cause further damage to cultural heritage of the country and to fulfil their obligations under international law by taking 
all possible measures to protect such heritage, in particular the safeguarding of World Heritage properties and those 
included in the Tentative List”.437 Furthermore, the same Committee elaborated a threefold appeal to 
the State of Syria. First, the latter was requested “to invite the World Heritage Centre and the Advisory Bodies 
to undertake a mission to Syria as soon as the security conditions permit in order to assess the state of conservation of 
the properties and elaborate, in consultation with the State Party, an action plan for their recovery”. Second, the 
latter was requested to prepare, in consultation with the World Heritage Centre and the Advisory 
Bodies, “the corrective measures as well as a Desired state of conservation for the removal of the properties from the 
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List of World Heritage in Danger, once a return to stability is effective in the country”. Third, Syria was 
requested “to submit to the World Heritage Centre, by 1 February 2014, a detailed report on the state of 
conservation of the World Heritage properties in Syria for examination by the World Heritage Committee at its 38th 
session in 2014”. The same Government was also suggested to consider ratifying the 1999 Second 
Protocol.438 Indeed, Syria is party only to the 1954 Hague Convention and its First Protocol, plus 
the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 
 
Differently from what is the scope of the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1999 Second Hague 
Protocol, Article 53 API and Article 16 AP II afford special protection to three types of objects (i.e. 
places of worship, historic monuments, works of art) on condition that they “constitute the cultural or spiritual 
heritage of peoples”. Of note, the spirituality criterion was inserted so as to protect “objects whose value 
transcends geographical boundaries, and which are unique in character and are intimately associated with the history 
and culture of a people”.439 Thus, although these provisions do not cover each place of worship, they 
undoubtedly include buildings that represent the religious nature of the people and “express the 
conscience of the people”.440 For instance, they apply to prominent religious establishments such as the 
St Peter’s Basilica in Rome, St Paul’s Cathedral in London, the Blue Mosque in Istanbul, the Dome 
of the Rock in the Old City of Jerusalem. In this regard, the official commentary to Protocol I refers 
to the ‘nation’, but it also highlights that its drafters purposely used the more inclusive term ‘people’ in 
this provision, rather than ‘country’, to describe the relative meaning of the ‘spirituality’ - within the 
meaning of Article 53(1) API - of a privileged building.  
Even thought both provisions function without prejudice to the obligations contained in 1954 
Hague Convention and other relevant international instruments including the Hague Regulations, 
the reference to the “cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples” is not identical to that contained in the 
preamble of the Hague Convention. As highlighted in the ICRC commentary, that phrase is 
deliberately distinguishable: “all objects of sufficient artistic or religious importance to constitute the heritage of 
peoples are protected, including those which have been renovated or restored”.441 The ICRC study on customary 
international humanitarian law has reinforced this point.442 Such interpretation has also been 
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confirmed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber443 as well as the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, 
which has observed that the negotiating history of Article 53 “suggests that it was intended to cover only a 
few of the most famous monuments, such as the Acropolis in Athens and St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome”.444 
 
Nevertheless, certain objects perceived to be purely cultural may neither reach “the threshold of 
great importance” recognised by the 1954 Hague Convention nor plausibly fall under the cultural 
objects that are specially protected by the 1977 Protocols. In spite of this, in war-torn contexts that 
challenge ethnic or religious identities attacks on non-secular objects may raise certain scepticism. In 
the Kordic case, indeed, the Trial Chamber of ICTY did define educational institutions broadly as 
“undoubtedly immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of peoples in that they are without 
exception centres of learning, arts, and sciences, with their valuable collections of books and works of arts and science” 
(emphasis added), without going to great lengths to substantiate its assumption and referring to the 
Roerich Pact, “which requires respect and protection to be accorded to educational institutions in time of peace as 
well as in war”.445 However, the Appeals Chamber in the same case could not see how all educational 
buildings fulfil those criteria, noting that the Trial Chamber erred in such a far-reaching 
classification, since it “did not consider whether and under which conditions the destruction of educational buildings 
constituted a crime qua custom at the time it was allegedly committed”. Nevertheless, even when educational 
buildings do not meet that high criteria, their destruction as civilian objects was deemed to 
constitute a war crime under customary international law.446 
Thus, a question arises as to whether adopting a generous definition of cultural property may 
have the inconvenient effect of reducing the regime drawn for objects whose cultural value is 
acknowledged more extensively. Specifically in relation to the risk of attenuating the higher 
protection afforded by the 1954 Hague Convention (through a broad category of the objects 
concerned), the necessity of making a distinction between the Masjid Al-Aqsa (Bayt al-Maqdis) or 
the Florentine Cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore and several other places of worship may be 
posited and the importance of reflecting such a distinction in related protective measures may be 
                                                                                                                                                            
important cultural property, namely that which forms part of the cultural or spiritual heritage of ‘peoples’ (i.e. mankind)”. 
443 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez (IT-95-14/2), Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 17 December 2004, para. 
91.  
444 Partial Award: Central Front, Eritrea’s Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 22, (28 April 2004), at 1270; also at 1249, para.113. 
445 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez (IT-95-14/2-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 
360. 
446 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez (IT-95-14/2-T), Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 17 December 2004, 
para. 92. In particular, the Appeal Chamber noted that Article 52(3) API designates schools as civilian property, thus 
their destruction is criminalised by the lex generalis concerning the destruction of civilian property; yet, in certain cases, as 





stressed as ways to guarantee that existing rules are taken seriously even during intense phases of an 
armed conflict.447 
6.5.b. Remarks on IHL rules regulating the targeting of cultural property 
As observed above, the 1907 Hague Regulations require belligerents to undertake all basic steps in 
military operations “to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, 
historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected” provided that they “are not 
being used at the time for military purposes”, marked with the distinctive sign and notified to the enemy.448  
 
In the case of property of great importance to the inherent cultural value and heritage of each people, the 1954 
Hague Convention and the 1999 Second Protocol prohibit any hostile act against it as well as any 
use of it and its direct surroundings for aims which presumably damage or destroy it, except that 
military necessity imperatively requires to do so.449 The absence of a definition of “military necessity” 
and the lack of clarity of the Hague Convention’s provisions on military necessity450 have been 
partly remedied by its Second Protocol. In particular, Article 6(a) spells out the cumulative 
conditions under which a State may invoke a waiver based on imperative military necessity to direct 
an hostile act against cultural property, while Article 6(b) clarifies the circumstances for invoking a 
waiver based on imperative military necessity to use cultural property; nonetheless, the invocation of 
this exception is further limited.451 As for cultural property under enhanced protection, Article 
                                                
447 On these points, see A. Bouvin, “The Legal Regime Applicable to Targeting Military Objectives in the Context of 
Contemporary Warfare”, Research Paper Series UCHL, 2006, p. 64, highlighting the challenging task “of identifying what rules 
apply to what object for which party” in view of that “the relevant instruments neither enjoy universal ratification nor are ratified by the 
same parties”. 
448 Article 27 HRs covers immovable heritage, while movables are protected solely if housed within such buildings. This 
norm reflects customary international law, so applicable in internal and international armed conflicts, see J.M. 
Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., pp. 127 and 131, Rule 38 A and Rule 39.  
449 Article 4 of 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and Article 6 of the 1999 Second Hague Protocol. These two 
prohibitions are deemed norms of customary international law applicable in both types of armed conflicts, see J.M. 
Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., pp. 127 and 131, Rule 38 B and Rule 39. 
450 Pursuant to Article 4(2) immunity may be waived in situations “where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver”, 
while under Article 11(2) special protection of cultural property may be withdrawn “only in exceptional cases of unavoidable 
military necessity” and “only for such time as that necessity continues”. See J. Hladík, “The 1954 Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the notion of military necessity. The review of the 
1954 Convention and the adoption of the Second Protocol thereto (26 March 1999)”, 8 IRRC, 1999, 621-635. 
451 Article 6 recites (emphasis added): “With the goal of ensuring respect for cultural property in accordance with Article 
4 of the Convention: a. a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity pursuant to Article 4 paragraph 2 of the 
Convention may only be invoked to direct an act of hostility against cultural property when and for as long as: i. that cultural 
property has, by its function, been made into a military objective; and ii. there is no feasible alternative available to obtain a similar military 
advantage to that offered by directing an act of hostility against that objective; b. a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity 
pursuant to Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Convention may only be invoked to use cultural property for purposes which 
are likely to expose it to destruction or damage when and for as long as no choice is possible between such use of the cultural property 





13(1)(b) regulates the loss of such status, namely “if, and for as long as, the property has, by its use, become a 
military objective”, while Article 13(2) set down a number of criteria to legitimately subject it to 
eventual attack.452 
 
Conversely, immunity for cultural property covered by the 1977 Protocols is afforded without referring to 
military necessity. Article 53 API and Article 16 APII essentially proscribe any hostile act against 
places of worship, historic monuments or works of art which define “the cultural or spiritual heritage of 
peoples”. As a basic counterpart, they prohibit their use “in support of the military effort” and in doing so 
they enhance the protection against targeting as afforded to all civilian buildings. Inasmuch as the 
violation of this prohibition determines the turning into a military objective, the principle of 
proportionality does however remain applicable.453 Furthermore, reprisals against this property are 
prohibited under Article 53(c) API (as under the 1954 Hague Convention). 
Regarding the “without prejudice” formula contained in Article 53 and the consequent possibility 
of relying on military necessity for those Contracting Parties to Protocol I that are simultaneously 
Parties to the 1954 Hague Convention, the need to read the waiver provision of Article 4(2) of the 
Hague Convention in light of contemporary customary international law, which allows to target 
only military objectives, has been argued.454 Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that Article 53 is 
“unique” in not specifying the cessation of protection when breached, other protective clauses of 
Protocol I incorporate an exception to that effect.455 However, a loss of immunity may occur only in case 
of military “use” by the enemy of the specially protected cultural objects, and this is a key feature of 
                                                                                                                                                            
only be taken by an officer commanding a force the equivalent of a battalion in size or larger, or a force smaller in size where 
circumstances do not permit otherwise; d. in case of an attack based on a decision taken in accordance with sub-
paragraph (a), an effective advance warning shall be given whenever circumstances permit”. 
452 Article 13 recites (emphasis added): “1. Cultural property under enhanced protection shall only lose such protection: 
a. if such protection is suspended or cancelled in accordance with Article 14; or b. if, and for as long as, the property 
has, by its use, become a military objective. 2. In the circumstances of sub-paragraph 1(b), such property may only be 
the object of attack if: a. the attack is the only feasible means of terminating the use of the property referred to in sub-
paragraph 1(b); b. all feasible precautions are taken in the choice of means and methods of attack, with a view to 
terminating such use and avoiding, or in any event minimising, damage to the cultural property; c. unless circumstances 
do not permit, due to requirements of immediate self-defence: i. the attack is ordered at the highest operational level of command; 
ii. effective advance warning is issued to the opposing forces requiring the termination of the use referred to in sub-paragraph 
1(b); and iii. Reasonable time is given to the opposing forces to redress the situation”. 
453 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., at 648, para. 2079; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, op. cit., 
vol. II, at 779-790, paras. 282-354.  
454 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 
178-179, quoting the view of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Strugar case, according to which “military necessity may be 
usefully defined for present purposes with reference to the widely acknowledged definition of military objectives in Article 52 of Additional 
Protocol I”; the case was related to the destruction of buildings in the Old Town of Dubrovnik, see Prosecutor v. Strugar, 
Trial Chamber, 31 January 2005, para. 295. 





the “complementary protection from attack” provided for in Article 53.456 
It is worth reflecting on the fact that “use” is considered “a customary law criterion” in the regime 
applicable to targeting cultural property. While the criteria of “nature” and “purpose” established in 
Article 52(2) API are viewed as inapplicable to cultural property,457 “location” has been deemed 
unclear because some objects are part of infrastructure that are seized or destroyed during the 
conduct of hostilities to avoid the adversary’s occupation of a site.458 However, some of the most 
valuable objects belonging to the inherent cultural heritage of mankind are placed in tactically 
relevant areas or constitute sites that could be occupied as their control could effectively contribute 
to military action.459 Indeed, the concern about “location” emerged during the negotiations of the 
1999 Second Protocol and it was finally rejected for being too broad according to the majority of 
delegates. In that context, since the criterion of “use” was considered too narrow, “function” was 
introduced in Article 6(a)(i) (“a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity pursuant to Article 4 
paragraph 2 of the Convention may only be invoked to direct an act of hostility against cultural property when and for 
as long as: i. that cultural property has, by its function, been made into military objects; …”). 
Still, the issue of attacks on cultural property even when it is not used for military action, or the 
issue of indiscriminate attacks against it, has been widely discussed in legal scholarship. As aptly 
stated by a distinguished expert, “in real life the rule should be simple: cultural property which is not used to 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction, seizure or neutralization does not offer a 
definite military advantage cannot be attacked. It is difficult to imagine how military commanders could teach their 
soldiers anything else”.460 In the same vein, the ICRC commentary to Protocol I explicitly stresses that 
“if protected objects were used in support of the military effort, this would obviously constitute a violation of Article 53 
of the Protocol, though it would not necessarily justify attacking them”; it further explains that “it is not permitted 
to destroy a cultural object whose use does not make any contribution to military action, nor a cultural object which has 
temporarily served as a refuge for combatants, but is no longer used as such”.461 Conversely, the taking of some 
military measures in anticipation of the potential action of the adversary has been considered 
                                                
456 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, p. 181. 
457 The consensus on this point among the delegations has been underlined, see J.M. Henckaerts, “New Rules for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict: The Significance of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict”, IRRC, 1999, p. 603.  
458 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmerman (eds.), op. cit., para. 2021. However, in case of use of an historic bridge, 
which turns it into a military objective, the attack against it only comes to be imperatively necessary once it is being used 
by the adversary, see J.M. Henckaerts, ibid., p. 605. 
459 See A. Bouvin, op. cit., p. 66, stressing that an “abusive” interpretation of “location” would critically diminished the 
protection afforded to cultural property.  
460 J.M. Henckaerts, op. cit., p. 605. 







Once the protective status of an object of cultural property has been lost, the fulfilment of 
certain conditions is required before legitimately targeting such an object. In this regard, Article 6 of 
the 1999 Hague Protocol is useful to identify some general rules applicable to property of great 
importance to the inherent cultural heritage of each people.463 In relation to Article 53 API, the 
necessity to take all preventive measures to terminate the use of the object concerned “in support of the 
military effort” is underlined in the ICRC commentary so as to prevent the damage or destruction of 
cultural objects. Yet, any attack against such an objective will be qualified by the principle of 
proportionality, meaning that the damage should not be “excessive” in respect to the direct and 
concrete military advantage anticipated, as well as by all the precautions required in Article 57. 
However, for certain cultural and spiritual sites a mechanical application of existing rules may 
result very difficult and impracticable without acknowledging the additional necessity of adapting 
those rules for taking into serious account the value of the cultural and spiritual site in question, 
notwithstanding the fact that this has turned into a legitimate military objective through use. The 
case of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem and its takeover by a group of Palestinian 
combatants in 2002 is instructive in this regard. Given that its undeniable importance to the 
Christian world and its indisputable value for the spiritual and cultural heritage of mankind could 
not be ignored by the Israeli Defence Force, the latter resorted mainly to siege tactics and refrained 
from storming the site: sporadic exchanges of fire led to some minor damage to the Church, but no 
direct attacks against this site were launched. Thus, in situations like the Church of the Nativity in 
Bethlehem it seems reasonable to argue that the imperative military necessity of targeting what has become a 
legitimate military objective demands proportionality to be calculated by taking into special account the significant 
impact of its possible destruction, given the persistence of its indisputable value for the spiritual and cultural heritage of 
mankind. Conversely, if a cultural or spiritual site is of minor value and has lost its protection, the 
lower threshold for a potential attack will not affect its legitimacy, which will still rely on the respect 
of the proportionality principle. These remarks appear in accordance with the rationale behind the 
law, namely the setting apart certain categories of objects warranting special protection because of 
                                                
462 A. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield2, 2004, p. 156. Laying detonating charges are taken as example, but they cannot be 
exploded until the object concerned is used by the enemy. 
463 See A. Bouvin, op. cit., pp. 67-68. The author takes the example of “a church used to shield combatants” and underlines the 
attacker’s obligation to guarantee the following: (a) that attacks against the church are carried out for as long as it is 
being utilised by the combatants; (b) no feasible alternative are possible to gain an analogous military advantage; (c) that 
the decision regarding the imperative military necessity of attacking the church is taken “at a certain level of command”; (d) 





their inherent value and general importance for humanity.  
 
Focusing on places of worship, two significant aspects are noteworthy for the purposes of the 
present study in light of the previous considerations. The first concerns the relevant shift in the law 
for having established equally shared obligations of all military forces, including attackers as well as 
defenders, not to use religious buildings for military purposes, instead of exclusively limiting military 
attackers in targeting as it was in the past.  
The second aspect regards some remaining ambiguities in the determination of which religious buildings are 
covered by special protection. Whereas not every place of worship meets the threshold of Article 53 API, 
all religious buildings representing the “people” do, thus most of churches, mosques, synagogues, and 
temples are covered. As already stressed, Article 53 prohibits to make these objects into military 
objectives and to destroy them. Such special protection is additional to the immunity assigned to all 
places of worship (irrespective of their significance) by Article 52. Hence, while the latter merely 
establishes that ordinary civilian objects “shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals”, Article 53 
specifically prohibits States from using places of worship belonging to the spiritual heritage of 
peoples “in support of the military effort”. However Protocol I does not add to the practical means for 
armed forces to identify special protected religious sites. As for cultural religious sites, it perhaps 
refers to the 1954 Hague Convention’s typical white and blue emblem. However, Protocol I does 
not designate a separate emblem for those religious buildings covered by Article 53 but not falling 
under the 1954 Hague Convention. In any event, as a matter of common sense, identifying a 
religious building is less problematic than identifying other civilian buildings: most religious 
buildings have exterior markings such as a cross, star, or crescent indicating their spiritual purpose. 
Furthermore, although Protocol I does not include an explicit prohibition against misuse of religious 
symbols, such a restriction may be implicit in the prohibition against using protected religious 
buildings for military purposes (Article 53).  
Finally, it is noteworthy that international humanitarian law does not specifically address 
whether abandonment affects the status or the lawfulness of military use of a religious building. The 
1954 Hague Convention and the 1977 Protocol I contain no derogations from the prohibition on 
using protected religious sites to support the military effort. In this regard, it is arguable that a 
religious building never loses its status through abandonment: a religious site remains sacred 





6.5.c. Remarks on the criminalisation of acts against cultural property  
As already underlined throughout the previous sections, provisions describing offences against 
cultural heritage and cultural property in times of armed conflict have been integrated into the 
statutes of several international criminal tribunals.464  
In particular, it is worth mentioning Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter establishing the 
International Military Tribunal, which listed “plunder of public and private property, wanton destruction of 
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity” among those acts which constitute 
war crimes; and which were deemed to represent the customary law of war by the Tribunal. This 
provision echoed Articles 46 and 56 HRs and constituted one of the bases for establishing the guilt 
of Alfred Rosenberg.  
Subsequently, other relevant provisions have echoed the rule contained in Article 27 HRs. For 
instance, Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute comprises acts of “seizure, destruction or wilful damage done to 
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and 
science” among the violations of the law or customs of war. Later, a similar approach was adopted in 
the ICC Statute, Articles 8(b)(ix) and 8(e)(iv) of which concern international and internal armed 
conflicts respectively and qualify as war crimes attacks intentionally directing “against buildings 
dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, or historic monuments, provided they are not 
military objectives”. In contrast to the language of Article 27 HRs, they positively refer to “education”, 
in addition to including an updated reference to “military objectives”, which is defined in greater detail 
than broader notions such as “military purposes” or “military necessity”. However, several lacunas 
have been addressed. Firstly, decision to include a traditional general list of protected property in 
these two provisions of the ICC Statute is open to criticism.465 The omission of any explicit 
                                                
464 See Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter establishing the International Military Tribunal. See Article 3(d) ICTY 
Statute. See Article 4(f) ICTR Statute. See Article 7 of the Law on the Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia, reading: 
“[t]he Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects responsible for the destruction of cultural property during 
armed conflict pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and which were 
committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979”. See Article 3(f) of the Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, which openly indicate only pillage as a war crime related to cultural property. See Article 8(2)(b)(ix) and 
Article 8(2)(e)(iv) ICC Statute. See Articles 13(b)(10) and 13(d)(14) of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. 
465 See M. Bothe, “War Crimes”, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary, 2001, 379, pp. 409-410. See also M. Frulli, “The criminalisation of offences against cultural heritage 
in times of armed conflicts: the Quest for consistency”, 22 EJIL, 2011, pp. 203-2017, critically addressing how the 
broadly recognised need to take into account “a cultural-value approach” for criminalising conduct against cultural property 
of universal importance was totally overlooked in the ICC Statute. Conversely, she appraises the attempts of Protocol II 
to the 1954 HC to move forward and - building on the definition of cultural property included in the 1954 HC - to set 
down serious violations of the Protocol itself alongside attaching greater seriousness to acts against cultural heritage, so 






criminalisation of acts against movable cultural property is an additional gap in this Statute466, 
especially in view of relevant destructions perpetrated in previous armed conflicts such as those in 
the Balkans region and in the Persian Gulf.467 Nevertheless, the preamble of the ICC Statute reflects 
the significance of culture for humanity by mentioning States parties’ consciousness “that all peoples 
are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic 
may be shattered at any time”. 
Therefore, the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention remains the most valuable 
and suitable existing intentional instrument for pursuing war crimes against cultural property. In 
particular, five “serious violations” are defined in Article 15(1) as acts intentionally committed in 
breach of the Protocol itself or the Hague Convention.468 Notably, only the first three offences - 
among which the first two concern property under enhanced protection - correspond to the grave 
breaches established in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. Significantly, 
States parties’ duty to adopt legislation making those acts criminal offences punishable under 
domestic sanctions is set in Article 15(2), which also clarifies that this implementation has to be done 
in compliance “with general principles of law and international law, including the rules extending individual 
criminal responsibility to persons other than those who directly commit the act”. Further, States parties are 
required to adopt measures to suppress “other violations” of the Protocol or the Convention inasmuch 
as they are committed intentionally, including “any use of cultural property” or “any illicit export, other 
removal or transfer of ownership of cultural property, other removal or transfer of ownership of cultural property from 
occupied territory”.469  
 
                                                
466 See M. Frulli, ibid., p. 213, who notes that Article 8(2)(a)(iv), Article 8(2)(b)(xiii), Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) and Article 
8(2)(e)(v) ICC Statute could be employed to address seizure or appropriation of property, but considers that only the 
latter two prohibiting pillage are more likely to be used for this purpose, although they regrettably include “military 
necessity” in a footnote to the elements of crime (“[a]s indicated by the use of the term ‘private or personal use’, appropriations justified 
by military necessity cannot constitute the crime of pillaging”, see Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3(part II-B), n. 47, p. 28, and 
n. 61, p. 39), differently from absolute prohibitions of pillage or plunder as established in previous provisions such as 
Article 3(e) ICTY Statute. 
467 Emblematically, the looting of part of the collection of the National Museum in Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation, 
as well as the destruction of unique vestiges of ancient Arab culture (e.g. a 3,000 year-old Hellenic column from Faylakah 
Island and a fourteenth century engraved wooden door from Morocco), the destruction of the planetarium and the 
looting of university laboratories; the damage and looting of the Bagdad Museum during the Second Gulf War; the 
destruction of thousands of manuscripts of the National Library in Sarajevo. 
468 Article 15 (1) of the 1999 Second Protocol reads: “1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Protocol if that 
person intentionally and in violation of the Convention or this Protocol commits any of the following acts: a. making cultural property under 
enhanced protection the object of attack; b. using cultural property under enhanced protection or its immediate surroundings in support of 
military action; c. extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural property protected under the Convention and this Protocol; d. making 
cultural property protected under the Convention and this Protocol the object of attack; e. theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of 
vandalism directed against cultural property protected under the Convention”. 





For the purpose of the present research, it is worth considering that the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY includes cases related to the looting and destruction of cultural and religious institutions, 
treasures and monuments in the conflict-torn contexts of the Balkans. In particular, several charges 
based on Article 3(d) of the Statute were brought forward in a number of cases.470 Furthermore, 
certain prosecutions indirectly dealt with cultural property as they concerned damage to civilian 
property in general or the targeting of cultural property amounted to the actus reus of the crime of 
persecution on politician, racial and religious grounds. Indeed, due to the nature of these conflicts, 
with ethnicity and religion being prominent issues, most of the offences against cultural property 
were related to educational and religious targets. In this context cultural property was principally 
protected for what it represented for particular groups or communities. Damage to cultural property 
and even acts of rape were seen as forms of “ethnic cleansing” and instruments to destroy the 
adversary’s identity. In a persuasive passage of the Kordic and Cerkez decision, the Trial Chamber of 
the ICTY found that the act of “destruction and wilful damage of institutions dedicated to Muslim religion or 
education, coupled with the requisite discriminatory intent, may amount to an act of persecution”, ultimately 
amounted “to an attack on the very religious identity of a people. As such, it manifests a nearly pure expression of the 
notion of ‘crimes against humanity’, for all of humanity is indeed injured by the destruction of a unique religious culture 
and its concomitant cultural objects”. 471  This view confirmed a statement of one of its earlier 
judgments.472 Notably, the ad hoc Tribunal also dealt with the impact that such prosecutions and 
punishments may have on the traditional division between crimes against property and crimes 
against persons.473 
                                                
470 E.g., Prosecutor v. Miodrag Jokić (IT-01-42/1-S), Judgment of 18 March 2004; Prosecutor v. Strugar (IT-01-42-T), 
Judgment of 31 January 2005, concerning the two commanders of the Jugoslav National Army that attack on the Old 
Town of Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991. For other prosecutions, see Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić (IT-95-14-T), 
Judgment of 3 March 2000, para. 185; Prosecutor v. Plavšić (IT-00-39-40/1), Judgment of 27 February 2003; Prosecutor v. 
Naletilić and Martinović (IT-98-34-T), Judgment of 31 March 2003, paras. 603-605; Prosecutor v. Brdanin (IT-99-36-PT), 9 
December 2003. See T. Meron, “The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict within the case-
law of the International tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, 2005, 57 Museum International, pp. 41-59.  
471 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez (IT-95-14/2-T), Judgment of 26 February 2001, paras. 206-207. 
On the connection between the crime of persecution and damage to cultural property in the Tribunal’s work, see H. 
Abtahi, “The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed conflict: the practice of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 2001, p. 20 ff. 
472 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić (IT-95-14-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment of 3 March 2000, para. 227. The Trial 
Chamber held that the attacks must be directed against a civilian population, be widespread or systematic, and 
perpetrated on discriminatory grounds for damage inflicted to cultural property to qualify as persecution, see ibid., para. 
207. It convicted Blaškić of having ordered a crime against humanity, namely persecutions against the Muslim civilians 
of Bosnia, inter alia, through attacks on towns and villages and the plunder and destruction of property and in particular 
of institutions dedicated to education and religion, see ibid., Part VI Disposition. See also Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al. 
(IT-95-16-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment of 14 January 2000, para. 544. 
473 See H. Abtahi, “The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict: The Practice of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 2001, pp. 31-32. Noting that the ICTY 





This jurisprudence built on the legacy of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal474 and 
the International Law Commission. 475  Since Nuremberg, the crime of persecution has been 
included in all relevant international criminal law instruments,476 although none of them contain 
such a detailed definition as that found in the Rome Statute. To elaborate, while Article 7(2)(g) 
defines persecution as the “intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law 
by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity”477, Article 7(1)(h) extends it to include “any identifiable 
group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender … or other grounds that are 
universally recognised as impermissible under international law”, despite requiring that persecution be 
committed “in connection with” any other crime within the ICC jurisdiction.478 
Nonetheless, the charges included in several indictments brought before the ICTY for the 
damage or wanton destruction of cultural property related to religious or ethnic groups referred not 
only to persecution, but also to genocide. Although such acts are not included in the definition of 
genocide under Article 4 of the ICTY Statute, they were used to establish the defendant’s mens rea, 
namely the discriminatory intent required for proving persecution as well as genocide.479 The Kristic 
case is instructive in this regard. After having emphasised that it was not individual members of the 
group that were to be targeted but the group itself, the Trial Chamber focused its attention on the 
                                                                                                                                                            
of war, especially the crime against humanity of persecution, the author stressed how such a practice might “collapse in the 
long term” the distinction between crimes against property and crimes against persons “at least for religious cultural property”. 
The ICTY showed its willingness to issue indictments charging crimes against forms of cultural property different from 
religious symbols with the indictment on the destruction of heritage in Dubrovnik; since Nuremberg and Tokyo, this 
was the first time that a crime against cultural property registered under the 1954 Hague Convention was sanctioned by 
an international tribunal. 
474 IMT, Judgment, 1 October 1946, The Trial of Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at 
Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22, 1950, at 248 and 302 (quoted by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, para. 
206). The crime against humanity of persecution against racial, religious or political grounds was articulated in Article 6 
(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, annexed to the Agreement by France, United Kingdom, United States and USSR for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (8 August 1945), 82 UNTS 279. See also 
District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case 40/61,The Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann, Judgment, 11 December 1961, 
para. 57. 
475 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-three session (29 April-19 June 1991), UN Doc. 
A/46/10/Suppl.10, at 268, according to which the “systematic destruction of monuments or buildings representative of a particular 
social, religious, cultural or other group” is included in the concept of persecution.  
476 E.g., Article II (1)(c) of Control Council Law No. 10, Article 5 (c) of the Tokyo Charter, Article 5 (h) ICTY Statute, 
and Article 3(h) ICTR Statute. 
477 This definition is based on the precedent set by the ICTY in the Tadic case and it is oriented around Article 18 of the 
1996 Draft Code. 
478 For a summary on the historical development of the crime of persecution, see K. Roberts, in H. Abtahi and G. Boas 
(eds.), The Dynamics of International Criminal Justice, 2006, p. 258 ff. The definition under Article 7(2)(g) is based on the 
precedent set by the ICTY in the Tadic case, but the ICTY judgments have further clarified the characterisation of the 
crime of persecution under customary international law.  
479 Article 4 ICTY Statute contains the same definition of genocide as Article II of the Genocide Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, in force 12 January 1951, GA Res. 260A(III), 
78 UNTS 277. The acts must have been perpetrated with a dolus specialis “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 





travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention to highlight that the list of groups contained in 
Article II “was designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly corresponding to what was recognised, before 
the Second World War, as “national minorities”, rather than to refer to several distinct prototypes of human 
groups”.480 In taking the opportunity to re-examine the question of whether acts directed at cultural 
aspects of a group constituted genocide as a crime in international law, the Trial Chamber noted 
how “the physical destruction of a group is the most obvious method, but one may also conceive of destroying a group 
through purposeful eradication of its culture and identity resulting in the eventual extinction of the group as an entity 
distinct from the remainder of the community”.481 This observation was significantly followed by the 
consideration that - unlike genocide - persecution is not limited to the biological or physical 
destruction of a group, but rather extends to include “all acts designed to destroy the social and/or cultural 
bases of a group”. In contrast, the Trial Chamber stressed that the drafters of the Genocide 
Convention expressly considered and rejected the inclusion of the cultural elements in the list of acts 
constituting genocide.482 The Appeals Chamber then confirmed that the Genocide Convention and 
customary international law limit genocide to the biological or physical destruction of the group.483 
Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber used evidence of the destruction of mosques and the houses of 
Bosnian Muslims to prove the mens rea or the specific intent element of genocide. 484  The 
International Court of Justice has referred to and confirmed this interpretation.485 
 
Further, although no formal cases have been filed in the International Criminal Court that may 
indicate how the Chamber, the Office of the Prosecutor, or Defence teams will interpret the Statute 
in relation to crimes against cultural property, it is worth referring to the situation in Mali. 
                                                
480 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33), Trial Chamber, Judgment of 2 August 2001, paras. 551-553 and 556. 
General Krstic - the later Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps within the Bosnian Serb Army - 
was charged with and sentenced of genocide, or complicity to commit genocide, murder in violation of the laws and 
customs of war and certain crimes against humanity (i.e. persecution, murder, inhumane treatment, forced deportation, 
terrorizing civilian populations and destruction of Bosnian Muslim property) for his involvement in the massacre of 
seven to eight thousand Bosnian Muslims and forced deportation at Srebrenica in 1995. 
481 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33), Trial Chamber, Judgment of 2 August 2001, para. 574. 
482 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33), Trial Chamber, Judgment of 2 August 2001, paras. 576 ff. The 
international community has consistently reaffirmed this position: Article 2 ICTR Statute; Article 6 ICC Statute; Article 
9, Statute of the Special Court for Cambodia; Article 4, Law on the Establishment of Cambodian Extraordinary 
Chambers.  
483 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33-A), Appeals Judgment of 19 April 2004, para. 25. 
484 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33), Trial Judgment of 2 August 2001, para. 580. See Prosecutor v. Radislav 
Krstic (IT-98-33-A), Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 19 April 2004, dissenting judgment of Judge Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen, para. 50. 
485 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro), 26 February 2007, paras. 191-201 (particularly para. 194). In its submission during the Merits phase, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina presented only two witnesses to the Court: regarding the destruction of cultural, religious and architectural 
heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the expert testimony was made by András J. Riedlmayer and his evidence was used 





Following its referral by the Malian State on 13 July 2012, Prosecutor Bensouda formally opened an 
investigation into alleged crimes committed on the territory of Mali since January 2012; at the 
beginning of 2013 she included “intentionally directing attacks against protected objects under Article 
8(2)(e)(iv)”, by members of Ansar Dine and possibly by members of AQIM, among the war crimes 
for which there are reasonable grounds to believe they have been committed during this internal 
conflict.486 As to the scale of the attacks concerned, the information available to the Prosecutor 
indicated that, in the period between 4 May 2012 and 10 July 2012, attacks against at least nine 
mausoleums and two great mosques, both inscribed under the UNESCO World Heritage List, and 
two historical monuments in the city of Timbuktu have been intentionally perpetrated by those 
insurgent groups.487 With regard to the nature of the war crime allegedly committed, the acts in 
question have been deemed to violate the special protection of cultural objects reflected in Article 53 
AP I, given that the religious and historical buildings in Timbuktu belong to World’s Heritage since 
22 December 1988. In this vein, as further reported, such destruction “appears to have shocked the 
conscience of humanity”, and the African Union has strongly condemned it.488 In relation to the manner 
of the attacks, it is reported that they were intentionally destroyed or damaged, “in some cases 
repeatedly and pursuant to the ideology of alleged perpetrators that these objects had to be destroyed”,489 and that the 
religious and historical sites were “demolished with axes, hatches and picks”, while the wooden parts were 
burned.490 
6.6. Education 
The special regime of protection designed under the law of armed conflict for certain objects does 
not cover education. However, a dramatic increase of the number of reported attacks on educational 
establishments in armed conflicts has taken place in the twenty-first century. The scale of this problem 
has been well documented by UNESCO since its first initiative in 2007,491 denouncing in 2010 the 
                                                
486 ICC OTP, Situation in Mali Article 53(1) Report, 16 January 2013, paras, 109-113. 
487 It referred to the UN Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Mali, S/2012/894, 29 November 2012, p. 
3. It is also highlighted that, on 28 June 2012 the World Heritage Committee placed Timbuktu and the Tomb of Askia 
on UNESCO’s List of World Heritage in Danger “to raise cooperation and support for the sites threatened by the armed conflict in the 
region”, see UNESCO, “Heritage sites in Northern Mali placed on List of World Heritage in Danger”, 28 June 2012. 
488 AU, Solemn Declaration on the Situation in Mali, 19th ord. sess. of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of 
the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (15-16 July 2012), 19 July 2012, particularly para. 5. 
489 It referred to the Guardian, “Timbuktu World Heritage site attacked by Islamists”, 1 July 2012. 
490 ICC OTP, Situation in Mali Article 53(1) Report, 16 January 2013, paras. 154-160. 
491 See B. O’Malley, “Education Under Attack”, Global study on targeted political and military violence against education staff, 
students, teachers, union and government officials, and institutions, commissioned by UNESCO, Education Sector, Division for the Co-
ordination of United Nations Priorities, 27 April 2007. According to this first global study on this issue, the number of 
reported attacks on education had increased in the preceding three years (rising since 2000 and increased six-fold 





systematic targeting of students, education staff and institutions which has been reported in a greater 
number of countries since then. In particular, such attacks intensified dramatically in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, India, Thailand and Nigeria,492 and several incidents occurred during short military 
operations in Georgia and Gaza.493 Attacks on teachers, students and teacher trade unionists 
continued to be a matter of grave concern also in Colombia, Iraq, Nepal, Thailand, and 
Afghanistan.494 In addition to putting at risk the life of those individuals, they have led to a dramatic 
decrease in the school attendance rate. In 2006 an estimated 43 million of the approximately 115 
million of children of primary school age in conflict-affected countries were reportedly not attending 
school.495 This “hidden crisis in education” was denounced by UNESCO again in 2011 who connected 
it to “institutionalised failures” in conflict prevention and reconstruction, highlighting the 
underestimated impact of warfare on the opportunities to exploit “the potential for education to act as a 
                                                                                                                                                            
occupied Palestinian territory, Thailand and Zimbabwe.  
492 See B. O’Malley, Education under attack, UNESCO, 2010. The number of attacks on schools, students and staff 
reportedly tripled in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2008, up from 242 to 670; in Pakistan, 356 schools were destroyed or 
damaged in one small region at the centre of the battle between the Army and the Taliban; in India, nearly 300 schools 
were blown up by Maoist rebels between 2006 and 2009; in Thailand the number of attacks on schools quadrupled 
between 2006 and 2007 to 164, then fell right back in 2008, although killings of teachers, students and security escorts 
for teachers continued; since 2009 the Islamic group Boko Haram has attacked several schools, opposing secular 
education as associated to Western society. 
493 With regard to Georgia, 127 education institutions were destroyed or damaged in August 2008, see Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG), IIFFMCG Report, Council of European 
Union, 30 September 2009, at 328-9. As to the Gaza Strip, around 250 students and 15 teachers died, 856 students and 
19 teachers were injured, 214 UNRWA schools and 346 government schools, 18 schools and kindergartens were 
destroyed and 262 schools were damaged during the bombardments of the Strip in the three weeks “Operation Cast 
Lead” at the turn of 2008-09, see Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/12/48, 25 September 2009, para. 1271 (damage or destruction of school buildings in Gaza) and para. 1659 
(damage or destruction of school buildings in Israel). See also “Psychological Assessment of Education in Gaza and 
Recommendations for Response”, Report on the findings conducted by K. Kostelny and Wessells, September 2010. 
The eight days “Operation Pillar of Defense” in November 2012 cost the lives of 11 students and four teachers, with 
around 300 students injured, nearly 300 educational facilities damaged, see 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ochaopt_education_cluster_gaza_escalation_20_12_2012.pdf. As to the recent 
“Operation Protective Edge” in July and August 2014, “at least 219 schools have been damaged, 22 of which so 
severely that they can no longer be used” and “among those still standing, 103 have been turned into collective shelters for 
some 330,000 displaced people, half of whom are children”, see UNESCO, “Gaza’s Education System in Crisis”, 25 August 
2014, available at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-
view/news/gaza_school_year_hit_by_resumption_in_hostilities/#.U_9krhbd7ww.  
494 In Iraq, 71 academics, two education officials and 37 students were killed in assassinations and targeted bombings 
between 2007 and 2009, see ibid. In Colombia, 90 teachers were murdered from 2006 to 2008. Report of the Secretary-
General on Children and Armed Conflict in Colombia, S/2009/434, 28 August 2009, para. 44. In southern Thailand, more 
than 280 schools were burned, at least 92 educational personnel were killed and 88 injured, teachers were threatened or 
harassed, and many other schools were closed down as of January 2009. According to the Ministry of education in 
Afghanistan the closure of approximately 570 schools as of March 2009 followed attacks and resulted in hundreds of 
thousand of students being denied an education, see UNICEF Afghanistan, Education in emergencies and post-crisis transition, 
2010 report evaluation, March 2011. 





force for peace”.496 
The ways through which conflict-torn societies have widely affected education concern either 
harassment and threats against teachers, parents and students, or the forced displacement of 
civilians within or outside their respective States’ territory, the recruitment of children into regular 
militaries and irregular armed groups, the use of educational infrastructure for military purposes, 
and their damage or destruction. Using education as a means for war propaganda or a tool for 
discrimination or incitement to aversion represents a further aspect that has emerged in such 
settings.  
 
A broad interpretation of attacks on schools which encompasses the full range of violations that 
place students at risk and deny their access to education has not yet comprehensively emerged in the 
UN Security Council’s response aimed at addressing severe abuses experienced by children in 
armed conflict.497 Following the identification of such attacks among the six grave violations against 
children in armed conflict, in Resolution 1998 (2011) the Security Council urged parties to conflict 
“to refrain from actions that impeded children’s access to education”,498 and explicitly requested the Secretary-
General to continue monitoring and reporting on the military use of schools. On this issue it also added 
“attacks and threats of attacks on schools, hospitals and protected persons in relation to schools and hospitals” to the 
criterion for listing in the annexes of the Secretary-General’s Annual Report on Children and 
Armed Conflict.499  
                                                
496 See EFA Global Monitoring Report, The hidden crisis: armed conflict and education, UNESCO, March 2011, particularly 
Chapter 3. According to this report, 28 million children were out of school in conflict-torn countries (i.e. 42% of the 
global out of school total), child death rates were more than double, and only 79% of young people were literate.  
497 For a decade, the Security Council’s response has included a number of resolutions (Res.1261 (1999) of 25 August 
1999, Res.1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, Res.1379 (2001) of 20 November 2001, Res.1460 (2003) of 30 January 2003, 
Res.1539 (2004) of 22 April 2004, and Res.1612 (2005) of 26 July 2005, and 1882/2009), the creation of a specialized 
working group issuing sets of conclusions on country situations, and the initiation of a reporting and monitoring 
mechanism on violations against children in armed conflict, which is active in sensitive countries. See also the 
Statements of its President on 24 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/33), 28 November 2006 (S/PRST/2006/48), 12 February 
2008 (S/PRST/2008/6), 17 July 2008 (S/PRST/2008/28) and 29 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/9). The Special 
Representative to the Secretary General on children and armed conflict has followed up on the working group’s 
conclusions by making regular fields visit to engage with parties to armed conflict responsible for violations against 
children, like in the case of Chad, Nepal, Philippines and Uganda. Although the international focus has been primarily 
on the recruitment and use of child soldiers, much larger number of children is affected by other grave violations 
resulting in severe and long-lasting consequences. 
498 SC Res. 1998, S/Res/1998 (2011), 12 July 2011, para. 4. The same concept was previously expressed by explicitly 
referring to “in particular the use of schools for military operations”, see Statement by the President of the Security Council, 
S/PRST/2009/9, 29 April 2009. 
499 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Leila Zerrouigi, 
“The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed conflict: The Legal Foundation”, Working Paper n. 1, 7 
November 2013, p. 20, emphasising that “the use of schools for military purposes puts children at risk of attack and hampers children’s 
right to education, resulting in reduced enrolment and high drop out rates, especially among girls and may also may lead to schools being 





Nonetheless, in expressing “deep concern at the military use of schools in contravention of applicable 
international law” in resolution 2143 (2014), the Security Council recognised that “such use may render 
schools legitimate targets of attack, thus endangering children’s and teachers’ safety as well as children’s education and 
in this regard: (a) Urge[d] all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian character of schools in accordance with 
international humanitarian law; (b) Encourage[d] Member States to consider concrete measures to deter the use of 
schools by armed forces and armed non-State groups in contravention of applicable international law; (c) Urge[d] 
Member States to ensure that attacks on schools in contravention of international humanitarian law are investigated 
and those responsible duly prosecuted”.500 
 
The disturbing picture of escalating attacks on education raises basic questions about the 
effectiveness and adequacy of the international legal framework concerning issues of education-
related violations in conflict-torn situations. In the context of the present chapter, the international 
legal protection of the conditions necessary for education or the prohibition of conduct interfering 
with education is particularly relevant in relation to educational facilities; an issue to which we shall 
return.  
6.6.a. Preliminary remarks on the protection of the right to education  
Before articulating some pertinent considerations in the context of the IHL rules governing the 
conduct of hostilities, it is worth briefly addressing the right to education as enshrined in Article 26 
UDHR establishing the right to free compulsory elementary education, in Articles 13 and 14 
ICESCR501 as well as in Article 28(1) CRC.502 Interpreted as an empowerment right, it constitutes 
the key vehicle “by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of 
poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities”; accordingly, its vital role in “empowering 
women, safeguarding children from exploitative and hazardous labour and sexual exploitation, promoting human rights 
and democracy, protecting the environment, and controlling population growth” has been acknowledged. As such, 
education is practically understood as one of the greatest financial investments States can make, as 
                                                
500 SC Res. 2143, S/Res/2143 (2014), 7 March 2014, para. 18. 
501 Article 13 ICESCR defines its scope: “States Parties ... recognise the right of everyone to education... [W]ith a view to achieving the 
full realisation of this right: (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; (b) Secondary education in its different forms 
... shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means ... [and] (c) Higher education shall be made equally 
accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means ...”. 
502 Article 28(1) CRC reads: “States Parties recognise the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right 
progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: (a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; 
(b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, ... [and] make them available and accessible to every child... (c) Make 
higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means; ... (e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at 





well as representing the tool allowing for enlightenment and “ability to wander freely and widely”503. 
Further relevant international guidance for conflict-torn situations has emerged in a number of 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child regarding Colombia504, Sri 
Lanka505, Thailand506, Israel507, Syria508, and Yemen.509 
In examining the enjoyment of the right to education within conflict-related emergencies that 
impair or seriously violate it, impede its development or hold back its realisation, the Special Rapporteur Vernor 
Muno Villalobos has affirmed basic points.510 The right “inheres” in every person no matter legal 
status, whether refugee, child soldier or internally displaced person. States parties to relevant human 
rights treaties are deemed under an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil such a right, “whether or 
not an emergency situation prevails”. Insofar as the existing legal undertakings of the international 
community include the provision of international cooperation in educational matters, as provided in 
Article 28(3) CRC, States also have main responsibility for guaranteeing education “even if they lack 
the capacity needed to do so”.  
The need for care and effort to secure the right to education is highlighted with special notice to 
the aims of education as interpreted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. These efforts go 
beyond access to formal schooling and embrace a far-reaching life experiences and learning 
processes that support the development of children’s personalities, abilities and talent, individually 
                                                
503 CESCR, General Comment No. 13: The right to education (Art. 13), E/C.12/1999/10, 12 August 1999, para. 1. 
504 CRC, Concluding Observations: Colombia, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/COL/CO/1, 2010, paras. 39-40 (“[M]ilitary 
presence in the vicinity of schools significantly increases the risk of exposing school children to hostilities and retaliations by illegal armed 
groups... The Committee urges the State party to immediately discontinue the occupation of schools by the armed forces and strictly ensure 
compliance with humanitarian law and the principle of distinction. The Committee urges the State party to conduct prompt and impartial 
investigations of reports indicating the occupation of schools by the armed forces and ensure that those responsible within the armed forces are 
duly suspended, prosecuted and sanctioned with appropriate penalties”). 
505  CRC, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/LKA/CO/1, 2010, para. 25 (“Immediately 
discontinue military occupation and use of the schools and strictly ensure compliance with humanitarian law and the principle of distinction ... 
Ensure that school infrastructures damaged as a result of military occupation are promptly and fully restored”). 
506 CRC, Concluding Observations: Thailand, UN Doc. CRC/C/THA/CO/3-4, 2012, para. 85 (“Ensure that schools are not 
disrupted by State military and paramilitary units and are protected from attacks by non-state armed groups”). 
507 CRC, Concluding observations: Israel, UN Doc. CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4, 2013, para. 64 (“Cease ... use of schools as outposts 
and detention centres ...”). 
508 CRC, Concluding Observations: Syria, UN Doc. CRC/C/SYR/CO/3-4, 2012, para. 52 (“[S]top using schools as detention 
centres, and ... strictly ensure compliance with humanitarian law and the principle of distinction”). 
509 CRC, Concluding Observations: Yemen, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/YEM/CO/1, 2014, para. 30 (“[E]nsure that ... national 
legislation explicitly prohibits the occupation and use of ... schools ... , in line with international humanitarian law; expedite the reconstruction 
of these facilities as appropriate; take concrete measures to ensure that cases of unlawful ... occupation of schools ... are promptly investigated, 
and that perpetrators are prosecuted and punished”). 
510 See Report to the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Vernor Muno Villalobos, Right to education in emergency situations, 
A/HRC/8/10, 20 May 2008, particularly paras. 36-40. The report focuses on the period from early response to an 
emergency to the initial stages of reconstruction, during which the worst violations of the right to education may occur 
since “educational systems and opportunities are destroyed”, humanitarian agencies pay partial attention, and well-defined 
programmatic principles, indicators or funding are relatively lacking. The Special Rapporteur refers to a legal 





and collectively.511 In this vein, States are required to assure that children seeking refugee status 
receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance under Article 22 CRC, including the 
provision of prompt and full access to education and rapid integration into a regular education 
system.512 Further Article 38 calls on States parties to respect and ensure respect for IHL rules 
relevant to the child, while Article 39 requires them to “take all appropriate measures to promote physical 
and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of armed conflicts”. 
An attempt to reduce the number of children recruited into regular and irregular militaries and 
to moderate the implications for their educational opportunities can be seen in the Optional 
Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict,513 which has been followed 
by several Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1612 (2005), establishing a monitoring 
and reporting mechanism.514 Notwithstanding weak accountability mechanisms provided for in 
relation to the treaty-based body under the CRC - which consists of no more than States parties’ 
reports and a new complaint procedure that has still not entered into force515 - its special interest in, 
and commitment to, the issue of education in emergencies, is reflected in its guidelines for submission of 
reports, written and oral questions and recommendations. 
 
Notably, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees requires States parties to accord 
refugee children the same treatment afforded to nationals as regards elementary education (Art. 22 
(1)) and treatment no less favourable than that accorded to foreigners as regards education other 
than elementary education (Art. 22 (2)).516 However, the underdevelopment of accountability 
mechanisms for member States remains critical; much of the work of UNHCR is geared towards 
the protection of displaced persons, notwithstanding the fact that its Statute provides no specific 
                                                
511 Ibid., para. 43, referring to CRC, General Comment No. 1: The aims of education, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1, 17 April 
2001. See Article 29 CRC. 
512 Ibid., para. 44, referring to CRC, General Comment No. 6: Treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country 
of origin, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6, 3 June 2005, paras. 41 ff.; CRC, Concluding Observations: Kyrgyzstan, 
CRC/C/OPAC/KGZ/CO/1, 2 May 2007, para. 16 (b); CRC, Concluding Observations: Norway, UN Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.126, 28 June 2000, para. 50. 
513 In addition to the API and APII and the ICC Statute, other international law sources prohibiting the recruitment of 
children include the African Charter on the Rights and Well-Being of Children, and the ILO Convention No. 182 on 
the prohibition of the Worst Forms of Child Labour and the Immediate Action for its elimination of 1999. 
514 See Security Council Res. 1261 (1999) condemning all attacks on “objects protected under international law”, including 
schools, and calling on all parties concerned to put an end to such practices; Res. 1314 (2000); Res. 1379 (2001); Res. 
1539 (2004). 
515 The third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, (19 
December 2011, entry into force on 14 April 2014), UN Doc. A/RES/66/138, allows for individual children to submit 
complaints regarding specific violations of their rights under the Convention and its first two Protocols. It opened for 
signature in 2012 and it will enter into force upon ratification by ten UN member States. 
516 According to a guiding principle of the policy on refugee children, in all actions regarding refugee children, the primary 





mandate for such work. 517  Despite the decision of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s 
Education Cluster in 2005 to create a group to improve the predictability and accountability of 
responses within the United Nations, the UNHCR still lacks sufficient resources to perform that role 
notwithstanding its leading role in some components.518  
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement519 affirm the right to free compulsory education, in 
particular the full and equal participation of women and girls (principle 23). Although not legally binding, 
their wide dissemination among States and international agencies has favoured their increasing use 
to guide protection and assistance strategies. 
6.6.b. Remarks on the protection of educational facilities 
As aptly addressed in legal scholarship, the right to education provides “the individual with control over 
the course of his or her life, and in particular, control over […] the State”; it specifically enables an individual 
to experience the benefit of other rights, to which it is strongly linked: “the key to social action in defence 
of rights, … , is an educated citizenry, able to spread its ideas and to organize in defence of its rights”.520 In this 
sense, freedom of expression, freedom of association and political participation, acquire substance 
when a person is educated. The same may be said for the right to take part in cultural life; as to 
ethnic and linguistic minorities the right to education represents a basic means to preserve and 
reinforce their cultural identity. Similarly, education contributes to prevent discrimination founded 
on social status and it enhances social mobility. Furthermore, it advances the fulfilment of other 
ESC rights such as the rights to food, to health, to work. In general, it supports the realisation of the 
right to an adequate standard of living. Concisely, it essentially contributes to a person’s ability to 
live with dignity. 
Its significance as an empowerment right - rather than disappearing when an armed conflict 
spreads out - entails exploring concrete ways to strengthen the international legal protection of the 
educational function in conflict and post-conflict situations in order to favour and support its enjoyment, 
particularly continuing to provide education. This may then positively condition the long-term 
impacts of the degradation of related systems or the long-term compromises needed to make 
education an integral factor in building peace.  
                                                
517 The General Assembly has progressively attributed the competence on issues regarding displaced persons, relying on 
Article 9 of the Statute of UNHCR. 
518 In 2007 the UNHCR drew a strategy in order to lead the areas of protection, refuge of emergency, coordination of 
camps and administration, see EC/58/SC/CRP.18. 
519 They developed as a response to the rising number of displaced persons and the lack of specific legal protection, and 
rely on international humanitarian law and international human rights law, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2. 
520 See J. Donnelly and R.E. Howard, “Assessing national human rights performance: a theoretical framework”, HRQ, 





As such, the disruption and destruction of educational facilities in conflict-torn contexts do represent a 
considerable factor affecting the realisation of the right to education. Indirect protection may derive 
from certain international human rights provisions since attacks on any related structures or 
materials on which the provision of education depends is likely to violate not only this right but also 
the right to freedom from discrimination, the right to private property and the right to health as 
enshrined in human rights treaties. Further elements that may be covered include computers, books, 
and sanitation services. However, the rules governing the conduct of hostilities deserve detailed 
consideration hereafter. Crucial IHL obligations of the parties to a conflict are intended to preserve 
core components of the right to education in conflict-torn circumstances such as internment of 
civilians,521 where children are separated from their parents or orphaned,522 and situations of 
occupation.523 Nonetheless, it is the intrinsic educational value of school facilities that often makes them the 
first public structures built in new settlements and determines their essential importance to a 
community’s future growth and development in post-conflict scenarios. Accordingly, the largely 
monitored and reported grave extent of attacks on education during military operations inspires a 
specific reflection on the IHL protection of educational facilities. A pertinent question arises as to 
whether the need to emphasise the inherent humanitarian value of additional objects - whose unique role within 
civilian communities affected by armed conflicts has progressively become more manifest in practice 
- should be taken more seriously and lead to them being accorded a privileged status in contemporary international law.  
 
Previous sections have shown that the 1907 Hague Regulations require military forces to take 
“necessary steps” during sieges and bombardments to spare buildings “dedicated to religious, art, science, or 
charitable purposes” without explicitly covering the category of school buildings (Art. 27). A vague 
prohibition on the seizure of civilian buildings, comprising also institutions dedicated to education, 
is also provided (Art. 56).524  The Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1929, and 1949 indirectly enhance 
                                                
521 Article 94 GCIV sets forth the detaining party’s obligations on the education of internees (especially young people 
and children). This provision is not examined in the ICRC study on customary IHL, but relevant rules include Rule 135  
(protection of children), Rule 104 (respect of convictions and religious practices), Rule 118 (further basic necessities of 
internees including clothing, food and medical treatment). 
522 Article 24 GCIV requires the parties to an international conflict to “take the necessary measures to ensure that [the education 
of] children under fifteen, who are orphaned or are separated from their families” is facilitated. “Their education shall, as far as possible, be 
entrusted to persons of a similar cultural tradition”. This rule has reached the status of customary international law, so applying 
to all children in the territory of the belligerent party (see ICRC Study on Customary IHL, Rule 150). Further, 
‘education’ is viewed broadly, including “moral and physical education as well as school work and religious instruction”, see J. 
Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Vol. 4, op. cit., at 187. 
523 Article 50 GCIV sets forth the occupying power’s obligations on the education of children, in cooperation with the 
local and national authorities. See ICRC Study on Customary IHL, Rule 135 (children) and Rule 104 (convictions and 
religious practices). 





the protection of school buildings to the extent that they may be used for sheltering wounded and 
sick persons. All buildings used for such purposes are entitled to be marked with distinctive medical 
emblems, such as the Red Cross or Red Crescent. However, these conventions exclusively concern 
the attacking force’s choice of targets.  
Conversely, the 1954 Hague Convention and its 1999 Protocol elevate the status of some 
historic schools on the basis of their inherent cultural value to society. Although school buildings are 
not specifically included in the definition of cultural property as provided by this convention (which 
then would not apply to most ordinary grammar schools or high schools) certain relevant aspects 
relating to the battlefield are addressed for protected historic school buildings. As underlined above, 
States parties are required to respect such property by refraining from using it in any manner that 
might expose it to damage or destruction during armed conflict, unless imperatively required by 
military necessity. In addition, these buildings may be marked with the blue and white emblem. 
Nonetheless, while some historic universities and school buildings may be easily qualified as being of 
“great importance to the cultural heritage of every people”, this definition may be open to diverging 
interpretations and consequently possible abuses by opposing conflicting parties.525  
In those rare cases in which educational institutions may be deemed of great importance to the 
spiritual or cultural heritage of peoples, as when they are located within buildings of such 
significance, they enjoy further special protection under the 1977 Protocols. This entails the 
prohibition of their use in favour of military effort and of acts of hostility against them, including 
their targeting as measures of reprisal. However, in contrast with the aforementioned shift in the law 
towards certain shared responsibilities by attacking and defending armed forces in their treatment of 
certain historic school buildings under the 1954 Hague Convention, the subsequent 1977 Protocol I 
did not contained any further evolution by granting schools and universities the general protection against direct 
and deliberate targeting that is recognised to all civilian buildings526. Accordingly, the possible conversion of 
such buildings into legitimate military objectives entails the negative presumption in favour of 
immunity from attack if it is doubtful whether “a school is being used to make an effective contribution to 
                                                                                                                                                            
protections for school buildings was emblematically represented by the shelling by the German Army on the University 
of Louvrain under the alleged premise that French forces were using the university for military purposes during World 
War I, see M.D. Thrlow, “Protecting Cultural Property in Iraq: How American Military Policy Comports with 
International Law”, Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, 2005, p. 158. 
525 A lack of clarity of the 1954 Convention in defining the school buildings to which it might provide a privileged status 
during armed conflict has been critically raised, noting that, while the definition of Article 1 might apply to the ancient 
buildings of Oxford and Cambridge Universities, the question becomes what is sufficiently ancient to receive the benefit 
of the privilege: “American universities are relatively new compared to the established educational institutions of Europe; conceivably, then, 
no American universities are eligible”, see G. Bart, “The ambiguous protection of schools under the law of war: time for parity 
with hospitals and religious buildings”, 40 Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2009, p. 211. 





military action”, as it is ordinarily employed for civilian purposes. As such, this implies a potential use by 
armed forces of any unoccupied civilian buildings for military purposes, especially those near combat areas.527 
Nevertheless, basic positive implications would derive from the belligerents’ obligation to take 
(passive) precautions against the effects of attack “to the maximum extent feasible”, including: avoiding 
placing military objectives within, or in close proximity of, highly populated areas where schools 
and universities are possibly found; removing civilian objects and persons under their control from 
surrounding military areas; and taking further essential precautions to protect education buildings 
under their control against the risks arising from hostilities.  
Therefore, Protocol I apparently limits the military use of schools to the extent that they are 
functioning and civilians and non-combatants are present.528 Such use includes, for instance, 
converting unoccupied school buildings into bases for soldiers or command posts for military 
operations, supply depots, or artillery sites. This may render them military objectives subject to 
lawful attack, although they would still of course be subject to the obligations upon the belligerents 
to respect proportionality and to adopt the well-known precautionary measures in attack.529  
In this regard, as articulated by a recent soft-law initiative, all feasible alternative measures should be 
considered by the parties to a conflict before attacking a school or university that has become a 
military objective, including advanced warning to the enemy about a forthcoming attack unless such 
use ceases; in particular, two notable aspects are emphasised: (a) prior to any attack, they should 
take into account “the duty of special care for children, and the potential long-term negative effect on a community’s 
access to education posed by the damage or destruction of the school”; (b) the military use “should not serve as 
justification for an opposing party that captures it to continue to use it in support of the military effort”, adding that 
“as soon as feasible, any evidence or indication of militarization or fortification should be removed and the facility 
returned to civilian authorities for the purpose of its educational function”. 530  Another pertinent remark 
                                                
527 See C. Pilloud et al., op. cit., pp. 636-7. 
528 The prohibition contained in Articles 51 and 58 about placing military objects in locations where civilians are 
present has already been discussed. These acts include the use of human shields to inhibit an opposing army from 
targeting those military objects. Accordingly, if civilian students are still using a school building, an army may not 
lawfully use the building for military purposes. 
529 As outlined above, under Article 57 API those planning or authorizing an attack must do everything feasible to 
establish whether the targets are civilians or civilian objects. Further, legal advisers must be available and advise 
commanders on the lawfulness of the attack when it is being planned or authorised; then, those who carry out the 
operation must stop the attack if it appears that the targets are civilians or civilian objects. 
530 Guideline 4 of the 2012 Lucens Guidelines. They have been developed by an expert group of Member States, 
regional organizations, military experts, child protection actors, education specialists, and international humanitarian 
and human rights lawyers. They aim at reducing the use of schools and universities by the parties to armed conflict in 
support of their military effort and to minimise the negative impact on students’ safety and education. They are 
intended “to serve as guidance for those involved in the planning and execution of military operations, in relation to decisions over the use and 
targeting of institutions dedicated to education”; “they may also serve as a tool for inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations 





concerns abandoned schools and universities: they should not be used for any purpose in support of 
the belligerents’ effort “except only when, and for as long as, no choice is possible between such use of the school or 
university and another feasible method for obtaining a similar military advantage”. The rationale in this case is to 
presume “appropriate alternative premises” as a better option even though they are not as “convenient” or 
as “well positioned” for the military purpose being pursued. It is indeed emphasised how the potential 
negative consequences of the use of a school, including its effect on a civilian population’s 
willingness to return to an area, cannot by fully knowledge by the parties to armed conflict.531 
Further, since international humanitarian law does not strictly provide a general prohibition on 
the use or the occupation of educational buildings for military purposes if the criteria of Article 52(2) 
are satisfied, it is reasonable to question whether such a “derivative” and indirect level of protection of most 
educational facilities - which focuses exclusively on the duties of armed forces to discriminate in targeting - should be 
considered anachronistic. In view of its significance as an empowerment right and the alarming 
escalation of military attacks, their military use may result in an absolute denial of students’ right to 
education, creating a serious conflict between international human rights and humanitarian law. 
The recognition of an autonomous privileged status to schools buildings on the basis of their intrinsic 
educational, and therefore humanitarian, value to society is arguably pertinent. Supporting such 
‘integral’ protection would imply expanding the focus of existing IHL rules on the conduct of 
hostilities, which should not only limit military forces’ choice of targets but also prohibit both 
attackers and defenders from converting educational buildings for military purposes. In this sense, 
the practice of placing military objectives in school facilities or using them to advance military goals 
would become unlawful, regardless their ordinary functioning and use by civilian students and 
educational staff. 
Within scholarly critiques of the ambiguous IHL protection of educational facilities, the banning of 
their use for military purposes has been strongly advocated in light of the controversial point that 
“perceived” military use is often exploited to justify attacks.532 Stressing that a school is currently no 
                                                                                                                                                            
training and doctrine. See Global Coalition to Protect Education From Attack (GCPEA), Draft Lucens Guidelines for 
Protecting Schools and Universities From Military Use during Armed Conflict, 2012.  
531 Guideline 2, in which articulates the following three guidelines: “(a) Any such use of abandoned schools and universities should 
be for the minimum time necessary; (b) Abandoned schools and universities that are used by the fighting forces of parties to armed conflict in 
support of the military effort should always remain available to allow educational authorities to re-open them as soon as practicable, provided 
this would not risk endangering the security of students and staff, (c) Any evidence or indication of militarization or fortification should be 
completely removed following the withdrawal of fighting forces, and any damage caused to the infrastructure of the institution should be 
promptly and fully repaired. All munitions and unexploded ordnance or remnants of war must be cleared from the site.” 
532 See G. Bart, “The Ambiguous Protection of Schools under the Law of War: Time for Parity with Hospitals and 
Religious Buildings”, Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2009. He stresses how during the heat of battle confusion over 
the evidence of the military use of a certain building can too easily be exploited to justify attacks. In this regard, the 





more protected than a cinema or a hotel, it has been shown how the military use of a school in a 
combat zone increases the risk of attack on educational facilities, since commanders will likely argue 
that if one building has been converted others must have also been.533 Thus, an outright ban on 
military use has been proposed alongside supporting the use of a recognisable symbol in order to 
render compliance easier. Although somewhat difficult to achieve, this ban would also require 
vetting on the purposes of course curriculums and research programmes within school buildings. As 
such, this would also potentially prohibit the use of schools for political programmes designed to 
recruit child soldiers or the use of university laboratories to develop weapons of war.534  
Strengthening the protection of education facilities would be in line with the IHL special 
protection regime afforded to other categories of objects including hospitals and medical 
establishments for their inherent humanitarian value and religious buildings representing the 
spiritual conscience of a people or community. Furthermore, this would be also in accordance to 
those IHL principles and rules affording special protection to children in armed conflicts, as already 
examined above. The partial or total use of education establishments for military purposes may 
actually put at risk the life and physical integrity of children, as well as restricting or even impeding 
access to education, either because pupils stop going to school for fear of being killed or injured or 
because they are deprived of premises on which to be educated. Further, the significance of 
education as a means of resilience of conflict-affected children and young people to protect and 
develop their full capabilities also supports this perspective. 
6.6.c. Remarks on the criminalisation of education-related violations 
Aside from the lack of a ban on military use of education buildings, within the debate on attacks on 
education in armed conflicts, significant concerns have been expressed in relation to the widespread 
impunity for perpetrators of such attacks, which is commonly deemed to result from failures to implement 
relevant existing norms, rather than from deficiencies in the law itself. As such, international 
humanitarian and human right law may be considered comprehensive enough to empower States’ 
investigations on situations relating to this specific field. Moreover, there is a certain scope to 
coordinate those legal regimes with international criminal law, to ensure a broader response to 
                                                                                                                                                            
use by military and security forces or armed opposition groups. For instance, on 7 and 8 August 2008, shelling by 
Georgian forces hit civilian buildings, including the university and several schools and nursery schools in Tskhinvali and 
outlying villages in South Ossetia and that some of the buildings were being used as defensive positions by South 
Ossetian forces, see Human Rights Watch, Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict Over 
South Ossetia, New York, 2009.  
533 Ibid., p. 441. 





education-related violations, which also attracts individual criminal responsibility. 
It is worth noting that the Rome Statute does not deal with the protection of education itself and 
does not define ‘attacks on schools’, although several criminal acts may result under certain 
circumstances. In particular, an attack intentionally directed at an educational facility as well as against the 
civilians inside it may be investigated and prosecuted as a war crime under the general offence of 
attacking civilians and civilian objects535 as well as under the specific offence of targeting buildings 
dedicated to education.536 In light of previous remarks, a limiting condition would be that such 
facilities must not be used in support of the belligerents’ effort at the time of the attack, either 
lawfully or unlawfully, and that the civilians must not be directly taking part in hostilities. The war 
crime of “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
wantonly and unlawfully” may provide a further measure to protect educational facilities. 537 
Furthermore, the attacking on educational buildings may amount to the crime against humanity of 
persecution or “other inhuman acts” if the acts concerned reach a certain level of gravity and if the mens 
rea of special persecutory intent is proven.538 As addressed in relation to cultural property, in the 
Kordic and Cerkez case the destruction of institutions “dedicated to Muslim religion or education” were 
deemed to constitute persecution of equivalent gravity to other crimes enumerated in Article 5 
ICTY Statute.539 This reasoning may apply to facilities where secular education takes place or 
where students of other faiths are educated; if the prosecutor can prove that the attack in question 
was carried out in the awareness of students’ belonging to particular national, ethnic, racial, 
religious or political groups. Moreover, an attack on educational facilities may arguably be evidence 
of other crimes, such as genocide.  
It is noteworthy that a number of cases in which the Office of the ICC Prosecutor has 
conducted investigations and prosecutions contain references to crimes that deal with attacks on 
                                                
535 Article 8(2)(b)(i), Article 8(2)(b)(ii), and Article 8(2)(e)(i) ICC Statute prohibit the intentional direction of attacks 
against the civilian population and against civilian objects in times of international and non-international armed conflict 
respectively. 
536 A textual reference of such prohibition is in Article 8 (2)(b)(ix) and Article 8 (2)(e)(iv) ICC Statute. Conversely, for 
cases in which the destruction of buildings dedicated to education constituted a war crime, see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic 
(IT-95-14), Trial Chamber, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 185; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic (IT-98-38), 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 March 2003, paras. 603-605 (“The damage or destruction must have been committed intentionally to 
institutions ... which may clearly be identified as dedicated to religion or education and which were not being used for military purposes at the 
time of the acts”). Concerning the destruction of educational facilities during the attack on Dubrovnik, see ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Miodrag Jokic (IT-01-42/1-S), Judgment of 18 March 2004, (sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment following a guilty 
plea for his involvement in such attack); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar (IT-01-42-T), Judgment of 31 January 2005 
(sentenced to 71/2 years upon conviction for, inter alia, destruction and wilful damage to educational institutions). 
537 Article 8 (2)(a)(iv) ICC Statute. 
538 Article 7 (1)(h) ICC Statute. 
539 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Trial Chamber, Judgment of 26 February 2001, paras. 206-207. See also ICTY, 





education. In the situation of Afghanistan, the preliminary investigations have concerned, inter alia, 
the “persistent attacks on girls’ schools by means of arson, armed attacks and bombs”.540 In the proceedings 
opened in relation to the situations in Sudan541 and the Central African Republic,542 relevant 
charges have concerned the commission of mass crimes (such as killings, rapes and pillaging against 
the civilian population, including children) and community leaders such as teachers were often 
targeted by such acts. Other reports under consideration at the office of the Prosecutor concern 
similar grave violations against children, including killing, maiming, and attacks on schools, such as 
those targeted by Zaraguinas, or armed bandits, for the purpose of abducting children for ransom, 
and resulting in parents refusing to send children to school. Indeed, it is worth mentioning the 
significant attention to the crime of using children under the age of 15 to actively participate in 
hostilities,543 and some abductions have been taken place in schools. Related charges have been 
brought in several cases concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 
July 2002 and the end of 2003 and the situation in Uganda during 2003 and 2004.544 
Notwithstanding the fact that international criminal law has a certain potential to protect 
education itself, the absence of explicit treaty provisions or case law in this regard strengthens the 
need, at an international level, to acknowledge the actual impact of armed conflicts on education. In 
this regard, there is scope to deem relevant breaches of international criminal law as education-
related violations. Examples may include the crime against humanity of persecution or the crime of 
incitement of genocide. In particular, a real and intentional deprivation of education could amount 
                                                
540 ICC OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 13 December 2011, para. 28; ICC OTP, Report on Preliminary 
Examination Activities 2012, 22 November 2012, para. 31. 
541 ICC, Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Situation in Darfur, Sudan. The Sudanese President 
Omar al-Bashir has been accused of multiple attacks that took place from March 2003 to 14 July 2008 “as part of the 
counter-insurgency campaign”: the attacks on the civilian population of Darfur - belonging largely to the Fur, Massalit 
and Zaghawa groups - included the bombing of schools, with children representing the large proportion of victims. 
Notably, in the application for al-Bashir’s arrest warrant, the bombing at schools was referred as evidence of genocide, 
crimes against humanity along with the rape by Janjaweed militias of schoolgirls and the murder of a school head 
teacher, see Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir: Public Redacted Version of the Prosecutor’s Application Under Article 58, 
ICC-02/05-157-AnxA, 14 July 2008, paras. 14, 112, 140, 232, 234. 
542 ICC, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Situation in the Central African Republic. The former 
vice president of the DRC, Bemba has been charged as a military commander allegedly responsible for his troops’ 
conduct in the Central African Republic from late October 2002 to mid-March 2003; in particular, two counts as 
crimes against humanity (murder and rape) and three counts as war crimes (murder, rape, and pillaging). 
543 They are punishable under Article 8(2)(b) (xxvi) and/or Article 8(2)(e)(vii) ICC Statute. 
544 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on confirmation of charges, 29 January 2007; 
ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on confirmation of charges, 30 
September 2008; ICC, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision on prosecutions’ application under Art. 
58, 18 July 2012; The Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-56, Warrant of Arrest for Okot Odhiambo, 8 July 2005; The 
Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-54, Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti, 8 July 2005; The Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-
53, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony, 8 July 2005, amended on 27 September 2005. On 11 July 2007 the proceedings 
against Laska Lukwiya were terminated due to his death, and the OTP also submitted information to Chamber on the 





to persecution under the Rome Statute if also the other elements are fulfilled.545 From the ICTY 
jurisprudence we can already note that the exclusion of members of an ethnic or religious group 
from educational institutions has been deemed as being capable of amounting to persecution under 
the ICTY Statute, even though it is not explicitly set out therein.546 Conversely, to the extent that 
educational materials and contents constitute direct and public incitement to genocide (e.g. through 
lessons or textbooks) which are taught to students with an intent to directly induce or provoke them 
to commit genocide, this may amount to the international crime provided for in Article 25(3)(e) 
Rome Statute. However, so far the application of this crime has been limited to broadcasts by mass 
media and public speeches by government officials.547  
6.6.d. Remarks on the international law potential in deterring attacks  
The drafting of an international treaty that would provide new legal rules specifically dealing with 
attacks on education has also been considered. However, this option is commonly deemed risky as it 
implies giving States the opportunity to unpick some of the safeguards that already exist for 
students, staff and educational buildings as civilians and civilian objects. In particular, the 
negotiating process could actually leave education targets with less protection in law rather than 
improving it. Nonetheless, the Security Council Resolution 1738 (2006) protecting journalists has 
been referred to as a precedent for pushing for a resolution which would deal with a specific group 
such as academics, in order to complement the existing protection provided for children, 
                                                
545 Article 7(1)(h) and (2)(g) ICC Statute; ICC, Elements of Crimes, at 10. The criteria include: education defined as a 
“fundamental right”; its deprivation contrary to international law (so, not consistent with lawful limitations); its denial in 
relation to a certain group on discriminatory grounds (i.e. based on a group’s national, political, religious, cultural, 
ethnic, racial, or gender identity) or other grounds universally accepted by international law; its deprivation as part of a 
systematic or widespread attack against any civilian population or in connection with any other act prohibited by the 
Rome Statute; and the knowledge by the perpetrator that this was part of such attack. 
546 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, para. 612, referring to the Justice Case before the U.S. 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal (Case No. 3, The United States of America v. Josef Altstotter et al., Indictment, pp.1063-1064), in 
Trials of War Criminals (Vol. III), in which the passing of decrees expelling Jews from educational institutions (or public 
services and business enterprises) was deemed to constitute a form of persecution. See Judgment of the International 
Military Tribunal for The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Nuremberg, 30 September and 1 October 1946, 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22, 1950, at 248 and 302. 
547  See ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu (ICTR-97-32-I), Trial Chamber, 1 June 2000; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 
Barayagwiza, and Ngeze (ICTR-99-52-T), Trial Chamber, 3 December 2003 (the Media Case). On relevant elements of 
incitement, see ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment of 2 September 1998, para. 555 
(incitement referred to as encouraging, persuading, or directly provocating a number of individuals or the public in 
general to commit genocide); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira (ICTR-05-88-T), Trial Chamber, 22 June 2009, para. 515 
(public incitement occurring through “speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public places or public gatherings, or through the sale or 
dissemination ... of written material or printed matter in public places …”); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ibid., para. 557, and ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, ibid., para. 514 (direct incitement to be assessed in view of cultural and linguistic context); ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, ibid., paras. 1000-1010 (the required intention that the incitement generates 
in others a certain state of mind necessary to commit genocide), para.1012 (while the context and the purpose of the 
message is relevant, the effect on the audience is not), and para. 678 (the commission of genocide or the proof that 





educational facilities and staff in its previous Resolution 1612 (2005).548  
 
Notably, UNESCO has identified several aspects necessary to realise “the potential of international 
law and national laws to help deter attacks”. 549  Firstly, it has highlighted the importance of the 
consideration of cases on perpetrators and commanders by national prosecutors and by the Office 
of the Prosecutor of the ICC. Secondly, it has emphasised the need to research and monitor the 
efficacy of accountability mechanisms against impunity for such attacks. Thirdly, it has stressed the 
need of legal training of officers, troops and military lawyers in the conduct of hostilities for 
protecting education from attack and the right to education. Fourthly, it has noted the importance 
of monitoring and reporting on compliance with relevant national and international law. Fifthly, it 
has considered the option of entering into specific agreements between belligerents not to perpetrate 
attacks on education. Sixthly, it has underlined the necessary improvement of the recognition of the 
value of education and its protection by advocacy and development of “an internationally recognisable 
symbol denoting safe sanctuary status” and “public education on the right to education and the laws of war”. 
Finally, victims’ reparation and assistance as well as the recovery of relevant facilities are deemed 
consistent with the duty to protect the right to education.  
 
It is worth noting that the political responsibilities of the international community have been 
taken into consideration within the overall debate. The relevance of international cooperation (as 
recognised in Articles 4 and 28 CRC) to implement the right to education has been emphasised; 
despite its partial and sometimes vague translation into international political responsibilities, some 
relevant developments have emerged.  
Although the importance of establishing minimum standards in basic education was addressed 
at the 1990 World Conference on Education For All, held in Jomtien, Thailand, education in 
emergencies received scant attention. Conversely, the Dakar Framework for Action on Education For All 
(adopted at the 2000 World Education Forum, held in Dakar) paid much consideration to 
educational consequences of emergencies: emphasis was placed on children affected by conflict, 
natural disasters and instability, and on educational programmes to advance “mutual understanding, 
                                                
548 Deputy Director of the Centre for North African Studies at the Cambridge University, Saad Jabbar, 18 March 2009. 
549  B. O’Malley, “Education Under Attack”, Commissioned by Mark Richmond, Director, Division for the 
Coordination of United Nations Priorities in Education, Education Sector, UNESCO, 2010. According to a conclusion 
shared in such study, “while action should be taken to correct any weak places in the law, most of the work to strengthen protection will 
have to go to solving other dimensions of the problem” (quoting the Office of HH Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al-Missned, 





peace and tolerance”, supporting the prevention of violence. According to a statement in the Dakar 
Framework for Action “no countries seriously committed to education for all will be thwarted in their achievement 
of this goal by a lack of resources”; for the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, this implies that 
any State wanting to ensure primary education, but incapable of doing so, should be able to obtain the funds essential 
for that purpose. Critically, the MDG assigned educational goals to a development agenda (rather than to 
a rights one). Precisely, the narrow view of quantifiable access to a full primary education that is 
free, compulsory and of good quality by the year 2015 (Goal 2) and the promotion of gender parity 
by the year 2005 (Goal 3) has implied to divert attention from other educational goals, which are 
crucial in emergency situations. As aptly stressed by the Special Rapporteur, such commitment to 
long-term development goals risk to be ineffective from the perspective of prioritizing education as a 
human right in emergencies as well as holding States accountable. 
Focusing on the growing coordination among all the actors involved in the protection of the 
right to education in emergencies, the creation of qualitative standards and indicators has resulted, inter alia, 
in broadening the legal and political framework under which those actors are expected to operate. 
Precisely, the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early 
Reconstruction, developed since 2004 by the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies 
(INEE), offer a consistent basis of principles and paths of action to all actors involved in the 
provision of education during emergencies, in order to coordinate their educational activities and to 
promote the acceptance of responsibilities. However, the efforts for strengthening the INEE 
Minimum Standards should be intensified.550  
Overall, despite the growing awareness about the necessary delivery of education in emergencies 
and the progress made in that respect, a huge gap between the legal and political responsibilities of the 
international community and its action and funding priorities persists. A range of reasons for, and 
consequences of, this gap has been spelled out, stressing certain general recommendations for 
States, donors, intergovernmental organizations and civil society organizations, which result 
particularly relevant for the present research.  
Precisely, insofar as the implementation of the right to education in emergencies should be an 
essential and unequivocal commitment of the international community, this right should be primarily 
acknowledged as an integral part of the humanitarian response to conflicts and natural disasters. In this regard, 
measures that may guarantee its immediate priority include: placing greater emphasis on this right 
during emergencies (as attention tends to focus on post-conflict situations); ending impunity of those 
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attacking schools, students and teachers; further researching into the effectiveness of some of the 
measures prompted by the increased violence against them (such as armed responses in defence of 
communities and the promotion of resistance); assigning more resources, specifically to fragile States 
(despite of the increased interest in the allocation and effectiveness of assistance in emergencies); 
prompting attention to the consequences of emergencies for girls and female adolescents, and 
strategic measures developed to give physical and emotional protection; researching specific 
programmes for young people and adolescents, including the needs of persons with disabilities; 
greater attention to the understanding and development of education for peace; greater use of 
qualitative methodologies to determine the degree of psychosocial care during emergencies.551 
As far as States are specifically concerned, the development of “a plan that prepares for education in 
emergencies” as part of States’ general educational programmes has been recommended, including 
measures for continuity of education at all levels and during all the phases of the emergency. A 
programme of studies to be drawn up in a way to be “adaptable, non-discriminatory, gender-sensitive 
and of high quality”, with attention of children’s and young people’s needs, has been suggested. The 
involvement of children, parents and civil society in planning school activities has been recommended so as 
provide “safe spaces for students” throughout the emergency. The design of specific plans to avoid 
exploitation of girls and young women in the wake of emergencies has been also considered. 
6.7. Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population 
Both 1977 Protocols afford special protection to objects that are indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population by prohibiting the destroying, attacking, removing or rendering them useless. This 
protection is intended to cover all eventualities, counting the destruction of harvests by defoliants or 
the pollution of water supplies by chemical or other agents.552 This represents a corollary to the 
prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare aimed at weakening or destroying the 
population,553 which is established for both internal and international armed conflicts and is deemed 
                                                
551 Ibid., paras. 68-73. In subsequent sections, the Special Rapporteur’s attempt is that of outlining the priorities of 
“actor” agencies and donors who are involved in realising the right to education in emergencies, and identifying the 
main education providers; then he deals with the affected populations. 
552 C. Pilloud and J. Pictet, “Article 54”, in Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmerman (eds.), op. cit., para. 2101; also para. 
4801. 
553 As detailed in the commentary on the 1977 Protocols, Article 54 (2) AP I “develops the principle formulated in paragraph 1 of 
prohibiting starvation of the civilian population; it describes the most usual ways in which this may be applied”, see Y. Sandoz, C. 
Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., para. 2098. Similarly, it is stated that Article 14 AP II “develops the principle 
prohibiting starvation from being used against civilians by pointing out the most usual ways in which starvation is brought about”, see Y. 





to be customary in nature in both situations.554 In the same vein, reprisals against such objects are 
forbidden.555  
In the case of international armed conflicts, Article 54(2) API proscribes the aforementioned acts 
if they are committed “for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population 
or to the adverse party”, “whatever the motive, them to move away, or for any other motive”.556 While in several 
military manuals the unlawfulness of the attack is determined according to its intent to impede the 
civilian population being supplied, many others do not specify this requirement and prohibit it as 
such.557 Similarly, attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population are 
prohibited in military manuals applicable to non-international armed conflicts and they also 
constitute an offence under several national legislations.558 
With regard to internal armed conflicts, Article 14 APII prohibits starvation of civilians as a 
method of combat as well as the destruction, attack, removal or making useless, for that purpose, objects essential 
to the civilian population’s survival. As clearly explained in the official commentary, no measure of 
military necessity justifies the starvation of civilians; thus no exceptions are foreseen under this 
provision.559 
 
A noteworthy issue relates to the types of damage caused. Under Article 54(2) the 
unlawfulness of the prohibited acts relies on that their purpose is identified in the denial of the sustenance 
value to the affected civilians. Here, a distinction between incidental and foreseeable damage is 
unhelpful. When the damage caused is incidental and so unintended, it is clear that it cannot fall 
within the prohibition set out in Article 54(2). Conversely, when the damage is foreseeable, the 
problem remains of the textual reference to the “purpose” of the attack, rather than to its effects. In 
fact, this regrettably appears to imply that situations of indirect damage hampering the survival of the 
population (even if they are foreseeable) do not fall perfectly within Article 54(2). As aptly noted, the term 
                                                
554 Article 54 (1) AP I, Article 14 AP II. See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., para. 2090. See 
J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., Rule 53, p. 186. 
555 Article 54 (4) AP I. 
556 Article 54 (2) AP I. See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., Rule 54, p. 189. 
557 For detailed indication of manuals and national legislation, see J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 190, 
Rule 54 (particularly notes 33-35). 
558 For detailed indication of manuals and national legislation, see J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 191, 
Rule 54  (particularly notes 39-40). 
559 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., at 1456, para. 4795: “The prohibition on using starvation 
against civilians is a rule from which no derogation may be made. A form of words whereby it would have been possible to make an exception 





“effect” is used elsewhere in Protocol I (e.g. in relation to indiscriminate attacks)560 but it is not 
referred to define the scope of the prohibition set out in Article 54(2).561 The unfortunate result is 
that actions indirectly impairing the population’s survival - e.g. targeting power supply installations - 
do not amount to a breach of this provision. 
 
As for the definition of this specially protected category of objects, both Article 54(2) API and Article 
14 APII contain an illustrative list including irrigation works, drinking water installations and 
supplies, agricultural areas for the production of livestock and crops. As recognised in the official 
commentary, “it cannot be excluded that as a result of climate or other circumstances, objects such as shelter or 
clothing must be considered as indispensable to survival” of civilians.562 In this sense, a widely shared view on 
the ordinary meaning of “starvation” - as expressed by the delegations participating in the 
negotiations of the Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court - equates to killing 
either by denial of food and water, or, more broadly, by denial or inadequate delivery of other 
indispensible items (e.g. medicines or blankets) which are crucial to survival.563 In this regard, under 
both 1977 Protocols medical supplies and foodstuff are considered essential to the civilian population’s 
survival, but only Protocol I refers to “clothing, bedding and means of shelter”.564 
Remarkably, what the expression “drinking water installations and supplies” exactly encompasses has 
been questioned in legal scholarship. While literally it surely means water reservoirs, wells and 
pumps, the special protection afforded by the 1977 Protocols seems reasonably capable of being 
expected to cover “electricity-generating plants that supply the power necessary for the purification and pumping of 
drinking water” because they are essential to the functioning of drinking water installations565 although 
this is perhaps not self-evident. 566  However, the “for the specific purpose” caveat weakens the 
                                                
560 In outlining three situations as indiscriminate attack, Article 51(4) deals at sub-paragraph (c) with attacks that “employ 
a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by the Protocol”.  
561 F. Hampson, “Means and Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf”, in P. Rowe (ed.), The Gulf War 1990-91 in 
International and English Law, Routledge, 1993, at 99. 
562 C. Pilloud and J. Pictet, “Article 54”, in Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., para. 2103, p. 655. 
563 See K. Dormann, “Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: The Elements of War Crimes - 
Part II: Other Serious Violations of the Laws and Customs Applicable in International and Non-International Armed 
Conflicts”, 83 IRRC, 2001, pp. 475-476.  
564 Article 69 (1) AP I requires the occupying power to provide for the civilian population living in the occupied territory 
“basic needs, such as clothing, bedding, means of shelter, other supplies essential to their survival”; Article 18 (2) AP II. 
565 See H. Shue and D. Wippman, “Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use Facilities Performing Indispensable Civilian 
Functions”, CILJ, 2002, p. 573, in which the authors emphasise that “consequently, if Article 52(2) is read in conjunction with 
Article 54, attacks upon the power source for the delivery of potable water, in other words water clean enough to drink without contracting 
illness, are prohibited subject to the ‘for the specific purpose’ caveat in Article 54(2) quoted above”. 





prohibition as applied to dual-use facilities.567 In addition, on the ambiguity in the definition of 
“water installations”, it has been underlined that “practice seems to indicate that the term does not include 
smallest elements of the fresh water network, but only the largest entities in so far as they are vital to prevent starvation 
of the civilian population, both by lack of fresh water itself and lack of fresh water for agriculture”.568 
 
Turning to the exceptions, one stems from Article 54(3) API, concerning the possibility of 
targeting objects fundamental to the population’s survival as far as they turn into military objectives when they are 
used as sustenance uniquely for combatants or otherwise in direct support of military action by the enemy.569 
Numerous military manuals, some legislation and official statements set forth this exception570 and, 
significantly, they also acknowledge the basic caveat in Article 54(3)(b): when those objects do not 
serve as sustenance uniquely for combatants but nonetheless in direct support of military action, the 
prohibition of starvation will still prohibit on attack on them if the attack is likely to cause starvation among the civilian 
population.571 However, since Article 14 APII does not set forth this exception and there is no 
practice supporting it, its applicability to non-international armed conflicts remains uncertain.572 
With regard to Article 54(3)(a), this exception may also represent a clear-cut case insomuch as 
the civilian population has been already deprived by the objects concerned, which are no longer 
available for their sustenance; an attack against them or their destruction would be lawful if they 
serve solely for the sustenance of combatants. For instance, it would be possible to demolish a 
drinking water installation solely supplying an enemy’s military base.573 
In relation to 54(3)(b), concrete examples have been debated regarding cases of armed forces 
using an object indispensable to the civilian population’s survival in manners directly supporting 
military action, so legitimising the attack against it. They include the destruction of an irrigation 
                                                
567 On this aspect, see J. Crawford, “The Law of Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical 
Power Systems”, 21 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 1997, p. 110, noting that “The United States accepts as customary 
international law the prohibition against intentionally targeting drinking-water installations, foodstuffs, crops, livestock and other objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. However, in the case of Iraq, these crucial items were lost to the noncombatant populace 
as a result of the reverberating effects of the aerial bombardment of electricity”. 
568 N. Jorgensen, “The Protection of Freshwater in Armed Conflicts”, 3 Journal of International Law and International 
Relations, 2007 pp. 57-96. 
569 Article 54 (3) AP I: “The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects covered by it as are used by an adverse Party: 
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or (b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, 
however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such 
inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement”. 
570 For details on the military manuals, see J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 192, Rule 54 (particularly 
note 47). 
571 This is acknowledged even in military manuals of States not party to Protocol I, such as Israel and the United States. 
572 See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 192, Rule 54. 





canal serving as defensive line,574 the bombardment of a food-producing area if the purpose is to 
prevent the advance of enemy troops (rather than the growing of food for civilian consumption),575 
and the razing of a railroad line that is a military objective, even if it serves “to transport food needed to 
supply the population of a city”.576 In these cases, however, the aforementioned caveat clearly entails that 
the attack will still remain forbidden if it would cause civilians to starve according to Article 54(1). Similarly, 
attacking a water tower that functions as an observation post would be lawful provided that it did 
not deny access to water to the population in a way causing its starvation or pushing it to flee.  
Nevertheless, the utility of this second dimension of the exception may be questioned in view of 
the textual prohibition of acts specifically intended to deny the “sustenance value” of the object concerned for 
whatsoever reason (including starvation and forced displacement). For instance, an option for the 
belligerent seeking to target a water tower would be to argue that such an attack solely attempted to 
deny the adversary’s direct support to military action through use of the tower, without any 
intention to deny its sustenance value to the civilian population. Under this line of argument, such 
an attack would be legitimate to the extent that the targeted object fulfils the definition of military 
objective under Article 52(2) and the proportionality principle is respected alongside precautionary 
measures. 
 
Leaving aside any military use of objects indispensable to the civilian population’s survival, 
imperative military necessity may also entitle a belligerent to destroy them provided they are situated within the territory 
under its own control. This exception is codified in Article 54(5), and in numerous military manuals as 
well.577 In particular, it refers to a belligerent facing a situation of imperative military necessity (such 
as an invasion) and resorting to the so-called “scorched earth policy” by, for instance, demaging its 
crops.578 Further, it requires either that the territory in question be the national territory of the party 
acting in its defence and wishing to appeal for the exception, or that the affected areas of national 
territory be controlled by the party concerned.579 This rule has two significant implications. An 
occupying power withdrawing from occupied territories cannot invoke this exception. Then, even in 
case of a party’s own territory, the latter may decide to resort to the “scorched earth” policy only when 
                                                
574 W.A. Solf, “Article 54”, in M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch and W.A. Solf (eds.), op. cit., p. 341. 
575 F. Kalshoven, Reflections on the Law of War: Collected Essays, 2007, p. 229. 
576 W.A. Solf, op. cit., p. 339. 
577 For details on the military manuals, see J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 193, Rule 54 (particularly 
notes 50-51). 
578 According to Article 54(5) AP I this exception is allowed “in recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in 
the defence of its national territory against invasion … where required by imperative military necessity”. 
579 Therefore, it must not be the enemy’s territory or an area of the national territory controlled by the enemy, see C. 





it is in evacuation or retreat from its own territory and resort cannot be had to such a policy when it 
is “seeking to expel the enemy or reoccupy its own territory”.580 Nonetheless, scorched earth measures have 
enormous potentially long-lasting negative effects on the civilian population. However, again, since Article 14 
APII does not set forth this exception, its applicability to non-international armed conflicts remains 
uncertain.581 
 
Reflecting on the status of these provisions in international law, as generally argued in legal 
scholarship, Article 54 makes it clear that attacks against foodstuffs and other objects essential to the 
population’s survival is covered by customary law.582 In this regard the determination by the Eritrea-
Ethiopia Claims Commission is noteworthy: aerial bombing attacks by Ethiopia against a water 
reservoir considered essential to the civilian population’s survival were acknowledged to be in 
violation of customary international law.  In particular, regarding this article as declaratory of 
customary law at the time of the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, the Commission held that “the provisions of 
Article 54 that prohibit attack against drinking water installations and supplies that are indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the adverse Party, had 
become part of customary international law by 1999”. The Commission reconstructed the content of this 
rule effectively through the detection of the State practice, also highlighting the compelling 
humanitarian nature of the norm. Based on this interpretation of the rule, it considered unlawful the 
shelling carried out against the reservoir of Harsile, which was considered fundamental to the 
survival of the population of the city of Assab.583  
Similarly, the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur included the prohibition to destroy objects 
indispensable to the civilian population’s survival under Article 14 among the customary rules on 
non-international armed conflicts which were deemed “relevant and applicable” to the conflict in 
Darfur.584 In finding large-scale destruction of villages in all South, West and North Darfur “by the 
                                                
580 See L. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, Melland Schill Studies in International Law3, Manchester University 
Press, 2006, at 169. This policy was employed as a screening tactic during massive retreats in the course of the World 
War II. In relation to the Hostage case, where General Rendulic was acquitted of the charge of having devastated enemy-
held territory in Norway to deny it to advancing Soviet forces, the author notes that this would probably not be legal for 
those ratifying the Protocol. 
581 See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 193, Rule 54. 
582 See Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 2010, at 218. In the same vein, 
Antonio Cassese stressed how “[t]his is an area where there exists great confusion and uncertainty concerning the content of [the] law”, 
claiming that custom proscribes “any attack upon means of subsistence which serves solely the civilian population”, see A. Cassese, 
“The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and Customary International Law”, 
UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, 1984, pp. 90-91.  
583 See Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 and 26 
(19 December 2005), 45 I.L.M. 396 (2006), at 416, paras. 100-101, and 104-105. 





Janjaweed during attacks, independently or in combination with Government forces”, it explicitly mentioned that 
“objects indispensable to the survival of civilian population were deliberately and wantonly destroyed”.585 
Notably, the relevance of customary intentional law has been also addressed as a “fertile soil” to 
root the definitions of “famine crimes”.586 
 
Previous considerations shed light on a certain complexity of the system laid down in Article 54 
though. In actual fact its effectiveness in providing protection to the civilian population may be called into question. 
The main rationale is safeguarding survival, but the relevant rules are formulated in a way that may 
obstruct concrete application. Prior analysis in fact shows that the prohibitions set out in Article 54 
cover cases of deliberate denial of sustenance, while other acts hampering the survival of the population 
through indirect damage - even when foreseeable - are left up to other rules, precisely those prohibiting 
indiscriminate attacks and requiring precautions to avoid tragic collateral damage. 
 
Some well-known instances of alleged violations of Article 54(2) API, as condemned by the 
United Nations and other international organizations, concerned the conflicts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As observed above, an explicit 
reference to this provision was articulated in the Fact-Finding Mission’s investigation on Operation 
Cast Lead in relation to “deliberate attacks on the foundations of civilian life in Gaza”, which reviewed 
numerous incidents implicating the destruction of industrial infrastructures, water installations, 
farms, food production, sewage treatment plants, and private houses.587 However, in order to 
determine a violation of Article 54(2) API, the specific intent of inhibiting the use of the attacked 
objects to the population for their sustenance value has to be proved alongside the absence of 
military necessity. In this regard, the reported outcomes remain uncertain. In reviewing the 
incidents concerned the Mission touched on and discussed exactly these aspects, but the accuracy of 
                                                
585 Ibid., para. 315. See also para. 235 (“There is an abundance of sites with evidence of villages burnt, completely or partially, with only 
shells of outer walls of the traditional circular houses left standing. Water pumps and wells have been destroyed implements for food processing 
wrecked, trees and crops were burnt and cut down, both in villages and in the wadis116, which are a major source of water for the rural 
population. Rural areas in Darfur are not the only scenes of destruction. Several towns also show signs of damage to homes and essential 
infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, and police stations”) and para. 305 (“… During the attacks Janjaweed are reported to have 
destroyed utensils, equipment for processing food, water containers and other household items essential for the survival of the inhabitants. Wells 
were reportedly poisoned by dropping the carcasses of cattle into the wells. In addition, as noted below, the destruction seems to have been 
consistently combined with looting of personal valuables, cash and, above all, live-stock”). 
586 D. Marcus, “Famine Crimes in International Law”, AJIL, 2003, at 269, quoting an observation by Theodor Meron: 
“Given the scarcity of actual practice, it may well be that, in reality, tribunals have been guided, and are likely to continue to be guided, by the 
degree of offensiveness of certain acts to human dignity; the more heinous the act, the more the tribunal will assume that it violates not only a 
moral principle of humanity but also a positive norm of customary law”, see T. Meron, “The Geneva Conventions as Customary 
Law”, AJIL, 1987, p. 361. 





the reconstruction of the facts remains crucial, and they have been strongly contested by Israel with 
photographic evidence.588 
 
Finally, focusing briefly on the prohibition of starvation as reflected in Article 54(1) API, it is 
noteworthy that the official commentary to Protocol I considers the possibility that “an action aimed at 
causing starvation […] be a crime of genocide if it were undertaken with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, according to the terms of the Genocide Convention” and specifically 
Article 2(c),589 which refers to the deliberate infliction of life conditions “calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part”. As noted by the Preparatory Commission in drafting the 
Elements of Crimes that fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction and as confirmed in the related footnote, 
“the term ‘conditions of life’ may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, deliberate deprivation of resources 
indispensable for survival, such as food or medical services, or systematic expulsion from homes”.590 The narrow 
focus of the mens rea requirement of genocide591 - namely the dolus specialis that a perpetrator 
specifically intended to destroy in whole or in part certain protected groups592 - appears to limit the 
possibility of characterising starvation as genocide, although some commentators have argued that 
deliberately perpetrated famines are genocide.593  
From an international criminal law perspective, it is worth mentioning the position taken by the 
ICTR whereby the means of a deliberate infliction of life conditions intended to bring about physical 
destruction include “methods of destruction which do not immediately lead to the death of members of the 
group”.594 Similarly, as to the situation in Darfur, the ICC Prosecutor charged President Al-Bashir 
                                                
588 See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affaires, “Gaza Operations Investigations: An Update”, 29 January 2010. 
589 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., para. 2097. See Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, entered into forced on 12 January 1951. 
590 See Elements of Crimes, Article 6(c)(4), footnote n. 4. See also Report of the Preparatory Commission for the 
International Criminal Court, Addendum, Part II, Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, 
PCICC/2000//1/Add.2, Art. 6 (c) n. 4. Equally, the Elements of Crimes of Article 7(1)(b) expressly indicate that the 
crime against humanity of extermination may cover “the deprivation of access to food and medicine” as infliction of the 
pertinent conditions, see footnote n. 9. 
591 A mens rea of recklessness does not suffice: see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic (IT-98-33-T), Judgment of 2 August 2001, 
para. 561, 40 ILM 1346 (2001), para. 571. 
592  A certain criticism of the Genocide Convention is that “it is clear from both the text and the travaux of the Convention that it 
does not include political, economic, or professional groups”, see S. Ratner and Abrams, Accountability for Human rights Atrocities in 
International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 1997, at 32. 
593 See K. Jonassohn and K.S. Bjornson, Genocide and Gross Human Rights Violations in Comparative Perspective, 1998. 
594 See ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 505-506 (506, “… For 
purposes of interpreting Article 2(2)(c) of the Statute, the Chamber is of the opinion that the means of deliberate inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or part, include, inter alia, subjecting a group of people to a 
subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum requirement”); ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1-T), Judgment, 21 May 1999, paras. 115-116 (116, “… the 





with (indirect) “methods of destruction other than direct killings and the causing of serious bodily and mental harm” 
which were deemed “an integral and prominent part” of a genocidal policy and of the commission of 
crimes against humanity. 595 Notably, the contamination of wells and water pumps was also 
explicitly considered in the second arrest warrant against Al-Bashir.596 In this regard, it seems 
reasonable to argue that the choice of counting such measures in criminal accusations represents a 
meaningful way of integrating socio-economic dimensions in the prosecution of existing crimes, particularly severe 
deprivation of food, water, healthcare and housing - rather than a direct criminalisation of related 
ESC rights. 
Starvation of civilians is not considered as a “grave breach” in Article 85 API. Conversely, 
Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) ICC Statute includes in the list of war crimes in international armed conflict 
“intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their 
survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions”597. These terms 
are relevant as they explicitly label the deliberate refusal of humanitarian assistance in violation of 
these Conventions as a war crime. Conversely, the starvation of civilians in non-international armed 
conflicts is not labelled in the same way under the Rome Statute.598 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
withholding sufficient living accommodation for a reasonable period, provided the above would lead to the destruction of the group in whole or 
in part.”) 
595 ICC, Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir (II-02/05-01/09), Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest, 12 July 2010, para. 34 (“… These methods of destruction included: (i) subjecting the group to destruction of their means of 
survival in their homeland; (ii) systematic displacement from their homes into inhospitable terrain where some died as a result of thirst, 
starvation and disease; (iii) usurpation of the land; and (iv) denial and hindrance of medical and other humanitarian assistance needed to 
sustain life in IDP camps.”). 
596 ICC, Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (ICC 02-/05-01/09), Second warrant of arrest issued by Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 July 
2012, at 7, in which the Trial Chamber considered that “there are also reasonable grounds to believe that in furtherance of the 
genocidal policy, as part of the GoS’s unlawful attack on the above-mentioned part of the civilian population of Darfur and with knowledge of 
such attack, GoS forces throughout the Darfur region (i) at times, contamined the wells and water pumps of the towns and villages primarily 
inhabited by members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups that they attacked; (ii) subjected hundreds of thousands of civilians belonging 
primarily to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups to acts of forcible transfer; and (iii) encouraged members of other tribes, which were allied 
with the GoS, to resettle in the villages and lands previously mainly inhabited by members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups”. 
597 It is worth underling the shared view expressed by the delegations participating in the negotiation of the Elements of 
Crimes for the ICC, according to which the ordinary meaning of “starvation” encompasses either the restrictive 
connotation of killing by depriving food and water, or the general connotation of depriving or insufficiently supplying 
basic goods such as medicines and blankets “indispensable for survival owing to the very low temperature in a region”, see K. 
Dörmann, “Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: The Elements of War Crimes - Part II: 
Other Serious Violations of the Laws and Customs Applicable in International and Non-International Armed 
Conflicts”, IRRC, 2001, p. 475. This is a broader understanding of “starvation”, which also corresponds to the concept of 
“supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population” used for belligerent occupation by Article 69 API. 
598 See C. Rottensteiner, “The Denial of Humanitarian Assistance as a Crime under International Law”, 81 IRRC, 





7. The prohibition of starvation in relation to siege and blockade 
Historically, starvation of civilians was permitted as a means of inducing surrender 599 . An 
emblematic reflection of military strategies that valued the tactical possibilities of starvation was the 
Lieber Code, which, in recognising that “[w]ar is not carried on by arms alone”, considered legitimate “to 
starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy”. 600 
Justification of mass hunger created by blockades or sieges was found by arguing that the military 
gain ultimately achieved outweighed the collateral damage inflicted on civilian populations.601 
For a comprehensive understanding of the examined restrictions posed by Article 54 API in 
favour of civilians, it seems pertinent to discuss them in relation to two ancient methods of warfare 
that are not completely forbidden under the law of armed conflict, namely siege and blockade. 
Indeed, the latter inevitably impact the possibility for the population of abandoning the besieged 
locality and receiving supplies. Consequently severe cumulative effects on the realisation of a wide 
range of ESC rights of the civilian population are likely to result.  
These two methods of warfare have been not so remote in recent practice. For instance, during 
the Balkans war the cities of Sarajevo and Dubrovnik were besieged, while instances of legitimate 
Governmental naval blockades of ports controlled by rebels include the blockade of confederate 
ports during the American civil war of 1861, the Nigerian blockade in 1967 of Biafra ports, which 
led to a humanitarian disaster when it emerged that there was widespread civilian hunger and 
starvation in the besieged areas;602 then, in 1991 the Yugoslav navy renewed the blockade of 
Croatian ports. More recently, blockade was resorted to by Israel in the context of its military 
campaign against Hezbollah in 2006. Controversial aspects emerged concerning the blockade 
imposed as part of Israel’s military-security “dual strategy” against Hamas, along with the “closure 
policy”, focusing on the prevention of “weapons, ammunition, military supplies, terrorists and money from 
                                                
599 See Waxman, “Siegecraft and Surrender: The Law and Strategy of Cities as Targets”, Va. J. Int’l L., 1999, at 408-
409. For a general discussion of sieges and blockades, see M. Waltzer, Just and unjust wars, 1977, pp. 160-75.  
600 See Article 17, U.S. War Department, General Orders No. 100, 24 April 1863, reprinted in D. Schindler and J. Toman 
(eds.), The Laws of Armed Conflicts3, 1988. 
601 C.A. Allen, “Civilian Starvation and Relief During Armed Conflict: The Modern Humanitarian Law”, Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1989, noting that: “Acts directed at starvation of people, including the impediment of relief 
efforts on behalf of starving populations, have long roots in the history of warfare”. For a thorough discussion of the history of siege 
craft, see generally Waxman, op. cit., pp. 357-401.  
602 After the end of the war, a Nigerian commission, including British doctors, visited Biafra and concluded that the 
evidence of deliberate starvation was overplayed, caused by confusion between the symptoms of starvation and various 
tropical illnesses. They did not doubt that starvation had occurred, but were unsurprisingly not clear of the extent to 
which it was a result of the Nigerian blockade or the restriction of food to the civilians by the Biafran government. See 
R.B. Alade, The Broken Bridge: Reflections and Experience of a Medical Doctor during the Nigerian Civil War; see M.I. Draper, 





entering the Gaza Strip, and the need to prevent the departure of terrorists, vessels filled with explosives and other 
maritime borne threats from Gaza”. 603  This blockade has also been effective during subsequent 
escalations of hostilities in 2012 and 2014. This practice is discussed after reviewing what exactly the 
law provides for. 
7.1. Siege 
Classical international law did not contest the lawfulness of siege as a method of warfare, and the 
legitimacy of an attempt to weaken a besieged area “through starvation” was not open to 
question.604 Its legality was confirmed in one of the “subsequent proceedings” at Nuremberg, in the High 
Command case, in which the Nazi siege of Leningrad during World War II, which represented an 
outstanding tragedy with more than one million Russians dead, received an imprimatur of legality ex 
post facto605 by the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.606 
While a trend towards an explicit prohibition of civilian starvation began with the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 by asserting that certain categories of people were protected from the ravages 
of hunger, the legitimacy of sieges and blockades was still recognised. In this vein, siege warfare is 
regulated under Article 17 GCIV in a marginal way, recommending that belligerents conclude 
agreements for removing only certain listed categories of civilians.607 Further, Article 23(1) GCIV 
requires to allow free passage of medical consignments and “objects necessary for religious worship” for all 
civilians, while other items (like clothing and food) must be permitted “for children under fifteen, expectant 
mothers and maternity cases”. Although blockade is not explicitly referred to, it is the “background” of 
                                                
603 See Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010, The Turkel Commission, Report - Part One, January 
2010, pp. 53, 58. 
604 C.C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States2, vol. 3, Little Brown, 1945, p. 1803. 
605 See C.A. Allen, “Civilian Starvation and Relief During Armed Conflict: The Modern Humanitarian Law”, 19(1) 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1989, p. 32. 
606 In responding to the charges against the principal defendant in the trial, German Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von 
Leeb, who knew and approved orders to use artillery to prevent Russian civilians’ attempt to flee through the German 
lines “by opening fire as early as possible, so that the infantry, if possible, is spared shooting on civilians”, the US Military Tribunal 
considered if this was an unlawful order and quoted Hyde to admit that “[a] belligerent commander may lawfully lay siege to a 
place controlled by the enemy and endeavor by a process of isolation to cause its surrender. The propriety of attempting to reduce it by starvation 
is not questioned. Hence, the cutting off of every source of sustenance from without is deemed legitimate. It is said that if the commander of a 
besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an 
extreme measure, to drive them back so as to hasten the surrender”. Then, the same Tribunal remarked: “[W]e might wish the law were 
otherwise but we must administer it as we find it. Consequently, we hold no criminality attached on this charge”. See U.S. Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg, The United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb et Al., Judgment of 27 October 1948, 11 NMT 462, 
in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XII, The German High Command Trial. See C.C. Hyde, International 
Law2, Little Brown and Co., 1945, pp. 1802-03. 
607 Article 17 GCIV reads: “The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or 
encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, 
medical personnel and medical equipment on their way to such areas”. In the commentary to the Convention it is noted that “[T]he 
words “The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour” show that under the Convention evacuation is not compulsory”, see O. M. Uhler and 





this norm.608 In addition to the conditions elucidated in paragraph 2,609 the limited reach of 
protection afforded by this provision has been remarked on in legal scholarship: “even if Article 23 is 
applicable to sieges in land warfare, there is no requirement to allow the supply of essential foodstuffs to the civilian 
population in general, as distinct from certain groups deemed particularly ‘vulnerable’”.610 In this regard, the 
drafters of the Geneva Conventions acknowledged that too much discretion was left to warring 
parties but they “had to bow to the harsh realities of war”.611 Some positive interpretations of Article 23 
have described it as “a nod towards special protection for civilians in non occupied areas against measures to 
deprive them of needed sustenance during armed conflict”,612 or deemed it not to be a blanket prohibition 
against starving civilians.613 
While the rules on sieges and blockades in the Geneva Conventions tend to express the idea that 
international humanitarian law “must achieve a compromise between military requirements and humanitarian 
considerations”,614 the previous examination of Article 54 API has shown that a stronger prohibition of 
civilians’ starvation is incorporated by changing the position of the law regarding the tactics 
available to a besieging force. Accordingly, this rule requires that a siege surrounding the enemy’s 
military fort be distinguished from one on a defended town inhabited by civilians. As observed 
above, systematic destruction of foodstuffs that can be consumed by the besieged is permissible as 
far as the sustenance at stake only regards the enemy armed forces; conversely it is forbidden when 
civilians are directly affected. In fact, as we have seen above, the special protection of food supply 
and drinking water installations essential for the civilian population does not drop when it is also 
utilised by belligerent forces and may become a military objective: the exclusive use by the latter 
remains functional to lose such immunity. Notably, in view that “a true siege would no longer be feasible” 
if civilians are affected, the prohibition of siege “in the old meaning and function of the term” has been 
                                                
608 See O.M. Uhler, H. Coursier, “Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War”, 
in J. Pictet et al., Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, vol. IV, 1958, pp.178-179. 
609 According to Article 23(2) GCIV, the duty to protect young children and expectant mothers is conditioned on the 
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610 See Y. Dinstein, “Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians, in Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: 
Challenges Ahead”, in A.J.M. Delissen, G.J. Tanja (eds.), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead: Essays in 
Honour of Frits Kalshoven, Dordrecht, Neth., and Boston: Nijhoff, 1991, p. 148. See E. Rosenblad, “Starvation as a 
Method of Warfare-Conditions for Regulation by Convention”, 7 International Lawyer, 1973, pp. 261-262. 
611 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1958, pp. 182-183. 
612 C. Allen, “Civilian Starvation and Relief During Armed Conflict: The Modern Humanitarian Law”, 19(1) Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1989, p. 39. 
613 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., p. 1457, para. 4797, observing that “up to now there has 
been no express rule of law forbidding besieging forces to let civilians die of starvation”. 
614 See P. Macalister - Smith, “Protection of the Civilian Population and the Prohibition of Starvation as a method of 





pointed out.615 However, even pursuant to Article 54 API, a possibility envisaged for the besieging 
belligerent party has been the one of preventing supplies from going through when “safe passage 
out of the besieged area” is ensured to civilians.616 
 
For the purpose of the present research, a noteworthy case recently investigated concerns the 
non-international armed conflict in Syria, as the sieges employed have been examined explicitly in 
relation to economic, social and cultural rights.617  
In particular, the tactics of siege warfare imposed by Government forces and pro-government 
militia on towns across the Syrian Arab Republic have been described as “instrumentalizing basic 
human needs for water, food, shelter and medical care, as part of its military strategy”. In addition to reporting 
that “besieged areas have been relentlessly shelled and bombarded”, Government forces’ restrictions of the 
distribution of humanitarian aid, including surgical supplies, have been found. Such tactics have 
been deemed in direct violation of international humanitarian law obligations to ensure that sick 
and wounded persons are collected and cared for, and to ensure unimpeded and rapid passage of 
humanitarian relief. Further, the denial of humanitarian food aid has been reported as protracted in 
many agricultural areas and leading to malnutrition and starvation; in particular, “as the siege was 
tightened, government forces blocked access roads and systematically confiscated food, fuel and medicine at checkpoint”. 
Significantly, the commission of inquiry not only put emphasis on the prohibited use of starvation of 
the population as a method of warfare, but also underlined that “such acts also violate core obligations 
under the right to adequate food and the right to the highest attainable standard of health”.  
Similarly, the siege imposed by non-state armed groups, mainly regarding Aleppo, has been 
reported as including denial of access to humanitarian convoys, leading to dire humanitarian 
conditions, “with residents digging wells for water and suffering illnesses due to the lack of sanitation”, in 
violation of their IHL obligations. In this context, the commission of inquiry has also reported 
attacks against farmers (residents of Mirdash and Shatha) cultivating their land with the specific 
purpose of preventing them from having access to agricultural goods and so depriving them of their 
main source of income and sustenance, underlining that this is prohibited under international 
                                                
615 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, p. 222, quoting G.B. 
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616 A.P.V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 63. 
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According to the San Remo Manual this method of warfare consists in “the blocking of the approach to 
the enemy coast, or a part of it, for the purpose of preventing ingress and egress of vessels or aircraft of all States”.618 
Customary international law subjects the imposition of a blockade to five cumulative conditions. To 
elaborate, a blockade has to be properly declared and notified; the force concerned has to maintain 
an effective blockade, even if it is stationed at a certain distance; it has to be applied to all vessels of 
all States impartially; it cannot prevent the access to the ports and coast concerned to neutral States; 
and it has to comply with certain humanitarian obligations.619  
Originally viewed as a naval measure, it has since encompassed land, technological, and air 
blockades.620 Its relevance essentially relies on the power and control exercised by the blockading 
State or entity, without achieving immediate military results, rather isolating and exerting pressure 
on the blockaded State or entity by obstructing its trade and damaging its economy, so affecting its 
military resistance. 
Being a method of warfare, its legality is plausible only during an armed conflict. However 
controversial practice exists, such as in the case of the blockade relating to the 34 day conflict 
between the Israeli military and Hezbollah paramilitary forces, which started on 12 July 2006 and 
continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect in the mid-August of the same 
year.621 In that context, Israel decided to place the whole coast of Lebanon under air and naval 
blockade in order to defeat Hezbollah and preventing supplies from reaching it, even though Israel 
and Lebanon were not waging any war in the technical sense. The international community 
respected this blockade, which was lifted only on 8 September 2006. 
 
                                                
618 L. Doswald-Beck (ed.), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (12 June 1994), CUP, 
1995, at 176. 
619 The Declaration of London of 1909 laid down the conditions regulating the establishment of a blockade. Although it 
remained ungratified, its provisions are regarded as declaratory of customary law, e.g., Annotated Supplement, 7.7.2-4. See 
also San Remo Manual, respectively, paras. 93, 95, 100, 99, 102-104.  
620 See N. Ronzitti, “The 2006 Conflict in Lebabon and International Law”, 16 Italian Yearbook of International Law, 2007, 
pp. 3-19; G.E. Bisharat, T. Crawley, S. Elturk, C. James, R. Mishaan, A. Radharkrishnan and A. Sanders, “Israel’s 
Invasion of Gaza in International Law”, 38 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 2009-2010, p. 59. 
621 SC Res. 1701 (2006), S/RES/1701, 11 August 2006. The conflict began when militants from the group Hezbollah 
fired rockets at Israeli border towns as a diversion for an anti-tank missile attack on two armored Humvees patrolling 
the Israeli side of the border fence, see New York Times via the International Heral Tribune, “Clashes spread to 





As far as the blockade undertakes “to exclude all transit into and out of a defined area or location”,622 in 
cases of a persistent blockade, interdicting any ingress and egress by vessels or aircraft carrying supplies, 
serious implications for the civilian population are likely to result in and affect several dimensions of its 
enjoyment of basic levels of ESC rights. In this sense, an effective blockade, if prolonged and extended to 
large areas, has the potential to entail enormous difficulties for civilians in getting healthy 
comestibles and resisting diseases. As aptly underlined, civilians are especially susceptible to the 
harmful consequences of a long blockade “since they may have the lowest priority in the distribution of food 
supplies”. 623  Emblematically, the so called “starvation blockade” or “hunger blockade” during and 
immediately after the First World War represented a policy resulting in the death of thousands of 
civilians in Germany, Austria and other occupied countries. The situation of Germany was 
described as that of a whole country “experiencing the uncontrolled effects of a rapidly accelerating famine”.624 
As far as Protocol I is concerned, while the prohibition of starvation set up by Article 54 does 
not refer to blockade, a relevant issue may arise as to whether to consider or not illegal under the law of 
armed conflict a blockade that deprives the enemy population of foodstuff and, in doing so, gives rise to civilians’ 
starvation, in the hope that it will put pressure on the government to seek peace. It has been argued 
that a blockade cannot have starvation as its only purpose, adding that “lest the expected injury to 
civilians in the wake of a blockade will be ‘excessive’ in relation to the military advantage anticipated”.625 In this 
regard, Article 49(3) is taken into account, stressing that its official comment sheds light on the 
original concern of the Diplomatic Conference not to revise the rules applicable to armed conflict in 
the air or at sea,626 and hence not to affect existing law on blockades.627 This interpretation has 
nevertheless been deemed “untenable”, in the face of the applicability of Article 54 to naval blockades 
affecting civilian persons and objects on land, and the unlawfulness of the case referred to.628 
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628 See Heintschel von Heinegg, “The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea”, in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of Humanitarian 
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Indeed, Article 54(1) is part of Protocol I affording general protection to the civilian population 
against the effects of hostilities and Article 49(3) applies to all “attacks”, comprising those from the 
sea against the land. Conversely, “violent action applied to frustrate an enemy blockade” would amount to an 
“attack” under Article 49(1), which refers to any act of violence against the adversary, whether 
offensive or defensive in nature. Yet, Article 54(2) proscribes acts such as removing or destroying 
objects indispensable to the sustenance of the civilian population, without mentioning acts of 
preventing such objects reaching the civilian population. This is a meaningful issue due to the fact that the 
blockading State generally aims to condition the lifting of the blockade on guarantees that the 
concerned airports and ports are not used to transfer humanitarian cargos together with weapons or 
similar materials. As aptly stressed, “inhibition of entry would be for purposes wider than the starvation of the 
civilian population”.629  
Nonetheless, focusing on relief actions, it is worth stressing that the blockading State is under an 
obligation to provide for and to permit free passage of supplies basic for the civilian population’s survival630. 
However, significant security concerns can affect such passage and its right to prescribe technical 
arrangements is recognised.631 Notably, in the context of the aforementioned military campaign 
against Hezbollah and notwithstanding the blockade imposed, Israel did grant immunity from 
attack to ships bringing medical and food supplies for the civilian population, as well as to vessels 
assisting in the evacuation of foreign nationals, although the majority of the latter held dual 
nationality, one of which was Lebanese.632 Conversely, the incident regarding the ‘Mavi Marmara’, 
namely the boarding and seizing by Israeli naval forces of the main ship in an international aid 
flotilla that had sought to breach the Israeli naval blockade of the Gaza Strip, provoked a debate 
concerning the legality of the latter.633 For the purpose of the present research, this merits specific 
                                                
629 L. Green, The contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 2008, pp. 205-206. 
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7.2.a. An atypical case of blockade: the connection with occupation and military 
operations 
The complexity of the situation concerning the Gaza Strip is as a result of a number of factors. To 
elaborate, a blockade has been imposed as a military and security measure by a State against a 
territory occupied by the same blockading State, namely a territory under the enemy’s control. 
Thus, the legal obligations that an occupying power has towards those living therein remain at issue. 
Further, the protracted combination of the naval blockade alongside land and air closures (“the 
closure policy”) has called into question Israel’s compliance with the required conditions under the law 
of naval warfare together with its humanitarian law obligations to protect the civilian population.  
In actual facts, since January 2006 Israel has imposed economic and political constraints 
following the victory of the Hamas-affiliated party in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections.634 
However, as discussed in the next chapter, the status of the Gaza Strip from the perspective of 
international law constitutes the subject of political, judicial and academic debate in the light of 
several events. 635 They include Israel’s disengagement in 2005,636 its declaration of the Strip as a 
“hostile territory”637 and its invocation of a “closure policy” entailing restrictions on the movement of 
goods in and out the Strip in September 2007,638 the reduction in sea access in 2008, declaring a 
maritime zone off its coast, prohibiting all shipping, allowing possible transportation of 
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humanitarian aid via land crossings,639 and reducing to three-nautical miles sea access for local 
fishermen in respect of the twenty-nautical miles under the Oslo Accords. With the commencement 
of “Operation Cast Lead” the naval blockade of the Gaza Strip was announced and it has remained 
effective even since.640 Conversely, the closure policy was eased to ban only goods with a military 
purpose in June 2010 and a plan on the export of goods from the Strip was announced in 
December 2010, although since February 2011 only the Kerem Shalom and Erez crossings between 
Israel and the Strip have been operative, for fuel and cargo and pedestrians respectively, while the 
Rafha crossing into Egypt has remained mostly closed.641 Further, Israel’s control of the airspace 
over Gaza has continued through its aviation, drones, and aircrafts surveillance.642 
After the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was instituted in June 1967, the position 
maintained by Israel has remained controversial. It has contended that the occupation came to an 
end when it withdrew its armed forces in 2005, that it is abiding by the humanitarian provisions of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, but not by the entire convention or the 1977 Protocols, and that it 
exercises its rights regarding borders control while its authority does not amount to “effective control”. 
A negative position has also been expressed by the Israeli Supreme Court643 which concluded that, 
since the territory is no longer occupied, Israel’s obligations as party to the conflict are limited to not preventing 
humanitarian minimum supplies essential for the civilian population, but it is no longer bound as an occupying 
power by the obligation to provide welfare to the latter.   
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Notwithstanding the fact that it remains difficult to determine the precise structure of 
government on the territory of the Gaza Strip, it is reasonable to argue that relevant powers are still 
exercisable by Israel on the Strip; they concern primarily the control and supply of both water and 
electricity, almost totally dependent by Israeli infrastructures;644 they are also manifested in its 
capacity to take control over the Strip any time, as emerged in relation to recent military operations 
in the context of a not consolidated governmental apparatus. Although ‘actual control’ may be 
lacking, such circumstances lead one to posit that either before or during recent hostilities, Israel has 
exercised activities steadily likely to affect on the situation of people living therein and on their enjoyment of basic 
rights. Regardless, the aforementioned withdrawal has not been as comprehensive as it should have 
been in order to terminate Israel’s position and ensuing obligations as occupying power. 
Indeed, a positive view has been generally taken within the international community. 645 
According to a recurring argument, since the 2005 disengagement Israel has no longer directly 
occupied Gaza, but it continues to have IHL duties as occupying power due to its complete control 
of the land crossings into and out of Gaza as well as the air spaces and costal access.646 This is 
equivalent to de facto control, which is constitutive for an occupation under Article 42 HRs. 
Nonetheless, in the context of the present chapter, it is worth also considering that the imposition of 
a blockade has been critically seen to have “profoundly affected the life and well-being of every single person in 
Gaza”, such that “regardless of the international status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory with respect of the use 
of force, the obligations of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as those of international human rights and 
international criminal law, are fully applicable”.647 
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withdrawal could not deprive the population of the benefit of the law of occupation”.  
645  See, e.g., Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 25 September 2009, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/12/48, para. 276; Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Committee on Gaza: No Safe Place, presented to the League of 
Arab States 30 April 2009, at 16 (“Gaza remains occupied territory and that Israel is obliged to comply with the Fourth Geneva 
Convention in its actions in Gaza”). On the Spanish Court exploring issues of alleged Israeli war crimes under the principle 
of universal jurisdiction and holding that Gaza constitutes occupied territory, see S. Weill, “The Targeted Killing of 
Salah Shehadeh: From Gaza to Madrid”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2009, p. 631. 
646 E.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/13/53/Rev.1, 7 June 2010, para. 4, n. 5. 
647 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, UN Doc. 





A relevant issue considered in this latter regard is the illegality of the naval blockade in itself, to the 
extent that its effect alongside the closure policy is deemed disproportionate under international 
humanitarian law and/or in the persistence of unlawful methods of warfare. The aforementioned 
Turkel, Turkish and Palmer Reports looked at Israel’s compliance with the principle of 
proportionality and the claims concerning its implementation of such methods. Highlighting that 
“considerable” damage are not the same as “excessive” damage, Israel’s compliance with 
proportionality was argued for in view of its mitigation of the unintended suffering of the Gazan 
civilian population by monitoring and adjusting its policy concerning goods allowed through the 
crossings, subject to the review of the Israeli judicial system.648 On the contrary, emphasising that 
the naval blockade has worsened an existing severe humanitarian crisis, its disproportionate impact 
has been contended; then its maintenance alongside the closure policy has been deemed to amount 
to collective punishment of the Gazan population.649 Conversely, a difficulty in assessing the specific 
impact of such a blockade in isolation from the closure policy was affirmed in the Palmer Report, 
stressing inter alia the low amount of supplies entering the Gaza Strip by sea, prior the blockade. 
Accordingly, the consequences of the blockade - either alone or in combination with the restrictions 
relating to the border crossings - in the overall humanitarian situation were deemed “slight” and 
unrealistically disproportionate.650 Despite the inability to determine that “the combined effects of the 
naval blockade and the crossings policy” rendered the former disproportionate, however the Palmer 
Report made the political consideration that Israel’s procedures which applied to land access to 
Gaza was “unsustainable” and required change. 
 
For the purposes of the present research, the issue of the blockade as examined by the Fact-
Finding Mission on the Gaza conflict is also meaningful, as specific attention seems to derive from 
the implementation of its mandate. Two main aspects of its analysis are relevant. 
1. It was highlighted that, besides controlling the airspace, borders and coastline, following the 
application of the disengagement plan, “Israel continued to control Gaza’s telecommunications, water, 
                                                
648 Turkel Report, pp. 90, 98-99, 100-102. 
649 Turkish Report, op. cit., pp. 70-71, 78-81. As referred also in this report, the blockade combined with the closure 
policy was deemed to constitute collective punishment as prohibited under Article 33 GCIV by the UN Human Rights 
Council’s report on the Flotilla incident (see UN Doc. A/HRC/15/21, 27 September 2010, p. 14), by the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (see “Easing the Blockade: Assessing the Humanitarian Impact on the 
Population of the Gaza Strip”, March 2011, p. 22), and by the ICRC (see ICRC, Gaza closure: not another year!, 
Geneva/Jerusalem 14 June 2010). 
650 Palmer Report, op. cit., p. 43-44, para. 78 (“Smuggling weapons by sea is one thing; delivering bulky food and other goods to supply 
a population of approximately 1.5 million people is another. Such facts militate against a finding that the naval blockade itself has a 
significant humanitarian impact.”). In considering the blockade as divisible from the closure policy, the Commission found 





electricity and sewage networks, as well as the population registry, and the flow of people and goods into and out of the 
territory while the inhabitants of Gaza continued to rely on the Israeli currency”.651 Accordingly, the “blockade” 
was referred to as the process of economic and political isolation, starting from Hamas’ electoral 
success in February 2006 alongside some donor countries’ withholding of financial support for the 
Strip and other actions endorsing the blockade explicitly or implicitly. Related measures comprise 
restrictions of importable goods, “the closure of border crossings for people, goods and services”. Attention was 
also paid to the economy as strongly influenced by the reduction of Palestinians’ fishing zone as well 
as the creation of a “buffer zone” along the frontier between Israel and Gaza and the resulting 
decrease of land accessible for industrial or agrarian activities. The damaging dimensions of the 
blockade led the Mission to hold that “Israel continues to be duty-bound under the Fourth Geneva Convention 
and to the full extent of the means available to it to ensure the supply of foodstuff, medical and hospital items and others 
to meet the humanitarian needs of the population of the Gaza Strip without qualification”.652  
2. A second aspect was addressed in relation to civilian immunity during the conduct of 
hostilities. The report criticised that the implementation of restrictive measures as part of the 
blockade, aside from creating an emergency situation, have “weakened the capacities of the health, 
water and other public sectors in Gaza” to react to a deteriorating situation created by the military 
operations.653 The impact on the local economy has further decreased the coping capacities and 
resilience of the local population, so worsening the consequences of the conflict on living standards.  
In relation to this second dimension of effects, the Mission’s approach to examine the 
“cumulative impact” of military operations plus blockade on the enjoyment of human rights by the 
population654 offers a chance to discuss the extent to which different branches of international law have been 
used and interpreted to deal with the complexities and anomalies of such context. Particularly, the report specified 
how at the beginning of such campaign the economy, family livelihoods and employment 
opportunities had already been affected. On the one hand, it emphasised how the restrictions on the 
exports from and imports to the Strip (via the airspace and naval blockade as well as the border 
crossings) have severely impacted the availability and accessibility of services and goods 
                                                
651 See “Disengagement Plan - General Outline” and “Overall concept of the Disengagement Plan”, 15 April 2004. 
652 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter V, paras. 311-326. Referring to the aforementioned case HCJ 9132/07, Al-
Bassiouni Ahmed et al. v. Prime Minister, as decided on 31 January 2008, the Mission deemed that the wide discretion 
retained by Israel about the timing and manner of delivering the minimum levels of supplies of electricity and fuel (as set 
by the Supreme Court) was exercised “capriciously and arbitrarily” by Israel (para. 326). This observation evokes a precise 
aspect addressed in the official commentary of Article 70(1) API: in dealing with the limitations of this clause, the 
commentary interprets it by precluding a refusal to make an agreement on relief actions for arbitrary or capricious 
reasons. 
653 For instance, this impact was examined in the Report of the High-Level Fact-Finding Mission to Beit Hanoun established under 
Human Rights Council resolution S-3/1, A/HRC/9/26, paras. 55 ff.  





indispensible to fully enjoy various social, economic and civil rights by children, women and men 
living therein.655 On the other hand, the report emphasised how the pre-existing precarious 
situation regarding access to essential goods in combination with the effects of the four-week 
military operation have led to further restrictions on access to basic items and destruction of 
facilities, land and infrastructures vital for enjoying fundamental rights, so increasing food 
insecurity, poverty and unemployment. Critically, the “beleaguered” health sector was seen under 
additional strain by the military campaign.656 In the words of the Fact-Finding Mission, the 
blockade (in connection with the hostilities) produced “a situation in which most people are destitute”. The 
overall situation was described as “a crisis of human dignity”.657 As significantly stated by Justice Barak, 
“a military commander’s obligation does not end with avoiding harm to the lives ad the dignity of the local residents, ‘a 
negative obligation’, but his obligation is also ‘positive’ - he must protect the lives and dignity of the of the residents, 
within the constraining of the time and space …”.658 
 
Remarkably, the entire legal analysis laid down in this regard dealt with the protection of 
specific economic and social rights of civilians living on the territory. In addition to referring to 
relevant IHL obligations as contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I and 
relevant customary international law, 659  the Mission focused specifically on human rights 
obligations as “applicable to Israel with respect to its actions in the Gaza Strip since they apply also in situation of 
armed conflict”.660 
In particular, access to shelter, food and clothing were addressed as human rights enshrined in 
Article 11 ICESCR, in addition to the right to education and the right to the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health as enshrined in Article 12. A reference to the CESCR’s 
                                                
655 In particular, “insufficient supply of fuel for electricity generation has had a negative impact on industrial activity, on the operation of 
hospitals, on water supply to households and on sewage treatment. In addition, import restrictions and the ban on all exports from Gaza have 
affected the industrial sector and agricultural production. Unemployment levels and the percentage of the population living in poverty were 
rising”. 
656 For instance, a source of great concern was “the long-term health impact of patients’ early discharges during the hostilities as well 
as of weapons containing substances such as tungsten and white phosphorous”; also the risk of suffering permanent disabilities 
regarded a huge number of persons; then, an increase of mental health problems was reported, including psychosomatic 
disorders, widespread “state of alienation in the population” and “numbness as a result of severe loss”, underling that these 
conditions were likely to intensify violence and extremism.  
657 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, para. 1215.  
658 This is reported in the report A/HRC/12/48, indicating the case HCJ 764/04. 
659 In particular, Article 23 GCIV and Article 70 API. On relevant provisions concerning the occupant’s obligations, 
reference was made to Article 50 GCIV (duty to facilitate the working of institutions dedicated the education and care 
of children), 55 GCIV (duty to guarantee medical and food supplies to the civilian population), Article 56 (duty to 
guarantee and preserve medical services and hospital establishments), Article 59 GCIV (duty to adopt relief schemes if 
the occupied territory is not well supplied) and Article 60 GCIV (duty to keep on fulfulling obligations even if third 
parties offer relief supplies). 





activity was made in view of its clarification on the content of those rights and corresponding State 
duties. Further, the CRC was considered for the child’s “right to life, survival and development” 
which is set out in Article 6, the child’s right to be protected from “all forms of mental or physical 
violence” set out in Article 19, the child’s right to the highest standard of health contained in Article 
24, the child’s right to an adequate standard of living in Article 27 and the child’s right to education 
in Articles 28 and 29. Furthermore, the CEDAW was taken into account so as to add specificity and 
scope to the obligations concerning women.  
The explicit reference to the concept of progressive realisation in the ICESCR was also 
articulated, stressing the potential achievement over time of the rights concerned as well as States 
parties’ duty “to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal”. Some 
emphasis was put on retrogressive measures as permitted only under stringent conditions;661 some 
strategies and objectives before and during the military operations were criticised.662 In doing so, a 
view was expressed whereby “the closure of, or the restrictions imposed on, border crossings by Israel in the 
immediate period before the military operations subjected the local population to extreme hardship and deprivations that 
are inconsistent with their protected status”. Specifically, “the restrictions on the entry of foodstuffs, medical supplies, 
agricultural and industrial materials, including industrial fuel, together with the restrictions on the use of land near the 
border and on fishing in the sea have resulted in widespread poverty, intensified dependence on food and other 
assistance, increased unemployment and economic paralysis”. The related conclusion emphasised Israel’s 
violation of its obligations as an occupying power under the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Notably, as regards the government’s argument that the policy of closure was a form of sanction, 
they were deemed “blanket sanctions” forbidden under international law, relying on the view 
addressed by the CESCR that  “[…] whatever the circumstances, such sanctions should always take full account 
of the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [and] […] it is essential to 
distinguish between the basic objective of applying political and economic pressure upon the governing elite of the country 
to persuade them to conform to international law, and the collateral infliction of suffering upon the most vulnerable 
groups within the targeted country”.663 
                                                
661 See ICESCR, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States Parties’ obligations, 14 December 1990, para 9. 
662 See UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVI. Some official statements made by Deputy Prime Minister Eli Yishai on 
6 January 2009 were evoked and reported: “It [should be] possible to destroy Gaza, so they will understand not to mess with us”, 
adding that “it is a great opportunity to demolish thousands of houses of all the terrorists, so they will think twice before they launch rockets”, 
see UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, para. 1300. Further, the so-called ‘Dahiya doctrine’ was identified as a 
tactics involving disproportionate use of force, requiring “widespread destruction as a means of deterrence”, causing great 
damage to civilian property and suffering to civilians; it has been considered consistent with previous Israeli practice, 
such as during the Second Lebanon War against in July 2006. 
663 UN doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, paras. 1299-1302, and para. 1306. See also ICESCR, General Comment No. 





Focusing on the blockade, the duties “to respect, protect, facilitate or provide - to the extent possible - for the 
enjoyment of the whole range of economic, social and cultural rights in the Gaza Strip” were expressively referred 
to in view of the ICJ’s statement concerning Israel’s obligation “not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of 
such rights in those fields where competence has been transferred to Palestinian authorities”.664 In particular, it was 
noted that its conduct led to a regression and deterioration in the realisation of those rights, so 
finding a failure to comply with those obligations.665  
Specific considerations were addressed for the right to water, recalling the CESCR’s position that 
“States parties should refrain at all times from imposing embargoes or similar measures that prevent the supply of 
water, as well as goods and services essential for securing the right to water”; this was deemed to be applicable 
to food and health services or goods.666 As anticipated, in looking at the type and extent of military 
operations conducted in Gaza, the right to water was further articulated in light of the CESCR’s 
observation whereby “the obligation to respect [the right to water] requires that States parties refrain from […] 
limiting access to, or destroying, water services and infrastructure as a punitive measure, for example, during armed 
conflicts in violation of international humanitarian law”.667 Similarly, ICRC Resolution II of 1996 calls 
upon belligerent parties to “take all feasible measures to avoid in their military operations, all acts liable to 
destroy or damage water sources”.668   
In investigating these operations, analogous considerations were applied to the right to adequate 
housing. The destruction of tanks or water wells, residential housing and pipe networks was not 
deemed “an inevitable or necessary incidence of military hostilities”, in view of the basic obligations to 
distinguish between military and civilian objects and not to aim attacks at civilian persons and 
objects.669 In other cases private houses were allegedly demolished during the last days when the 
army fully controlled the areas concerned. Military necessity and the prevention of rockets fire were 
not deemed “plausible reasons for the widespread destruction”. Similar reflections were made for the 
damage of agricultural land and greenhouses in light of their importance for local food security. The 
                                                                                                                                                            
16. See also ICRC, “Gaza closure: not another year!”, June 2010.  
664 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ 
Reports 2004, para. 112. 
665 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, para. 1308. 
666 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, para. 1303. See ICESCR, General Comments No. 12: The right to food, 12 May 
1999, para. 8. 
667 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, para. 1317. See ICESCR, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, 20 
January 2003, para. 21. 
668 ICRC Resolution II of 29 February 1996 (adopted by consensus, 26th international conference of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent). See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 150. 
669 The Mission did not received information suggesting that all the houses in question were “booby-trapped” or served as 
“hideouts” for Hamas’ fighters, and it did not assumed that this was the case. According to the described patterns of 
destruction, the demolition or firing occurred after the orders to leave the houses was given, without clear necessity to 
occupy such properties or to destroy them, as the military forces effectively controlled the area. See UN Doc. 





overall destruction was found to be in breach of “the duties to respect the right of the people in the Gaza Strip 
to an adequate standard of living”, including access to water, food and housing.  
Focusing on several fundamental rights of the child, other alleged violations concerned State 
obligations under the CRC during the military operations in the Strip.670 Attention was paid to 
Article 24(1) under which “States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to 
ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health-care services”.  Alleged violations related 
to Article 38(1) (“States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law 
applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child”) as well as Article 38(4) (“States Parties shall 
take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an armed conflict”). In 
addition, a violation of Article 39 was identified in the active prevention of reconstruction efforts, as 
it does not honour the obligations to “take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological 
recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: […] armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take 
place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child”. Remarkably, children’s 
psychological learning difficulties were deemed amplified by the impact of the blockade alongside 
the damage on education infrastructures due to the conduct of hostilities.671 
Focusing on the CEDAW, the Fact-Finding Mission concurred with the relevant Committee’s 
statement that “the human rights of women and children in Gaza, in particular to peace and security, free 
movement, livelihood and health, have been seriously violated during this military engagement”.672 In addition, 
noting that Israel has signed, but not yet ratified, the CRPD (Article 11 of which requires States 
parties to take “all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of 
risk, including situations of armed conflict”) its obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of this 
Convention was underlined.673  
 
Two questions explicitly articulated in the examination of the combined impact of military 
operations plus blockade on the Gaza population and its enjoyment of human rights deserve further 
attention, since they refer to aspects discussed throughout the present research.  
                                                
670 See also Statement by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, “Effects of the Gaza conflict on children 
‘devastating’”, 12 January 2009. See also UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, paras. 1321-1322. 
671 Some 280 schools and kindergartens were reportedly destroyed in a context of restrictions on the implementation of 
construction materials and many educational buildings already in serious need of reparation, see UN Doc. 
A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, para. 1267. 
672 UN Press release, “UN Committee says women’s rights were seriously violated during Gaza conflict”, 6 February 
2009. See also A/HRC/12/48, paras. 1271-1278, 1323. 





(1) Firstly there is the issue on whether the population of Gaza was subject to collective punishment or penalty. 
The relevant prohibitions established under the law of armed conflict are part of customary 
international law.674 In particular, collective penalties and other similar measures of intimidation or 
terrorism are forbidden under Article 50 HRs and Article 33 GCIV which also proscribes reprisals 
against protected persons. In addition, Article 75(2)(d) API prohibits the act of collective punishment 
“at any time and in any place whatsoever”. Notably, the scope of collective penalties includes “sanctions and 
harassment of any sort, administrative, by police action or otherwise” and so exceeds physical or criminal 
sanctions.675 In emphasising this observation, it was suggested that “there was an intent to subject the 
Gaza population to conditions such that they would be induced into withdrawing their support from Hamas” in light 
of the cumulative effect of blockade policies and military operations, in addition to statements 
regarding the whole Strip as “hostile territory”.676  According to the Mission, the Palestinian armed 
groups operating in Gaza were not fought in a target way, while military, political and economic 
sanctions were taken against the local population.677 In particular, “the intention to inflict collective 
punishment” was deemed to be cumulatively indicated by the examined facts, the conditions resulting 
from the armed forces’ deliberate actions, and the governmental policies on Gaza as declared by its 
representatives before, during and after the military operation. 
 
(2) Secondly, there is the issue of “whether the crime of persecution as a form of crime against humanity had been 
committed against the civilian population of the Strip”. In referring explicitly to the ICTY Trial Chamber,678 
it was noted that the commission of a crime against humanity depends on whether it is determined 
that “there was a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population that blatantly discriminated and infringed a 
fundamental right recognised under international customary law or treaty, and was carried out deliberately with the 
                                                
674 See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 374, Rule 103. 
675 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmerman (eds.), op. cit., at 3055. 
676 To the Mission, a confirmation apparently came from the comments by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 
aforementioned decision by the Supreme Court to uphold the fuel cuts, also in connection to the cited strategies before 
and during the military operations. The reported statement reads: “The Palestinians need to understand that business is not 
usual, I mean there is no equation in which Israeli children will be under attacks by Kassam rockets on a daily basis and life in the Gaza Strip 
can be as usual”, citing Global Security, “Israel’s Supreme Court upholds fuel cuts to Gaza”, 30 November 2007. 
677 In this sense, “this has been seen and felt by many people with whom the Mission spoke as a form of collective punishment inflicted on 
the Palestinian because of their political choices”, see UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, para. 1325. 
678 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Trial Chamber (IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T), Judgment of 22 February 2001, 
para. 431, reading: “Only the attack, not the individual acts of the accused, must be “widespread or systematic”.  A single act could 
therefore be regarded as a crime against humanity if it takes place in the relevant context: For example, the act of denouncing a Jewish 
neighbour to the Nazi authorities – if committed against a background of widespread persecution – has been regarded as amounting to a crime 
against humanity.  An isolated act, however, - i.e. an atrocity which did not occur within such a context - cannot”. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Kupreškic and Others (IT-95-16-T), Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 550. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1-T), 





intention so to discriminate”.679  
Additionally, a reference to the Tadić case was made, recalling the ICTY Trial Chamber’s 
finding that “the crime of persecution encompasses a variety of acts, including, inter alia, those of a physical, 
economic or judicial nature, that violate an individual’s right to the equal enjoyment of his basic rights”.680 Notably, 
the Trial Chamber considered that the variety of acts constituting persecution had been discussed in 
the Eichmann case, underling a precise statement laid down by the Jerusalem District Court in its 
noting that paragraph 4 of the Programme of the National Socialist Party declared that Jews could 
not be citizens of the German State, since they did not belong to the German people, and that 
paragraph 8 demanded that all non-Germans, who had immigrated to Germany after 2 August 
1914, leave the Reich territory immediately.681 
A further reference to the ICTY jurisprudence concerned the Kupreskic case, in which the Trial 
Chamber described the acts that would constitute the crime of persecution, particularly by focusing 
on the following relevant terms: “[…] (c) Persecution can also involve a variety of other discriminatory acts, 
involving attacks on political, social, and economic rights. […] (d) Persecution is commonly used to describe a series of 
acts rather than a single act. Acts of persecution will usually form part of a policy or at least of a patterned practice, 
and must be regarded in their context. […] (e) […] discriminatory acts charged as persecution must not be considered 
in isolation. Some of the acts mentioned above may not, in and of themselves, be so serious as to constitute a crime 
against humanity. For example, restrictions placed on a particular group to curtail their rights to participate in 
particular aspects of social life (such as visits to public parks, theatres or libraries) constitute discrimination, which is 
in itself a reprehensible act; however, they may not in and of themselves amount to persecution. These acts must not be 
considered in isolation but examined in their context and weighed for their cumulative effect”.682 
In view of these references, the Fact-finding Mission’s position was that “some of the actions of the 
Government of Israel might justify a competent court finding that crimes against humanity have been committed”. This 
was articulated in light of several issues: the actions denying Palestinians “from their means of subsistence, 
employment, housing and water”; the denial of Palestinians’ freedom of movement and of the right to 
                                                
679 A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, para. 1326.  
680 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Chamber (IT-94- 1-T), Judgment of 7 May 1997, para. 710. 
681 In particular, the Jerusalem District Court stated that: “[w]ith the rise of Hitler to power, the persecution of Jews became official 
policy and assumed the quasi-legal form of laws and regulations published by the Government of the Reich in accordance with legislative 
powers delegated to it by the Reichstag on March 24, 1933 (Session 14, at 71) and of direct acts of violence organised by the regime against 
the persons and property of Jews … The purpose of these acts carried out in the first stage was to deprive the Jews of citizen rights, to degrade 
them and strike fear into their hearts, to separate them from the rest of the inhabitants, to oust them from the economic and cultural life of the 
State and to close to them the sources of livelihood.  These trends became sharper as the years went by, until the outbreak of the war.  Even 
before German Jewry suffered its first general shock on April 1, 1933, when Jewish businesses were boycotted, the arrest of Jews and their 
dispatch to concentration camps had begun … On November 7, 1938, Hirsch Grynschpan shot the Counsellor of the German Embassy in 
Paris, vom Rath.  After this act, the wave of persecution swelled up against the Jews in Germany”, see Notes on Judgments, paras. 56-
57, referencing T/1403. 





leave and enter their own country; and the limitation or denial of Palestinians’ rights to access a 
court of law and an effective remedy by Israeli laws.683 
 
All the previous considerations arise another relevant issue in the context of the present study, 
namely whether the lack of adequate basic supplies for civilians, especially when aggravated by a 
blockade, gives rise to an unquestionable entitlement to gain relief action from the outside and what 
is provided under the existing normative framework regulating humanitarian assistance and access 
in situations of armed conflict as well as within an occupied territory.684 This will be addressed in 
the next chapter. 
                                                
683 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, Chapter XVII, Chapter XXVII. 
684 See H. Spieker, “The right to give and receive humanitarian assistance”, in H.J. Heintze and A. Zwitter (ed.), 
International Law and Humanitarian Assistance: A Crosscut Through Legal Issues Pertaining to Humanitarianism, Berlin/Heildelberg, 





CHAPTER II: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO CIVILIANS 
1. Some remarks on relief assistance and access to civilians 
The issue of ensuring indispensable needs of civilians in contexts of humanitarian emergencies as 
induced by armed conflicts may be taken into account as part of the comprehensive question 
concerning States’ primary responsibility to meet the basic needs of affected civilian populations 
under their control along with the role of humanitarian assistance and access to be provided in line 
with humanitarian principles. This broader issue may be framed under different legal perspectives. 
Embracing a human rights approach, such a primary responsibility of the State can be derived 
not only from its commitments as member of the United Nations685 but also from its obligations as 
party to human rights treaties; pertinent rights relate, inter alia, to health care, shelter, clothing, food 
and water, livelihood, and the principle of non-discrimination. 686  The major human rights 
instruments do not deal with humanitarian assistance and related access, but some references are 
contained in Article 22(1) CRC, in Article 23(1) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child, the Article 5(6)(7) and Article 7(5b)(5g) of the African Union for the Protection and 
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.  
Embracing an international humanitarian law perspective, the normative framework varies 
depending on the character of the conflict (international or internal) as well as the relationship 
between the belligerents and the civilians subject to their authority and control. Explicit provisions 
regulate the rapid and unimpeded consignments of relief supplies to civilians under the control to 
                                                
685 The respect for human dignity is among the cornerstones of the Charter. As noticed by the Institut de Droit 
International, human rights are “a direct expression of the dignity of the human person. The obligation of States to ensure their observance 
derives from the recognition of this dignity as proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Declaration of Human Rights”, see 
The protection of human rights and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of states, 1989, Article 1(1). 
686 As discussed in other sections of the present study, States parties have an obligation to ensure essential levels of ESC 
rights and to take the necessary action in times of public emergency even if induced by conflict-torn contexts. Although 
the General Assembly’s resolutions do not explicitly connect the primary responsibility of the State to provide 
humanitarian exigencies to its own population with the respect of human rights, a link in this regard appears to emerge 





the party of a conflict (other than occupied territories) but subject them to the consent of the 
affected State.687 
Indeed, humanitarian assistance and access play a role only when the concerned State is unable 
or unwilling to adequately assist688 civilians adversely affected by warfare and being in the territory 
subject to its jurisdiction or under its effective control. Such a subsidiary role has been implicitly or 
explicitly affirmed through the constant reference to the primary role of the State in providing 
assistance in contexts of natural disasters689 and similar emergencies situations occurring in its 
territory. The existence of a primary responsibility of the State was clearly re-affirmed in the three 
resolutions of the General Assembly, whose historical importance is due for having framed the legal 
regime of humanitarian assistance and for having explicitly recognised that “it is up to each State first 
and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations occurring in its 
territory”.690 Since then, both the Security Council and the General Assembly have constantly 
affirmed such a principle, even though the common language used by UN organs in resolutions 
concerning humanitarian assistance has tended to recognise the “primary responsibility” (rôle primaire in 
the French version) of the State, without making explicit references to the international norm 
containing the corresponding obligation. 691  This reflects a sort of compromise to reconcile 
humanitarian exigencies and the prerogatives of the State.692 Interestingly, as for the formation of a 
                                                
687 See Arts. 23, 30, 55, 59(1), 142 GCIV; Arts. 68, 69, 70(1)-(5) API; Arts. 14(1)(2) API II. 
688 The reasons may vary: the case of a State that is unable to face an humanitarian emergencies because it does not 
have the necessary means and resources; conversely, the case of State’s authority lacking effective control on its territory, 
or the case of a so called “destructured” State where there is a situation of complete anarchy; nevertheless, the case of a 
State that wilfully do not provide humanitarian assistance. 
689 After being acknowledged in the Secretary General’s first report on assistance in cases of natural disaster, the primary 
role of the State has been highlighted in subsequent resolutions by the General Assembly, which has also appreciated 
efforts made to alleviate the consequences of natural disasters on its territory. See Secretary General Comprehensive Report on 
Assistance in Cases of Natural Disaster, E/4994 (1971), at 61. See GA Res. 36/225 (XXXVI) of 17 December 1981, 
Preamble and para. 2; see GA Res. 48/188, International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, 21 December 1993, 
Preamble, where the GA expressed the conviction that “each country bears the primary responsibility for protecting its people, 
infrastructure and other national assets from the impact of natural disasters”. As for the earthquake in Iran, see GA Res. 2378 
(XXIII) of 23 October 1968, Preamble. As for the earthquake and cyclone in Yemen, see GA Res. 46/179 of 19 
December 1991, Preamble. As for Pakistan, Gibuti affected by floods, see GA Res. 47/2 of 7 October 1992, Preamble 
and Art. 2, and GA Res. 49/21 of 20 December 1994, Preamble.  
690 See the two Resolutions on Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters and Similar Emergency 
Situations, GA Res. 43/131 of 8 December 1988, Preamble, and GA Res. 45/100 of 14 December 1990, Preamble; the 
third resolution on Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nation, 
GA Res. 46/182 of 19 December 1991, para. 4. 
691 For specific reference of humanitarian assistance, see, e.g., GA Res. 56/103 on International Cooperation on 
Humanitarian Assistance in the Field of Natural Disasters, from Relief to Development, 5 February 2002, Preamble. 
On the humanitarian emergency in Darfur, see SC Res. 1556 (2004), 30 July 2004, Preamble; interestingly, when this 
resolution was adopted, some delegates of States members of the Security Council affirmed the existence of a State’s 
obligation to assist and protect its own population, see some statements by Germany and United Kingdom on the “sacred 
obligation to protect is citizens” and “that most basic of obligations, the duty to protect (its) citizens”. 
692 The debates preceding the adoption of GA Res. 43/131 of 1988 are emblematic: victims’ needs were in tension with 





customary norm recognising the existence of a primary obligation of the State, almost all the 
members of the XVI Commission of the Institut de Droit International who drafted the resolution on 
Humanitarian Assistance693 expressed their positive acknowledgement in this regard, while those 
expressing a contrary position admitted that the corresponding norm imposing such a duty can be 
considered as being in statu nascendi. 694  However, two remarkable aspects of that major 
acknowledgement concern the content and the addressees of the norm. The State or territorial 
authority is required to use all available resources to protect basic humanitarian exigencies, rather 
than an absolute protection. Then, the recognition of a duty to provide the necessary humanitarian 
assistance is extended upon “any other authority exercising jurisdiction or de facto control over the victims of a 
disaster”.695 
 
Relief action in favour of the civilian population of the belligerent State has been firstly 
regulated in Article 23 GCIV, as already noted in the previous chapter. The enemy as well as a 
third country are equally obliged to allow such relief action, even in favour of the population of the 
adverse party. The party concerned is nonetheless entitled to check the real essentiality (for the 
population’s survival) of the items to be consigned, besides ensuring that their destination is not 
going to accrue the military strength or the economy of the belligerent.696 
Making a step forward, Protocol I contains further rules relating to relief action in favour of the 
civilian population of the belligerent States. As a corollary to the prohibition of starvation contained 
in Article 54, additional protection is provided to the objects used for humanitarian relief 
operations, as their security and safety constitute basic conditions for such a delivery. In enlarging 
the obligation stemming from Article 23 GCIV, Article 70(1) API entitles the whole population to 
relief (and not only particularly vulnerable groups).697 The modalities for safe passage of supplies are 
detailed and require not to consider the offer of relief as “interference in the armed conflict” or “an 
unfriendly act”. In particular, when the civilian population of any territory under belligerents’ control 
(other than occupied territory) is not appropriately provided with rudimentary supplies, 
                                                                                                                                                            
within of voluntary accepted juridical limitations, see Résolution su la reconnaissancedu droit d’assistance humanitaire et du droit à 
dette assistance, in M. Bettati, B. Kouchner (eds.), Le devoir d’ingérence. Peut-on les laisser mourir?, Paris: Denoel, 1987, pp. 291-
292. 
693 Institut de Droit International, Sixteenth Commission, Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance, Bruges, Session 
2003; see statements by J.A. Carrillo Salcedo, H.G. Schermers, F.H. Paolillo, B. Vukas, B. Jakovljevic, AIDI, p. 399 ff. 
694 Particularly, according to A. Cassese “State practice has not yet evinced the birth of such a duty”, AIDI, p. 533 
695 Institut de Droit International, Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance, ibid., Art. III, paras. 1 and 2.  
696 See N. Ronzitti, “Civilian Population in Armed Conflict”, MPEPIL, 2010. 
697 See R. Provost, “Starvation as a Weapon: Legal Implications of the United Nations Food Blockade against Iraq and 





humanitarian and impartial relief actions from the outside “shall be undertaken”, so implying a duty to 
accept relief offers in line with this clause.698 In this context, targeting humanitarian relief objects as 
well as destroying, misappropriating and looting them is prohibited. Indeed, the obligation to allow 
humanitarian assistance entails a certain passive behaviour by belligerents as well as certain actions 
to “protect relief consignments and facilitate their transit and rapid distribution” (Article 70(4) API).699 Of note, 
an intentional attack against relief personnel as well as the wilful impediment of relief supply as 
stipulated in the Geneva Conventions constitute war crimes.700 
However, Article 70(1) explicitly subjects the implementation of the obligation to allow relief 
actions to an agreement between the parties concerned. As a result, they are conditioned to the 
acceptance by belligerents, which can also decide on the modalities for their consignment and 
inspect the convoys or vessels concerned.701 As mentioned at the end of previous chapter, a relevant 
question concerns whether scarcity of supplies to civilians, when aggravated by the imposition of a 
blockade used as a method of warfare, gives rise to an unquestionable entitlement to gain relief action from the 
outside. Article 70 API leads to an unsatisfying outcome, since relief efforts for civilians exposed to a 
blockade are still “subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned”. Nonetheless, in the official comment to 
Article 54 API, the obligation to ensure humanitarian relief is admitted when blockade is used as a 
method of warfare, noting that: “(i)t should be emphasised that the object of a blockade is to deprive the 
adversary of supplies needed to conduct hostilities, and not to starve civilians”. Insofar as a blockade leads to 
such a severe effect, Article 70 is understood to require relief actions when the provision of medical 
and food supplies, means of shelter, clothing and other goods indispensable to the population’s 
survival is not adequate.702 
The sovereignty dimension emerging from Article 70(1) has been deemed to amount to a “severe 
limitation” on the affected populations’ right to receive relief.703 Conversely, the contingency of relief 
actions on an agreement by all the parties concerned has led some scholars to argue that a “genuine” 
obligation to permit (or right to attain) free passage of humanitarian assistance to civilians does not 
                                                
698 See M. Bothe, “Relief Actions”, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Rudolf Bernhardt, 1982, p. 176.  
699 In the same vein, all States are required to protect relief supplies intended for an occupied territory (Art. 59 GCIV); 
see Art. 8(2)(b)(iii) Rome Statute. See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., p. 109, Rule 32. 
700 See respectively Article 8 (2)(b)(iii) and Article 8 (2)(b)(xxv) Rome Statute. 
701 See Arts. 64 and 70(3) AP I. See Arts. 59-63, 108-109 GC IV. See also Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian 
Assistance, adopted by the Council of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (San Remo) in April 1993, 
Principle 12, in which it is recognised that the control of the territorial States must not “unduly delay the providing of 
humanitarian assistance”, IRRC, 1993, at 554. 
702 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., at 654, para. 2095. 





exist,704 noting however that Article 70(1) is officially interpreted to preclude a refusal to an 
agreement on relief actions for “arbitrary or capricious” reasons.705 From this line of reasoning, a 
belligerent willing to refuse consent to such a delivery could invoke other practical reasons. As 
underlined by a commentator, the drafters of Article 70(1) apparently made “the impression of an 
ironclad obligation, and at the same time took the bite out of that rule”.706  
Focusing on the limitations imposed upon the belligerent parties concerning potential refusal of relief 
offers from humanitarian organizations and the like, legitimate reasons may include cases in which 
the criteria of humanity, impartiality and neutrality are not met:707 undoubtedly belligerents must 
permit and facilitate the “rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief” when the latter is 
impartial, carried out without unfavourable differences, and subject to their control; they must also 
guarantee the freedom of movement of related authorised personnel. Conversely, although military 
necessity or security reasons have been deemed legitimate reasons to oppose a refusal to relief actions,708 
they are not mentioned in any of the relevant articles. 
 
As far as internal armed conflicts are concerned, besides Article 14 APII examined above, 
Article 18(2) APII requires non-discriminatory delivery of humanitarian assistance from the outside.  
In situations of blockade, the ICRC commentary admits that it may “remain legitimate” and 
suggests to refer to the rule dealing with relief actions.709 In this regard, the weak language of Article 
18 APII permits them as “subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned”.710 Thus, a dilemma 
may arise when the party concerned is intended to starve its own civilian population and so such 
consent is unlikely. Nonetheless, the decision is not left to the belligerents’ discretion; if an impartial 
                                                
704 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 2010. 
705 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., p. 819, para. 2805, noting that this article does not mean 
that the parties concerned have “an absolute and unlimited freedom to refuse their agreement to relief actions”; rather, “a party refusing 
its agreement must do so for valid reasons, not for arbitrary or capricious ones”. In the same vein, see Dinstein, The Conduct of 
Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2010, p. 227; C.A. Allen, “Civilian Starvation and Relief 
during Armed Conflict: The Modern Humanitarian Law”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1989, p. 72. 
706 E. Rauch, The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts and the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Repercussions on the Law of Naval Warfare, Duncker and Humblot, 1984, pp. 91-
2. 
707 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., paras. 2797-2804. 
708 In this vein, M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, A.W. Solf (eds.), op. cit., p. 436. According to M. Bothe, Relief Actions, Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law, at 95, when legitimate military considerations crash with humanitarian exigencies, the 
principle of proportionality might be useful to solve the conflict. However, military necessity issues cannot allow the 
territorial State to indefinitely block humanitarian operations, see ibid., pp. 93-94. 
709 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., at 1457-8, paras. 4796 and 4798. 
710 “Article 18 APII recites: “If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, 
such as food-stuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial 






and non-discriminatory humanitarian organization is able to remedy to the vulnerable population’s 
survival, then related relief actions are generally viewed as required. In this vein, the relevant rule is 
interpreted to preclude the competent authorities from refusing their consent “without good grounds”711 
and so implicitly breaching Article 14. Although plausible reasons for delaying or frustrating 
humanitarian assistance could be found, the military necessity of blockade must be measured in 
view of the prohibition on starving civilians. 
Of note, Article 38(1) GCIV confers upon the aliens present in the belligerents’ territory the 
right “to receive the individual or collective relief that may be sent to them”. The latter has been interpreted to 
comprise consignments such as medical supplies, food and clothing coming from the country of 
origin or any other country, and sent by governments, humanitarian organizations or private 
individuals. Further, the country of residence is required to permit the entrance into its territory of 
such consignments and their integral arrival to the recipient.712 
 
 A crucial issue of humanitarian assistance remains the unhampered access to civilians affected and in 
need.713 Often the denial of humanitarian access results from situations in which belligerents misuse 
their authority to supervise or channel humanitarian assistance within their respective territory 
under the veil of sovereignty, or they restrict the access to certain areas covered by the armed 
conflict for security concerns, or they refuse to grant the access by denying the humanitarian 
problem,714 the deliberate displacement or the starvation of the civilian population.715  
As already observed in relation to IHL rules on relief action, belligerent parties are obliged to 
“allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief” offered by humanitarian organizations, 
even if the latter favours the civilian population of the adversary. In this regard, the UN Security 
Council has supported a certain development of a subjective right to humanitarian access of humanitarian 
actors as part of the norm imposing such obligation. Indeed, the implementation of this norm may depend 
on the Security Council’s role in situations where the consent of the responsible authorities is 
lacking. Cases in which UN Member States and other relevant actors have been required to allow 
immediate and unimpeded humanitarian access (by a Security Council’s authorization of several measures 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) have been frequent in the practice. In such contexts, the 
                                                
711 See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., at 1479, para. 4885. 
712 O.M. Uhler and H. Coursier (eds.), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention, 1958, pp. 246-7. 
713 See Report of the Secretary General on Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance 
of the United Nations, A/45/587, 24 October 1990, at 7, para. 26. 
714 C. Phuong, International Protection for Internally Displaced Persons, 2004, p. 226. 






humanitarian situation itself or the “obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance”716 
have been declared to represent or contribute to a threat to international peace and security.717  
As commonly known, resolution 688 (1990) on Iraq set the precedent,718 and its subsequent 
decisions addressing difficult humanitarian emergencies have often included provisions to grant 
humanitarian access.719 It is worth noting that, in the situation of the early 1990s concerning the 
former Yugoslavia, the provision of humanitarian relief represented a key objective for deciding 
mandatory measures and a constant issue throughout the armed conflict.720 In resolution 752 (1992) 
the parties were called to guarantee the establishment of the conditions for “the effective and unhindered 
delivery of humanitarian assistance”.721 When it imposed mandatory sanctions against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia for failure to comply with its decisions, it aimed inter alia at overcoming the 
impasse for effective and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid to refugees and IDPs, including 
safe and secure access to airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina.722 As the ICTY Trial Chamber then 
recognised in the Kristic case, the blocking of aid convoys was part of the “creation of a humanitarian 
crisis”723 which, along with acts of spreading terror and forcible transfers, gave rise to individual 
                                                
716 E.g., on Sierra Leone see S/RES/1132 (8 October 1997), preamble; on Somalia see S/RES/794 (3 December 1992), 
preamble; S/RES/751 (14 April 1992), paras. 7, 12, 13, 14; S/RES/767 (24 July 1992), preamble. 8, 9; on Kosovo see 
RES/1199 (23 September 1998), para. 2; on Rwanda see S/RES/918 (17 May 1994), preamble. 
717 According to the Secretary General, “[h]umanitarian emergencies, by causing the mass exodus of people, may constitute threats to 
international peace and security”. Report of the Secretary General on The Work of the Organization, A/48/1, 10 September 
1993, para. 481. 
718 See S/RES/688 (5 April 1991), para. 3, in which it “[i]nsists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian 
organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq”. In previous paragraphs it “condemns the repression of the Iraqi 
civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdisk-populated areas […]” (para. 1) and “demands that Iraq … 
immediately end this repression […]” (para. 2). 
719 Among the initial decisions followed from the case of Iraq, for instance: on Somalia, see S/RES/794 (3 December 
1992), preamble and para. 3. On Rwanda, see S/RES/929 (22 June 1994), para. 3, referring to S/RES/925 (8 June 
1994), para. 4 (a) and (b). On Sierra Leone, see S/RES/1132 (7 October 1997), para. 2; S/PRST/1999/1 (7 January 
1999). On Kosovo, see RES/1199 (23 September 1998), paras. 2 and 4 (c). On the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), see S/RES/1234 (9 April 1999), para. 9; S/RES/1355 (15 June 2001), preamble and para. 19. On Sudan, 
Chad and the Central African Republic, see S/RES/1778 (25 Sept. 2007), para. 17. 
720 In the early stages of the conflict, two prior commitments have been identified as the drivers of the Security Council’s 
policy: the universal mandate of UNHCR and its protection regime and the mandate of the UN Protection Force in 
Croatia. This response combined economic and military sanctions on Belgrade with military protection for the delivery 
of relief to Bosnians, first of the airport and later of land convoys, see S.L. Woodward, “The Security Council and the 
Wars in the Former Yugoslavia”, in V. Lowe et al. (eds.) The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought 
and Practice since 1945, 2008, p. 425. 
721 See S/RES/752 (1992), para. 8. 
722 In Res. 757 (1992), acting under Chapter VII, it demanded the parties to “immediately create” the conditions for 
“effective and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance” (para. 17). In Res. 770 (1992), acting under Chapter VII, it called 
upon States “to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the 
United Nation the delivery … of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever in need in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina” (para. 2). 
In Res. 781 (1992) a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina was established, as this measure was 
deemed “an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance”; the ban was reaffirmed in SC Res. 786 
(1992). 
723 This crisis was the “prelude to the forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslim civilians”, see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić (IT-98-33), 





criminal responsibility for inhumane acts and persecution as crimes against humanity.724 
Of note, in consideration of the Security Council’s practice regarding access to humanitarian 
assistance, the Institut de Droit International has determined that it may undertake the required 
measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter “[i]f the refusal to accept a bona fide offer of humanitarian 
assistance or to allow access to the victims leads to a threat to international peace and security”.725 Then, a 
codification of such a practice has resulted in its resolutions on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict.726 For instance, in 2000 it called upon “all parties concerned, including neighbouring States, to 
cooperate fully with the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator and United Nations agencies in providing … 
access” of humanitarian personnel as well as confirming that the deliberate denial of humanitarian 
access is a violation of international law which may constitute a threat to international peace and 
security.727 Similarly, explicitly referring to the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions, in 
2006 it urged “all those concerned to allow full unimpeded access by humanitarian personnel to civilians in need of 
assistance in situations of armed conflict”, and in so doing it extended this obligation to non-State 
actors.728 Furthermore, extensive consideration of its comprehensive practice in this regard has been 
made in the ICRC study to investigate the customary character acquired by the obligation to grant humanitarian 
access in international and internal armed conflicts.729 
Relevant recent situations have concerned, inter alia, Libya, Mali e Syria.730 For instance, in 
                                                
724 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić (IT-98-33), Judgment of 2 August 2001, para. 653. 
725 Institut de Droit International, Sixteenth Commission, Humanitarian Assistance: Resolution, Bruges Session 2003, at 8, 
Section XIII, para. 3. See also the “Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance”, adopted by the 
Council of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (San Remo) in April 1993, principle 7: “The competent United 
Nations organs and regional organizations may undertake necessary measures, including coercion, in accordance with their respective mandates, 
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726 S/RES/1265 (17 September 1999); S/RES/1296 (19 April 2000); S/RES/1674 (28 April 2006). For the purpose of 
adopting its first resolution on the protection of civilians, the Council took into account the report to the Security 
Council by the Secretary General on The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (S/1999/957, 8 September 1999), 
but also his report on The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in 
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Security Council’s Report, “Cross-Cutting Report No. 2: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, October 2008. 
727 S/RES/1296 (19 April 2000), para. 8. 
728 S/RES/1674 (26 April 2006), para. 22. See also S/RES/1502 (23 August 2003), para. 4. 
729 See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, op. cit., at 194-195, Rule 55. An emblematic reference concerns the 
situation in Somalia, S/RES/1772 (20 August 2007), paras. 18 and 20, in which it encouraged “Member States whose naval 
vessels and military aircraft operate in international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia to be vigilant to any incident of piracy 
therein and to take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid, against any such act, 
in line with relevant international law”; additionally, it “strongly support(ed) and encourage(d) the ongoing relief efforts in Somalia, … , 
and call(ed) on all parties and armed groups in Somalia to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of AMISOM and 
humanitarian personnel, and grant timely, safe and unhindered access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all those in need, and 
urge(d) the countries in the region to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance by land or via air and sea ports”. 
730 See, e.g., S/RES/2139 (22 February 2014), approved unanimously, para. 4, in which it demanded all parties to the 





relation to the situation of Libya, in the preamble of Resolution 1973 (2011) the Security Council 
recalled paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011), expressing “its readiness to consider taking additional 
appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available 
humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”, as well as “its determination to ensure the 
protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance 
and the safety of humanitarian personnel”. Then, acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council 
demanded Libyan authorities to comply with their obligations ensuing from international law, 
including international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law and to “take all measures 
to protect civilians and meet their basic needs and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian 
assistance”.731 
As in previous cases, the Security Council deals with this issue by primarily urging parties to 
consent the unimpeded provision of humanitarian supplies to civilians, and if they keep disregarding 
its appeal, it acts under Chapter VII.  
                                                                                                                                                            
of IHL and the UN guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance; para. 6, in which it demanded all parties 
to promptly permit “rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access” for UN humanitarian agencies and partners; para. 7, in 
which it urged all parties to “take all appropriate steps … to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to all the affected people in 
Syria”. See S/RES/2165 (14 July 2014), adopted unanimously, para. 2 in which it decided that the UN humanitarian 
agencies and implementing partners were “authorised to use routes across conflict lines and the border crossings of Bab al-Salam, Bab 
al-Hawa, Al Yarubiyah and Al-Ramtha, in addition to those already in use, in order to ensure that humanitarian assistance” (namely four 
border crossings that were not controlled by the Government of Syria); para. 3, in which it decided “to establish a 
monitoring mechanism, under the authority of the United Nations Secretary-General, to monitor, with the consent of the relevant neighbouring 
countries of Syria, the loading of all humanitarian relief consignments”; para. 6, in which it decided “that all Syrian parties to the conflict 
shall enable the immediate and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance directly to people throughout Syria, by the United Nations 
humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, on the basis of United Nations assessments of need and devoid of any political 
prejudices and aims, including by immediately removing all impediments to the provision of humanitarian assistance”. See S/RES/2191 
(17 December 2014), in which it renewed authorisation for cross-border humanitarian access until January 2015. 





CHAPTER III: THE “WELFARE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION” 
UNDER THE LAWS OF OCCUPATIONAND ESC RIGHTS  
 
1. Introduction 
As one of the traditional possible follow-ups of warfare, belligerent occupation has been regulated 
through long-standing legal efforts dating back to the nineteenth century and having gradually 
provided for several rules informed by a shift of concern to the welfare of local populations in the hands of occupying 
powers.732 But the relevance and adequacy of such efforts as a constantly firm basis in this last regard 
remains disputable.  
It is submitted that ESC rights constitute an ever more unavoidable component of the on-going legal 
debate on the protective scope of occupation law and the unequivocal intentions of its drafters to safeguard 
the needs and interests of civilian populations living under occupation. In shaping this legal regime, 
the evolution of international law along with relevant contemporary practice have in fact brought 
up more critically the issue of protecting this set of rights for the pursuit of the livelihood and well-being of the 
original inhabitants of occupied territories. As such, they are entitled “to live as normal a life as possible”, 
in line with their own traditions, laws and culture; this entails continuing, inter alia, adequate 
standards of living, health, education and employment conditions in an uninterrupted manner as far 
as possible, and, in actual fact, considerable efforts on the ground orbit around this persistent 
concern.  
 
Modern practice has included both classical and atypical situations of exercise of effective 
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control/authority over a foreign territory.733 Accordingly, the protective purpose of the laws of occupation is 
inferred not only as an intrinsic function of the existing regime but also as an evolving function of the 
challenged regime.  
On the one hand, the scope and adequacy of IHL to meet the occupied civilian population’s socio-
economic and cultural entitlements may be examined.734 Relevant obligations placed upon the 
occupant are to be considered, as is questioning their contingency to contextual factors. The rules 
and institutions of occupation law are investigated by addressing the intensity and modalities of 
application to contentious issues that arise in impacting ESC rights in practice. This perspective 
contributes to gaining a better understanding of its role in newly emerging realities of occupiers’ 
policies affecting such rights. Indeed, occupation law provides for relevant standards to assess the 
lawfulness of the occupant’s discretion in the exercise of authority, which may be distinguished from 
irrelevant and illegitimate discretion. One of the main objectives is commonly described as searching 
for a delicate balance between the interests of the protected local population against the security needs of the 
military commander in the occupied territory. Conversely, it does not allow the latter to take into account 
the economic, national and social interests of his own country to the extent that no implications exist 
for the interests of the local population or the security interest in the occupied area; indeed, only the 
army’s military needs therein can be considered (which are different from those of national security 
in its broad sense).735 
In assuming the welfare of the civilian population as the major reasonable standard among the 
interests to which occupation law affords protection, the present chapter essentially examines whether 
and to what extent IHL has been - or ought be - adjudged for its benefit as related to ESC rights. In particular, it 
explores whether the delicate balance between the two cardinal points - the security needs versus the civilian 
needs of the occupied population - has been performed adequately in such an area. In other words, it 
                                                
733 For a recent examination of basic questions such as the provisional nature of the de facto authority exercised by the 
occupant, “effective control” on the occupied territory and the auxiliary criteria identified in jurisprudence, the delimitation 
of the rights and duties incumbent upon an occupying power, the conditions triggering the beginning and the 
termination of a situation of occupation, see ICRC reports submitted to the 28th, 30th and 31th International 
Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, in December 2003, November 2007 and December 2011, titled 
“International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts”. Additionally, the ICRC has addressed 
legal questions on the administration of occupied territories by coalitions, the potential application of occupation law for 
UN administration of foreign territory by coalitions of States, the use of force in occupied territory. 
734 A basic duty upon the occupant is related to upholding the laws of occupation and enhancing their objectives even 
by safeguarding the interests of the protected groups (such as the local population of the occupied territory, according to 
Article 4 GCIV). 
735 For a worthy and comprehensive determination as to this aspect, see HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan Elma’almoon 
Eltha’aooniah Elmahduda Elmaoolie v. Commander of IDF Forces (also cited as: A cooperative Society Lawfully registered in the Judea 
and Samaria Region v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria region et al.; or as: A Teachers’ Housing Cooperative Society v. 
The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region), Judgment of 12 December 1983, in 37(4) PD 785, at 794-795, 





inquires as to whether and how far occupation law has been interpreted and refined to feasibly 
safeguard the ESC rights of civilians in view of the limits set by this legal regime. In doing so it 
investigates whether further considerations and objectives have been attached to such a balancing 
formula in ways leading to deviations from - and contradictions of - IHL rules covering ESC rights. 
On the other hand, beyond occupation law as the benchmark for ruling, the scope of IHL is 
questioned in response to changed international expectations as have arisen by several 
developments consolidated in international law. In this vein, normative as well as factual aspects 
challenging the foundations and viability of occupation law are taken into account. In particular, 
the impact of modern international human rights law gains great significance and potential in the 
safeguarding of the socio-economic and cultural entitlements of the civilian population. Similarly, 
the time factor of prolonged occupation deserves explicit consideration for its implications on the 
enjoyment of ESC rights as functional to preserve or pursue civilian welfare.  
2. The protective purpose of the law of occupation and its scope for ESC 
rights 
2.1. The protective purpose as an intrinsic function of the existing regime 
The protection of the occupied population has not equally informed all the relevant sources of the 
law of occupation. Facilitating States’ interests was the primary focus of this regime, which was 
initially established to ensure their stability and security, their territorial integrity, and above all to 
protect their sovereignty. A clear shift of concern from governments to people only emerged in its 
evolution. The primary codification of the international law of occupation in the Regulations 
annexed to the 1907 Hague Regulations followed to a gradual development during the second half 
of the nineteenth century through deliberations among European governments - mainly in the 
context of the peace conferences held in Brussels (1874) and in the Hague (1899 and 1907); it was 
further developed by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention and the 1977 Protocol I. As far as 
cultural property is specifically concerned, several treaties provided for its protection in situations of 
occupation,736 including the 1907 Hague Regulations737, the 1954 Hague Convention,738 the 1970 
                                                
736 See also Rule 41 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL, which recognises customary law status to certain 
obligations under these treaties, including also that of “returning illicitly exported property to the competent authorities of the occupied 
territories”. 
737 Article 56 reads: “1. The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and 
sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private property. 2. All seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions of this 





UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,739 and the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague 
Convention.740 In respect to such an evolution of this legal regime, certain considerations may be 
addressed as follows. 
2.1.a. The Hague Regulations 
The early perception of occupation as a temporary and factual situation within inter-State 
relationships741 led to the codification of rules based on the principle of inalienability of sovereignty 
(Articles 42-56 HRs), which imposed the obligation to respect the interests of the former sovereign 
by precluding the occupant from unilaterally modifying the legal status of the occupied territory and 
by requiring the same occupant to respect and maintain the fundamental institutions and laws 
existing therein, with the responsibility to preserve the status quo in the territory concerned at the 
moment of occupation.  
The 1907 Hague Regulations set the general framework for the occupant’s duties and powers 
through the rather indistinct terms of Article 43, which legitimised his authority for administering 
the occupied territory to the extent that it was functional to comply with its positive obligation to 
“restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws 
in force in the country”. As discussed hereafter, Article 43 and its objectives have been deemed a “mini-
constitution” for such an administration, and its combination with other key provisions of 
occupation law represents the “DNA” of this regime. A structural connection with the principle of 
trusteeship has often been affirmed to explain the relationship between the occupant and the occupied 
territory administered in the interests of both the legitimate sovereign and the duly constituted 
successor in title and those of the local inhabitants.742 It is worth noting that, although Article 43 
                                                                                                                                                            
738 Article 5 obliges a party occupying the territory of another party to support the competent national authorities in 
preserving and safeguarding the cultural property therein and, if necessary, to take “the most necessary measures of 
preservation” as damaged by military operations. 
739 Article 9 makes “illicit” “the export and transfer of ownership of cultural property under compulsion arising directly or indirectly from 
the occupation of a country by a foreign power”. 
740 Article 9 specifically deals with the protection of cultural property in occupied territory; Article 11 bans “any illicit 
export, other removal or transfer of ownership of cultural property” in occupied territory, “any archaeological excavation, save where this is 
strictly required to safeguard, record, or preserve cultural property (and) any alteration to, or change of use of, cultural property which is 
intended to conceal or destroy cultural, historical or scientific evidence”, and additionally obliges the occupant to “closely cooperate” 
“with the competent national authorities of the occupied territory” when conducting “any archaeological excavation of, alteration to, or 
change of use of, cultural property in occupied territory”. 
741 The definition of occupation is set out in Article 42 HRs, according to which “territory is considered occupied when it is 
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established 
and can be exercised”. 
742 See Wilson, “The Laws of War in Occupied Territories”, 18 Transactions of the Grotius Society, 1933, 17, at 38 (“enemy 





represents the cornerstone for determining the occupant’s responsibility, the scope of the prescribed 
obligations have been affected by an evolving concern over the protection of local inhabitants and by an 
evolving role of the occupying power from a disinterested enemy to a full-term administrator.  
In any case, at the time of codification the Hague Regulations confined at a subordinate level 
the occupier’s responsibility vis-à-vis the local inhabitants living under its provisional and de facto 
authority. For instance, protection was provided without conferring an absolute nature as regards 
the obligation to respect for life, family honour and rights, religious convictions and practices.743 In 
light of a marginal involvement in the life of the local inhabitants, two primary rules framed their 
legal relations at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the occupier’s negative duty to 
refrain from infringing on most basic rights and the inhabitants’ duty to obey (but not a bond of 
loyalty).744  
Indeed, the Hague Regulations imposed the role of administrator as limited in its essence. In the 
words of Article 55, the task is necessarily that of the “usufructuary” of immovable public property, 
functioning consistently with the rules of “usufruct” and filling a provisional administrative position so 
as to preserve the “capital of assets” found in the occupied territory. While the occupier was 
permitted to use the revenues of that capital under certain circumstances, the literal interpretation 
of Article 55 definitely prohibited the use of the capital itself, so seemingly without admitting 
“reasonable” or “proportionate” use of the capital of natural resources such as “land”, “forests”, 
“rivers”: these are resources whose exhaustion is irreversible. Notably, the occupier’s obligation to 
safeguard the capital of assets embodies the negative content of refraining from harming the capital 
and the positive content of initiating measures to preserve the capital. This rule will be specifically 
considered later at section 6, having raised basic issues of interpretation regarding certain natural 
                                                                                                                                                            
Occupation?”, 55 British Yearbook of International Law, 1984, 249, at 295 (“the idea of ‘trusteeship’ is implicit in all occupation law 
… all occupants are in some vague and general sense trustees”); G. Von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public 
International Law, 1986, p. 686 (the “occupant … exercises a temporary right of administration on a sort of trusteeship basis”); A. 
Gerson, “Trustee Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel’s Presence in the West bank”, 14 Harvard International Law 
Journal, 1973, pp. 1-49; Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, Princeton, 2004, p. 6 (“The occupant’s status is 
conceived to be that of a trustee. Changes over time have affected both identity of the beneficiaries of this trust and the powers of the trustee, 
namely the occupant”). For a discussion of the principle of trust, see Ben-Naftali, Grass, Michaeli, “Illigal Occupation: 
Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2005, pp. 575-579. See also Separate 
Opinion of Judge Koroma, ICJ Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 2. 
743 Pursuant to Article 46 HRs, “Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and 
practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated”. 
744 The three possible sources of the duty of obedience included municipal law (i.e., the population was to follow the laws 
of the land as they were the laws of the legitimate sovereign), international law (i.e., the duties incumbent upon the 
sovereign gave rise to corollary rights), and the capacity of the occupant to enforce such obedience, see Oppenheim, 
“The Legal Relations between an Occupying Power and Inhabitants”, 33 L. Q. Rev., 363, pp. 365-69; R.R. Baxter, 





resources of occupied territories and their economic development - as evidenced in recent case law. 
An additional relevant prohibition concerns the destruction or seizure of the property belonging 
to the enemy unless imperatively required by the necessities of hostilities (Article 23(g)).745 
2.1.b. The Forth Geneva Convention 
The way of looking at the relations between the occupier and the local inhabitants was significantly 
impacted by the horrendous atrocities faced by civilians during World War II. Thus, the 
aforementioned codification process of 1949 included rules geared more towards ensuring the basic needs and 
preserving the interests of civilians in occupied territories. In particular, two essential innovations reflected the 
sharp shift of concern as regards occupied populations, namely the codification of IHL-based rights and 
the expansion of the regulatory powers of the occupant. 746  Such a conceptual shift - that was also 
underpinned by the thinking of the New Deal and the welfare State model - has become of vital 
relevance in the modern phenomenon of occupation.  
As to the first innovation, Part III of GCIV comprised Section I (Arts. 27-34) concerning “the 
status and treatment of protected persons” and its core provision obliged the occupant to protect civilians 
against humiliations, violence or adverse discrimination, to treat them humanely at all times, to 
respect their honour, family rights, religious convictions and customs, while preserving the 
occupant’s right to protect his own security (Art. 27). Furthermore, Section III (Arts. 47-78) dealt 
with conditions in occupied territories, embodying additional positive duties upon the occupant.  
It should be recognised that several of such positive obligations covered a range of ESC rights of the 
local inhabitants.747 They specifically concern: humane and non-discriminatory treatment of people 
(Art. 27); education and minors’ protection (facilitating the proper functioning of institutions 
dedicated to the education and care of children, Art. 50); forced labour, requisitioning services and 
working at the behest of the occupying power (prohibiting any measures aimed at generating 
unemployment or limiting the opportunities for workers so as to encourage them to serve the 
occupant, Art. 51-52); property (prohibiting the destruction of personal or real property of 
individuals or groups except if it is absolute necessary for military purposes, Art. 53); food and 
medical supplies (ensuring the provision of them and prohibiting to requisite relief supplies and 
                                                
745 See N. Corso, “Occupazione bellica e tutela della proprietà privata”, 6 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2012, p. 5-
44. 
746 See H-P. Gasser, “Protection of the Civilian Population”, in D. Feck (ed.), Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed 
Conflicts, 1995, paras. 525-578, 242-279; N. Ronzitti, Diritto internazionale dei conflitti armati5, Torino, 2014, pp. 270-274. 
747 For an analysis of the limited set of ESC rights embodied in IHL treaty-based rules, see “Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Occupied Territory”, in Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation. Continuity and Change of International 





immovable property belonging to relief societies, Art. 55); public health and hygiene (ensuring 
medical supplies and maintaining hospitals and certain public health services, particularly by 
adopting and applying “the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious 
diseases and epidemics”, even in view of the “ethical” and “moral” sensitivities of the population, Art. 56) 
(prohibiting the requisition of civilian hospitals alongside their material and stores, Art. 57); relief 
schemes and related agreements if the territory is inadequately supplied (Art. 59).748 Furthermore, 
the grave braches defined in Article 147 included, inter alia, the “wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health”, in addition to “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”. 
As to the second innovation, Article 64 broadened the occupant’s regulatory authority by 
allowing for the suspension or repeal of existing local laws as well as the enactment of new 
legislation in certain exceptional situations. The first paragraph refers to threats to the occupier’s 
security and obstacles to the application of the Convention, whereas under the second paragraph 
the local population may be subjected to any laws “essential” to fulfil the occupier’s obligations under 
the same Convention, or to preserve the orderly government of the occupied territory, or to ensure 
its security (i.e. of the occupier, the property and members of the occupying forces or 
administration). It is generally agreed that these two paragraphs should be read together, thus 
considering “the entire legal system” of the occupied territory rather than only the reference to penal 
laws.749 As detailed hereafter, Article 64 is deemed an “amplification” of Article 43 HRs, expressing 
more specifically its terms.750 It has been extensively debated as regards the exception “unless 
absolutely prevented” / “empêchement absolu” contained in Article 43 HRs,751  which is commonly 
                                                
748 Then, Article 60 emphasises that relief consignments are not to relieve the occupier of its responsibilities relating to 
food and medical supplies, as they do not constitute the normal source of supply but only something additional for 
civilian population in large suffering, see ICRC Commentary to GCIV, at 323. 
749 See H-P. Gasser, “Protection of the Civilian Population”, in D. Feck (ed.), Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed 
Conflicts, 1995, p. 209, 255. In the words of the ICRC Commentary, “there is no reason to infer a contrario that that the 
occupation authorities are not also bound to respect the civil law of the country, or even its constitution”, Pictet (ed.), The Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949: Commentary IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War, ICRC, Geneva, 
1956, p. 335. On the same opinion, Dinstein, “Legislation under Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: 
Belligerent Occupation and Peacebuilding”, Harvard: Program on Humanitarian Policy, Occasional Papers Series, Fall 2004, pp. 
5-6. For a recent emphasis expressed on this point, see Occupation and Other forms od Administration of Foreign Territories, 
Report prepared and edited by Tristan Ferrero, ICRC, Geneva, April 2012, at 58, in which the occupant’s ability to 
suspend or repeal local laws is interpreted as extended to laws in general - ordinances, decrees, administrative 
regulations, court precedents, executive orders - because of the reference to “the laws in force in the country” (and not only to 
“penal laws”) in Article 43. 
750 R.T. Yingling and R.W. Ginnane, “The Geneva Conventions of 1949”, 46 AJIL, 1952, 393, p. 422. 
751 See J. Pictet (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 
Civilians Persons in Time of War, ICRC, 1956, p. 335; Schwenk, op. cit., pp. 399-402; Dinstein, “Legislation under 
Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and Peacebuilding”, Harvard: Program on 





interpreted as the equivalent of  “necessity” / “necessité”. In elucidating what entitles the occupant to 
enact new legislation and to repeal, suspend or modify the local system, Article 64 details three 
dimensions of necessity, which are not all-inclusive however. In actual fact, this concept is deemed 
sufficiently elastic so as to permit amendments if reasonably required by the circumstances.752 
Remarkably, insofar as necessity is a broader concept able to accommodate the diverging needs of local 
inhabitants living under occupation, its “elusive” nature may leave abundant scope for its teleological 
construction to take into account the changing social and economic needs of the population. 
Certain implications for ESC rights shall be explained henceforth. 
Finally, the Fourth Geneva Convention provided significant indications as to the intrinsic object 
and purpose of occupation law to ensure, at all times, the utmost protection of the civilian 
population. Article 2(2) expanded the applicability of such rules, providing that the occupation of the 
territory of a Contracting Party may take place even without a declaration of war or armed 
resistance.753 Furthermore, Article 4 expanded the duties on the occupant by applying such rules to 
“protected persons” including individuals who find themselves in its hands and are not its own 
nationals.754 Further, Article 6(3) regulated the intensity and scope of the occupant’s obligations towards the 
occupied population755 by requiring the cumulative fulfilment of two criteria to “downgrade” them to a 
                                                                                                                                                            
with Article 43, M. Sassòli, “Legislation and maintenance of public order and civil life by occupying powers”, 16 EJIL, 
2005, 661, pp. 669-671, 674-674, 678-679. 
752 See Y. Dinstein, The international law of belligerent occupation, 2009, pp. 116 and 135-136. The author refers to the 
necessity of revising the laws in force in an occupied territory when they grant a right of appeal from local courts to a 
higher tribunal functioning in an unoccupied part of the country; he notes that the occupier does not have to submit to 
such dependence on enemy institutions, and that the comprehensive concept of necessity allows for the amendment of 
the laws in force in order to suspend the nexus to that higher tribunal for the duration of the occupation. Thus, 
transferring the authority to hear appeals from the local courts to another judicial instance operating within the 
occupied territory (citing C. Fairman, “Asserted Jurisdiction of the Italian Court of Cassation over the Court of Appeal 
of the Free Territory of Trieste”, 45 AJIL, 1951, p. 548).  
753 Article 2(2) GCIV reads: “The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”. The ICRC Commentary affirms the application of 
the framework of the law of occupation en bloc, as set out in this provision, regardless of the type of occupation and/or 
the extent of the occupier’s control over the territory, see Pictet (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary 
IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War (1958), “Article 2”, at 21. According to Eyal 
Benvenisti, the rationale for this inclusive definition of occupation is “that at the heart of all occupations exists a potential - if not 
an inherent - conflict of interest between occupant and occupied. This special situation is the result of the administration of the affairs of a 
country by an entity that is not its sovereign government”, see E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, Princeton, 1993, at 
4. 
754 See Pictet (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians 
Persons in Time of War (1958), Article 4, p. 46, addressing that “in the hands of” applies to persons who are present in the 
territory of the occupant other than its own nationals or the nationals of its allies. 
755 Article 6(3) reads: “In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close 
of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises 
the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 
49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143”. The ICRC Commentary clarifies that “general close of military operations” means “when the 
last shot has been fired” and “the final end of all fighting between all those concerned”, Pictet (ed.), ibid., Article 6. For a critique of 





partial set (limited to the provisions enumerated in Article 6): a year has passed since military 
operations have come to an end; the occupant continues to exercise some “functions of 
government” in such territory”.756 The importance of the latter substantial condition relies on 
formalizing a link among the application of the Convention and the transfer of responsibilities;757 as 
such, unless those requirements are fulfilled, occupation law continues to apply in its entirety 
throughout the occupation, from its beginning to its effective end. 
2.1.c. Additional Protocol I 
Further protection of the local population was provided under Protocol I of 1977, including few 
supplementary measures such as those afforded under Article 55, Article 69 and Article 75 (1).758 
2.1.d. Basic remarks  
As this brief overview clearly shows, not only has the protective purpose of the laws of occupation gradually 
emerged in favour of the occupied population but also a sceptical approach to the occupier’s intentions has 
been fostered on the basis of rules aimed at avoiding abuses of its power vis-à-vis the occupied 
territory and its inhabitants; while certain rights are conferred on the occupier, essential and strict 
limits on the scope of its powers are imposed too. As regards ESC rights, in covering a range of 
basic needs and interests of the civilian population, the examined sources - the Fourth Geneva 
Convention in particular - impose fundamental duties that do not have a purely negative nature, 
rather they consist of due diligence obligations on the occupier according to its actual capacities and means. 
                                                                                                                                                            
perdu’: rethinking Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the light of the legal consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion”, 38 Israel Law Review, 2005. 
756 The travaux préparatoires of Article 6 GCIV indicate that the third paragraph refers to occupations in which there has 
been a transfer of governmental functions by the occupying power to local authorities. Specifically, the first draft of the 
Convention stipulated that the treaty would remain applicable until the end of an occupation, see “Draft Convention 
for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War”, in Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Federal 
Political Department, Berne, Vol. I, at 114 (Art. 4). Then, an amendment proposed by the United States introduced the 
“one-year” time limit to the application of the Convention, under the justification that occupation leads to a gradual 
return of governmental responsibilities to local authorities and that, next to such a transfer, the Occupying Power 
should not be subject to the relevant obligations of the Convention, see ibid., Vol. II-A, p. 623.  
757 Italy articulated clearly this aspect: “An occupation which lasted beyond the date of cessation of hostilities only entailed obligations 
which were to be lifted progressively, as and when the local authority took over administrative powers”, see Final Record of the Diplomatic 
Conference of Geneva of 1949, Federal Political Department, Berne, p. 625. 
758 Article 75(1) API reads: “In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in Article 1 of this Protocol, persons who are in the 
power of a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be 
treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection provided by this Article without any adverse distinction 
based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on 
any other similar criteria. Each Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions and religious practices of all such persons.” Individuals 
covered by paragraph 1 fulfil three conditions: i) they must be in the power of a belligerent party; ii) they must be 
affected by armed conflict or by occupation; iii) they must not benefit from “more favourable treatment” under the GCs 





However, they do not elaborate much as to the meaning of such duties.759  
In considering how far IHL positive obligations addressing ESC rights may extend, the present 
thesis raises certain questions. On the one hand, it asks in which direction the context works. Does the 
context require restrictive or expansive approaches to interpret such obligations, so limiting or enlarging 
their normative content? Are the occupier’s efforts and actions to implement them contingent on 
several contextual factors, such as the intensity of control exercised in the occupied territory, the 
resources available therein,760 and the temporal dimension of occupation761? These questions will be 
explored particularly in relation to Article 43 HRs and generally in view of case law and practice. 
On the other hand, the scope of such IHL obligations is questioned in response to changed 
international expectations as arisen in several developments in international law as detailed 
hereafter. 
2.2. The protective purpose as an evolving function of the challenged regime 
As anticipated, practices surfacing during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have presented 
exceptional and polymorphic features. Besides classical forms of belligerent occupation, the concept 
of occupation has evolved and covered new types of situations.762 In addition to the definition set 
out in Article 42 HRs, the legal discourse on the existence of a situation of occupation has 
developed the notion of “effective control” to illustrate the conditions and circumstances needed to 
determine such a situation. Conversely, distinct cases of authority (exercised by one or more States, 
or an international organization763) over a foreign territory, without any sovereign title, have 
                                                
759 This aspect is mentioned in N. Lubell, “Human rights obligations in military occupation”, 94 IRCR, 2012, pp. 329-
334, referring to Arts. 55 and 56 GC IV and noting that this convention does not elaborate on the meaning of “ensuring 
the work of public health services”.  
760 For instance, the healthcare duties embodied in the Fourth Geneva Convention are prefaced by the terms “(t)he fullest 
extent of the means available to it” (Arts. 55 and 56 GC IV). 
761 The overviewed treaties say little about inevitable issues arising in a prolonged occupation and concerning the 
safeguarding and promotion of the economic, social and cultural life of the local population under occupation. 
762 As Adam Roberts noticed, “(t)he core meaning of the term (occupation) is obvious enough, but as usually happens with abstract 
concepts, its frontiers are less clear”, see A. Roberts, “What is a Military Occupation?”, BYIL, 1984, p. 249. For a study on 
the origins and evolution of the concept of occupation in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, see E. Benvenisti, 
The International Law of Occupation2, Oxford, 2012, pp. 20-42. For an analysis on a new model of “multilateral occupation” as 
explicitly intended to create or rebuild a State (so focused more - but not exclusively - on regime change and 
humanitarian interventions), see G.T. Harris, “The Era of Multilateral Occupations”, 24 Berkley Journal of International 
Law 1, 2006, pp. 1-79. Harris describes the emergence of a new regime of occupation and an emerging “de facto modern 
law of occupation”, which break from past practice and the de jure occupation law, and in which nation-building would be 
the substantive norm and multilateralism would be the procedural norm; to the author, the assumptions and parameters 
of the de jure occupation law appear outdated and incapable of providing a meaningful legal framework for modern 
occupations, arguing that the resource and legitimacy needs of the latter generate an “invisible hand” pushing occupiers 
toward international cooperation and compliance with international norms of behaviour. 
763 E.g. the United Nations or the European Union have set up a territorial authority to oversee the management of a 






Relevant practice includes, inter alia: the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, 
including the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, since the war of 1967; the Turkish 
occupation of the northern part of Cyprus since 1974; the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara 
since 1975; the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by forces controlled by Croatia and Serbia 
between 1992 and 1995; the Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other 
surrounding districts of Azerbaijan since 1992; the Ethiopian and Eritrean occupation forces in the 
context of the 1998-2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia war; the occupation of areas of Congo since 1998 by the 
armed forces of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda; the occupation of Iraq by the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom in 2003-2004; Eritrea’s occupation of a portion of Djibouti’s 
territory (the Ras-Doumeira area) since a clash over a disputed border in 2008. 
Legal scholars’ debates on such practice have addressed various major aspects that have 
challenged the foundations and the viability of occupation law. They inevitably touch also the 
protective purpose of this regime. At least four of them are noteworthy for the present discourse 
dealing with the welfare of the occupied population in the sphere of ESC rights. 
2.2.a. The rare, rejected or failed application of the laws of occupation 
Firstly, modern occupying powers have not generally acknowledged their status as occupiers nor 
invoked the laws of occupation as applicable to their actions in the foreign territories that came 
under their effective military control. In particular, in most of the occupations of the 1930s and 
those occurred during World War II, the occupying powers failed to apply the framework 
prescribed by the Hague Regulations for the military administration of occupied territories, and the 
ousted governments (from exile or upon their return) afforded slight respect to them too (by often 
refusing to acknowledge the validity of acts enacted by the occupants).764 Even the occupations that 
                                                                                                                                                            
two cases of Kosovo and East Timor, see O. Korhonen, J. Gras, and K. Creutz, International Post-Conflict Situations: New 
Challenges for Co-Operative Governance, Erik Castrén Institute Research Reports 18/2006, Helsinki, 2006, pp. 131-168. It is 
worth noting that the applicability of the law of occupation was not recognised by the UN post-conflict administrations 
regimes (such as in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999) or by the multilateral regimes endorsed by the United Nations 
(such as in Somalia in 1992, except for the Australian unit in Somalia). 
764 See E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation2, Oxford, 2012, pp. 108-201. The author addresses this aspect in 
his review of the relevant practice. In particular, this occurred during and after World War I in relation to the two 
major occupations, namely the German occupation of Belgium and parts of France in 1914-18, and the Allied 
occupation of the German Rhineland area pursuant to the Armistice Agreement of November 11, 1918, see E. 
Benvenisti, ibid., pp. 108-130. However, the occupants’ recurring disregard of the Hague Regulations is mainly 
addressed for the occupations in the wake of World War II, including the practice of the three Axis Powers (Japan, Italy, 
Germany, which claimed exceptions to the applicability of the law of occupation) and the occupations by the Soviet 
Union in 1939-40 (proceeding with the invasion of Poland and the Baltic Republic of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), 





have taken place since 1970s are generally addressed as cases in which occupants did not invoke the 
laws of occupation as the source of authority or did not respect them as a guide to act or 
implemented them in ways that promoted their own interests at the expense of those of the 
occupied.765 In this latter regard, the few cases in which occupation law was followed on “a de facto 
basis” - although not as model examples - are the aforementioned Israeli occupation since 1967 and 
the early stages of the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq in 2003-04.766 
A recent explanation of States’ reluctance to be labelled as occupying powers and to have their 
conducts restrained by this branch of law has been linked to the pejorative connotation usually 
attached to the concept of occupation, which is contrary to the maintenance of international peace 
and security under the UN Charter.767 As addressed hereafter, such a negative connotation has 
been reinforced by the ascendancy of the principle of self-determination of peoples and the 
condemnation of “foreign occupation” on the basis of this principle in a number of UN General 
Assembly resolutions that, equating it to colonialism, perceived it as anachronistic and (politically) 
illegal since the decolonization process.768 
As far as reinforcing the mechanisms of compliance with occupation law remains a general 
requirement, it is reasonable to posit that an effective way to achieve it may be gaining a better 
understanding of the function of such mechanisms in newly emerging situations. The legal discourse 
                                                                                                                                                            
the illegal mode of governance chosen by the occupying army in assuming control – their ideologies contradicted the 
basic principles of occupation law), see E. Benvenisti, ibid., pp. 132-142. In particular, the author underlines that “the 
occupations by the Axis powers before and during WWII were bent on establishing new orders in Europe and South-East Asia, imposed 
through cruel ruthlessness. Soviet aims during that war were also far removed from the parameters of the law of occupation”. Conversely, as 
to the practice of the Allied occupations (i.e. the British occupations of Ethiopia and Madagascar, the US occupations of 
French North Africa and Italy, the occupations of Germany and Japan), the author discerns the occupants’ efforts to 
find legal justifications for failures to abide by the Hague Regulations, see E. Benvenisti, ibid., pp. 143-166.  
765 Relevant State practice include the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990, the Moroccan annexation of 
Western Sahara in 1975, and the Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor in 1975-99; the Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan in 1978-88, the United States’ intervention in Grenada in 1983-84, and the United States’ intervention 
in Panama in 1989; the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in 1979-89, the US-led coalition’s occupation of 
Afghanistan in 2001-02, India’s involvement in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, the Turkish invasion and 
occupation of the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus and the establishment of the “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus” since 1974, the Russian occupation of Georgia since 2008. For a review of occupations since the 1970s, see E. 
Benvenisti, ibid., 2012, pp. 167-202. 
766 The Palestine and Iraq occupations stand as the only examples since World War II where occupiers have “established 
a distinct military government over occupied areas under the framework of the law of occupation”, see E. Benvenisti, ibid., p. 203. 
767 This aspect is emphasised in the ICRC reports submitted to the 28th, 30th and 31st international conferences of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent, in December 2003, November 2007 and December 2011 respectively, titled International 
Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. 
768 See the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States, GA Res. 2625 of 24 October 1970, Annex, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), A/5217, first principle, para. 11, 
providing that “(the) territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the 
provisions of the Charter”, and it characterises “foreign occupation” as illegal. However, the IHL applicability is not excluded 
by this resolution, which does not seem to undermine the conceptual framework of occupation law as a temporary 
modality of administration during international armed conflicts. See also the Declaration of the Right to Development, 





framed through out this chapter in relation to ESC rights aims at contributing to such an 
understanding. 
2.2.b. The (alleged) inadequacy of the conservationist principle 
A second aspect challenging the foundations and viability of occupation law in the practice is related 
to the “inactive custodian approach”769 or the laissez-faire governance to be assumed by the occupant, 
which is one of the rationales underpinning the 1907 Hague Regulations.770 In particular, the 
emphasis on the preservation of the status quo ante in the occupied territory has been deemed scarcely 
adequate for regulating the occupier’s duties in dynamic situations in which institutional, economic, 
and social reconstructions are undertaken therein.771 
Remarkably, the adequacy of the 1907 Hague Regulations to economic exigencies in time of 
military occupation was debated early on by the French Court of Nancy in its judgment of 3 March 
1926 issued in the Falck case.772 That Court extensively interpreted Article 55 concerning the 
occupier’s duty to use and administer the resources (immovable public properties) of the occupied 
territory in line with the rules of usufruct. While Article 55 originated under a conception of tactical 
warfare featured by quick movements of troops, the Court observed that it was to be understood 
broadly, as it would have been otherwise incompatible with modern warfare, being as the latter was 
characterised by considerable immobilized armies in the occupied territory with further requests of 
huge amounts of food and military provisions: “in such circumstances the rights of mere usufruct are no longer 
sufficient and must give place to rights of disposition and appropriation”.773  
                                                
769 E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 2004, Preface to under the law of occupation. 
770 It derives from the more general conservationist principle of values, which supports the development of international 
law, see G. Sperduti, Lezioni di diritto internazionale, Milano, 1958, p. 19 ff. It is confirmed in Article 4 AP I (“The application 
of the Conventions and of this Protocol, as well as the conclusion of the agreements provided for therein, shall not affect the legal status of the 
Parties to the conflicts. Neither the occupation of a territory nor the application of the Conventions and this Protocol shall affect the legal status 
of the territory in question”). 
771 S. Silingardi, “Occupazione bellica e obblighi delle potenze occupanti nel campo economico”, RDI, 2006, pp. 998-
999. The author highlights in this vein the significance of SC Res. 1483 of 2003, in which the Security Council - after 
the end of the military operations by the US-UK coalition, which led to the debellatio of the Ba’athista regime and the 
beginning of the occupation of Iraq - gave a catalogue as to the modalities to be followed by the Coalition Provisional 
Authority to achieve the objectives imposed in the economic field, which were defined in terms of “assistance” to the 
concerned population to favour “[the] economic reconstructions and the conditions for sustainable development”, see SC Res. 1483 
(2003), para. 8 (e); similar wording is found in Considerando n. 7 of its Preamble as well as in paras. 1, 2, 8 (d), 14, 15. See 
also S/2004/625, “Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 24 of the Security Council Resolution 
1483”, 5 August 2004, paras. 87-88, in which “the overarching term reconstruction” is defined by indicating that it “covers several 
key aspects: the repair of physical infrastructure, laying the foundations for economic recovery and rehabilitation, and, finally, longer term 
economic reform […] comprehensive reforms associated with a transition to a market economy”. 
772 See International Law Reports, 1926-27, p. 480 ff. 
773  On this point, see Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation, Washington, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1942, p. 13, noting that “The Hague Regulations […] do not safeguard coherently the whole 





Thereafter, an emblematic concept has been used to debate the basis for departing from the 
conservationist principle behind occupation law, namely “transformative occupation”, whose definition 
has not been univocal among scholars though. While this has been referred to as an occupation 
“whose stated purpose (whether or not actually achieved) is to change States that have failed, or have been under 
tyrannical rule”,774 it has been specified that “l’expression «occupation transformative» a été utilisée par la 
doctrine pour décrire des formes d’occupation dont la caractéristique essentielle est de réorganiser le système administratif 
du territoire occupé, dans des proportions telles que cette réorganisation s’apparente à un changement de régime”;775 
furthermore, it has been deemed a long-term process that implies modifying or rebuilding the 
political, social and cultural framework of a territory and tends to take the form of nation 
building.776 Recently, several experts have agreed on describing the “transformative” occupant’s 
main objective as overhauling the institutional and political structures of the occupied territory, 
often bringing them in line with its own perspective.777 In any case, in such situations a clear friction 
emerges between, on the one hand, the legal requirements expressing the conservationist principle 
(particularly the preclusion from annexing the occupied territory or otherwise unilaterally changing 
its legal status, and the respect for pre-existing institutions and laws in force therein unless absolutely 
necessary) and, on the other hand, action for far-reaching changes transforming local institutions as well 
as the occupied landscape and its economy (whether the affected structures be in collapse, weak, or 
posing a threat to international peace and security) as the latter should actually be the reserve only 
of a sovereign government. The legal debates as such evidence a clear tension, which has primarily 
emerged in relation to the occupation of Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom in 
2003-2004, and which has led to the question as to whether “transformative occupation” has any legal 
                                                                                                                                                            
than ‘doing’ or even ‘obtaining’, on vested rights rather than on economic function or opportunity”; Ziccardi, “Occupazione bellica ed 
amministrazione della giustizia”, in Temi, 1948, p. 16 ff. 
774  A. Roberts, “Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights”, AJIL, 2006, p. 
580. 
775 See Koutroulis, V. “Mythes et réalités de l’application du droit international humanitaire aux occupations dites 
transformatives”, 40(2) Revue belge de droit international, 2007, p. 371, referring to N. Bhuta, “The Antinomies of 
Transformative Occupation”, 16 EJIL, 2005, pp. 733-739; E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 2004, at x-xi; 
D.P. Goodman, “The need for Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupation”, 37 Stan. L. Rev., 1984-
1985, pp. 1591-1596; K. Homi Kaikobad, “Problems of Belligerent Occupation: the Scope of Powers Exercised by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, April/May 2003 - June 2004”, 54 ICLQ, 2005, pp. 260-261; M. Ottolenghi, 
“The Stars and Stripes in Al-Fardos Square: the Implications for the International Law of Belligerent Occupation”, 72 
Fordham Law Review, 2003-2004, pp. 2200-2218.  
776 See J.L. Payne, Deconstructing Nation Building, The American Conservative, 2005. In dealing with multilateral occupation, 
which implies multiple nation States assisting in the occupation of a territory, the author posits that it tends to be viewed 
as more politically legitimate, although it makes difficult issues of attribution and accountability given that multiple 
States share the role of occupant.  
777 See Occupation and Other forms od Administration of Foreign Territories, Report prepared and edited by Tristan Ferrero, 





basis, or, rather, whether it is completely at odds with the basic premises of occupation law.778  
The conservationist premises of occupation law deserve consideration also in light of the 
relevance acquired by the principle of self-determination in international law since the latter half of the 
twentieth century. This will be articulated for the most part in section 3.  
The temporal dimension of occupation represents a further challenge for the conservationist 
principle, the rules of which may be superseded by prolonged occupations exceeding the limits of 
the occupiers’ legitimate powers. A flexible interpretation of the obligation to respect the status quo of 
the territory - as established in Article 43 HRs along with Article 64 GCIV - has indeed been 
extensively debated.779 This point will be examined for the most part in sections 4 and 5. 
Nonetheless, the legal relevance acquired by the time factor in the practice as well as in legal 
scholarship requires us to examine it as the fourth determining aspect of the current viability of this 
regime (section 2.2.d). 
2.2.c. Substantial developments of international law  
A third challenging aspect commonly addressed by scholars debating the foundations and viability 
of occupation law regards the evolution of international law in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. In particular, two meaningful developments were not duly reflected in the founding sources 
of that specific legal regime and have ended up requiring a substantial review; for instance, a review of 
its approach toward the effects of the collapse of the ousted government or toward the effects of the 
transition from an authoritarian regime to a new democratic order in the occupied territory. They 
include the rise of the principle of self-determination as well as international human rights law. 
They have indeed given new substance to the aforementioned shift in focus regarding the 
beneficiaries of the “trust” created by occupation, offering additional normative contents to the needs, 
interests and rights of the civilian population, thus supporting a further departure from the Hague 
Law as already determined by the Geneva Law regarding the protection provided to it.  
                                                
778 “Transformative” changes such as the major institutional reforms introduced since May 2003 in occupied Iraq by the 
US and the UK, as occupying powers, were deemed to exceed the law of occupation and be ultra vires, and indeed they 
had required a specific authorization by the UN Security Council (see Res. 1483 of 23 May 2003); Roberts, 
“Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights”, 2006, 100 AJIL, p. 580; 
Benvenisti and Keinan, “The Occupation of Iraq: A Reassessment”, 86 International Law Studies, 2010, pp. 270-271, 273. 
A similar argument was made as regards far-reaching institutional changes that the victorious Allies introduced during 
the occupation of Germany and Japan post World War II, see Y. Dinstein, op. cit., 2009, p. 33.  
779 See M. Sassòli, “Legislation and maintenance of public order and civil life by Occupying Powers”, 16 EJIL, 2005, 
pp. 663-680; Y. Dinstein, “Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: belligerent occupation and 
peacebuilding”, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University, Occasional Paper Series, 2004, at 
7-8; Schwenk, “Legislative power of the military occupant under Article 43, Hague Regulations”, 54 Yale Law Journal, 





2.2.c.i. The principle of self-determination of peoples 
This principle is widely accepted by reference to the UN Charter - Articles 1(2) and 55 - which has 
been followed by its recognition as a collective right of the peoples in subsequent sources, such as 
the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the 
1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and other similar non-legally 
binding instruments,780 in addition to its inclusion in common Article 1 ICCPR and ICESCR.  
Its perception as “one of the essential principles of contemporary international law” has grown in the latter 
half of the twentieth century,781 although the parameters and the scope of its consequences are still 
not fully elaborated.782 While “external” self-determination has increasingly acquired relevance and 
its ius cogens status has been widely acknowledged,783 the international legal order has provided more 
                                                
780 See UN GA Res. 1514 (XV) of December 1960; Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States, Annex to UN GA Res. 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970; Helsinki Final Act 
adopted on 1 August 1975 by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Principle VIII of the 
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States refers to self-determination).  
781 See ICJ, Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment of 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, 4, at 102, para. 
29. In two Advisory Opinions the ICJ has referred to the “right to self-determination” as a legal principle and not simply a 
political aspiration, see ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16, at 31; Western Sahara, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, pp 31-33. For a general assessment of the principle, see Arangio-Ruiz, 
“Autodeterminazione (diritto dei popoli alla)”, Enc. Giur., Vol. IV, Roma, 1988; Cass, “Re-Thinking Self-
Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law Theories”, Syr. JILC, 1992, 21 ff.; A. Cassese, Self-
determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, 1995; Guarino, Autodeterminazione dei popoli, in Digesto delle Discipline 
Pubblicistiche, IV ed. Vol. II, Torino, 1987, 4 ff.; Palmisano, Nazioni Unite e autodeterminazione interna. Il principio alla luce degli 
strumanti rilevanti dell’ONU, Milano, 1977; Palmisano, “L’autodeterminazione interna nel sistema dei Patti sui diritti 
dell’uomo”, RDI, 1996, 365 ff.; Salmon, “Internal aspects of the Right to Self-Determination: Towards a Democratic 
Legitimacy Principle?”, in Toumuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-determination, Dortrecht, 1993, p. 253 ff.; K. Knop, 
Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law, 2002; McCorquodale, “Self-Determination: A Human Rights 
Approach”, 43 ICLQ, 1994, p. 857. 
782 For a reflection on the current state of international law regarding the concept of self-determination, see Duncan 
French, Statehood and Self-determination, Reconciling tradition and Modernity in International Law, CUP, 2013. See also D. Thürer 
and T. Burri, “Self-Determination”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2008. On the differences between 
external and internal self-determination, see also J. Crawford, “The Right to Self-Determination in International Law: 
Its Development and Future”, in P. Alston (ed.), Peoples Rights, Oxford, 2001, pp. 7-67. 
783  According to its external dimension, which invokes perceptions of independence and non-interference, self-
determination implies the right of a population of a territory subject to colonial domination or racist regime or alien 
occupation to determine freely its future political status by originating a new State or integrating into an existing one. 
See ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun, at 89 ff.; ICJ East 
Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports, 1995, p. 90 ff., at 266; ICJ, Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment 3 February 2006, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard, paras. 
4 and 10 (this was the first case in which the Court has provided support to the notion of ius cogens, see ibid, para. 64). See 
also ILC, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries”, Report of the 
International Law Commission, 53rd sess., A/56/10 (2001), at 85 (Commentary to Article 26 (5)), reproduced in J. Crawford, 
The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries, 2002. For scholars’ support 
of the ius cogens character of the external dimension of the principle, see Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law7, 
Oxford, 2008, p. 511; Doehring, “Self-Determination”, in Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary, 2002, 48, 50; A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples - A Legal Reappraisal, 1995, 320; Gross Espiell, “Self-





limited guarantees to “internal” self-determination by admitting interferences it considered 
necessary to maintain peace and international security.784  
It is worth highlighting that, in addition to the (external/internal) political dimension of the right 
to self-determination, its economic, social and cultural dimensions have been referred to. A specific recognition 
of them as functional to the comprehensive implementation of this right is contained in the two 
Covenants of 1966. The scope of such recognition is indeed meaningful; common Article 1 refers 
not only to the right of peoples to “pursue their own economic, social and cultural development” (paragraph 
1), but also to their right to “freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources”, and then to the right not to 
be deprived of their “own means of subsistence” (paragraph 2). These latter dimensions deserve attention in 
relation to the common acknowledgement that the advent of this principle - in reshaping 
international relations as well as impacting traditional international institutions - has also influenced 
occupation law.785 Some scholars have already explored the impact on the scope of this legal regime 
by the right to self-determination of peoples.786 The present research aims at contributing to this 
debate from the narrow perspective of ESC rights, taking into account the following aspects.  
Primarily, the right of peoples to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development under common 
Article 1(1) may acquire relevance in both external and internal dimensions: it may invoke 
perceptions of non-interference and a certain basic freedom to economic, social, cultural activities 
                                                                                                                                                            
167; S. Wheatley, “The Security Council, Democratic legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq”, 2006, 17 EJIL p. 531, 
538. 
784 According to its internal dimension, self-determination implies the right of people of an existing State to choose freely 
their own political system and to pursue their own economic, social and cultural development (as such it refers to the 
principle of sovereign equality of States and the prohibition of intervention). See D. Schweigman, The Authority of the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice, Kluwer Law 
International, 2001, p. 170 ff. As for relevant practice, for instance, the Security Council’s interferences as to the 
internal dimension of the right to self-determination were made with regard to the Supreme National Council of 
Cambodia, which was instituted with a Joint Statement of Cambodian political factions (A/45/490-S21732 of 17 
September 1990) and immediately recognised by the Security Council as the only depositary of Cambodia’s sovereignty 
(Res. 718 of 1991), see G. Cellamare, “L’Autorità transitoria delle Nazioni Unite in Cambogia”, in P. Picone (ed.), 
Interventi delle Nazioni Unite e diritto internazionale, Padova, 1995, p. 261 ff., 270 ff. 
785 For prominent changes in the traditional law of occupation as introduced by the principle of self-determination, see 
E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 1993, at 187. The author identifies, firstly, the transformation of armed 
struggle based on self-determination of peoples under three forms of regimes (colonial, racist, or foreign occupation) into 
international armed conflict under Article 1(4) API, and, secondly, the situation of hostage taking pursuant to these 
regimes as placed outside the scope of application of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages. 
786 On the principle of self-determination as a main limit to interventions by the occupying power regarding the laws in 
force in the occupied territory, see T. Meron, “Applicability of Multilateral Conventions to Occupied Territory”, AJIL, 
1978, p. 542 ff. On the relevance of this principle concerning the conduct of the Coalition Provisional Authority in 
occupied Iraq, see E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 2004, pp. 13-15; M. Sassoli, “Legislation and 
maintenance of public order and civil life by occupying powers”, 16 EJIL, 2005, p. 676 ff.; G. Fox, “The Occupation of 
Iraq”, Georgetown Journal of Int. Law, 2005, p. 262 ff.; C. McCarthy, “The Paradox of International Law of Military 
Occupation: Sovereignty and the Reformation of Iraq”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 2005, p. 49 ff. Conversely, in 
favour of the occupant’s intervention to adapt the laws in force in occupied territories to its own internal order, see Y. 





independent from government policies undertaken by an occupying power.  
Secondly, the right of peoples to freely dispose of natural wealth and resources under common Article 1(2) 
may challenge the related exploitation if it occurs against the rights and interests of the people 
concerned.787 As detailed in the following section 3, holding only temporary administration powers 
of the occupied territory, the military commander is required to preserve the state of affairs existing 
on the eve of occupation and to refrain from changing the status quo of the territory in any manner 
that would create irreversible situations on the ground. This prevents the occupier from “colonising” 
the territory for its own purpose and from depriving the indigenous population of the right to enjoy 
local natural resources. This aspect will be discussed further in section 6 concerning the 
usufructuary rules laid down in Article 55 HRs as applied to natural resources. 
Thirdly, the free disposal of natural wealth and resources is recognised in common Article 1(2) “without 
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual 
benefit, and international law”; this provision may restrain States’ claims to nationalise and confiscate 
foreign property.788  
Fourthly, the requirement not to deprive people of their own means of subsistence in common Article 2(1) 
reinforces a direct connection between the right to self-determination and basic rights such as the 
right to life, the right to an adequate standard of living, or property rights.  
Finally, the acknowledgement in common Article 1(3) of the two Covenants of 1966 of a 
responsibility upon all States to promote the realisation of the right to self-determination and respect it in accordance 
with the UN Charter789 acquires special relevance in view of the increased attention to the State’s 
collective responsibility to ensure respect for human rights standards and humanitarian principles. 
2.2.c.ii. Modern international human rights law 
As anticipated, the second major concept evolved in public international law and not duly reflected 
in occupation law concerns human rights norms. The rise of this legal regime has considerably 
altered international expectations regarding the treatment of civilian populations living under the 
                                                
787 The reference to the free disposition of natural wealth and resources is a weakened version of an earlier draft 
reference to “permanent sovereignty” over such resources, see M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR 
Commentary, Kehl: N.P. Engel, 2005, at 24-25. The terms of the earlier draft were inspired by the 1962 General 
Assembly resolution on “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources”, see GA Res. 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 
1962.  
788 This reference has to be read also in light of Article 25 ICESCR (and Article 47 CCPR) according to which “nothing 
in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilise fully and freely their natural wealth 
and resources”, see M. Novak, op. cit., pp. 24-25, 628-629. 
789 This paragraph is to be read even in view of Article 28 UDHR whereby “everyone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised”, see A. Eide, “Article 28”, in G. Alfredsson 





administration of occupied territories, especially because this system has been extensively recognised 
as applicable in such situations.790 
Significantly, the respect and protection of internationally recognised human rights have been 
addressed as possibly “additional” to the three objectives allowing amendments to local laws in such 
administration under occupation law, namely when it is “essential” for implementing international 
humanitarian law, or maintaining the orderly government of the territory, or ensuring the security 
of the occupier and local administration. For instance, the occupier could not tolerate the laws in 
force in the occupied territory when they discriminate on the basis of race, colour, national or ethnic 
origin, religion or faith, political belief; they could be abolished. Furthermore, the applicability of 
international human rights law to occupation as such has been deemed a crucial cause of the shift in the 
policy goals of contemporary occupations:791 protecting fundamental rights would require - rather than 
simply allow - an occupier to engage in nation-building, so setting up institutions that fulfil human 
rights obligations on the eve of occupation.792 This debatable reading will be considered henceforth, 
for the most part in section 5.3. 
In addressing the relevance of international human rights law in situations amounting to 
occupation,793 legal scholarship has started to examine its scope of application ratione materiae and 
ratione loci with regard to ESC rights.794 Their interplay with occupation law has been explored for 
the preservation of minimum living conditions, their degree of realisation, and the respect of 
property. As aptly highlighted, unlike the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to health, 
occupation law affords more detailed regulation of the right to property, ruling on the treatment of 
movable and immovable goods, prohibiting their destruction (with some exceptions) and setting 
limits to their ownership or requisition by the occupying forces.795 
                                                
790 See, e.g., ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 240, 
para. 25; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 
2004, ICJ Reports 2004, pp. 178-181, paras. 106-113; ICJ, DRC v. Uganda, Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 
2005, pp. 242-243, para. 216; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Appl. No. 15318/89, Judgment, 23 
March 1995, paras. 62-64; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, Appl. No. 15318/89, Judgment, 18 December 1996, paras. 54, 
57; ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment, 7 July 2011, paras. 138-142. 
791 T. Ferraro, “The Law of occupation and human rights law: some selected issues”, in R. Kolb and S. Gaggioli (eds.), 
Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 2013, pp. 273-293. 
792 Harris, op. cit., 2006, pp. 1-78. 
793 E.g., A. Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupations: the Israeli-Occupied Territories since 1967”, 84 AJIL, 1990, pp. 
70-74; the report by Al-Haq, The Applicability of Human Rights Law to Occupied Territories: The Case of the Occupied Palestinian 
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In examining such interactions, a certain enlargement as well as deepening of the relevant 
normative system is addressed throughout the present thesis. At times modern international human 
rights law establishes new guarantees in comparison to occupation law, or its detailed normative content 
“materialises” some provisions of the Hague Regulations or the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Nevertheless, this potential varies according to the ESC rights concerned and the nature of ensuing 
obligations. Overall, several positive implications may derive from such applicability in periods of 
occupation. For instance, it may influence the interpretation of IHL, fill normative gaps in the scope 
of protection of ESC rights, redefine the occupants’ obligations towards the local inhabitants, serve 
as yardstick encouraging courts to take a more active approach in advancing the welfare of occupied 
civilian population, and advance legal culture of compliance via human rights supervisory 
mechanisms.  
 
(1) An emblematic case regards the impact on the right to food as dealt with by the former Special 
Rapporteur Jean Ziegler in thematic reports and in various reports on missions to the occupied 
Palestinian territories. His analysis covered the causes of the food crisis therein (i.e. closures and 
movement restrictions; destruction, expropriation and confiscation of Palestinian land; the so-called 
strategy of “Bantustanization”; impeding humanitarian aid), considering the relevant legal framework 
and confirming the opinions on the applicability of the ICESCR to the OPT as expressed by other 
UN bodies.796 Both legal regimes were taken into account to address the occupant’s responsibility to 
ensure the basic needs of the local population and to avoid violating the right to food.  
In particular, following the CESCR’s interpretation expressed in General Comment no. 12, this 
right was referred to as “primarily the right to be able to feed oneself through physical and economic access to 
food”; further, it was summarised as “the right to have regular, permanent and free access, either directly or by 
means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient food corresponding to the 
cultural traditions of the people to which the consumer belongs, and which ensures a physical and mental, individual 
and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free of fear”.797 As underlined in the CESCR’s General Comment 
no. 15, it was also interpreted to include access to drinking water and irrigation water necessary for 
                                                                                                                                                            
examples of food, health and property”, IRRC, 2008, pp. 629-651, in which the author considers whether IHL rules are 
“confirmed, complemented, relativized or contradicted” by those drawn from human rights law. 
796 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, on his mission to the occupied Palestinian territories (3-12 July 
2003), UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31 October 2003. On the causes of the food crisis, see ibid., paras. 11-19, 
and on the legal framework, see ibid., paras. 21-31. 
797 This refers to his previous thematic report, see Report by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Mr. Jean Ziegler, submitted 





subsistence agricultural production.798  
In expressing concern for abundant violations of different obligations flowing from the right to 
food in the occupied territories, they were elaborated according to the traditional tripartite 
typology.799 In this vein, the obligation to respect this right requires that the occupier not disrupt or 
destroy the Palestinians’ existing access to food. This immediate obligation requires avoiding negatively 
affecting existing availability as well as physical or economic access to adequate food and water. Possible 
violations of such a duty included the imposition of closures and curfews, the destruction of 
Palestinian land, water and other resources, the expropriation of Palestinian land, water and other 
resources, and the security fence.800 Conversely, the obligation to protect the right to food entails the 
occupier to protect the civilian population in occupied areas from third parties trying to restrict, 
deny or destroy existing access to food and water. As to violations of such a duty, impunity for 
settlers shooting at Palestinians in their fields for harvesting was referred to.801 Finally, the obligation 
to fulfil the right to food imposes on the occupier to facilitate people’s capacity to feed themselves and, 
as a last resort, to provide food assistance to people who cannot feed themselves for reasons beyond 
their own control. Accordingly, a treaty obligation was articulated as facilitating and ensuring access to 
food to the civilian Palestinian population as well as facilitating humanitarian access for impartial 
organizations providing emergency assistance.802  
 
(2) It is worth noting that, to some extent, IHL protective provisions on property may be understood 
differently in view of human rights standards, such as the right to housing under Article 11 ICESCR 
and the right to culture under Article 15 ICESCR. For instance, attacks and destructions of homes 
may affect civilians beyond the ordinary right to property. As observed by the Human Rights 
Committee, the “partly punitive nature of the demolition of property and homes in the Occupied Territories” has 
contravened the freedom to choose one’s residence under Article 12, the right not to be subjected to 
arbitrary interference with one’s home under Article 17 ICCPR, the equality of all persons before 
the law and equal protection of the law under Article 26, and the freedom from inhuman and cruel 
                                                
798 See Preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, A/56/210, 23 
July 2001; on examples of linkages between the right to water and the right to food, see Report submitted by the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2002/25, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/54, 10 January 2003, para. 56. 
799 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, on his mission to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (3-12 July 
2003), UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31 October 2003, paras. 40-56. 
800 Ibid., paras. 41-52. 
801 Ibid., para. 53. 





treatment under Article 7.803 
Notably, the occupier’s obligation to protect ESC rights from third parties’ abuses was addressed in 
relation to settlers’ violence.804 A similar approach featured a joint condemnation by Special 
Rapporteurs on the right to adequate housing, the right to food, and the right to safe and drinking 
water and sanitation, respectively. They emphasised that “Palestinian property is not only destroyed by the 
Israeli Civil Administration authorities and military but also by Israeli settlers. In some places, there are nearly weekly 
burnings of Palestinian villagers’ land, trees and crops by Israeli settlers”.805  
 
(3) The significance of referring to human rights law in periods of belligerent occupation was also 
emphasised by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi 
occupation (1990-1991). The grave breaches of human rights committed by occupying forces and 
consisting of devastation and pillaging of infrastructure (such as cultural and religious institutions, 
libraries, museums, schools, industrial structures, banks) were deemed to have critically challenged 
the enjoyment of ESC rights by the civilian population.806 
Of note, the seriousness of the situation concerning the healthcare system (as destructed by 
occupying forces as well as undermined by the departure of many professionals due to attacks and 
intimidation, dismantling of health facilities, denials of access to hospitals) was considered as better 
evaluated through the concept of the right to health, rather than Articles 55 and 56 GCIV.807 
As regards the attacks on oil wells by the withdrawing Iraqi forces which were deemed 
deliberate and systematic,808 the extensive and considerable environmental damage (related to their 
burning producing smoke emissions and the oil spills polluting coastline and seawater) was 
                                                
803 HRC, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 21 August 2003, para. 16; Concluding Observations: 
Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3, 29 July 2010, para. 18. 
804 See Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the 
Palestinian Territories occupied since 1967, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/29, 17 January 2006, para. 29. 
805 The Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, Ms. Raquel Rolnik; the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
to food, Oliver De Schutter; the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe and drinking water and sanitation, 
Catarina de Albuquerque (see OHCHR, “West Bank: demolitions and attacks against Palestinians must stop – UN 
experts”, press release, 27 September 2011). According to them, “with no effective action by the police and security forces, there is 
neither accountability for nor effective protection against these serious crimes, which further encourages the perpetrators to continue committing 
them”; then the necessity for Israeli authorities to “take all necessary measures to prevent attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians 
property in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and investigate and prosecute criminal acts committed by settlers in an independent, 
impartial, effective, through and timely manner” has been addressed (Ibid.). For additional condemnation of settlers’ violence, 
see UNHRC Res. 16/31, UN Doc. A/HCR/16/31, March 2011, para. 4 (a).  
806 Report on the situation of human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi Occupation, prepared by Mr. Walter Kälin, Special Rapporterur of the 
Commission on Human Rights in accordance with Commission resolution 1991/67, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/26, 16 January 
1992,1. 
807 See W. Kalin, Human Rights un Times of Occupation: The Case of Kuwait, Bern, 1994, p. 28, noting that “the true significance 
of these events was only elucidated by recourse to the concept of the right to health as guaranteed by the (ICESCR)”. 





evaluated by relying solely on their “effects on human rights”, since Iraq was not party to AP I and its 
relevant rules on environmental protection had not reached customary status; nonetheless, the 
damage was finally deemed to violate the obligation to “maintain public health” under Article 56 
GCIV. 809  Despite unavoidable detrimental environmental consequences by warfare, it was 
concluded that “the deliberate causing of large-scale environmental damage which severely affects the health of a 
considerable portion of the population concerned, or creates risks for the health of future generations, amounts to a 
serious violation of the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health as embodied in article 12 of 
the (ICESCR)”. 810  However, “because of the limited short-term consequences for the health of the civilian 
population and of the difficulties in determining the long-term impact on the health situation” it was cautiously 
observed that it was “too early” for evaluating if the right to health would have been violated in the 
actual case.811 
Focusing on the “systematic dismantling and destruction of the major educational, scientific and cultural 
institutions”, the grave impact of the devastation of the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research was 
connected to the future impossibility of conducting “applied research” .812 The relevance of Article 
15(2) ICESCR was underlined for the scientific production stolen and taken to Iraq. These acts 
were deemed systematic and deliberate, in breach of the right to enjoy scientific progress and the 
right to education, besides violating Article 50 GVIV which calls for the occupant “to facilitate the 
proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and the education of children”.813  
Conversely, the pillaging, demolishing and devastation of private property and public 
infrastructure were evaluated under the section on ESC rights by referring solely to Articles 16, 33 
and 53 GCIV (rather than recurring to concept of the right to an adequate standard of living, 
including housing). Of note, it was noted that in certain circumstances international humanitarian 
law could have justified the related damage or confiscation for military necessity and use. 
Nonetheless, the mass destruction and damage was deemed “deliberate, premeditated, systematic and large 
scale, in clear violation with international law”.814 
2.2.d. The legal relevance of the temporal dimension of the laws of occupation 
A fourth aspect that has acquired - in a controversial way though - a certain legal relevance 
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811 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/26, 16 January 1992, ibid., para. 208. 
812 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/26, 16 January 1992, ibid., paras. 212-216. 
813 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/26, 16 January 1992, ibid., paras. 211 and 218. 
814 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/26, 16 January 1992, ibid., paras. 234-235. The SC Res. 687 of 3 April 1991 acknowledged 





concerns the time element of a situation of occupation, or more exactly what is called “prolonged” 
occupation.815 Indeed, many years may pass from the moment in which the occupant starts to 
exercise effective control of a territory and the end of such a situation (as determined by the 
withdraw from the foreign territory or by the stipulation of a valid agreement between the occupant 
and the sovereign authority of the occupied territory). 
Although no time limits of effective control over a foreign territory are placed by the 1907 
Hague Regulations or the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention816 or the 1977 Protocol I,817 long-
lasting occupations end up challenging the objects and purposes of this regime. Two basic principles 
are particularly tested, namely the provisional nature of belligerent occupation (occupation is temporary, 
thus it cannot be either permanent nor indefinite) and the preservation of the status quo ante (the 
conservationist principle).  
In actual fact, the prolonged character of an occupation does not alter per se the occupier’s 
obligations set forth in the aforementioned legal sources. However, questions arise as to whether and 
to what extent the time factor impacts the interpretation of IHL rules and their application on the ground in reality. 
That is, how much the duration of an occupation influences the ordinary approach of subjecting 
those realities to the rule of law.  
As far as the occupier’s authority is specifically concerned, an “inherent dilemma” is that the 
extended duration of an occupation may be invoked as an element in favour of a more flexible as 
                                                
815 A. Roberts, “Prolonged military occupation: the Israeli-occupied territories since 1967”, 84 AJIL, 1990, p. 47, 
according to which this “is taken to be an occupation that last no more than five years and extends into a period when hostilities are 
sharply reduced - i.e., a period approximating peacetime”. See Y. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 
Cambridge, 2009, pp. 116-117, in which the author defines prolonged occupation only by referring to its duration and 
by making a distinction from “semi-prolonged” occupations - whose duration extends to “a number of years (rather than 
decades) and which lasted for a little more than three years. 
816 Article 6(3) GCIV reads: “In case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general 
close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power 
exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 
34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143”. However, many scholars considers the “one year” time limit as fallen into 
desuetude, see E. David, Principes de droit des conflits armés4, Bruylant, 2008, p. 263; M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf 
(eds.), “Article 3”, op. cit., at 59; R. Kolb, “Deux questions ponctuelles relatives au droit de l’occupation de guerre”, 61 
Revue Hellénique de Droit International, 2008, at 358-360; O. Ben-Naftali, “’A la recherche du temps perdu’: rethinking 
Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the light of the legal consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion”, 38 Israel Law Review, 2005, at 217; D. Alonzo-Maizlish, “When does 
it end? Problems in the law of occupation”, in R. Arnold and P.A. Hildbrand (eds.), International Humanitarian Law and the 
21st Century’s Conflicts, Changes and Challenges, Editions Interuniversitaires Suisses – Edis, Lausanne, 2005, at 106 
(expressing some doubts). See also ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 
July 2004, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, at 185, para. 125. 
817 Pursuant to Article 3(b) AP I, “(t)he application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease … in case of occupied territories, 
on the termination of occupation, except … for those persons whose final release, repatriation or re-establishment takes place thereafter”. For the 
172 States that have ratified this Protocol (see the ICRC list of States parties to IHL treaties), the temporal limit of “one year after the general 
close of military operations” established in Article 6(3) GCIV has been abolished and the rules pertaining to occupation remain applicable 





well as more restrictive application of occupation law.818 Scholarly opinions have either supported 
extensive powers of the occupant 819  or limited its autonomy and discretion. 820  An essential 
argument in favour of permissive application is avoiding freezing the legal situation, and to prevent 
certain adaptations to the realities on the ground, primarily to ensure the continuation of normal life 
of the local population. In line with the largely supported view that the benefit of the protected 
population should be acknowledged as a key principle guiding the policies and measures taken up 
by the occupier, the importance to assume decisions concerning the social, economic and at times political realms to 
preserve normal life in the occupied territory as far as possible has also been emphasised.821 However, insofar 
as the temporary (non-sovereign) administration of this territory should generally entail no 
interferences with its original economic and social structures, organization, legal system or 
demography, a basic question emerges as to what extent the protection of local inhabitants living under 
protracted occupation may also require far-reaching measures for the development of the occupied territory.  
Indeed, the longer an occupation continues and the wider the occupier’s authority is exercised 
over the local population, the more the basic distinction between military and ordinary 
governments may become troubled and less perceptible. This brings forth opposing issues. For 
instance, an enduring occupier may be required to give supplementary guarantees on the 
reversibility of contentious measures adopted, as abstaining from introducing fundamental 
institutional changes or simply affirming their temporariness may be deemed not sufficiently 
                                                
818 A. Roberts, “Prolonged military occupation: the Israeli-occupied territories since 1967”, 84 AJIL 1, 1990, pp. 52-53, 
in which the author emphasises that “(i)n a prolonged occupation there may be strong reasons for recognising the powers of an occupant 
in certain specific respects - for example, be- cause there is a need to make drastic and permanent changes in the economy or the system of 
government. At the same time, there may be strong reasons for limiting the occupant’s powers in other respects. An examination of past 
occupations suggests that any variations in the rules may have a more complex and multifaceted character than simply the curtailment of the 
rights of one party or another”. See C. Chinkin “Laws of occupation”, in N. Botha, M. Oliver, D. Van Tonder (eds.), 
Multilateralism and International Law with Western Sahara as a Case Study, Unisa Press, Pretoria, 2010, p. 178, noting that “an 
inherent dilemma” features prolonged occupation: on one side, “the requirements under occupation law that inhibit the occupier from 
changing law must not be abused so that the occupied territory gets stranded in a form of legal vacuum whereby it becomes socially and 
economically underdeveloped”; on the other side, however, “allowing - even requiring - the occupier to undertake development, legal or 
other social programs may come too close to annexation”. Thus, for the author “prolonged occupation may be a basis for limiting - at least 
legally - the occupier’s powers”. 
819 Y. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge University Press, 2009, at 120. The author 
stresses how “pressures for departures from the legal status quo in occupied territories proliferate over time, and there comes a moment when 
they cannot be put off”, then highlighting that “if the constant transformations in everyday technology and communitarian life are ignored 
by the legislator, the inertia is liable to cause grievous social woes”. He concludes by taking “as almost axiomatic that the military 
government must be given more leeway in the application of its lawmaking power if the occupation endures for many years”. 
820 See, inter alia, O. Ben-Naftali, “‘A la recherché du temps perdu’: rethinking Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention in the light of the legal consequences of the construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
Advisory Opinion”, 38 Israel Law Review, 2005, pp. 218-219.  
821 See the speech of Philip Spoerri, Director of International Law and Cooperation of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, concerning complex issues undermining the protection of the civilian population in the occupied 
territory, which is referred to in M. Mancini, “Report of the Conference “New Conflicts and the Challenge of the 





adequate.822 Conversely, a long-term occupier may have a reduced opportunity to assert an 
impossibility to act in favour of growth of the occupied territory and welfare of the local population, 
given the interdependence arising and enhanced over the years between the occupier and the 
population.823 As such, State practice seems to suggest that in the case of a protracted occupation 
such an interdependence may lower the degree of control required for a State to be an occupying 
power: such a continuation may not entail full and exclusive control over the territory concerned.824 
In examining the impact of the time element on the occupier’s authority, a specific dimension 
concerns the application of military necessity.825 As already highlighted, IHL treaties do not contain a 
definition of this concept, which is instead put forth by several military manuals.826 The various 
exceptions to military necessity have a different scope from one rule to the other.827  
What seems unequivocal is that the long duration of occupation cannot be evoked in order to fit 
political, demographic or economic considerations of the occupying power into the notion of 
military necessity.828 Conversely, State practice, military manuals, and international or national case 
                                                
822 Even though the ICJ did not explicitly referred to the long duration of the occupation, the Court was reluctant to 
accept the Israelis’ repeated affirmations that the wall was a temporary measure and that Israel was “ready and able … to 
adjust or dismantle” it, see ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (9 July 2004), 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, para. 116. In this vein, the Court recognised that “the construction of the wall and its 
associated régime create a ‘fait accompli’ on the ground that could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal 
characterisation of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto annexation”, see the ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the wall, op. 
cit., para. 121. Indeed, after the disengagement of 2005 the situation in the Gaza Strip has evidenced the difficulties in 
reversing the “temporary” measures adopted by Israel. 
823 This aspect is discussed in the following section 4 concerning the qualifications provided for in Article 43 “all the 
measures in his power” and “as far as possible”. 
824 The fact that a very large majority of States consider Gaza still occupied, despite the 2005 Israeli disengagement, 
indicates this remark. The qualification of Gaza as occupied territory has been accepted by the majority of States, see 
GA Res. 64/94, 10 December 2009, paras. 4 and 10 (adopted by 162 votes in favour, 9 against, 5 abstentions); GA Res. 
65/105, 10 December 2010, paras. 5 and 10 (165 votes in favour, 9 against, 2 abstentions); GA Res. 66/79, 9 
December 2011, paras. 5 and 10 (159 votes in favour, 9 against, 4 abstentions).  
825 Basically, military necessity can be invoked only if the particular IHL rule provides for the relevant exception and, 
furthermore, that it cannot be invoked to justify acts contrary to international humanitarian law. 
826 See UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford, 2004, at 21-22, para. 2.2. Similarly, 
Canada, National Defence, Chief of Defence Staff, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Law of Armed Conflict at the 
Operational and Tactical Levels, 13 August 2001, B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, at 2-1, para. 202; United States, Department of 
the Army Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare, FM 27-10, 1956, at 4; France, Ministère de la Défense, Manuel de droit 
des conflits armés, Secrétariat général pour l’administration, Direction des Affaires juridiques, Sous-direction du droit 
international et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, (undated), at 48. These definitions can be traced 
back to the 1863 Lieber Code, which defined military necessity as “the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for 
securing the ends of war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war” (Article 14), with the additional remark 
that “in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult” (Article 16), 
see Instructions for the Government of Armies Of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863. 
827 E.g., under Article 52 HRs “requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the 
needs of the army of occupation”. Article 53 GCIV prohibits the destruction of public or private property inside the occupied 
territory by the occupying power “except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”. Article 48 
GCIV allows the protected persons “who are not nationals of the power whose territory is occupied” to leave the latter, “unless their 
departure is contrary to the national interests of the occupying power” (Art. 35). 
828  These considerations are excluded from its scope, see N. Hayashi, “Requirements of military necessity in 





law offer few indications regarding the possibility that the duration of the occupation may influence 
the interpretation of those exceptions.829  
In considering the implications of the temporal dimension of occupation in the spheres of ESC rights of the local 
population, its legal relevance may be explored in view of the evolution of the concept itself. The 
regime of territorial occupation has been increasingly conceptualised in terms of protecting the safety 
and welfare of the civilian population. This has been even addressed as one of the developments favouring 
the questioning of the basic distinction between sovereignty and belligerent occupation.830  
It is worth highlighting that the transitoriness of the occupation is meant to enhance the local population’s 
interests by ensuring that, upon its termination, control over the territory will be gone back to the 
legitimate sovereign. Conversely, the prolongation of the occupation is deemed to harm the local population, 
because it remains subject to a provisional military regime rather than a sovereign ruler.831 
Accordingly, such a protraction is seen either as an element imposing increased and expanded 
obligations on the military commander832 to safeguard the interests of the civilian population,833 or 
                                                                                                                                                            
ff. The author analyses the Elon Moreh decision of the Supreme Court of Israel, which concerned an order to requisition 
privately owned Palestinian land to establish a settlement. The order was deemed null and void since it was based on a 
mostly political decision and therefore it was outside the scope of the military necessity exception contained in Article 52 
HRs. See HCJ 390/79, Duweikat et al. v. Government of Israel et al., 22 October 1979, reproduced in 19 ILM, 1980, at 171-
175. The Supreme Court of Israel has generally affirmed that “[t]he Military Commander may not consider the national, economic 
and social interests of his own State, so long as they do not affect his security interest in the Region or the interest of the local population”, see 
Askan Judgment, p. 13, para. 13. This was reaffirmed, in relation to Article 43 HRs, in the Yesh Din judgment (see p. 15, 
para. 8). See also H. McCoubrey, “The nature of the modern doctrine of military necessity”, 30 Revue du droit pénal 
militaire et du droit de la guerre, 1991, at 227; B.M. Carnahan, “Lincoln, Lieber and the laws of war: the origins and limits of 
the principle of military necessity”, 92 AJIL 2, 1998, p. 219 ff. 
829 For instance, among the States that intervened before the ICJ in the advisory proceedings on the separation wall, 
only Switzerland emphasised that the protracted duration of the Israeli occupation implied a more rigorous 
examination of necessity and proportionality, see Switzerland, Wall advisory proceedings, Written Statement of the 
Swiss Confederation, 30 January 2004, at 6, para. 26, in which it was stated that “(t)he law of armed conflict strikes a balance 
between humanitarian demands and military needs. … Hence, every step taken in the context of hostilities, of a military, security or 
administrative character, must respect the principle of necessity, proportionality and humanity. … Any examination of necessity and 
proportionality in circumstances of prolonged occupation when hostilities have ceased must be more rigorous, since stricter conditions govern the 
imposition of restrictions in such circumstances on the fundamental rights of protected persons”. Conversely, no other recommendations 
were made by States as to the fact that the exceptions to military necessity were excluded or they should be interpreted 
restrictively due to the duration of the occupation. 
830 M. Koskenniemi, “Occupation and Sovereignty - Still a Useful Distinction?”, in O. Engdahl and P. Wrange (eds.), 
Laws at War - The Law as it was and the Law as it Should Be, Koninklijke Brill BV, 2008, pp. 166-169.  
831 These two aspects are explicitly addressed in the legal opinion submitted by Israeli international law scholars in the 
Yesh Din case. 
832 Y. Dinstein, The international law of belligerent occupation, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 49, 120; D.P. Goodman, 
“The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupation”, 37(6) Stanford Law Review, 1573; A. 
Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967”, 84(1) AJIL, p. 44, 52; Y. 
Dinstein, The Dilemmas Relating to Legislation under Article 43 of The Hague Regulations and Peace Building 1, pp. 5-7 (Paper 
submitted to the informal high-level expert meeting on current challenges to International Humanitarian Law, 
Cambridge, 25-27 June 2004). 
833 A. Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967”, 84 AJIL, 1990, p. 44, 
96; Y. Dinstein, The international law of belligerent occupation, Cambridge, 2009, 116-117; E. Benvenisti, The international law 
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as a factor refining and reinforcing the prohibition from using his authority in favour of unrelated 
interests of his own matters.834 In fact, the risk is that of misusing such prolongation to inflate the 
authority concerned to levels that distort the difference between sovereign and occupier. 
 
(1)  Focusing on the most pertinent case of protracted occupation in modern times, i.e. the one that 
concerns the Palestinian territories, various decisions by the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as High 
Court of Justice on the OPT have explicitly recognised that the protraction of occupation should not enhance 
the profits and benefits from such situation to the occupier’s citizens.835 Instead, this Court has deemed it a factor 
that must work in favour of the protected population, emphasising that prolongation does not remove or 
shadow the nature of the military ruler, which remains temporary as well as non-sovereign.836 Of 
remark is the view whereby “the needs of the local population gain extra emphasis” which has also led the 
same Court to recognise that certain legislative measures “might become appropriate in a long-term military 
government”.837 
The understanding of the occupant acting as a “trustee” of the local inhabitants and charged to 
administer the occupied territory in view of their benefit has been affirmed in a series of judgments. 
According to this Court, the military commander’s measures taken to secure the occupation “must be 
properly balanced against the rights, needs and interests of the local population”;838 any intervention by the 
                                                
834 D.P. Goodman, “The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law of Belligerent Occupation”, 37(6) Stanford Law 
Review, 1985, p. 1573, 1586; E. Benvenisti, The international law of occupation, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 6, 27, 
145, 147; A. Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967”, 84(1) AJIL, p. 44, 
87; A. Cassese, “Powers and Duties of An Occupant in Relation to Land and Natural Resources”, in E. Playfair (ed.), 
International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1992, p. 419, 420. 
835 See HCJ 69/81, Abu Aita et al. v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region et al., Judgment of 5 April 1983, 37(2) PD 
197, at 213 (English excerpt in 13 Israel YbkHR 348) in which President Shamgar found that “(t)he needs of any territory, 
whether it is under military occupation or otherwise, naturally change with the passage of time and the attending economic development. As 
explained above, the authors of the regulations were not satisfied with a definition of an obligation limited to restoring the previous condition. 
The duration of the military occupation might influence the nature of the needs, and the necessity of performing adjustments and a new 
deployment might grow the longer the duration... The time element influences the range of authorities, whether weighing the needs of the army or 
the needs of the territory, or when forging the balance between the two”.  
See also HCJ 69/81, ibid., at 209, stating that “(t)he provisions of the Hague Convention must be applied to the area in adjustment to 
the circumstances created in the territory as a result of the prolonged occupation thereof ... and with utmost consideration for the needs of the 
area”. 
836 See HCJ 1661/05, Gaza Coast Regional Council et al v. Israeli Knesset et al, at 230, in which it is found that: “However, these 
developments do not divest the military government from that nature (see HCJ 500/72 Maryam Khalil Salem Abu al-Tin v. Defense 
Minister, 27(1) PD 481, 484). They do not blur ‘the difference between a military government and a regular government' (Jam'iyat Iscan 
affair, 803). They do not extend Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to those areas. The temporariness of the belligerent occupation 
and its actual difficulties do not cancel the belligerent occupation. Acting President Shamgar (as was his title at the time) noted correctly in the 
Abu Aita affair that the temporariness of the military governor's authority means that 'its duration and validity are equal to the duration of the 
effective control of the area and the duration of the military government established in the territory”. 
837 See HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, at 800-801, in which Justice Barak held that “(I)n a long-term military occupation, the 
needs of the local population gain extra emphasis ... Therefore, legislative measures that could be inappropriate in a short-term military 
government, might become appropriate in a long-term military government”. 
838 HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel and the Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, 





occupying authority in the lives of the population must be strictly proportionate to the gained 
advantage; then, such balancing approach is not only “well anchored in the humanitarian law of public 
international law” (particularly Article 46 HRs and Article 27 GCIV), but even derives from “general 
principles of law, including reasonableness and good faith” as well as a “general principle of international law”.839 
Even in light of the other three factors challenging the viability of occupation law as detailed 
above, the long-lasting duration of occupation has favoured uncertainties about the sufficiency of 
the traditional regime. In case of persistent occupation the Hague Regulations and the Fourth 
Geneva Convention do not indicate any lawful departure from existing law. Nonetheless, the need 
of specific regulations to respond to practical issues arising in the context of enduring occupations may be 
questioned; many experts agree on the establishment of monitoring and supervisory mechanisms, 
which would guarantee that the occupier is not entrusted with the final decision and which would 
contribute not to give him all the benefit of the doubt in acting for the welfare of the occupied 
population.840  
In this regard, as far as the situation in the Palestinian territories is concerned, the improvements 
to the electricity grid and the construction of highways have been debated as two illustrations of the 
concrete need not to postpone ad infinitum certain decisions “for the benefit of the local population” 
when time and circumstances so demand. While this has been the only case of an enduring occupier 
openly recognising that status,841 other situations that can be deemed prolonged include Turkey’s 
occupation of the northern area of Cyprus and Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara.842 It is 
worth highlighting at this juncture certain details on these two cases.  
 
(2)  As for the former, following the military invasion by Turkey in July and August 1974, the 
Republic of Cyprus has been de facto separated into two areas.843 The northern area is under the 
                                                
839 HCJ 2056/04, ibid., para. 35 and para. 36. For a comment, see M. Koskenniemi, “Occupied Zone - a Zone of 
Reasonableness”, Israel Law Review, 2008, pp. 13-40. 
840 See “Second Meeting of Experts: Delimiting the Rights and Duties of an Occupying Power and the Relevance of 
Occupation Law for UN Administration of Territory”, 15-16 December 2008, Geneva, at 72-78. 
841 The Supreme Court of Israel has recognised this in several decisions on the interpretation and application of 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law in relation to belligerent occupation; some of its past 
and recent case law deals with the effect of the prolonged nature of occupation on the relevant norms. 
842 See GA Res. 34/37, 21 November 1979, preambular para. 9 and paras. 5 and 6 (85 in favour, 6 against, 41 
abstentions); GA Res. 35/19 of 11 November 1980, preambular para. 7 and para. 3 (88 in favour, 8 against, 43 
abstentions).  
843 The military invasion took place when the Greek military regime, as supported by the Cypriot military forces, 
carried out a coup d’etat against the government of Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus. On 20 
July 1974 Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus supposedly to “re-establish the constitutional order” and to protect the 
Turkish Cypriot community. SC Res. 353 (1974) of 20 July 1974 requested, inter alia, the withdrawal of foreign military 
personnel “present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements”. Under the UN auspices unsuccessful peace 





unrecognised, illegitimate, and unilaterally proclaimed “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”; 
whilst the southern area is under the (sole) legitimate government of Cyprus.844 The status of the 
Republic of Cyprus has been reaffirmed, inter alia, by the European Union845 and the Council of 
Europe.846 In the same vein, in decisions on issues which have incidentally questioned the status of 
the TRNC, a number of international and national courts have not recognised its legitimacy and 
have qualified as an occupation the presence of Turkish forces engaged in Cyprus.847  
In the context of such decisions, a number of human rights violations have been found to arise 
out of the enduring military occupation, the persistent division of the territory and the activities of 
                                                                                                                                                            
against Cyprus and occupied 36.02 percent of its northern territory. GA Res. 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974 on the 
“Question of Cyprus” urged all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus and 
urged the “speedy withdrawal” of all foreign armed forces, military presence and personnel from Cyprus. SC Res. 365 
(1974) of 13 December 1974 endorsed the same resolution and urged the parties to implement it immediately; SC Res. 
367 (1975) of 12 May 1975 endorsed both of them. For the qualification of the presence of Turkish forces in the 
northern part of Cyprus as foreign occupation, see in particular GA Res. 33/15, 9 November 1978, preambular para. 6, 
(110 in favour, 4 against, 22 abstentions); GA Res. 34/30 of 20 November 1979, preambular para. 9, (99 in favour, 5 
against, 35 abstentions); GA Res. 37/253 of 13 May 1983, preambular para. 8 and para. 8, (103 in favour, 5 against, 20 
abstentions). 
844 In 1983 the local Turkish Cypriot authorities proclaimed the independence as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” 
(TRNC) and adopted a Constitution, but only Turkey has recognised it as a separate State under international law. GA 
Res. 37/253 of 13 May 1983 deplored that “part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is still occupied by foreign forces” and 
demanded the immediate withdrawal, while the Security Council declared the secession invalid, null, and void in its 
Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), in which it called upon the international community neither to recognise the 
TRNC nor to assist or in any way cooperate with it. See SC Res. S/RES/541 of 18 November 1983, and SC Res. 
S/RES/541 of 11 May 1984. 
845 On 16 November 1983, a statement was adopted by the European Community, which rejected the declaration of 
independence by the Turkish Cypriot leaders and expressed deep concern about the establishment of the TRNC; it also 
supported the sovereignty, unity, and independence of Cyprus. In the same vein, the European Parliament issued 
several resolutions on the political situation in Cyprus and Turkey (e.g., its resolution on the political situation following 
the UN-sponsored talks on Cyprus, 17 September 1997). 
846 In Resolution (83) 13 of 24 November 1983 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, inter alia: (a) 
deplored the declaration of the “purported independence” of the TRNC; (b) acknowledged the unilateral declaration as 
invalid; (c) reiterated its commitment to the Republic of Cyprus as the sole legitimate government.  
847 A number of cases have indeed appeared before national courts in the United States and Europe, as well as before 
the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. See, e.g., Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, Case C-439/92, 5 July 1994, in which the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus was acknowledged over 
the whole island as regards its relations with the European Community. Moreover, four inter-state applications under 
Article 33 ECHR were initiated by Cyprus against Turkey, in addition to several individual applications under the same 
Convention. In particular, see ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), No. 15318/89, Judgment, 23 March 
1995, paras. 62-64; ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, Judgment (merits), 18 December 1996, No. 15318/89, paras. 42-44, 56-
57; ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, No. 25781/94, Judgment (merits), 10 May 2001, paras. 75-76. Indeed, in a number of 
cases the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkey exercises “effective control” over the northern part of 
Cyprus, which engages its legal responsibility under the ECHR: the Court found that since it had “effective overall 
control” over northern Cyprus, Turkey’s responsibility could not “be confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials” therein 
but was “also engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration” which remained reliant on “Turkish military and other 
support”. In elaborating on this issue, the Court affirmed that, in terms of Article 1 ECHR, “Turkey’s jurisdiction must be 
considered to extend to securing the entire range of substantive rights set out in this Convention and those additional protocols which it has 
ratified, and that violations of those rights are imputable to Turkey” (see ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, No. 25781/94, Grand 





the unrecognised TRCN.848 Recurrent abuses have regarded the access, control, use and enjoyment 
of property rights of Greek Cypriots displaced from the occupied northern part of the island, and 
their right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence; they have been often 
recognised as the legitimate owners of the abandoned and expropriated properties and as entitled to 
compensation for the lost use of such properties.849 Moreover, Turkey’s failure of conducting 
effective investigations into the fate and whereabouts of Greek Cypriot missing persons has been 
deemed a continuing violation of Articles 2, 3 and 5 ECHR.850 
Some of these cases have regarded cultural objects.851 Recently, the lack of access to, and 
enjoyment of, religious property belonging to the Greek Orthodox Autocephalous Church of 
Cyprus was claimed to be in violation of Article 1 of the first Protocol of the ECHR as well as in 
violation of Article 9 ECHR (freedom of religion) and Article 11 ECHR (freedom of assembly); this 
was complained in view that Turkish Cypriot authorities had constantly not permitted the Church 
and its parishioners to hold religious services in related places of worship and cemeteries located in 
the northern part of Cyprus. In the same vein, the applicant asserted that numerous properties had 
been vandalized, destroyed, looted or deprived of religious function and that ecclesiastical vessels 
had been damaged or sold.852 However, the European Court found that the complaints regarding 
freedoms of religion and assembly were “closely linked” to the applicant’s inability to enjoy the 
property in question and that domestic remedies had not been exhausted before the Immovable 
                                                
848 See, e.g., European Commission of Human Rights, Cyprus v. Turkey, Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 1976; European 
Commission of Human Rights, Cyprus v. Turkey, No. 8007/77, 1983; British Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Apostolides 
v. Orams, No. A2/2006/2114, 19 January 2010.  
849 See, e.g., ECtHR, Xenides Arestis v. Turkey, No. 46347/99, Judgment (merits) of 22 December 2005 and Judgment (just 
satisfaction) of 7 December 2006. After this case, Law No. 67/2005 established that all natural and legal persons 
asserting rights to immovable or movable property could bring a claim before the Immovable Property Commission, 
which was set up for the compensation, exchange and restitution of such properties (see www.northcyprusipc.org). See 
also ECtHR, Demopoulos and 7 Others  v. Turkey, Nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04, 
19993/04, 21819/04, Decision, 1 March 2010; in paragraph 127 of this decision, the ECtHR held that that 
Commission “provides an accessible and effective framework of redress in respect of complaints about interference with the property owned by 
Greek Cypriots”. 
850  See, e.g., ECtHR, Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 
16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, Grand Chamber, 18 September 2009. Recently, in delivering the 
judgment on just satisfaction in Cyprus v. Turkey, the Grand Chamber held (by a majority) that “Turkey was to pay Cyprus 
30,000,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the relatives of the missing persons, and EUR 60,000,000 in 
respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the enclaved Greek-Cypriot residents of the Karpas peninsula” (see ECtHR, Cyprus v. 
Turkey (just satisfaction), Grand Chamber, Judgment, 12 May 2014, at 20-21). 
851 See, e.g., US Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman 
Fine Arts Inc., 917 F.2d 278, Decision of 24 October 1990. It confirmed the decision of 3 August 1989 by the US District 
Court in Indianapolis. It concerned the ownership of sixth-century mosaics plundered from the Church of Kanakaria 
(located in the occupied northern area of the island). Turkish antiquities “smugglers” had removed these mosaics and 
sold them for $1.2 million to an American art dealer. They were returned to the applicant as the legitimate owner. 
852 ECtHR, Archbishop Chrysostomos II v. Turkey, No. 66611/2009, Decision on admissibility, 4 January 2011. The Court 
held that the Immovable Property Commission “is able both to order restitution of property and to award pecuniary and non- 





Property Commission; accordingly the Court rejected the application for non-exhaustion of 
domestic remedies under Article 35 ECHR. Of note, the inability to access to sites and icons of 
religious and cultural importance has concerned other religious communities, including Jews, 
Armenian Orthodoxs and Maronite Chatolics.853  
For the purpose of the present research, it is worth also considering that in the course of the 
aforementioned military invasion and during the following four decades of occupation several 
religious monuments or archaeological sites have been damaged.854 In addition, historic and 
architectural buildings have been destroyed and artefacts taken from religious sites in the northern 
part of the island have been lost or stolen.855 Regardless of the lawfulness or not of the 1974 conflict 
in Cyprus - the legality of resorting to armed conflict being subject to the UN Charter and jus ad 
bellum - the enduring military occupation and the resulting damage and destruction fall within the 
scope and application of international humanitarian law.  
As regards the specific issue of illicit traffic and exportation of cultural property from such 
territorial area, two conventions may be particularly relevant. The 1970 UNESCO Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property (ratified by Turkey and Cyprus) regards as “illicit” “the export or transfer of ownership 
of cultural property under compulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a country by a foreign 
power”.856 Further, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects (ratified only by Cyprus) may provide for uniform rules for return claims by States or 
restitution claims by individuals. 
 
(3) As for Western Sahara, this is the last remaining colonial territory on the list of Non-Self-
Governing Territories under Chapter XI of the UN Charter since 1963, until which time it had 
been a Spanish protectorate from 1884. 857  Certain aspects of its controversial status under 
                                                
853 See Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the question of human rights in Cyprus, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/19/22, 27 January 2012, paras. 32-37. 
854 Some hearings on the issue of destruction of cultural property were held at the European Parliament (e.g. a public 
hearing on “The protection of Cultural heritage in Cyprus” was organised by the Committee on Culture and Education 
on 11 April 2007, which led to the Motion for a Resolution of the European Parliament B6-0000/2007, 2 May 2007). 
In 2006 the European Parliament adopted a Declaration on the Protection and Preservation of the Religious Heritage 
in the northern part of Cyprus (EUR.PARL. DOC. P6_TA (2006) 0335, 30 August 2006).  
855 See C. Chotzakoglou, Religious Monuments in Turkish-occupied Cyprus. Evidence and Acts of Continuous Destruction, Lefkosia 
2012, 2008, pp. 28-29; Flagellum Dei: The Destruction of the Cultural Heritage in the Turkish occupied part of Cyprus, Nicosia, 
Cyprus: Press and Information Office, 2nd, 1989; M. Jansen, War and Cultural Heritage: Cyprus after the 1974 Invasion, 
Minnesota Mediterranean and Eastern European Monographs XIV, University of Minnesota, 2005. 
856 Article 11. Article 16 requires Contracting Parties to take steps to prevent illicit traffic via legal and administrative 
measures; Article 6 requires them to adopt an export certificate for any exported cultural object. 





international law are discussed here.  
Spain assumed its role as administering power of Western Sahara until 26 February 1976, when 
it informed the Secretary General that it terminated its presence therein and relinquished its 
responsibilities and duties over the Territory, so leaving the latter to de facto administration of 
Morocco and Mauritania in their respective controlled areas.858 Morocco and Mauritania’s claims 
to the Territory under the right to territorial integrity were based on supposed historical ties to 
Western Sahara (prior to the Spanish colonization), but encountered the opposition from the Frente 
Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Polisario Front), which began as an 
insurgent movement in 1973 representing the Saharawi people who claimed independence and 
have been internationally recognised as the political representative of the people of Western Sahara 
since 1979.859 Then, following the withdrawal of Mauritania from the non-self governing territory 
in 1979, Morocco has remained the sole State exercising administrative authority in Western 
Sahara, maintaining de facto control over more than two-thirds of this Territory (which was de facto 
annexed). This formal system of external control appears as a situation of occupation of that area.860 
The existence of any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and 
the Kingdom Morocco or the Mauritanian entity were firmly rejected by the ICJ in its advisory 
opinion in 1975. The Court affirmed the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-
determination, whose “essential feature” was identified in the free choice of a people to determine its 
future territorial status.861  
Regardless of this clear opinion, Morocco has undertaken several unilateral steps denoting a 
constant denial of such a right; its categorical insistence that Western Sahara constitutes an integral 
part of its territory still endures, despite the UN-sponsored solutions advanced over the years.862 
                                                
858 According to the Declaration of Principles on Western Sahara, which was concluded in Madrid between Spain, 
Morocco and Mauritania (“the Madrid Agreement”) on 14 November 1975, the powers and responsibilities of Spain were 
supposed to be transferred to a temporary tripartite administration. However, the Madrid Agreement neither 
transferred sovereignty over the territory nor conferred upon any of the signatories the status of administering power 
(because Spain alone could not transfer unilaterally such authority). Thus, the international status of Western Sahara as 
a Non-Self-Governing Territory was not affected. 
859 In February 1976 the Polisario Front proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, which has become a party 
to the African Union since 1984, whereas Morocco revoked its membership from it in the same year. A guerrilla war for 
independence against Moroccan forces (and also against Mauritania until 1979) was run by the Polisario Front (with the 
support of Algeria) until 1991. 
860 GA Res. 34/37, 21 November 1979, para. 5, deploring the aggravated situation of “continued occupation” of Western 
Sahara. 
861 See ICJ, Western Sahara case, Advisory Opinion, 16 October 1975, paras. 161-162.  
862 For an overview of Morocco’s actions severely impeding the exercise of this right (starting from the “Green March” of 
350.000 unarmed civilians into Western Sahara on 17 October 1975) and of the UN-sponsored solutions, see M. 





Indeed, since the withdrawal of Spain in 1976, a settlement in Western Sahara addressing the 
subsequent fighting between Morocco and the Polisario Front has been searched for. This issue has 
been dealt with both by the Security Council as a question of peace and security,863 and by the 
General Assembly as a question of decolonisation. In particular, the inalienable right of the Sahrawi 
people to self-determination and independence has been consistently recognised by the latter, 
calling for the exercise of this right in accordance with the decolonization principles embodied in its 
two Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV).864 They embody the requirements to give effect to 
Articles 73 and 74 of the UN Charter, which lays down the fundamental principles applicable to 
non-self governing territories.865  
Even the subsequent General Assembly resolutions on the question of implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples are noteworthy 
for the purpose of clarifying the legal regime applicable to Western Sahara.866 In particular, the 
administering Powers were demanded to guarantee that all economic activities in the Non-Self-
Governing Territories concerned did not negatively affect the peoples’ interests, but be directed 
towards assisting them in the exercise of their right to self-determination. They also included 
provisions intended to protect the “inalienable rights” of the peoples of those Territories to their 
natural resources, and to establish and maintain control over the future development of those 
                                                                                                                                                            
Morocco Fisheries Agreement”, in D. French (ed.), Statehood and Self-Determination. Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in 
International Law, Cambridge, 2013, 256-268.  
863 In its early SC Res. 377 (1975) of 22 October 1975 and SC Res. 379 (1975) of 2 November 1975 it requested the 
Secretary General to enter into consultations with the parties. Since 1988 the political process aiming at a peaceful 
settlement of the question of Western Sahara has been on the Security Council’s agenda. SC Res. 690 (1991) established 
the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), aimed at implementing a “Settlement Plan”, 
including a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration 
with Morocco. After years of failed initiatives, some positive developments followed UN-sponsored talks since 2007: 
negotiations started as requested by SC Res. 1754 (2007), the Polisario Front and Morocco submitted their own 
settlement proposals to the UN, though their positions remained far apart on the definition of self-determination. The 
meeting was held in February 2010, but there is still no solution on the core substantive issues. See the Reports of the 
Secretary-General on the situation of Western Sahara, S/2007/619 of 19 October 2007, S/2011/249 of 1 April 2011, 
S/2012/197 of 5 April 2012, S/2013/220 of 8 April 2013. Notably, SC Res. 1920 (2010) addressed the importance of 
“making progress on the human dimension of the conflict as a means to promote transparency and mutual confidence”. 
864 See GA Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
UNGAOR, 15th Sess, (1960); GA Res. 1541 (XV), Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an 
obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter, UNGAOR, 15th Sess., (1960). See also GA 
Res. 1542 (XV), Transmission of information under Article 73e of the Charter, UNGAOR, 15th Sess., (1960). In this vein, GA 
Res. 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965 requested Spain (as “administrating Power” under Chapter XI of the UN Charter) 
to take immediate steps towards the decolonization of Western Sahara in accordance with the right to self-
determination. Then, GA Res. 2229 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 called on Spain, Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria to 
organise a referendum in order to enable the Sahrawi people to freely exercise such a right. 
865 Particularly, the principle that the inhabitants’ interests are prevalent, and that their wellbeing and development is 
the “sacred trust” of their respective administering Powers, which have accepted “the obligation to promote to the utmost” it. 
866 GA Res. 35/118, 11 December 1980; GA Res. 52/78, 10 December 1997; GA Res. 54/91, 6 December 1999; GA 





resources.867 They address the need to protect the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories from 
exploitation and plundering by foreign economic interests.868 A significant distinction has been 
developed between economic activities detrimental to the peoples of such Territories and those 
directed to benefit them, particularly contributing to their socio-economic development. 869  
3. The prohibition to change the legal status of the occupied territory 
One of the types of obligations resting upon the occupier regards the status of the territory and 
primarily arises under general principles of international law, including the prohibition of the use of 
force, equality of States, and non-intervention. In this vein, it is undisputed that the occupation of a 
territory does not affect its legal status: whatever the occupier might claim occupation does not stand for 
any change of status, nor annexation nor “liberation”.870  
This principle is confirmed in Article 4 AP I,871 besides underlying previous sources. It in fact 
                                                
867 GA Res. 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, established the principle 
concerned as the right of peoples and nations to use and dispose of the natural resources in their territories in the interest of their national 
development and well-being. A reaffirmation is contained in the ICESCR, the ICCPR, and in subsequent resolutions, such 
as GA Res. 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 (Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order) and 
GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974 (Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States). 
The principle of “permanent sovereignty over natural resources”, as a corollary to the principle of territorial sovereignty or the 
right to self-determination, is unquestionably part of customary international law. However, its legal scope and 
implications have remained contentious. In the context of Western Sahara, the question discussed in this regard has 
been whether the principle of “permanent sovereignty” prohibits any activities related to natural resources undertaken by an 
administering Power in a Non-Self-Governing Territory, or only those which are undertaken in disrespect of the needs, 
interests and benefits of the people of that Territory. 
Of note is that the 2002 legal opinion by the Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs, requested by the Security 
Council to address the issue about “the legality ... of actions allegedly taken by the Moroccan authorities consisting in the offering and 
signing of contracts with foreign companies for the exploration of mineral resources in Western Sahara”. This issue was analyzed by 
analogy as part of the more general question of whether mineral resource activities in a Non-Self-Governing Territory 
by an administering Power are illegal, as such, or only if conducted in disregard of the needs and interests of the people 
of that Territory. The support for the latter conclusion was explained in the legal opinion in view of the analysis of 
relevant provisions of the UN Charter, GA resolutions, the ICJ case law and States’ practice.  
868 See also GA Res. 48/46 of 10 December 1992 and GA Res. 49/40 of 9 December 1994, adopted under the agenda 
item entitled “Activities of foreign economic and other interests which impede the implementation of the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Territories under Colonial Domination”. It 
reiterated that “the exploitation and plundering of the marine and other natural resources of colonial and Non-Self-Governing Territories by 
foreign economic interests, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, is a threat to the integrity and prosperity of those 
Territories”, and that “any administering Power that deprives the colonial peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the exercise of their 
legitimate rights over their natural resources ... violates the solemn obligations it has assumed under the Charter of the United Nations”.  
869 GA Res. 50/33 of 6 December 1995, para. 2, asserting that “the value of foreign economic investment undertaken in 
collaboration with the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories and in accordance with their wishes in order to make a valid contribution 
to the socio-economic development of the Territories”. This position was reaffirmed, see GA Res. 52/72 of 10 December 1997, 
GA Res. 53/61 of 3 December 1998, GA Res. 54/84 of 6 December 1999, GA Res. 55/138 of 8 December 2000, GA 
Res. 56/66 of 10 December 2001. 
870 See C. Greenwood, “The administration of occupied territory in international law”, in Greenwood, Essays on war in 
international law, 2006, at 353. 
871 Article 4 API reads: “The application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, as well as the conclusion of the agreements provided for 





resonates in several rules of the Hague and Geneva laws, in view of which the occupant is supposed 
to introduce as few changes (i.e. demographical, geographical, political) as possible in order to 
maintain the status quo of the territory at the beginning of occupation. The usufructuary rules 
embodied in Article 55 HRs are emblematic. 872  Similarly, Article 47 GCIV prohibits any 
deprivation of the benefits afforded to “protected persons” under the same Convention which could 
stem, in particular, from “any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions 
or government of the said territory”, or from the annexation of the entire or part of this territory. Another 
significant example is the prohibition of any kind of transfer of the occupant’s population to such 
territory (regardless of whether it was voluntary or forced) under Article 49(6) GCIV, reflective of 
customary international law. 
Occupation does not transfer sovereignty nor denote permanency. The obligation to preserve the 
legal status of the occupied territory primarily precludes the occupant from unilaterally modifying it, 
including by annexing the territory or dismembering it to constitute autonomous and independent 
state entities.873 More generally, such preclusion covers any demographic or territorial modification 
susceptible to create a fait accompli, namely a factual situation on the ground that is irreversible and 
substantially equivalent to an annexation.874  
As anticipated, the scope of this obligation requires consideration in light of the relevance 
acquired by the principle of self-determination in international law since the latter half of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
and this Protocol shall affect the legal status of the territory in question”. See J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, pp. 73-74, also highlighting that the principle follows from the 
inadmissibility of the use of force, as laid down in the UN Charter and elaborated in the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the UN Charter 
(GA Resolution 2625 (XXV)). 
872 Article 55 HRs reads: “The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, 
forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied territory. It must safeguard the capital of these 
properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct”. 
873 Any purported annexation, or agreement for annexation, would be ineffective and would not change the legal status 
of the territory. For example, the transfer of administrative authority over the Territory of Western Sahara to Morocco 
and Mauritania in 1975 did not affect the international status of Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory: 
the 1975 Madrid Agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania did not transfer sovereignty over that Territory, 
nor did it make any of the signatories the administering power of that territory - a status which Spain could not have 
transferred unilaterally: see S/2002/161, Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the 
Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council, 12 February 2002, para. 6. As appropriately highlighted by C. 
Chinkin, however, Morocco’s exercise of de facto administrative authority, assisted by its military control over more than 
two-thirds of the Western Sahara, represents “a formal system of external control”; Morocco occupies that area, see C. 
Chinkin, “Laws of occupation”, op. cit., p. 199. 
874 See ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 
2004, para. 121 (“the construction of the wall and its associated regime has creat(ed) a ‘fait accompli’ on the ground that could well become 






twentieth century.875 Before exploring what this means in relation to the cultural, social and economic 
dimensions of the right to self-determination, it is worth focusing on the general impact of this principle in 
its scope. 
Primarily, the occupant’s de facto control of the foreign territory implies per se an impediment to a 
full enactment of the right to self-determination of the local population.876 This appears tolerated by 
the international community as far as the occupation is temporarily limited and does not 
permanently prejudice the legal status of the occupied territory. In this regard, it is worth 
mentioning that the legitimacy of the Ugandan occupation of the Congolese region of Ituri was 
assessed by the International Court of Justice exclusively under the ius ad bellum and the ius in bello, 
thus implicitly excluding the violation by Uganda of the right to self-determination of the local 
population.877 
Conversely, the principle of self-determination may enhance the obligation to preserve the legal 
status of the occupied territory. While this duty was traditionally justified as necessary to protect the 
status of the sovereign State holding title to the territory prior to the occupation, under 
contemporary international law - and precisely in view of that principle - sovereignty is to be vested 
in the local population living under occupation. Accordingly, any attempts to annex the occupied 
territory or to impose a new legal status from the outside also constitutes, in general terms, a 
violation of its right to self-determination, and, in a more constricted fashion, a violation of an 
external or merely an internal self-determination. 
 
In any case, it is precisely this principle that has substantiated the expansion of the scope of 
application of the obligation to preserve the legal status of the occupied territory and the related 
prohibition from annexing it (or equivalent practices) to the occupied Palestinian territories, 
notwithstanding the absence of State sovereignty exercised over them.878 In this regard, it is worth 
                                                
875 See L. Cardona, “Le principe du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes et l’occupation étrangère”, in Droit du 
pouvoir, pouvoir du droit: Mélanges offerts à Jean Salmon, Bruxelles, 2007, p. 855 ff. 
876 Y. Jung, “In pursuit of Reconstructing Iraq: Does Self-Determination Matter?”, 33 Denver Journal of International Law 
and Policy, 2005, p. 391 ff., at 404.  
877 Antonio Cassese appears to link the legitimacy of occupation, in light of the principle of self-determination, to the 
respect of the norms regulating the use of force; according to Cassese, “self-determination is violated whenever there is a military 
invasion or belligerent occupation of a foreign country, except where the occupation - although unlawful - is of a minimal duration or is solely 
intended as a measure of repelling, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, an armed attack initiated by the vanquished Power and consequently is 
not protracted”. On these issues, see also O. Ben-Naftali, A. Gross, K. Michaeli, “Illegal Occupation: Framing the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2005, p. 551 ff.; Y. Ronen, “Illegal Occupation and 
its Consequences”, Israel Law Review, 2008, p. 201 ff.  
878 The land in question, however, was not open for title acquisition as terra nullius; in this case the sovereignty did reside 





highlighting that the international community has recognised Israel as a legitimate party to the 
negotiations for the solution of the Palestinian question, considering the Israeli involvement as 
essential for any sustainable choice undertaken by the Palestinians. Accordingly, the conduct as 
occupying power has been deemed in violation of their right to the (external) self-determination as 
far as it has overcome the conditions agreed with them879 by attempting to unilaterally affect one of 
the three factual conditions which define the potential State (i.e. permanent population, 
representative authority, defined territory).880 Notably, several UN political organs have condemned 
the implicit annexation of East Jerusalem881 and the practices and policy of settlements in the 
Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, which have resulted “in changing the 
legal status and geographical nature” and substantially shaping the demographic composition of 
those territories;882 resulting in a critical depletion of natural resources, especially water resources, 
thereby threatening an irreparably impoverishment of the soil on which the future State should 
stand.  
Along with such settlements, the Israeli construction of the “security fence” since 2002 has been 
deemed to alter the demographic composition of those territories (inasmuch as it has contributed to 
the departure of Palestinians from certain areas), thus impeding severely the exercise of their right to 
self-determination. Besides censuring the wall as able to create a factual situation irreversible and 
substantially equivalent to an annexation, the International Court of Justice has deemed it an 
element that subtracts a part of the territory to the availability of Palestinians and prevents the 
maintenance of those links between different communities on which a developing union State relies, 
de facto unilaterally reducing the space within which the concerned population can exercise such 
right.883  
                                                                                                                                                            
an analysis on this point, see N. Berman, “Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law”, 7 
Wisconsin International Law Journal, 1988, pp. 51-91.  
879 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 
162, in which the Court refers to the Roadmap approved by SC Res. 1515 (2003). 
880 See F. Gareau, “Shouting at the Wall: Self-determination and the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, LJIl, 2005, p. 489 ff., 507 ff. 
881 See Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel of 30 July 1980, in www.mfa.gov.il, which declares Jerusalem “complete and 
united” capital of the State of Israel, though without explicitly establishing the annexation of the east part of the city. 
882 See SC Res. 446 (1979), particularly paras. 1 and 3, determining that “the policy and practices of Israel in establishing 
settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction to 
achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East”, and calling upon “Israel, as the occupying power, to abide 
scrupulously by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, to rescind its previous measures and to desist from taking any action which would result 
in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 
1967, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories”. See also 
SC Res. 452 (1979) and SC Res. 465 (1980), in particular paras. 5 and 8. 
883 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 
122. The Court recalled that “the planned route would incorporate in the area between the Green 1ine and the wall more than 16 per 





It is noteworthy that, even recently, the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people - 
viewed as “including the right to determine how to implement self-determination, the right to have a demographic and 
territorial presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources” 
- has been explicitly deemed violated through the existence and ongoing expansion of Israeli 
settlements.884  
Thus, it appears that the practice of one of the most debated cases of long-standing occupation 
lays emphasis on the significance as well as the necessity of considering the scope of the obligation to 
preserve the legal status of the occupied territory in light of the principle of self-determination as articulated in 
its economic, social and cultural dimensions (rather than the political claim to independent statehood). 
Nonetheless, the legitimacy of measures and activities that are potentially capable of compromising 
the legal status of the occupied territory in view of such dimensions (e.g. the exploitation of natural 
resources, the settlements policies) can be examined even under other obligations ensuing from the 
law of occupation. 
Conversely, it is worth noting that the principle of self-determination may diminish the rigidity of 
the conservationist premises of this regime.885 In this vein, the respect for the will of the people living 
under a situation of protracted occupation should be taken into due account by the occupying 
power when reviewing whether the local laws in force ought to be reformed or modified to 
accommodate views of dynamic social, economic and political forces in the occupied territory.886  
4. The obligation to restore and ensure public order and life in occupied 
territory  
Not being the sovereign of the affected territory the occupant is allowed to exercise therein a de facto 
                                                                                                                                                            
settlers (that is 320,000 individuals) would reside in that area, and also 237,000 Palestinians. The Court added that, as a 
result of such a construction, around 160,000 other Palestinians would live in almost entirely “encircled communities”. 
Therefore, the Court concluded that “the route chosen for the wall gives expression in loco to the illegal measures taken by lsrael with 
regard to Jerusalem and the settlements, as deplored by the Security Council”. Furthermore, the Court highlighted the additional risk 
of “further alterations to the demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory resulting from the construction of the wall 
inasmuch as it is contributing (as explained in paragraph 133) to the departure of Palestinian populations from certain areas”. Thus, it was 
determined that such a construction, together with previously adopted measures, “severely impedes the exercise by the 
Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, and is therefore a breach of Israel's obligation to respect that right”. 
884 See Report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East 
Jerusalem, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/63, 7 February 2013, paras. 32-38.  
885 R. Kolb, “Étude sur l’occupation et sur l’article 47 de la IVème Convention de Genève du 12 aout 1949 relative à la 
protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre: le degree d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé”, 10 AfYbkIL, 
2002, 267, p. 313. 





authority to satisfy its military exigencies as well as furthering civil life, provided that such exercise is 
not prohibited by the laws of occupation and is compatible with international law. 
In restraining its legislative capacity that has been transferred, Article 43 HRs legitimises a 
limited authority of the military commander administering the occupied territory to comply with its 
positive obligations to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, “l’ordre et la vie publique” therein, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. In the precursors to this 
article, namely the Brussels Convention of 1874 (which never entered into force), these basic 
obligations were encompassed in two provisions (Arts. 2 and 3),887 then combined into the single 
text of 1907; this integration corroborates that the occupant’s legislative powers and the obligation 
to respect local laws are part of general principles.888  
Of note is that Article 43 HRs has been acknowledged as declaratory of customary international 
law.889 Several legal scholars have confirmed this view.890 
4.1. The meaning of the expression “vie publique” 
The official French version of this provision refers to “l’ordre et la vie publics”, and criticisms that the 
first English translation, namely “public order and safety”, did not accurately convey the meaning of the 
original are well known.891 The latter indeed embraces all aspects of public or civil life, rather than solely 
security and public order. Evidence of this wider interpretation is found in the legislative history of 
                                                
887 These two provisions evoked the occupant’s extensive legislative authority and a limited possibility to modify the 
existing laws concerning circumstances of necessity.  
888 See E.H. Schwenk, “Legislative Power of the Military Occupant under Article 43, Hague Regulations”, 54 Yale Law 
Journal, 1945, p. 397; M. Sassoli, “Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers”, 
EJIL, 2005, pp. 663-664; Y. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 90-91; Y. Arai-
Takahashi, The Law of Occupation, op. cit., 2009, pp. 93-96. 
889 See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, Nuremberg, 30 
September and 1 October 1946, p. 65 (reprinted in 41(1) AJIL, 1947, pp. 248-249). See ICJ, Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, paras. 89 and 124. The Israeli 
High Court of Justice has also acknowledged the applicability and justiciability of the 1907 Hague Regulations in view 
of their customary value, see the Beth-El case (HCJ 606/78, Ayub at al v. Minister of Defence et al.) and the Bekaot case (HCJ 
610/78, Matawa et al. v. Minister of Defence et al.), 33(2) PD, 113, both summarised in Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 1979, 
pp. 337-342); see also HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, 785, 793. See Shamgar (ed.), Military Government in the Territories 
Administered by Israel: the Legal Aspects, 1982. 
890 See G. Von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory - A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation, 1957, 
pp. 10-12; E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 1993, p. 8; D. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice - The Supreme 
Court of Israel ad the Occupied Territories, 2002, p. 57; M. Sassoli, “Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil 
Life by Occupying Powers”, EJIL, 2005, p. 663. For analysis of the recognition of the customary law status of the 
Hague Regulations by municipal Courts, see Morgenstern, “Validity of Acts of the Belligerent Occupant”, 28 BYIL, 
1951, 291, p. 292. 
891 See E.H. Schwenk, “Legislative Power of the Military Occupant under Article 43, Hague Regulations”, 54 Yale Law 
Journal, 1945, 393, at 397, aptly suggesting that a more comprehensive phrase was “public order and civil life”. Such 
critique is endorsed by many scholars, see E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 1993, p. 9; M. MacDougal 
and F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 1961, p. 746; D. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice - The Supreme 





this article: according to the explanation proposed by Baron Lambermont at the time of the Brussels 
Conference of 1874, “la vie publique” encompasses “des fonctions sociales, des transactions ordinaires, qui 
constituent la vie de tous les jours” - “social functions, ordinary transactions which constitute daily life”.892 Legal 
scholarship has also relied on this broad interpretation by referring to several elements concerning 
the welfare of the civilian population.893 
Significantly, an extensive meaning of the French phrase “l’ordre et la vie publics” has been 
endorsed by several judicial bodies. After the World War II, it was interpreted as “the whole social, 
commercial and economic life of the community”.894 Then, a similar approach was taken by the Israeli High 
Court of Justice. Primarily, the French version was deemed to imply that the occupier’s duty is not 
narrowed to prevent breaches of public order, rather encompassing the duty to restore and ensure “the whole 
social, commercial and economic life of the community”.895 However, while a wide interpretation of public 
life was agreed, the judges disagree on the way to appraise whether the measures are truly adopted to 
ensure civil life.896 In focusing on the motive behind the measure (i.e. if adopted for the good of the 
                                                
892 Baron Lambermont was the Belgian representative at the negotiations for the “Brussels Declaration”, which codified 
several old norms of international humanitarian law, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Belgique, Actes de la 
Conférence de Bruxelles de 1874 sur le projet d’une convention international concernant la guerre, protocols des séances plénières, protocols de 
la Commissionn déléguée par la conference, annexes, 1874, at 23, reproduced in E.H. Schwenk, op. cit., at 393. 
893 See E.H. Schwenk, “Legislative Power of the Military Occupant under Article 43, Hague Regulations”, 54 Yale Law 
Journal, 1945, at 393, and 400-401; G. Von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory - A Commentary on the Law and Practice of 
Belligerent Occupation, 1957, at 97; M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, Yale University 
Press, 1961, reprinted as idem, The International Law of War - Transnational Coercion and World Public Order, 1994, at 746; L. 
Oppenheim, “International Law: A Treatise”, in H. Lauterpacht (ed.), Vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality7, Longmans 
Green and Co., 1963, at 434; T. Meron, “Applicability of Multilateral Conventions to Occupied Territories”, 72 AJIL, 
1978, 542, at 549; E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 1993, at 9; D. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice - The 
Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories, 2002, at 58-59. 
894 See Control Commission Court of Criminal Appeal, established at the British Zone of Control in Germany, Grahame 
v. The Director of Prosecutions, 26 July 1947, Case No.103, Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, Vol. 14, 
1947, 228, at 232. Nonetheless, this Tribunal clarified that the Military Government of Germany set up by the four 
Allied Powers was “unprecedented” as it represented “the supreme organs of government in Germany”, and that the legislative 
power of the Control Council and the Zone and Sector Commanders were not limited by the restrictions under the 
Hague Convention regarding belligerent occupation, see ibid., at 233. 
895 See HCJ 337/71, Christian Society for Holy Places v. Minister of Defence, 26(1) PD 574, (case summarised in Israel Yearbook 
on Human Rights, 1972, p. 354). This was the first published decision dealing with the Occupied Palestinian Territories: it 
dealt with an amendment introduced by the military commander into the Jordanian Labour Law to facilitate 
mandatory arbitration of labour disputes. The petitioner, which was a charitable organization running a hospital in 
Bethlehem and implicated in a dispute with the hospital stuff, argued to the Court that the amendment to the Jordanian 
Law exceeded the occupier’s powers under Article 43 HRs.  
896 This important aspect of the judgment will be considered hereafter. The majority agreed on focusing on the motive 
behind the measure (if it is adopted for the good of the population then it would be considered as necessary to ensure 
civil life); conversely, the minority highlighted the distinction between “restoring” and “ensuring” public order and civil 
life (the test for the legitimacy of the measures is the situation existing before the occupation began: the occupier cannot 
introduce innovations even if its motive is to advance the welfare of the local population, and “ensuring measures must not 
change the nature of public order and civil life that were restored”). These two perspectives reflect radically distinct approaches to 
the status and role of the military government in occupied territory. Both approaches seem tricky: the one of the 
“benevolent occupant” would cover far-reaching changes in occupied territory under the pretext of measures taken for the 





population then it would be deemed necessary to ensure civil life), the Court finally endorsed the 
view of the “benevolent occupant” who considers the changing circumstances in the occupied territory 
and adopts the measures needed to further the civil life of the local population (taken as its general 
welfare).  
Notably, in a later decision the same High Court described the term “public life” to include 
“conducting a proper administration on all its branches accepted nowadays a well-functioning country, including 
security, health, education, welfare, and also, inter alia, quality of transportation …”.897 Furthermore, it was 
affirmed that Article 43 HRs “extends to the public order and life in all their aspects . . . such as economic, social, 
educational, hygienic [sic], medical, traffic and similar matters that are connected with life in a modern society”;898 
according to the Court’s theory, the military government may determine the notion of “proper 
administration” and of its powers as concepts that are suited to “a modern and civilized state at the end of the 
twentieth century”, rather than measured by the laissez-faire governance (traditionally prevalent at the 
time of the adoption of the Hague Regulations).899 
Overall, the potential of widening the parameters of the concept “vie publique” should be noted. 
This may be a suitable way for adapting the occupant’s measures to meet specific needs and 
interests of the civilian population in the area of ESC rights. In this vein, it seems reasonable to 
contend the coherence of such approach with a contemporary interpretation of Article 43 HRs that 
aptly takes into serious account the evolution of the law. In particular, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, Protocol I and international human rights law may require the occupier’s action in 
areas wider than the mere maintenance of public order and safety, eventually supporting the local 
authorities in the administration of the occupied territory, so as to protect the local population. 
Indeed, besides the duty to prevent, investigate and prosecute violations of civil rights,900 negative and 
                                                                                                                                                            
which social and economic conditions mostly remain as they were at the beginning of the occupation, but it would not 
endure in a protracted occupation with changing social, economic and political circumstances. 
897 See HCJ 202/81, Tabib et al., v. (a) Minister of Defence, (b) Military Governor of Tulkarem, 36(2) PD 622, at 629, English 
excerpt in 13 Israel YbkHR, 1983, 364. The case concerned the expropriation of land for construction of a road to 
circumvent a town. 
898 See HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, para. 18, at 19 - English summary in 14 Israel YbkHR, 1984, 301, at 306. The 
case concerned the construction of high-speed motorways. The case law of the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court 
of Justice with regard the military commander’s power is anchored in this judgment, as is highlighted in the following 
sections. 
899 See HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, at 800. 
900 This primarily implies the obligation to prevent, investigate and prosecute violations of the civil rights of local 
inhabitants as victims of crimes perpetrated by State and non-State organs in the occupied territory, see ICJ, Congo v. 
Uganda, op. cit., para. 178 (“The Court thus concludes that Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri at the relevant time. As such it was 
under an obligation, according to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, to take all the measures in its power to restore, and ensure, as 
far as possible, public order and safety in the occupied area, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the DRC. This 
obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, 





positive obligations concerning ESC rights are established upon the occupier, as previously anticipated in section 
2 and detailed in the following section 4.2. 
In this context the jurisprudence of the Israeli High Court of Justice remains noteworthy. In 
assessing the public welfare of the Palestinian population, this Court has often taken into specific 
consideration their substantial interests regarding economic and social welfare. As far as the supply of 
electricity on the West Bank is concerned, however, two famous cases have shown different judicial 
approaches to the occupier’s measures dealing with such interests, which ended up widening or 
restricting the scope of governmental powers under Article 43 HRs.901 In one case the Court 
determined that attaching the West Bank city of Hebron to the Israeli national electricity network 
was a military commander’s decision taken in respect of the welfare of the local population as it 
would assure a reliable source of electricity, thus deeming it an act taken to ensure “civil life”.902 
Conversely, in another case the Court affirmed the unlawfulness of the military commander’s 
decision to place the supply of electricity to East Jerusalem and part of the West Bank in the hands 
of a supplier from outside the occupied territories (i.e. the Israeli Electricity Company instead of the 
local Jerusalem company) since its implications were beyond economic and technical aspects.903 
Here, the benefit of the local population was not measured in sole terms of economic development and 
social welfare, but also took into account political interests (i.e. it could be worse off receiving a 
steady supply of electricity from a national company than it would be receiving an inferior supply 
from a local company). Moreover, it was addressed that the temporary nature of the military 
government in essence requires him to generally refrain from changes that have extensive and 
                                                
901 For a broad discussion of the two models of judicial decision-making illustrated in these two cases in which the 
authorities claim that measures adopted to serve political interest of Israel further the welfare of the local population, see 
D. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice. The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories, State University New York 
Press, 2002, pp. 64-68. 
902 See HCJ 256/72, Electric Corporation for Jerusalem District Ltd. v. Minister of Defence et al., 27(1) PD 124, at 22, excerpted in 
5 Israel YbkHR, 1975, 381 (herein after Hebron Electricity case). As aptly addressed by David Kretzmer, the Court followed 
the approach of the “benevolent occupant” primarily adopted in the Christian society case, but, as opposed to that case, there 
were clear political implications in the occupier’s decision to make the residents of Hebron dependent on an Israeli 
supplier of electricity; not only was the occupier’s decision not taken solely for the benefit of the population, but the 
latter was not the “dominant factor” either in that decision. Moreover, apart from the arguable economic benefits to the 
residents of Hebron, the effect of making them dependent on an Israeli supplier was certainly not in their political 
interests. See D. Kretzmer, op. cit., at 65. 
903 HCJ 351/80, Jerusalem District Electricity Company v. (a) Minister of Energy and Infrastructure, (b) Commander of the Judea and 
Samaria Region, 35(2) PD 673, at 692, excerpted in 11 Israel YbkHR, 1981, 354. The local Palestinian company challenged 
the validity of the two acquisition orders issued by the military commander by arguing that they violated Article 43, 
given the duty upon him to preserve the status quo without introducing drastic changes. Moreover, the motive of the 
occupant was identified as being the intention to tie local residents to the Israel Electricity Company, rather than 






Remarkably, both methods accepted that the legitimacy of those measures depended on whether 
they were taken for the benefit of the population; however, in one case the Court ignored the political 
reasons behind them and emphasised the short-term material benefit to the local population, while 
in the other case the temporariness of the military regime was deemed a serious limit to its 
governmental powers and the welfare of the local population was not relegated to questions of 
material benefit.905 
4.2. Restoring and ensuring civil life: nature and implications for ESC rights 
As is generally addressed in legal literature, restoring and ensuring public order and civil life is an obligation of 
means, since these two concepts represent just aims that the occupier pursues with lawful, available, 
and proportionate906 measures. It demands positive actions, specifically by the executive and the 
judicial branch of the military government. The qualifications in Article 43 HRs “all the measures in 
his power” and “as far as possible” do corroborate this view.  
A further relevant classification on this general obligation was laid down by Justice Shamgar of 
the Israeli High Court: the duty to “restore” public order and safety would be an “immediate and 
primary” duty, while the duty to “ensure” public order and safety would be “subsequent and continuous” 
during the occupation and would necessitate adjustment in accordance with changing social needs 
concerning security, economy, health and transport.907 It is likely that the second obligation 
becomes mostly relevant as the occupation persists for a very long time and when the occupier faces 
matters mainly connected to the changeable needs and ordinary life of local inhabitants (rather than 
to combat-like situations). 
The opinion that in certain instances an occupier is even “obliged” to enact legislation intended 
to “ensure … public order and civil life” has been suggested in earlier legal scholarship.908 Subsequent 
                                                
904 As David Kretzmer commented, “this decision was a voice in the wilderness”, see Kretzmer, “The law of belligerent 
occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel”, 94 IRRC, 2012, at 219. 
905 See D. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, 2002, p. 67-68. 
906 Proportion is particularly required as concerns the population’s interest to have civil life restored and maintained and 
the possible adverse impact of the occupier’s means on the same population.  
907 See HCJ 69/81, Abu Aita et al. v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region et al, Judgment of 5 April 1983 37(2) PD 197, 
at 213, English excerpt in 13 Israel YbkHR 348, at 356-357. The twofold requirement (restoring public order/restoring 
and ensuring civil life) contained in the general obligation of Article 43 was actually highlighted even with respect to the 
first case on the Palestinian territories, see HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, in Israel YbkHR 301, at 306. 
908 See A. Leurqui, “L’occupation allemande en Belgique et l’article 43 de la Convention de la Haye du 18 octobre, 
1907”, 1916, 1 International Law Notes, at 54-55, observing that “… lorsque l’occupation se prologue, lorsque, par suite de la guerre, 
la situation économique et sociale du pays occupé subit des changements profonds, il est bien évident que le nouvelles measures législatives 





judicial practice confirms this, as is suggested in a dictum by the United States Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, which articulated the affirmative obligation on the occupant to implement good 
administration in the occupied territory.909  
 
Several specific prohibitions laid down in the Forth Geneva Convention limit the measures allowed 
for the occupier in the exercise of its powers. It proscribes collective punishments (Art. 33), 
deportations (Art. 49), coercion (Art. 31), torture (Art. 32), the taking of hostages (Art. 34), and the 
destruction of property belonging to the enemy such as house demolitions (Art. 53).910  
Certain suggestions on what “civil life” represents and what measures may or must be adopted to 
restore and ensure it are found in occupation law. In the Hague Regulations, relevant provisions 
deal with family rights, property and religious practice (Art. 46), taxation, contributions and 
requisitions (Arts. 48-52), public property (Arts. 53, 55, 56). Relevant rules in the Forth Geneva 
Convention have been detailed above (Art. 55 on food and medical supplies; Art. 56 on hygiene and 
public health; Art. 57 on hospitals; Arts. 59-62 on relief; Art. 58 on spiritual assistance; Arts. 51-52 
on working conditions, labour market measures and related prohibitions; Art. 50(3) on certain 
dimensions of education). Protocol I includes Art. 69 on relief and Arts. 63-64(3) on civil defence.  
In covering a range of the ESC rights of the protected local population, these IHL provisions 
impose fundamental duties that do not have a purely negative nature, rather they consist of due 
diligence obligations on the occupier according to its actual capacities and means, though their meaning is not 
elaborated much. Being the occupier not the sovereign ruler the required standards of action may 
appear lower than the ones States are expected to comply with under international human rights 
law. Nonetheless, the extension of such IHL obligations may be questioned in view of the context on 
the ground, in particular whether the latter requires restrictive or expansive approaches to interpret 
their normative content. Inevitably the answer is informed by Article 43 HRs alongside the 
emerging practice; indeed, those rules are properly interpreted in view of the principles and 
objectives anchored in this “mini-constitution” of occupation law.  
                                                                                                                                                            
International Law”, in E. Playfair (ed.), International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories - Two Decades of Israeli 
Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1992, Ch. 7, 241, at 246. 
909 See US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 8 July 1947 - 19 February 1948, Trial of Wilhelm List and Others (Hostage Trial), 
1949, 8 LRTWC 34, at 57 (Section IV “The Status of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Norway, and the Partisan Group Operating Therein, 
at the Relevant Time”), in which the Tribunal held that “(t)he status of an occupant of the territory of the enemy having been achieved, 
International Law places the responsibility upon the commanding general of preserving order, punishing crime, and protecting lives and property 
within the occupied territory. His power in accomplishing these ends is as great as his responsibility. But he is definitely limited by recognised 
rules of International Law, particularly the Hague Regulations of 1907”. 
910 Pursuant to Article 53 GCIV, “(a)ny destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or 
collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where 





4.2.1. The occupier’s legislative competence and the context  
In the exercise of his legitimate powers, the interpretation of the scope of positive measures, actions, policies 
or efforts to restore and ensure civil life - including implementing the aforementioned due diligence 
obligations on ESC rights - appears contingent to several contextual factors, and, at a minimum, at least 
the following three. 
4.2.1.a. Control over the territory 
Firstly, the intensity of control plays an essential role in determining the scope of the occupier’s 
measures or efforts. The presence of enemy troops or armed resistance movements therein may 
reduce its capacity to meet the needs of the local inhabitants, but a major commitment in the 
ordinary administration of the territory, in the interest of the protected population, may follow to a gradual 
pacification of the area concerned.911 As long as the occupant shares the exercise of powers with 
independent local authorities, it appears that the due diligence nature of such obligations implies 
that the responsibility for omissions by the latter may arise to the extent it fails to supervise their 
conduct.  
4.2.1.b. Resources available in the occupied territory 
Secondly, the actual availability of resources constitutes another factor to which the occupier’s positive 
measures or policies remain contingent. Besides the qualifications in Article 43 HRs “all the measures 
in his power” and “as far as possible”, other major provisions covering ESC rights specifically require to 
implement its obligations “to the fullest extent of the means available to it”.912 Moreover, the occupant may 
rely on the proceeds of taxes imposed on behalf of the State, or even impose extraordinary 
contributions, so as to meet the needs of the protected local population, whose tax raising capacities 
might be seriously compromised by the contextual emergency that exists. If this is the case, the 
occupier is required to integrate available resources with its own, or to accept eventual offers 
coming from third-party States and international organizations.913  
In any case, a rational use of available resources is established, taking into account all the exigencies to 
be met in the occupied territory, namely the needs of the local population and those of the 
                                                
911 R. Kolb and S. Vité, Le droit de l’occupation militaire, Bruxelles, 2009, p. 392 ff.  
912 Arts. 55 and 56 GCIV; Art. 69 API. Article 2 ICESCR provides a similar formulation by requiring to States parties 
“to take steps […] to the maximum of (their) available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights 
recognised in the present Covenants”. 
913 Arts. 59 ff. GCIV; Arts. 70 ff. API. On humanitarian assistance in the occupied territory, see Zorzi Giustiniani, 
“Responsabilità di governo dell’occupante e diritto all’assistenza umanitaria: il caso iracheno”, Dir. Pub. Comp. Eur., 





occupying forces therein. The temporariness of occupation by nature does not allow it to undertake 
long-term projects that imply durable planning choices or legislative reforms,914 rather it permits 
measures necessary and urgent to maintain a protection level similar to that previously guaranteed 
by the ousted government of the occupied State.  
Even though certain circumstances of occupation (such as its prolonged duration) may raise the 
need of deeper improving and adjusting positive efforts and actions, their legitimacy would depend 
on their being strictly critical so as not to render meaningless the rights safeguarded under 
occupation law.915 However, such circumstances may even controversially affect the use of natural 
resources in the occupied territory, as proven by certain issues of interpretation that have surfaced 
regarding the rules on the management of property. Relevant practice has particularly concerned 
the occupier’s investments and projects whose supposed object was to benefit the local population 
for developing the economy in the occupied territory (and not strictly necessary for supplying the 
same population).916 This will be examined in the following section 6. 
4.2.1.c. Time period of occupation 
Thirdly, the temporal dimension represents another factor to which the occupant’s positive measures or 
policies remain contingent. The notions of public order, safety, and civil life are likely to evolve over 
time, especially when combat-like situations are followed by a quasi-absence of hostilities, so arises a 
need to adjust the interpretation of the traditional laws of occupation to keep benefiting the protected local population. 
Conversely, the occupier’s authority remains limited by precise prohibitions and obligations under 
international law. As anticipated above (section 2.2.d.), an “inherent dilemma” on such an authority is 
that the extended duration of an occupation may be invoked to favour either a more flexible or more 
restrictive application of occupation law, thus recognising the extensive powers of the occupant or 
limiting its discretion.  
A crucial consideration, however, is that the longer an occupier maintains its presence in the 
                                                
914 R. Kolb and S. Vité, op. cit., at 396. On the prohibition to modify existing laws, see next section 5. 
915 See S. Vité, “The Interrelation of the Law of Occupation and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Examples 
of Food, Health and Property”, IRCR, 2008, at 629 ff., at 634. See also CESCR, Comment No. 3, paras. 10, 12. 
916 Of particular relevance is the approach followed by the Supreme Court of Israel in several cases. Article 43 HRs 
would allow the occupier long-lasting investments provided they are beneficial for the development of the economy in the 
occupied territory and they do not introduce changes into the basic institutions therein. In this vein, Article 43 would 
not only set up a minimum standard for the protection of public order and civil life, but it would also establish a 
maximum standard, in a way that only those initiatives taken by the occupier beyond the latter standard might be 
deemed as unlawful. The principal case in which the Court’s approach was articulated is that of the Jami’at Ascan case, 
in which the building of a highway was deemed legitimate. Controversial case law has nonetheless surfaced concerning 
the issue of stone quarries in the West Bank, see HCJ 9717/03, Naale v. Supreme Planning Council in Judea and Samaria; HCJ 





foreign territory and the more its policies and practices advance, the more the limits established by 
occupation law tend to weaken.917 Accordingly, it remains controversial to which extent the long 
duration of occupation may be invoked to allow for a permissive application of this regime, 
especially of IHL provisions on the “preservation of the status quo” in this territory. A substantial risk 
of such an application in fact remains: adjusting those provisions in a way that accommodates the 
contextual peculiarities but simultaneously circumvents the basic boundaries set by occupation law.  
Therefore, contending that the occupier “has to provide more” for the occupied population the 
longer it remains in the foreign territory poses a key issue: the legal contours of such an obligation and 
the ways in which it may be guaranteed that its conduct is in good faith and its intention is to serve 
“the benefit of local population”, without upholding the occupation indeterminately for its own 
benefits or undertaking measures otherwise prohibited in short-terms occupations (i.e. measures 
insisting on “development” as opposed to “maintenance” in accordance with the conservationist 
principle).918 
 
In this regard, in dealing (directly or indirectly) with the ESC rights of a protected population 
living under enduring occupation, certain case law before national courts deserves great attention. 
To be exact, the prolonged character of the Israeli occupation919 has been invoked by the High 
Court of Israel to justify the implementation of infrastructure projects with enduring effects on the 
Palestinian territories, such as the construction of high-speed motorways (the Jami’at Ascan case)920 or 
high capacity electrical lines (the Hebron Electricity case). 921  Recently the protraction of the 
occupation has been raised in another case concerning the activities for the exploitation of quarries 
therein (i.e. the Yesh Din case, which has been critically debated for reasons of judicial inaccurate 
                                                
917 For this reason, Christopher Greenwood highlighted that international law’s regulation of belligerent occupations 
should be developed towards “bringing about an end to the conflict which produced the occupation, not in trying to turn a body of law 
designed to ensure that a military regime observes basic standards of humanity into a device for establishing a liberal democracy or other long-
term solution”, see C. Greenwood, “The Administration of Occupied Territory in International law”, in E. Playfair (ed.), 
International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories, Clarendon Press, 1992. 
918 The presumption of good faith may result very difficult to maintain in unstable and precarious situations in which 
trust between enemies in war is inevitably absent and which are featured by long-standing practice of domination and 
exploitation of foreign territory.  
919 For a recent contribution demonstrating the illegality of this occupation, see O. Ben-Naftali, “PathoLAWgical 
Occupation: Normalizing the Exceptional Case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Other Legal Pathologies”, in 
O. Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford, 2011, pp. 129-200. 
According to the author, who considers the Israeli occupation as “a conquest in disguise” (at 158), the annexation of East 
Jerusalem, the establishment and expansion of settlements in the West Bank, the extensive confiscation of Palestinian 
land, and the construction of the wall evidently indicate the intention of Israel to retain its control over the occupied 
territory ad infinitum. 
920 See HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case. The extent of legislation that could be adopted during prolonged occupation 
was an issue specifically raised. 





interpretation (i.e. a misunderstanding) of the laws of occupation, as detailed in the section 6).922 
Notwithstanding the final judgements, it is exactly from this case law that a clarification seems to 
emerge regarding the view that the long duration of occupation does constitute a factor enhancing the obligations 
imposed by Article 43 HRs. In other words, it contributes to show that the continuation of occupation 
in fact creates new restraints on the standard of action of the occupier. As such, the duration of 
occupation would allow for restrictive application of IHL provisions on the preservation of the status 
quo in the occupied territory. Accordingly, the impact of such a temporal dimension on the military 
commander’s discretion concretely consists in establishing further limits to his legitimate powers and 
recognising increased and expanded obligations on him for the benefit of the protected local population.  
 
Focusing on this case law, the following remarks deal mostly with the use of the protracted character of 
occupation in the Court’s legal reasoning, while other considerations on the same cases will be articulated 
in other sections of the present chapter. 
(1) In the Jami’at Ascan case, the central issue before the Court was whether the occupant could 
undertake a project “that has permanent implications” reaching “beyond the time limits of the military 
government itself”.923 
Referring primarily to Article 43 HRs, the Court stated that the distinction between short-term 
and long-term occupations influences the scope of “the public order and life”924, significantly admitting 
in the same paragraph that “the time dimension can be taken into account when considering proper policy in cases 
in which there is room for policymaking within the Regulations themselves”. It is worth highlighting that this 
consideration does not mean that the duration would impose to adjust every rule of the Hague 
Regulations regardless of whether the phrasing of a specific rule allows for it or not.  
Then, the Court explicitly asserted that “(t)he life of a population, like the life of an individual, is not 
static but is in a perpetual movement that contains development, growth and change. A military government cannot 
ignore this. It may not freeze life. … The Military Government’s authority therefore extends to taking measures 
necessary for growth, change and progress. The conclusion is that a military government may develop industry, trade, 
agriculture, education, health and welfare services and similar matters of proper administration that are necessary for 
                                                
922 See HCJ 2164/09, “Yesh Din” - Volunteers for Human Rights v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank and others, 
Judgment of 26 December 2011.  
923 HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, at 17, para. 16. 
924 See HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, at 23-24, para. 22 affirming that “military and security needs predominates in a short-
term military occupation” while “the needs of the local population gain weight in a long-term military occupation”. Therefore for the 
Court, “legislative measures (such as new taxation or a new rate of taxation for an existing tax) that might be improper for a short-term 






securing the changing needs of a population in an area subject to belligerent occupation”.925  
Although limits to such measures rest on the temporary character of the military government, 
being the occupier not the sovereign ruler, 926  the Court asserted that investments favouring 
development and growth in the occupied territory but simultaneously leading to persisting changes 
therein “are permitted if they are reasonably required for the needs of the local population”.927 This margin of 
appreciation was deemed reflected in Article 43 HRs (under which the occupier has to take “all 
measures in its power” to ensure “as far as possible” public order and life).928 To the Court, no obligation 
to adopt far-reaching measures for the development of the occupied territory exists upon the 
military commander, but the latter may choose to make fundamental investments and this option 
will rely on factors such as the occupier’s “physical capacity, the manpower (military and civilian) at its 
disposal and its monetary resources”.929 
In linking Article 46 HRs (regarding expropriation of private property, as it cannot be 
confiscated) to Article 43 HRs, the Court found that the high-speed motorway construction plan, as 
well as the expropriations necessary for its realisation, were in compliance with the Hague 
Regulations.930  
Remarkably, two relevant faults in the Court’s reasoning and consideration about the time 
dimension of the occupation may be highlighted. Firstly, the influence of the prolonged character of 
occupation was not envisaged for the restraints on the occupier’s authority (as imposed by the 
temporary - hence non-sovereign - character of the occupation). This may be problematic: the 
longer an occupation continues and the wider the occupier’s authority is exercised, the more the 
difference between a military and an ordinary government is hard to perceive (too much authority 
may result in what some refer to as “creeping annexation”). Thus, the duration of an occupation seems 
to demand the occupier to offer further assurances about the non-permanent or the reversible character of adopted 
measures. 
Secondly, the “minimal standard” identified by the Court for securing the public order and life of 
                                                
925 HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, at 28-29, para. 26. 
926 HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, at 27, para. 23. 
927 HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, at 30-31, para. 27, in which the Court acknowledged that the occupier’s measures 
should not “blur the distinction between a military and ordinary government”, citing as prohibited measures the “institutional 
changes” or those measures that “bring about a substantial change in the fundamental institutions” of the occupied territory. 
928 HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, at 33, para. 29, in which the Court went on to assert that there is for the occupier “a 
minimal standard with regard to securing the public order and life of the local population below which the military government functioning as a 
proper government may not descend, and that there certainly exists a maximal standard with regard to securing the public order and life of the 
population above which the military government functioning as a temporary government may not ascend, and that between these two there exists 
a field of authority within which there is permission and not duty to choose between various options …”. 
929 HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, at 33-34, para. 29. 





the local population - below which the military government functioning as a proper government 
cannot go - was the only dimension through which the impact of the prolonged character of 
occupation was analysed. This may be challenging: as far as the time element broadens the scope of 
“public order and life” it affects the overall obligations established in Article 43 HRs. In particular, the 
long duration of occupation affects, equally, the interpretation of “as far as possible” and “all the 
measures in his power”. Accordingly, the more extended is the occupation, the more tricky it becomes 
for the occupier to invoke that it has no power to adopt measures for the growth and development 
of the occupied territory, or submitting that it is an impossibility to do so. Thus, the interpretation of 
the “minimal standard” mentioned by the Court seems to impose on the persistent occupier no less than 
certain positive obligations to act in favour of such development and growth. This may prove particularly 
relevant in cases of the occupier’s refusal to apply human rights instruments in the occupied 
territory. 
 
(2) In the Yesh Din case, the question of the prolonged character of occupation was again raised. 
The central issue was whether the policy to grant licenses to Israeli companies to open and operate 
stone quarries in the occupied territories of Judea and Samaria was lawful for the military 
authorities.931 According to the petitioner, this policy was incompatible with the obligation to 
manage public property as usufruct under Article 55 HRs; moreover, permitting operation of the 
quarries could not be deemed to have been permitted for the welfare of the local population as the 
great majority of the quarried stone was used in Israel, rather than by Palestinians in the occupied 
territories.932 Therefore, relying on Articles 43 and 55 HRs, the petitioner requested an order to 
cease such activities and stop the establishment of new quarries or the expansion of existing ones 
therein.933 
Contrary to the approach adopted in the Ascan case, the Court interpreted the time element as 
adjusting occupation law irrespective of whether the wording of the rules concerned allows for it or not. 
However, it remains unclear whether the duration was regarded as directly altering the scope of 
                                                
931 For a critical analysis of the case, see Guy Harpaz, Yuval Shany, Eyal  Benvenisti, Amichai Cohen, Yael Ronen, 
Barak Medina, and Orna Ben-Naftali, Expert Legal Opinion, opinion with regard to the issues arising from the Yesh 
Din judgment in support of the petitioners’ motion for a review of the judgment (En Banc review), January 2012, at 38 
ff. See also Kretzmer, “The Law of belligerent occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel”, 94 IRRC, 2012, at 220-222; 
I. Scobbie and A. Margalit, “The Israeli Military Commander’s power under the Law of Occupation in relation to 
Quarrying Activity in Area C”, Sir Joseph Hotung Programme for Law, Human Rights and Peace Building in the 
Middle East, SOAS, 4 July 2012, 1-11. 
932 HCJ 2164/09, Yesh Din case, para 1. The figures submitted to the Court by the authorities show that 94% of the 
stone from the quarries operated by Israeli companies was for use in Israel. 





application of Article 55 or whether this modification derived from the link between Article 55 and 
Article 43. In any case, Article 55 does not foresee such an adjustment, as will be discussed in the 
section 6.  
The Court then agreed with the view admitted by the Israeli governmental authorities that the 
duration of the occupation creates positive obligations for the occupier.934 This would imply that the policy 
concerning the quarries could not be undertaken freely, being that it is covered by the general duty 
to ensure public order and civil life.  
Notably, the time element was used to promote an expanding interpretation of Articles 43 and 55 HRs, 
which ended up eluding two basic legal boundaries enshrined in these rules and, paradoxically, 
articulated in the case law previously developed.935 This aspect has been highlighted in a significant 
amicus curiae brief filed by seven leading Israeli international law scholars. They justifiably argue not 
only that the Court wrongly interpreted the laws of occupation and, in particular, the provisions on 
the management of public property in the occupied territories, but also that the Court’s ruling stood 
in direct contradiction with those laws. As was clearly highlighted, “the protraction of the occupation does 
broadly impact the appropriate interpretation of Article 43 and as such the powers of the Military Commander 
according to the laws of occupation as a whole, but this broad impact is subject to two strict and basic limitations: the 
first of which is that the expansion does not allow the Military Commander to factor in considerations that are 
prohibited by Article 43 or to act outside of the other provisions that apply to his powers, and the second is that the 
expansion must be exercised for the benefit of the local population and not against it”.936  
5. The obligation to respect pre-existing legal system and admissible 
exceptions  
Not being the sovereign ruler of the controlled territory, the occupying power temporarily performs 
its functions and exercises de facto authority with the duty to respect the laws existing therein at the time of the 
commencement of the occupation, unless prevented by certain admissible purposes. Moreover, in view that the task 
                                                
934 HCJ 2164/09, Yesh Din case, para. 12. See also Israel, Ministry of Justice, HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din, Response on Behalf 
of Respondents 1-2, 20 May 2010, para. 52: “in a state of prolonged belligerent occupation, the prevailing belief is that the military 
administration acquires additional positive duties in relation to the area it is administering”. 
935 HCJ 2164/09, Yesh Din case, para. 92.  
936 See Guy Harpaz, Yuval Shany, Eyal Benvenisti, Amichai Cohen, Yael Ronen, Barak Medina, and Orna Ben-
Naftali, Expert Legal Opinion, HCJ 2164/09, Yesh Din - Volunteers for Human Rights, et. al. v. Commander of the IDF Forces in 
the West Bank, et. al., (Judgment, 26 December 2011), 29 January 2012, para. 84, at 30. The opinion was submitted to the 
High Court of Justice in support of human rights organization, Yesh Din and its motion for an en banc review (an 





of ensuring or restoring civil life and public order is limited ratione temporis937 and in accordance with 
the maintenance of local laws as far as possible and restricted changes therein, every legislative 
amendment should be matched with the transitional nature of the occupation. 
5.1. The meaning of “les lois en viguer” and “empêchement absolu”  
Pursuant to Article 43 HRs the occupier’s legislative powers must be performed in compliance with 
the general principle of respecting “les lois en viguer” in the occupied territory predating the 
occupation, except in cases of “empêchement absolu”. As articulated in the Brussels Declaration (“les lois 
qui étaient en viguet dans les pays en temps de paix”), this entails maintaining the laws in force without 
modifying, suspending or replacing them with its own laws. It is widely recognised that “les lois” 
cover all the fields of legislation (e.g. tax collection, requisition, private property) and refers not only 
to promulgated laws.938  Being that local institutions and constitutional order constitute aspects of 
“the laws in force in the country”, it has been reasonably argued that “the occupant’s competence to establish 
and operate processes of governmental administration in the territory occupied does not extend to the reconstruction of the 
fundamental institutions of the occupied area”.939 Conversely, the occupier is not bound to respect the laws 
enacted by the “absent” legitimate sovereign after the beginning of occupation, although it may give 
effect in the occupied territory to such legislation “whenever military and political conditions permit”.940  
The general prohibition on amending pre-existing legal system admits exceptions. The term 
“empêchement absolu” is commonly interpreted as corresponding to “nécessité” (the original language of 
Article 3 of the Brussels Declaration941), but various connotations have been expounded in scholars’ 
                                                
937 See L. Oppenheim, “International Law - A Treatise”, in H. Lauterpacht (ed.), Vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality7, 
London: Longman, 1952, at 436 and 437. 
938 In addition to the laws in strict sense (whether basic or trivial; national or municipal; civil or criminal; substantive or 
procedural), the term encompasses constitution (see UK Manual, op. cit., para. 11.11), decrees, ordinances (see E.H. 
Schwenk, op. cit., at 397), court precedents (particularly in territories of common law tradition, see E. Benvenisti, op. cit., 
at 16), administrative regulations and executive orders (see G. Von Glahn, op. cit., at 97 and 99; E.H. Feilchenfeld, op. 
cit., at 89). 
939 M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, Yale University Press, 1961, at 767. 
940 See E. Stein, “Application of the Law of the Absent Sovereign in Territory under Belligerent Occupation: The Schio 
Massacre”, 46 Michigan Law Review (1947-1948), 341, at 349, 362. On this point, Yoram Dinstein also takes into account 
that “Article 43 does not purport to have any impact on the relations between the absent territorial sovereign and its own nationals living in the 
occupied territory”, addressing the notion that a nationals’ commitments are not diminished by occupation, and referring to 
the Haaland case of 1945 in which the Supreme Court of Norway recognised that, despite its absence from the occupied 
territory, the territorial sovereign can enact criminal legislative measures concerning the conduct of its own nationals 
during occupation, but such measures will produce effects only after its end, see Y. Dinstein, “Legislation under 
Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and Peacebuilding”, Harvard: Program on 
Humanitarian Policy, Occasional Papers Series, Fall 2004, at 4, citing Public Prosecutor v. Reidar Haaland (Norway, Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, 1945), 12 Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (1943-1945), 444, 445. 
941 “Necessity” in Article 3 of the Brussels Declaration was not intended a synonym for “military necessity” in the travaux 





opinions.942 According to a broad interpretation of the exception contained in Article 43 HRs and 
confirmed in Article 64 GCIV, the occupier may be prevented from applying local laws not only because of 
the legitimate interests of the occupant’s army, but also because of the interests of the local civilian 
population.943 Such an interpretation is actually coherent with a wider reading of “l’ordre et la vie 
publics” as detailed previously.  
A narrow interpretation of the necessity exception was instead given by the post-World War I 
practice of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, which were established under the Peace Treaties of 1919-
1920.944 But an extensive reading of the exception featured in the practice of allied occupying 
powers during Second World War suggests they strongly felt the necessity of drastic modifications of 
existing laws and institutional structures of the occupied States’ systems permeated with the 
ideologies of Nazism, fascism and militarism; in any case, different legal justifications were provided 
for such radical departures from the conservationist premises of the Hague Regulations. 945 
Similarly, the exception in Article 43 HRs was flexibly interpreted in subsequent judicial 
decisions.946  
As has been noted heretofore, scholars’ expansive reading of the necessity grounds of Article 43 
                                                
942  Some authors refer to “military necessity”, see M. Greenspan, The modern Law of Land Warfare, 1959, at 224; M. 
Bothe, “Occupation, Belligerent”, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 1997, iii, at 765. 
Conversely, certain scholars call for just sufficient justification to alter local laws, see E.H. Feilchenfeld, The International 
Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation, 1942, at 89, para. 325, in which he noticed that “[t]he term ‘absolutely prevented’ has never 
been interpreted literally” and he noted that the benefit of doubt should be given to the old laws rather than the new ones. 
According to Yoram Dinstein, “absolute prevention means necessity” and thus the adverb “absolutely” is of small significance, 
see Y. Dinstein, “The international of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights”, Israel YbkHR, 1978, at 112, citing 
Scwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. II: The Law of Armed Conflict, 1967, at 
193 (the author narrowly construes the exception). 
943 See E.H. Schwenk, op. cit., at 400-401, who argues that narrowing the term to the occupier’s military necessity would 
be undesirable, particularly when the occupation endures, as the duty to restore civil life and public order is primarily in 
the interests of the population. See also J. Pictet (ed.), op. cit., at 274; G. Von Glahn, op. cit., at 97. See A.D. McNair and 
A.D. Watts, The Legal Effects of War, 1966, at 369, mentioning three grounds for being “absolutely prevented” from 
respecting local laws, i.e. the maintenance of order, the occupant’s safety, and the realisation of the legitimate purpose of 
occupation; this wider reading reflects the practice of the allied occupying powers in the course of World War II. 
944 See German-Belgian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Milaire v. Etat allemande, 2 RDTAM, 1923, 715, No. 168, at 719, in 
which the Tribunal ruled that “article 43 a pour object non de metre l’occupant au benefice d’un privilege ou d’un droit, mais, au 
contraire, de lui imposer une obligation”. See German-Belgian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Ville d’Anvers v. Germany, 19 October 
1925, 5 RDTAM, 1926, 712, at 716-717, in which the Tribunal maintained that the three measures (issued by the 
German Governor-General for reacting to acts of mob violence against German nationals in occupied Belgium) went 
beyond the necessities of war within the meaning of “absolutely prevented” and conflicted with Article 43 HRs. 
945 For an analysis of this period, see Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation, op. cit., 2009, pp. 107-111. Notably, the 
British Military Manual reads: “The occupying power may amend the existing law of the occupied territory or promulgate new law if this 
is necessitated by the exigencies of armed conflict, the maintenance of order, or the welfare of the population”, see UK Ministry of 
Defence, The Manual of the law of Armed Conflict, 2004, para. 11.25. 
946 Following the two World Wars, courts have acknowledged as valid a variety of laws by occupying powers, see 
references to relevant cases in E. David, Principes de droit des conflits armés3, 2002, p. 511. For permissive practice on 
legislation in the occupied territories by the Israeli High Court of Justice, see D. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: the 





HRs started to emerge since the end of the Second World War,947 with the welfare of the local protected 
population appropriately included in the related notion. An additional suggestion has been that of 
interpreting this exception more widely the longer an occupation continues.948 Under such a 
circumstance, an occupant would be required - and not simply entitled - to adapt his legitimate 
powers to the changeable pressing needs of local inhabitants. In this manner, in the late twentieth century 
the welfare of civilian population has come to acquire relevance in the case law before the Supreme 
Court of Israel, which has endorsed such a view over time; in the words of Justice Sussman, “a 
prolonged military occupation brings in its wake social, economic and commercial needs of the population”.949 
Similarly, Justice Barak has taken this view.950 
Focusing on the occupier’s evaluation of the socio-economic interests of the local inhabitants of the occupied 
territory, however, it seems reasonable to herald a warning light. A risk of abuse remains in the 
determination of what is necessary in complex and changeable circumstances.951 In fact, the 
                                                
947 See O. Debbash, L’Occupation Militaire - Pouvoirs reconnus aux forces armées hors de leur territorìire national, 1962, at 172, in 
which he considers that “(l)a formule de l’article 43 du Règlament de la Haye … permet à l’occupant d’exercer une compétence 
réglamentaire limitée par ce double bt: la securité de l’armée  et l’ordre public local. Pour rendre compte de ce qui est permis à l’occupant, et de 
ce qui lui est interdit, on peut faire appel aux deux notions implicitement visées par l’institution de l’occupation militaire: la compétence de 
«gestion» et la competence de «disposition»”. See also A. Gerson, “War, Conquered Territory, and Military Occupation in the 
Contemporary international Legal System”, 18 Harvard International Law Journal, 1977, pp. 538-539, referring to “the 
principles of self-determination and fundamental human rights”.  
948 This is specifically suggested in R. Kolb, Ius in bello, Le droit international humanitaire des conflits armés, 2002, at 186. See 
also E.H. Schwenk, op. cit., pp. 400-401. 
949 HCJ 337/71, The Christian Society for Holy Places v. Minister of Defence, 26(1) PD, English summary in 2 Israel YbkHR, 
1972, 354, at 355; this was a labour dispute between the Christian Society for the Holy Places and hospital workers on 
strike who were employed by the Society. This case illustrates the delicate nature of the assessment of the changing 
social needs of the local population. Specifically, the local Jordanian Labour Law predating the Israeli occupation, 
provided a procedure for compulsory arbitration under which the arbitrators were to be appointed from among the 
employers’ and employees’ associations. Since the latter did not exist in Jordan, however, an order amending the 
Jordanian law was issued by the Israeli Regional Commander to permit the possibility of compulsory arbitration the  
appointment of an arbitrator by the Office in Charge of Labour Affairs. According to the majority of the Israeli Court, 
the occupant was entitled to modify the local law in order to reflect changing social needs of the civilian population. Conversely, as 
observed in the dissenting opinion of Justice Cohn, compulsory arbitration in labour disputes was yet to be introduced 
in Israel; this latter aspect is considered in Dinstein’s argument that, in assessing the concept of necessity, the relevant 
military authorities exceeded their boundaries of discretion, see Y. Dinstein, op. cit., 2004, p. 10.  
950 See HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan Elma’almoon Eltha’aooniah Elmahduda Elmaoolie v. Commander of IDF Forces, 37(4) PD 785 
(per Justice Barak), English summary in 14 Israel YbkHR, 1984, 301, p. 309, in which Justice Barak maintained that “[t]he 
authority of a military administration applies to taking all measures necessary to ensure growth, change and development”, and hence that 
“a military administration is … required to ensure the changing needs of a population in a territory under belligerent occupation”. 
Additionally, he held that “[i]n exercising this authority [governmental authority] cognizance must be taken of the fact that the military 
administration in question functions for a prolonged period, during which the local population undergoes fundamental changes”, so that “a 
military administration is authorized to initiate underlying fundamental investments and long-range projects for the benefit of the local 
population”, see, ibid., pp. 312-313. 
951  See Zwanenburg, “Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and the Law of Occupation”, IRRC, 
2004, 745, at 751. See also E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, Princeton, 2004, p. 11, warning that Article 
43 HRs is “an extremely convenient tool” allowing the occupant to intervene when it suits and to hide behind claims of 





occupant’s interpretation of what is needed is infrequently subject to revision during occupation.952 
In the Jami’at Ascan case, for example, it was emphasised that the temporary nature of the military 
commander’s powers entails that he must not be authorised to take into account any national, 
economic, or social interest of his own State, and even national security interests, but only his own 
military needs and those of the local population.953 A recent reaffirmation of this view concerning Article 43 
HRs is found in the Yesh Din judgment.954 
In any case, the aforementioned necessity grounds demand careful examination even in the light 
of the rules embodied in Article 64 GCIV, as the next section aims to articulate. 
5.1.a. Case study: the planning and building authority in Area C of the West Bank 
In the context of the present analysis, another recent case before the Israeli High Court of Justice is 
noteworthy. The petitioners demanded to re-transfer the planning authority in Area C of the West 
Bank from the Israeli Civil Administration to local institutions and district committees, principally 
on the basis Article 43 HRs.955 It is worth highlighting that planning and building are matters of 
daily civil life; the legal and practical issues arising from such activities have implications for the 
Palestinians living in the area concerned.956 The relevance for the present research lies in that such 
policies have been significant for the social and economic development of the region.957  
In this regard, some preliminary clarifications on the scope of the Oslo Agreements and related 
implications for the law of occupation concerning the planning and building authority appear apt. 
Pursuant to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, Israel’s exclusive control includes the 
                                                
952 See G. Von Glahn, op. cit., at 100. Exceptionally, the International Court of Justice was able to give an opinion on 
whether certain measures adopted by an occupying power were necessary, see ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ibid., para. 137. 
953 HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, para.13 (English summary in 14 Israel YbkHR, 1984, at 304). 
954 HCJ 2164/09, Judgment of 26 December 2011, at 15, para. 8. 
955 Head of Ad-Dirat-Al-Rfai’ya Village and Others vs. the Israeli Minister of Defence, the Commander of the IDF Forces in the West 
Bank, the Head of the Civil Administration and the High Planning Council in the West Bank, Petition to grant Order Nisi and 
Emergency Interim Order, 31 July 2011. The appeal was submitted by the council of this village (located in the 
southern district of Hebron, Wesk Bank) together with a coalition of organisations, namely Rabbis For Human Rights, 
ICAHD, JLAC, St. Yves. The “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” divided 
the West Bank into Areas A, B and C with regard to issues on civil and security responsibility. In Area C (approximately 
60% of the relevant territory) Israel’s exclusive control has been retained over security, planning and construction 
matters, while the occupied population has not administered or participated in the institutions concerned. See Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Washington D.C., 28 September 1995) reprinted in 36 ILM, 
1997, especially Arts. XI, XIII, XVII. 
956 The Palestinians living in Area C has been estimated at around 150,000, see Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights, 
The Prohibited Zone - Israeli planning policy in the Palestinian villages in Area C, June 2008, at 7, (Bimkom is an Israeli non-profit 
organization). 
957 See A. Coon, Town Planning Under Military Occupation, Dartmouth Publishing Comapny, Lodon, 1992, at 3. See World 
Bank, “The Economic Effects of Restricted Access to Land in the West Bank”, 2008, at iv-v, considering how land use 
and planning regulations in Area C have been “detrimental to Palestinian economic development [as they] tend to limit development 





planning and construction in Area C. Nonetheless, the joint interpretation of Articles 7 and 47 
GCIV confines the effects of the accords between an occupier and enemy authorities or those of the 
occupied territory; such accords must not “adversely affect the situation of protected persons”, “nor restrict” 
the rights conferred upon them, or deny them the benefits of the Fourth Geneva Convention “by any 
change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory”. 
Therefore, under the Oslo Agreements the transferred authority in planning and construction could 
not justify legislative powers beyond that which is allowed for by the boundaries of Article 43 HRs; 
so it could not deny Palestinian residents to benefit local laws in effect on the eve of occupation; the 
relevant 1966 Jordanian Law actually conferred a certain power in planning to the representative of 
local communities.958 The 1995 Interim Agreement indeed confirms this aspect and refers to the 
respect of international law (under Article XVII “the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary 
legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities in accordance with international law”). Overall, these 
agreements could confer the occupant some authority in planning and building insofar as it does not 
conflict with IHL protecting the local population; furthermore, they could not confer legitimacy to 
policies and practices already illegal under IHL before their signature. 
Notably, two independent reasons have been addressed to claim the unlawfulness of the 
controversial changes made by the Israeli Civilian Administration; they reiterate that the occupant 
is not entitled to make unjustified amendments to local legislation, and that it is bound to respect 
local laws.959  
As for the first reason, the Military Order No. 418 in 1971 and its subsequent revisions (2000-
2009) have been seen to exceed the admissible powers to suspend, abolish or amend local legislation and local 
administrative institutions under Article 43 HRs.960 In particular, they made changes as follows: the 
District Committees were abolished and their powers were transferred to the Higher Planning 
Council,961 the possible appointment of a village council as a Local Planning Committee was 
                                                
958 At the time Israel started to occupy the West Bank in 1967, these policies were under a Jordanian Law on Towns, 
Villages, and Building Planning, which had been enacted in 1966 (hereinafter Jordanian Law). 
959 See T. Boutruche and M. Sassòli, Expert Opinion on International Humanitarian Law Requiring of the Occupying Power to 
Transfer Back Planning Authority to Protected Persons Regarding Area C of the West Bank, 1 February 2011, pp. 1-34. The opinion 
was written at the request of the petitioners in the case concerned. 
960 On the ground that the inclusion of Jordanian representatives of the central government in the planning process was 
a legal requirement, Israel revised the Jordanian Law through Military Orders; in particular, the Military Order Concerning 
Towns, Villages, and Building Planning Law (Judea and Samaria No. 418 of 1971, and its successive revisions, radically 
amended the entire planning system in the West Bank. It has been noted that some amendaments of the law 
accommodated the different situation of the new authorities which effectively controlled the West Bank starting from 
1967, but certain changes to the Jordanian Law did not meet the “necessity exception” of Article 43 HRs (including the 
maintenance of order, the exigencies of an armed conflict, or the welfare of the local population), see T. Boutruche and 
M. Sassòli, op. cit., at 22-26. 





eliminated962 and local representatives were not included within the planning institutions; a separate 
planning framework for the settlements was created.963 In this regard, it is reasonable to agree on the 
participation of local representatives as an important prerequisite for addressing adequately the needs of the local 
communities, especially in view of the nature of planning as well as the long-term impacts on the 
economic and social development of the areas concerned, in addition to the legal relationship 
between the occupant and the local inhabitants.964 Further, as detailed in previous sections, radical 
changes often lack consistency with the basic principle that changes may be allowed only for the duration of 
occupation. In any case, planning and building were not made easier in comparison with the situation 
under the previous local laws (for instance, a new registration in the Israeli Engineers Register is 
required for drawing up plans in built-up locations). 
As for the second reason, the planning regime as set up by the Israeli Civilian Administration 
has been seen to fail to comply with its duty to ensure and restore public welfare in the occupied territory under the 
authentic French text of Article 43 HRs. Such a concept of public welfare entails a system that 
meets the local exigencies to construct new buildings for health, demographic and economic 
considerations. In particular, the construction of houses on these lands constitutes a valuable aspect of family 
rights (Art. 27 GCIV) and private property (building for family expansion is a normal need of civil life), 
which the occupant is bound to respect under Article 46 HRs. Thus, insofar as the new planning 
process has proved insufficient and inadequate to satisfy “the planning needs of the local 
communities” in an area of the West Bank exclusively controlled by the occupant,965 it seems 
reasonable to content that the changes made to the Jordanian Law should be repealed whilst the 
local and district committees should be reinstated, while safeguarding the security interests of the 
occupying forces. In this regard, what appears an indefensible claim is that the protection of such a 
security interest and the maintenance of “orderly government” in Areas C would be attained by Israel in 
                                                
962 Military Order No. 418, Articles 2(4) and 4(A). See Bimkom, ibid., at 40. 
963 Under Article 2A of Military Order 418 the commander can appoint a “Special Local Planning Committee” (SLPC) 
when the relevant planning area “does not include the area of a city or village council”. According to the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, with this “new Planning Area” (not in force before 1967) “SLPCs can be appointed 
only for Israeli settlements”; additionally, as “[a]ll settlement Local and Regional council areas were subsequently proclaimed new planning 
areas, virtually all settlements now have SLPCs” (see UN OCHA oPt, Restricting Space: The Planning Regime Applied by Israel in Area 
C of the West Bank, Special Focus, December 2009, at 11). Moreover, the Israeli Civil Administration has created a 
separate District Planning sub-Committee for Israeli settlements; the commander may allocate the authority of such 
committee to the SLPC. 
964 As noticed by Theo Boutruche and Marco Sassòli, Israel, as an occupying power, “could only have ensured to be able to 
overturn decisions affecting the security of its occupying forces and take any measures indispensable to ensure that such local committees actually 
function”, see op. cit., at 26. 
965 In particular, this regime has reportedly abolished or limited the Palestinians’ representation and participation in the 






it taking all decisions by itself as regards matters of planning and building.966 Moreover, a different 
view would contradict the obligation to respect local legislation and institutions. 
In waiting for the Court’s ruling on this ongoing case, it is worth highlighting that it illustrates 
how plausible and valid may become the needs of the local population in contexts of prolonged occupation. This case 
shows nonetheless the risk that the commercial, social, and economic changes brought in the wake of a protracted 
situation of occupation may not validly excuse the adaptation of local legislation according to the military orders by the 
occupier. Rather than improving the planning system in respect to the natural growth of the civilian 
population in the West Bank, the amendments to the Jordanian Law appear to worsen it, and this 
been even more relevant in view of the long term effects of planning and building policies.  
Significantly, it seems that, while enhancing civil life is “an obligation of means”, the lawfulness of 
changes to local legal system as exceptionally justified by this purpose relies on that they really enhance public life in 
comparison to the situation under earlier local laws. In this regard, the occupant has the burden of 
proof about such amelioration. Inasmuch as this improvement does not occur in a context of 
prolonged occupation, those changes remain not justified and should be repealed. 
Moreover, this case offers the chance to emphasise a specific aspect of the concept of welfare of the 
protected population as related to the planning and construction in an occupied territory: such welfare is a concept 
encompassing the entitlement to participate to the planning process via formal representation which 
allows to consider the local inhabitants’ exigencies as well as the effect of planning policies and 
corresponding outcomes for the same population. 
Additionally, two delicate aspects that surface from this case concern possible discriminatory 
practices and the humanitarian impacts of the aforementioned system. Firstly, a great amount of 
rejected applications for a building permit has exposed Palestinians to demolition orders and  “stop 
work” orders.967 In this regard, inasmuch as these rejections are due to a planning process 
conflicting with the occupant’s legitimate powers, the demolitions concerned may constitute a 
violation of Article 53 GCIV.968 The intensification of “administrative demolitions” remains then a 
                                                
966 On detailed considerations about public welfare and the new planning and building policies and their implications, 
in addition to their failure in respect of the needs of the local population, see T. Boutruche and M. Sassòli, op. cit., at 27-
31; UNOCHA oPt, Restricting Space: The Planning Regime Applied by Israel in Area C of the West Bank, Special Focus, 
December 2009; UNOCHA oPt, “Lack of Permit” Demolitions and Resultant Displacement in Area C, Special Focus, May 2008.  
967 Human Rights Watch, Separate and Unequal Israel’s Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, 2010, at 11. 
968 House demolitions and forced evictions as origined by such a process raise the concern of constituting even abuses of 
the right of everyone to a home under Article 17 ICCPR and the right to adequate housing under Article 11 (1) ICESCR. See 





relevant consideration with its impact in terms of forced displacements of the inhabitants.969 
Secondly, the creation of a separate planning framework for Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories has raised an issue related to the perception that amending available plans and getting 
building permits is much difficult for local residents than for those settlers. In this regard, if the 
process concerned diverges from the one valid for Palestinians, then this would represent an 
inadmissible practice, independent of the unlawfulness of the settlements as such.970  
It is worth considering that, in the interim decision of 28 April 2014 the Supreme Court ordered 
the State to propose within ninety days “institutionalised ways” to enable participation of local 
Palestinians in Area C in the planning processes that affect their lives. Further, Justices Rubinstein, 
Handel, and Solberg expressed dissatisfaction with the planning situation and rejected Israel’s 
argument that Palestinians’ participation exists in the present system and thus the status quo ought to 
remain. The same judges also requested the State to explain the data provided by the petitioners 
concerning discrimination and inadequate planning for Palestinians in Area C.  
5.2. The necessity exceptions  
The expansion of the occupant’s regulatory powers as laid down in Article 64 GCIV represents a 
basic innovation revealing the sharp shift of concern with regard to the civilian population by the international 
community since the Second World War. In reviewing the scope of the conservationist approach of 
the Hague Regulations, this provision allows for the suspension, modification or repeal of pre-
existing local laws as well as the enactment of new legislation in the occupied territory under three 
special objectives that represent certain necessity grounds.971 
5.2.1. Necessity on security grounds 
The least questionable case of legislation an occupier may enact is one whereby that is “essential” to 
ensure its security, though the discretion in deciding what is essential remains relatively broad, 
                                                
969 They are carried out when building permits were not sought in advance of the related construction. See the Report 
on “OPT: The legality of house demolitions under International Humanitarian Law”, Harvard University, 31 May 
2004. 
970 Article 49 (6) GCIV. It is worth noting that under international humanitarian law non-discrimination is addressed 
only between “protected persons”, while Israeli settlers are not included in this category; conversely, discrimination is 
prohibited under human rights law in respect to every individual under the State’s jurisdiction (so covering all residents 
of the Area C). 
971 Specifically, Article 64(1) refers to threats to the occupier’s security and obstacles to the application of GCIV, 
whereas under Article 64(2) the local population may be subjected to any laws “essential” to fulfil the occupier’s 
obligations under GCIV, or to maintain the orderly government of the occupied territory, or to ensure its own security. 
As already addressed in section 2 of the present chapter, scholars generally agree to read these two paragraphs together, 





under both Article 43 HRs and Article 64(2) GCIV.972 Nonetheless, under this criterion the 
occupant is not allowed to pass legislation prescribing any measure explicitly prohibited by 
international humanitarian law (e.g. collective punishment, house demolitions or deportations)973 as 
well as legislation establishing adverse distinctions prohibited under Article 27 GCIV. 
State practice related to the exercise of such a legislative power is ample and uniform. For 
instance, customary norms recognise the occupant may prohibit actions stimulating the spirit of 
opposition of the civilian population to its authority and strengthening the bond with the legitimate 
sovereign; the prohibition to display the national flag and to sing national hymns or other acts 
inciting revolt are generally deemed lawful.974 In addition, the press and other means of mass 
communication may be subject to censorship so as to prevent the diffusion of information useful to 
the enemy and propaganda in favour of the occupied state or of the resistance.975 
In accepting that ensuring security entitles the occupying powers to constraint or hold in 
abeyance several civil and political rights of local inhabitants of the occupied territory, the present 
thesis does not discuss these matters further. It is worth however adding that, beyond its own 
security, under the wording of Article 43 HRs a legitimate aim for legislation is protecting the security of 
the local population: the occupier is bound to maintain and restore public order, and as such has the 
authority also to legislate if absolutely necessary for this purpose. 
5.2.2. Necessity for maintaining the orderly government of the occupied territory 
The maintenance of the orderly government is another “essential” ground allowing an occupant to 
legislate under Article 64(2) GCIV; it may be conceived as a wider objective dealing with the 
restoration and preservation of “l’ordre public” in an occupied territory. The occupier’s regulatory 
powers under this ground appear broad; related measures often are functional even in ensuring its 
armed forces’ security. The restrictions on the freedom of movement in the occupied territory (e.g. 
establishing curfews or prohibiting circulation of persons in certain areas) or measures intended to 
                                                
972  It includes the occupying power’s security, the security of property and personnel of its armed forces or 
administration, besides lines of communication. Yoram Dinstein explains the necessity on security grounds as “fundamental” 
and “unassailable”, arguing that the occupant is given “more than some latitude” in taking legislative measures to limit the 
general welfare and rights of local inhabitants, which are considered as necessary for the security of the army and 
administration, see Y. Dinstein, “Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and 
Peacebuilding”, Harvard: Program on Humanitarian Policy, Occasional Papers Series, Fall 2004, p. 12. 
973 See Arts. 33(1), 53, 49(1) GCIV. 
974 During WWII, Germany prohibited the selling of orange flowers in the occupied territory of Holland, see De Jong, 
Holland Fights the Nazis, London, 1941, at 35. 
975 See Bernstein, “Freedom of Speech in the Israeli Occupied Territories; The Search for a Standard”, NYUJILP, 





avoid the risk of riots (e.g. banning unauthorized public meetings) are clear examples.976 Indeed, the 
concept of maintaining orderly government has a flexible nature, with the potential of widening the 
occupier’s legislative competence beyond mere measures designed to restore and ensure public 
order or to guarantee the security of the local population.  
In this way, an occupier might choose to deal with issues concerning the continuation of normal life under 
provisions relating to an “orderly government” which affect economic and social life.977 However, the boundaries 
of such legislative competence appear to remain contingent to an evaluation of the welfare of the 
local population. Practices in occupied Iraq are illustrative in this regard: the legality of several 
comprehensive economic measures adopted by the Coalition Provisional Authority reflecting neo-
liberal economic attitudes are circumspect.978 These measures have been essentially criticised for 
exceeding and disregarding the boundaries of necessity in breach of IHL.979 Then, in affecting the 
enjoyment of the right of Iraqi people to freely dispose of their natural resources and wealth, such 
changes have appeared as not necessary neither for the sake of human rights or economic life.980 
Besides exercising regulatory competence for claimed economy recoveries, since the occupier is 
bound to maintain and ensure civil life in the occupied territory, its legislative powers might be 
extended to enhance the humanitarian guarantees of the local population (especially when existing local laws 
or their absence absolutely precludes it from achieving that purpose)981 or to take into account allegedly 
mutable social and economic needs and interests of the same population. In occupied Iraq, the CPA 
                                                
976 See G. Von Glahn, op. cit., at 140. As for the Palestinian occupied territories, see Shehadeh, “The Legislative stages 
of the Israeli Military Occupation”, in Playfair (ed.), op. cit., 151 ff, at 153. 
977 An example of change deemed necessary to maintain economic life occurred in the context of occupied Iraq, when 
the CPA dealt with the circulation of currency (see CPA Order No. 43: New Iraqi Dinar Banknotes, CPA/ORD/14 
October 2003/43), as it addressed the issue that numerous different series of these dinar circulated: as such, the aim was 
to contribute to stabilizing the economy and instilling public confidence. The CPA also amended the traffic code (see 
CPA Order No. 86: Traffic Code with Annex A, CPA/ORD/19 May 2004/86). 
978 They encompassed the liberalisation of trade and foreign investment, the simplification of the procedure for the 
conclusion of public contracts, and the amendments of Iraqi company law. See CPA Order No. 39: Foreign Investment, 
CPA/ORD/19 September 2003/39 (amended by Order No. 46, CPA/ORD/20 December 2003/46), 
CPFR/ORD/20 December 2003/39; CPA Order No. 54: Trade Liberalization Policy 2004 with Annex A, 2004 
CPA/ORD/24 February 2004/54; CPA Order No. 64: Amendment to the Company Law No. 21 of 1997, 
CPA/ORD/29 February 2004/64; CPA Order No. 56: Central Bank Law, CPA/ORD/1 March 2004/56; CPA 
Order No. 87: Public Contracts, CPA/ORD/14 May 2004/87. In this context, foreign investors were allowed to own 
Iraqi companies without being obliged to return profits into Iraq (while under the previous Iraqi Constitution this 
conversely allowed such a practice only to citizens of Arab countries), see CPA Order No. 39: Foreign Investment, 
CPA/ORD/19 September 2003/39, section 7(2)(d); CPA Order No. 46: CPA/ORD/20 December 2003/46 (as the 
revised order).  
979 See M. Zwanenburg, “Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and the law of Occupation”, IRRC, 
2004, 745, pp. 757-759; M. Sassoli, “Legislation and maintenance of public order and civil life by occupying powers”, 
16 EJIL, 2005, 661, p. 679. 
980 See A. Roberts, “The End of Occupation of Iraq (2004)”, International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, Monitoring 
IHL in Iraq, p. 7; Catàn, “Iraq Business Deals May be Invalid, Law Experts Warn”, Financial times, 2 November 2003; 
Eviatar, “Free-Market Iraq? Not So Fast”, New York Times, 10 January 2004. 





implemented a wide range of reforms that led, for instance, to amend the Labour Code982 and to set 
up the property reconciliation and claims institutions so as to decide property disputes mainly 
concerning the Kurdistan regional area,983 in view of the forced displacement of huge amount of 
people with several religious and ethnic backgrounds from their properties in Iraq.    
In this vein, an overall inertia could seriously harm ESC rights whose safeguard requires public 
authorities’ active commitment.984 Nevertheless, assessing mutable social and economic needs of the 
local population by reference to the ‘necessity ground of maintaining orderly government’ appears 
an extremely complex process, even objectionable for local inhabitants embracing different 
economic, social and cultural values and traditions. Accordingly, there is reason to contend that the 
measures enacted by the occupant in this regard entail, in any case, previous consultation with those 
inhabitants to avoid breaching the requirement of self-determination of peoples.985  
According to certain legal scholars the necessity of “l’ordre public” may be tested and understood 
by relying on that the occupiers’ measures are not dissimilar to those enacted in their home 
countries.986 As noted by others, however, this may function when the answer is negative987. Indeed, 
in the light of multiple conflicting interests involved, the occupant’s good faith cannot warrant the legitimacy 
of the measure to be adopted. Hence the necessity ground for any new piece of legislation deserves serious 
scrutiny.988 The view that any concern shown for the local population’s needs cannot be above 
                                                
982 CPA Order No. 89 was adopted on 5 May 2004 to reform the Iraqi Labour Code (Amendment to the Labour Code Law 
No. 71 of 1987), setting a minimum age of recruitment and regulating labour conditions for persons under eighteen 
years old, in view that Iraq was party to ILO Convention Nos. 138 and 182 and so it had the obligation “to take 
affirmative steps toward eliminating child labour” (CPA/ORD/05 May 2004/89).  
983 CPA, Regulation No. 4: Establishment of the Iraqi Property Reconciliation Facility, CPA/REG/14 Jan. 2004/04; 
CPA; Regulation No. 8: Delegation of Authority Regarding Establishment of a Property Claims Commission (Amended 
by Reg. 12), CPA/REG/14 Jan. 2004/08; CPA, Regulation No. 12: Establishment of the Iraq Property Claims 
Commission (As Amended and Restated) with Annex A, CPA/REG/24 June 2004/12.  
984 See Original Civil Jurisdiction (Singapore), 21 February 1956, Public Trustee v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and 
China, in ILR, vol. 23, p. 687 ff., at 694, holding that “It was a practical necessity, and within their legal power and duty under 
Article 43, for the Japanese to provide for and regulate matters of currency and banking so that the population could live orderly lives”. 
985 Two persuasive examples have been proffered. One regards labour regulations on hiring and firing (which may be very 
flexible in Anglo-Saxon countries based on the neo-liberal attitudes while not in countries anchored in a social 
democratic model, such as continental European countries or Japan). The other example concerns the right of fair trial 
(whose standards and requirements may differ between the Anglo-Saxon common law and the civil law countries). See 
M. Sassoli, “Legislation and maintenance of public order and civil life by occupying powers”, 16 EJIL, 2005, at 677. 
986 It is well known the “litmus test” articulated by Yoram Dinstein. See Dinstein, “The International Law of Belligerent 
Occupation and Human Rights”, IYHR, 1978, at 113; Dinstein, “Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and Peacebuilding”, Harvard: Program on Humanitarian Policy, Occasional Papers Series, 
Fall 2004, at 9; Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge, 2009, at 120-123. 
987 See T. Meron, “Applicability of Multilateral Conventions to Occupied Territories”, 72 AJIL, 1978, 542, at 549-550, 
highlighting that “(i)f legislative changes introduced by an occupant, ostensibly in order to benefit the local population, do not correspond to 
the law in force in the occupant’s own territory, there may be an immediate case for suspecting the occupant’s animus. One should, however, be 
wary of carrying such a test, inconclusive as it is, beyond this point. In practice the standard implicit in the test may be abused by an occupant 
interested in a gradual extension of its laws to the occupied territory under a strategy of creeping annexation”. 
988 Dinstein himself emphasises that any professed humanitarian motives by the occupier “may serve as a ruse for a hidden 





suspicion has been addressed in discussing the occupier’s trustee-like obligations.989 Even a risk of 
“ethnocentrism” underlying occupation measures has been raised as a risk whereby it should be 
concluded that the lawfulness of the occupier’s conduct is to be objectively assessed in relation to the 
sovereign rights of the people whose territory is occupied.990 
In any case, it is reasonable to contend that the lawfulness of legislation enacted pursuant to the 
several interests of the “orderly government” of occupied territory relies on two caveats. On the one 
hand, the measure should be strictly necessary to ensure a level of protection of local population in 
accordance to international human rights standards relevant in such a territory, as articulated in the 
section 5.3. On the other hand, the measure should not disproportionately frustrate the interest of 
respecting the existing local legal system. The reference in Article 64(2) solely to the “essential” / 
“indispensable” legislative measures excludes the occupier’s possibility to reform entire sectors of a pre-
existing legal system.991 Furthermore, respect for the criterion of proportionality under Article 64 
imposes a restriction on adopting constitutional reforms that are likely to change permanently the 
occupied territory, reflecting the temporary nature of an occupation. Such reforms would end up 
sacrificing disproportionately the interests of the occupied State or affecting the free exercise of the 
right to self-determination of the occupied peoples.992 In particular, the legitimacy of constitutional 
reforms aimed at changing the form of the state or government should be excluded, even when 
aimed at setting up a “more democratic” regime expected to guarantee better the rights concerned.993 
                                                
989 See A. Gerson, “War, Conquered Territory, and Military Occupation in the Contemporary International Legal 
System”, 18 Harvard International Law Journal, 1976-1977, 525, at 538, noting that “… ‘humanitarian’ motives were suspect. The 
ease with which such an exception to the prohibition on institutional change could serve as a ruse for creation of fait accomplis to the occupant’s 
advantage was well known. Claims by occupants that such change as they initiated was humanitarian, dictated by ‘the imperative needs of the 
population’, would, during the course of occupation, be exceedingly difficult to disprove. To prevent this possibility of abuse the Hague 
Regulation adopted the measure of common law jurisprudence regarding trustees. An occupant, like a trustee, would be severely restricted in his 
authority, not because certain activities could not be honestly done, but because of the extreme difficulty of proving them to have been dishonest 
…”. 
990 A. Pellet, “The Destruction of Troy Will Not Take Place”, in E. Playfair (ed.), op. cit., at 169, observing that “… the 
occupier is not the territorial sovereign. He cannot legislate for the occupied people as he does within his own frontiers. […] there is nothing to 
stop him taking into consideration the legislative and statutory evolution of the country whose territory is occupied and considering this evolution 
as worthy of note, it being understood that he is free to take into account or not. A solution of this type would have the advantage of countering 
the risk of opposition to progress entailed in an occupation which is excessively prolonged while not failing into the disadvantages of 
ethnocentrism subjectivity. […] The lawfulness of the occupier’s conduct  … can, and should, be judged in relation to a far more objective 
element, the criterion of the sovereign rights of the people whose territory is occupied”. 
991 In this vein, the reforms introduced by the Allied Military Government on the pensions regulation and on the 
regulation supporting births, which were in force in Venezia Giulia before the occupation of 1945-1947, are deemed 
unlawful in light of the applicable law at that time, see General Order No. 43, 11 Feb. 1946, in Allied Military Government 
Gazzette, 1946, vol.1, n. 14, at 3; General Order n. 281, 12 Dec. 1946, Allied Military Government Gazzette, 1946, vol.2, at 
332. 
992 R. Kolb and S. Vitè, Le droit de l’occupation militaire. Perspectives historiques et enjeux juridiques actuales, Bruylant, 2009, p. 272 
f. 
993 C. Greenwood, “The Administration of Occupied Territory in International Law”, in C. Greenwood (ed.) Essays on 





5.2.3. Necessity for fulfilling the obligations under the Geneva Conventions 
Consistent with a further explicit dimension of the occupier’s regulatory competence under Article 
64(2) GCIV, the local population may be subjected to any legislative measures deemed “essential” to discharge his 
obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention.994 Significantly, this provision was inspired by the case 
concerning the Allies’ occupation of the territories previously administered by the Reich.995 Thus, 
legislative powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to ensure the rights and benefits of the civilian 
population under that Convention. For instance, Article 27 entitles protected persons to “respect for their 
persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs”; 
then, the occupier is bound to repeal by law “any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or 
political opinion”, as this would be in conflict with Article 27(4). 
Although Article 64 confers on the occupier the authority to alter pre-existing laws in language 
of entitlement (“may”), it sets up a specific obligation to waive pre-existing norms running counter to 
the Geneva Conventions, in accordance with common Article 1 (“…to respect and to ensure respect for the 
present Convention in all circumstances”). This is confirmed in the ICRC Commentary, highlighting the 
prevalence of the humanitarian interests of civilian population over the interest of the occupied State to 
safeguard the status quo.996 Notably, this has concrete consequences when the occupant is intended to 
apply firmly certain legislation that was in force in the occupied territory at the beginning of the 
occupation but is incompatible with IHL obligations. In fact, the occupant is prevented from 
invoking predating local legislation to excuse its failure to perform to that Convention.997 
A guiding example may be the Israeli practice to rely on local Emergency Regulations - dating 
                                                
994 The French expression “indispensable” appears more restrictive than “essential” and also closer to the conservationist 
premises of the Hague Regulations. In any case, compared to the expression “unless absolutely prevented” of Article 43, the 
element in Article 64 GCIV expresses the authority to change existing legislation to “fulfill its obligations under the [...] 
Convention”. 
995 Emblematic is the case of the anti-Jewish and other racial laws abolished because of their discriminatory nature, even 
before that the Reich was completely dismantled, in all the territories occupied by the United States, with the exception 
of the French colonies in North Africa, where General Eisenhower wanted to avoid the risk of a conflict between Jews 
and Muslims, see his message at Marshal on 8 December 1942 as reproduced in Coles, Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers 
Become Governors, Washington, 1992, at 45. 
996 See J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War, ICRC, 1958, 
at 360. 
997 See J. Pictet (ed.), ibid., at 336. See also Y. Dinstein, “Legislation under Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and Peacebuilding”, Harvard: Program on Humanitarian Policy, Occasional Papers Series, 
Fall 2004, at 7. According to the author, the prohibition to implement a predating norm that conflicts with an 
obligation contained in the Forth Geneva Convention derives from the general rule, codified in Article 27 VCLT 
whereby the ineffectiveness of an international obligation cannot rely on its incompatibility with a domestic norm. For 
Dinstein, in fact, if Article 27 VCLT prohibits on the occupier to invoke the provisions of its internal law to justify its 
failure to perform an international norm of occupation law, then a fortiori it prohibits to invoke, under the same aims, a 
norm of the local legal system of the occupied territory to justify its failure to implement the Convention. However, 
Dinstein’s thesis does not take into account the circumstance that - in contrast with the norms of the occupier’s legal 





back to the British Mandate for Palestine998 and still in force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
on the eve of Israeli occupation - which permitted military commanders to destroy private property 
as a punitive measure, and not only “where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operations” as provided in Article 53 GCIV (based on Article 23(g) HRs).999 In this regard, the view 
articulated by the Israeli High Court of Justice in some case law on the punitive demolitions of 
houses inhabited by Palestinians guilty for having committed hostile acts against the occupying 
power (or for having violated security norms imposed by the occupier) and by their families cannot 
be shared.1000 The lawfulness of those demolitions was affirmed by the Court insofar as they were 
carried out in conformity with the local Emergency Regulations. However, it is unquestionable that 
the demolition of houses as punitive measure is incompatible with Article 53 GCIV. Hence, the 
occupant could not legitimately rely on such regulations and it was bound to suspend or repeal 
them.1001 
It should be noted that, in Article 64 GCIV, the reference to laws essential for (or which are an 
obstacle to) the occupant’s respect of this Convention is commonly deemed to encompass any IHL 
obligations. As long as this regime requires specific conduct and bounds to implement such 
obligations, the same regime could not prohibit the occupant to legislate for applying them. As a 
corollary, it is generally emphasised that, in order to accomplish several IHL duties in line with the 
principles of the rule of law, the occupant is allowed to amend, repeal or suspend predating local laws at 
odds with the entire Geneva Conventions, and even to enact new legislation if necessary to realise effective 
safeguards of the protected persons’ rights.  
In the preparatory works of Article 64, examples for the “necessity ground to legislate” 
specifically concerned the provisions in the fields of hygiene and public health, food, child welfare, and labour.1002 
                                                
998 Prior to the entry into force of the Mandate for Palestine, the Ottoman province of Palestine came under belligerent 
occupation by the British during World War I and shortly afterwards. See N. Bentwich, “The Legal Administration of 
Palestine under the British Military Occupation”, 1 British Year Book of International Law, 1920-1921, pp. 139-148. 
999 See Carroll, “The Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses in the Occupied Territories: An Analysis of Its Legality in 
International Law”, MJIL, 1989-90, at 1195 ff., in particular at 1206. 
1000 See HCJ 97/79, Abu Awad v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, 33(3) PD 309, excerpted in 9 Israel YbkHR, 
1979, at 343 ff.; HCJ 897/86, Jaber v. IDF Central Area Commander et al., Israel YbkHR, 1988, at 252 ff. 
1001 On this issue, see Carroll, “The Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses in the Occupied Territories: An Analysis of 
Its Legality in International Law”, MJIL, 1989-90, at 1202 ff.; Dinstein, “The Israel Supreme Court and the law of 
Belligerent Occupation: Demolitions and Sealing off of Houses”, IYHR, 1999, at 285-304; Farrell, “Israel Demolition of 
Palestinian Houses as a Punitive Measure: Application of International Law to Regulation 119”, BJIL, 2002-2003, at 
871 ff.; Simon, “The Demolition of homes in the Israeli Occupied Territories”, YJIL, 1994, at 1 ff. 
1002 See Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Berne, 1950, vol. II-A, at 672 (19th meeting of Committee 
III, 19 May 1949, statement of Mr. Quentin-Baxter of New Zealand concerning the regulation on distribution of food 
supplies) and at 833 (Report of Committee III to the Plenary Assembly of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, which refers to “the 






This is in line with the fact that the drafters of these Conventions, drawing on the welfare state 
concept and the Keynesian-interventionist economic model, envisaged a range of obligations 
relating to social and economic matters.1003 Moreover, according to the ICRC Commentary, 
examples of abrogable laws include “provisions which adversely affect racial or religious minorities”.1004 An 
occupier (as any State Party to GC IV) is also bound to legislate to bring to trial persons having 
committed grave breaches of law, if such law is not yet in force within the occupied territory.1005 
In practice the necessity ground to legislate pursuant to the fulfilment of the Geneva 
Conventions has been widely interpreted in the case of the CPA occupation of Iraq. In confirming 
that the United States and United Kingdom were occupying powers in Iraq and in specifically 
calling upon them to comply fully with the obligations imposed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the 1907 Hague Regulations, the Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) applied a concept of 
welfare whose nature was definitely wide-ranging. It called upon the CPA “to promote the welfare of the 
Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration 
of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which Iraqi people can freely determine their own 
political future”.1006  
As emphasised in legal scholarship debating the legitimacy of changes of existing legislation or 
institutions in occupied territories, two aspects remain important. On one hand, the changes 
justified by the aim of restoring and ensure civil life would be lawful only if they facilitate/improve civil 
life in comparison with the previous system; on the other hand, the burden of proof about the 
amelioration relies on the occupier. In the context of long-lasting occupation, legislative change is 
not justifiable if its result is such that this enhancement does not occur; in which case it should be 
repealed. 
5.3. Necessity for implementing international human rights law 
The three objectives heretofore reviewed are not all-inclusive. The concept of necessity under 
Article 64 GCIV has been deemed sufficiently comprehensive/elastic to permit amendments of pre-
existing local legislation if reasonably required by the circumstances of occupation. 1007  As 
                                                
1003 This aspect is highlighted in Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation, op. cit., 2009, at 133.  
1004 See J. Pictet (ed.), op. cit., at 335. 
1005 See UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford, 2004, para. 11.26, note 54. 
1006 SC Res. 1483, preamble, paras. 4 and 5, 22 May 2003 (adopted by a vote of 14-0, with one member (Syria) not 
present). This was endorsed by SC Res. 1500 (2003), which welcomed the establishment of the Governing Council of 
Iraq. It was a detailed resolution, containing 27 operative paragraphs and a long preamble. Under the present research, 
other paragraphs particularly relevant are 2, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15. 
1007 See Y. Dinstein, The international law of belligerent occupation, 2009, pp. 116 and 135-136. The author refers to the 





anticipated, international human rights standards are not explicitly mentioned as an additional exception to the 
general principle prohibiting changes to local laws. At the time of the codification of the Hague 
Regulations, indeed, international human rights law did not yet exist, while the latter was just 
conceived of when the Fourth Geneva Convention was drafted in 1949.1008  
Notwithstanding the position of certain occupying powers,1009 further practice and judicial 
decisions have confirmed that an occupant is bound to international human rights law concerning the treatment of 
local inhabitants living under occupation.1010 Notably, at the end of WWII the occupier was entitled to 
abrogate discriminatory or oppressive national legislation such as the National Socialist Nuremberg 
laws.1011 In the occupied Iraq new legal texts were adopted to take Iraqi legislation towards 
international human rights standards, as detailed hereafter. Additionally, a relevant 
acknowledgment in this context has come from the ICJ in the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo; in examining Uganda’s actions, the Court addressed the occupant’s duties 
under Article 43 HRs and the entailment of human rights obligations in this regard.1012  
                                                                                                                                                            
higher tribunal functioning in an unoccupied part of the country: Dinstein notices that the occupier does not have to 
submit to such dependence on enemy institutions and that the comprehensive concept of necessity allows to amend the 
laws in force to suspend the nexus to that higher tribunal for the duration of the occupation, so transferring the 
authority to hear appeals from the local courts to another judicial instance operating within the occupied territory (the 
author cites C. Fairman, “Asserted Jurisdiction of the Italian Court of Cassation over the Court of Appeal of the Free 
Territory of Trieste”, 45 AJIL, 1951, p. 548. 
1008 Of note is the rejection of a proposal made by the Mexican Delegation to the effect that the occupier could modify 
local legislation only if it was in breach of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man. See Final Record of the 
Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Berne, 1950, vol. II A, at 671. 
1009 See ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the wall, op. cit., para. 102 and 110; A. Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupations: 
the Israeli-Occupied Territories since 1967”, 84 AJIL, 1990, 44, at 71-72. As regards the Coalition Provisional 
Authority Administrator in Iraq (CPA), Ambassador Paul Bremer is reported to have affirmed that “the only relevant 
standard applicable to the Coalition’s detention practices is the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949”, see Amnesty International, Iraq: 
Memorandum on concerns related to legislation introduced by the Coalition Provisional Authority, 4 December 2003, (MDE 
14/176/2003). 
1010 E.g., see references in Report on the situation of human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi Occupation, prepared by Mr. Walter Kälin, 
Special Rapporterur of the Commission on Human Rights in accordance with Commission resolution 1991/67, E/CN.4/1992/26, 16 
January 1992, paras. 50-59. As to the ICJ, see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, paras. 107-112; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, paras. 216-217. As to Northern Cyprus, the European Court of Human 
Rights deemed it occupied by Turkey and applied the ECtHR, see Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits, 28 November 1996, para. 
56) and Cyprus v. Turkey (10 May 2001, paras. 69-77). As to the Human Rights Committee, see Concluding Observations: 
Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93, 18 August 1998, para. 10; Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, 21 November 2014, para. 5; General Comment No. 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6, 21 
April 2004, para. 10. See General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict and Post-conflict Situations, 
CEDAW/C/GC/30, 18 October 2013, para. 9. See UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 
Oxford, 2004, paras. 11.19.  
1011 See G. Von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1957, pp. 95, 107; M. Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare, University of 
California Press, 1959, p. 245. 
1012 See ICJ, Case Concening Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 
19 December 2005, paras. 178-179: “178. The Court thus concludes that Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri at the relevant 
time. As such it was under an obligation, according to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, to take all the measures in its power to 





Few scholars have specifically examined whether or not obligations stemming from international 
human rights law offer a distinct ground of exception to the general rule prohibiting changes to 
local legal system. In this respect, “l’ordre et la vie publics” in the Hague Regulations has been 
interpreted as “encompass(ing) a requirement that the occupant respect and ensure ‘as far as possible’ the 
international human rights standards protected by customary international law and those treaties to which it is a 
party”.1013 
 Distinct aspects as to the occupant’s necessity to implement human rights obligations may be articulated.  
(1)  Firstly, fundamental rights as enshrined in peremptory norms of international law would prevail over 
incompatible local legislation in force in the occupied territory.1014 
(2)   Secondly, as long as an occupant has to ensure law and order under occupation law, his 
failure to abide by IHL obligations cannot justify a rejection of the applicability of human rights obligations in the 
occupied territory. As to the substance, it may be contended a requirement not only to respect the local 
population’ human rights as pertains to its negative sense, thus refraining from interfering or curtailing with 
their enjoyment, but also a requirement to positively protect them without tolerating violations, as 
required, at the very last, by existing IHL obligations. A partial or total inability to act raises 
questions as to what extent a minimum effort was nonetheless possible and whether it should have been made. 
Thus, due diligence required may depend on the context.  
      Focusing on ESC rights, they regularly necessitate the State to take positive action, including 
adopting legislative measures, besides the negative tier of respecting them. Accordingly, an occupier 
would be allowed to adopt additional provisions “genuinely necessary” to safeguard such rights. 
Nevertheless, human rights treaties on ESC rights generally grant States latitude in the 
implementation of ensuing obligations: to the extent that local laws deal with such latitude, the 
                                                                                                                                                            
force in the DRC. This obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence by 
any third party. 179. The Court, having concluded that Uganda was an occupying Power in Ituri at the relevant time, finds that Uganda’s 
responsibility is engaged both for any acts of its military that violated its international obligations and for any lack of vigilance in preventing 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on 
their own account”. 
1013 See S. Wills, “Occupation Law and Multinational Operations: Problems and Perspectives”, 77 BYIL, 2006, 256, at 
267, mentioning the reasoning by Lord Justice Sedley in the UK Court of Appeal (civil division), The Queen (on the 
application of Mazin Jumaa Gatteh Al-Skeini and Others) and the Secretary of State for Defence, Judgment of 21 December 2005 
EWCA Cov 1609, paras. 195-196. See also UK House of Lords, Opinions of the Lords of Appeal For Judgment in the 
Cause Al Skeini and others (Respondents) v. Secretary of State for Defence (Appellant) Al Skeini and others (Appellants) v. Secretary of State 
for Defence (Respondent), (Consolidated Appeals), 13 June 2007, UKHL 26. See also M. Sassoli, “Legislation and 
Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers”, 16 EJIL, 2005, p. 676.  
1014 On this aspect, the British Manual of Military Law, part III, London, 1958, para. 510, authorised derogation to 
local norms “where the law of the occupied State is such as to shock elementary conceptions of justice and of the rule of law”. The British 
Military Manual seems to admit ample derogations by affirming that the occupier’s powers “may be sufficiently wide to 
enable repeal of laws, e.g., that violate human rights treaties”, see UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 





occupier may definitely not repeal them. As highlighted in the ICRC Commentary, indeed, 
occupying authorities may not modify local legislation “merely to make it accord with their own legal 
conceptions”,1015 also if the latter are consistent with international norms on human rights. 
(3)  Thirdly, the denial of applicability of human rights obligations might be argued on the basis of perceived 
restrictions under occupation law. 1016 As observed above, the occupant’s regulatory competence is 
intended to minimise changes endangering the basic assumptions on the temporariness of 
occupation and his non-sovereign authority. As far as such legal restrictions are not absolute, 
however, an evolutionary approach has led to view the occupant as “absolutely prevented” from applying 
local legislation contrary to international law, and in doing so permitting certain changes consistent with 
the objectives of occupation law. The evolutionary reading of Article 43 HRs - along with its 
interplay with Article 64 GCIV - has led the “empêchement absolu” exception to acquire more 
flexibility than its negative formulation might evoke.1017 Changes of local laws have been deemed required - 
not only exceptionally allowed - to comply with the obligation to restore and ensure a wider notion of public life. 
Significantly, combined interpretations of these articles have led to refer such exception to cases of 
either material necessity or “legal necessity”,1018 namely the necessity to implement IHL obligations 
whether customary or conventional1019 as well as obligations ensuing from non-derogable human 
rights norms.1020 In any case, positive convergence between the distinct regimes may enable us to 
understand broadly the occupant’s requirement to fulfil IHL obligations and so give effect to 
civilians’ fundamental guarantees in occupied territories. 
While the potential for occupants’ abuses in the form of legislative changes driven by self-interest 
                                                
1015 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War, ICRC, 1958, at 
336. 
1016 For a case in which the restrictions placed by occupation law have been raised as impediments for fulfilling human 
rights obligations, see ECtHR, Al Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011, 
para. 114. 
1017 The notion of “empêchement absolu” has been traditionally identified only with cases of impossibility determined by the 
exigency to satisfy strict military necessities, see M. Bothe, “Occupation, Belligerent”, Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, at 765; H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law2, New York, 1952, at 73; Oppenheim, “The Legal Relations 
between an Occupying Power and the Inhabitants”, 33 LQR, 1917, at 365. 
1018  See M. Sassoli, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Peace operations in the Twenty-First century, 2004, in 
www.ihlresearch.org, at 8. 
1019 See J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention, op. cit., at 359, according to which Article 64 merely express “sous 
une forme plus précise, le contenu de l’article 43 du Règlament de La Haye”. In this vein, see Y. Dinstein, “Legislation under 
Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and Peacebuilding”, Harvard: Program on 
Humanitarian Policy, Occasional Papers Series, Fall 2004, at 6, in which the author stresses that “the Geneva Convention must 
prevail over any conflicting local legislation in the occupied territory. That means that the laws in force in the occupied territory must be adapted 
where necessary to the Geneva Convention (and, indeed, to any other binding instrument of international humanitarian law)”. 
1020 See M. Sassoli, “Article 43 of the Hague regulations and Peace operations in the Twenty-First century”, 2004, in 
www.ihlresearch.org, at 12-14. On the prevalence (on local laws) of human rights enshrined in peremptory norms of 
international law, see British Manual of Military Law, Part III, London, 1958, at 510: “There is room for the view that the 
Allied Powers were, in the terms of Hague rule 43, “absolutely prevented” from administering law and principles the application of which in 





in such territories is foreseeable, it is reasonable to contend that there is certain room for changes 
based on modern international human rights law and intended to benefit the civilian population living under 
occupation. The main issue seems mostly related to the way to suspend, modify, repeal pre-existing 
local laws, or enact new legislation in an occupied territory featured by challenging circumstances 
on the ground. In the area of ESC rights, human rights treaties have either supported normative 
clarification or offered further normative contents of fundamental rights, as will be detailed in Chapter 4. 
Therefore, in providing for specific and contemporary understanding of immediate and long-term 
needs and the interests of the occupied civilian population in such areas, they have the potential to 
meet the ground of “necessity” (which would be more difficult to attain under IHL rules).  
In particular, human rights law may become relevant where occupation law scarsely, if at all, 
addresses certain subjects such as regarding the right to social security, the right to form trade unions, and 
the right to maternity leave with pay, whose pertinence may rise during prolonged occupation.1021 
Articles 51 and 52 GCIV protect the right to work, although this scarcely beyond issues on 
compulsory labour, requisitioning services and work conditions of protected persons working at the 
request of the occupant.1022 
The right to education may be illustrative as well. The occupant’s positive obligations under 
Articles 24 and 50 GCIV may be interpreted in conjunction with Article 13(2)(a) ICESCR, which 
categorically establishes that “primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all”;1023 further more 
detailed requirements set forth by the CESCR gain relevance though.1024 Thus, in providing a modern 
understanding of the educational needs of a child, international human rights law may clarify and expand 
those comparatively vague occupation law rules.1025 Certain tensions may remain though. For instance, 
                                                
1021 On the argument that the application of human rights standards is reinforced by a prolonged period of occupation 
or a “stalemated situation” of occupation, see Cohen, Human Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territories 1967-1982, 1985, p. 29; 
A. Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories 1967-1988”, 84 AJIL, 1990, p. 71. 
1022 See ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the wall, op. cit., paras. 130 and 133-134, in which the Court relied on the occupant’s 
duty not to interfere with the right to work of the population living under occupation, where the construction of the wall 
and its associated regime (e.g. the restrictions on movement) obstructed capacities to earn a livelihood. 
1023 Art. 50 (1) and (3) GCIV read: “The Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the 
proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children.   […] Should the local institutions be inadequate for the purpose, 
the Occupying Power shall make arrangements for the maintenance and education, if possible by persons of their own nationality, language and 
religion, of children who are orphaned or separated from their parents as a result of the war and who cannot be adequately cared for by a near 
relative or friend”. 
1024 See CESCR, General Comment No. 13: The right to education, 8 December 1999, E/C.12/1999/10, particularly para. 57 
on core obligations. 
1025 In actual fact, authorithative interpretations of certain aspects of such rules are offered in the ICRC commentary, 
which set three grounds for defining “children” in terms of age: Article 50 GCIV grants protection to “children and younger 
people up to the age of fifteen”, but in some circumstances the “degree of development of the physical and mental faculties of the persons 
concerned” has to be taken into account, see Pictet (ed.), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention, op. cit., p. 285-286. Then, the 
legislation of the occupied territory should be considered, see Comentary to Additional Protocol I, op. cit., para. 3179. Further, 





according to the ICRC commentary to Article 50(1) GCIV, the occupant is bound to assist 
educational institutions for children if needed, but not allowed to interfere with them; besides, such 
assistance can only be provided by “mutual agreement” with local and national authorities.1026 This 
view about non-interference and cooperation may positively mitigate the occupant’s intention to 
replace old education system with a new one. Nonetheless it leaves a basic dilemma that concerns 
“the extent to which an occupant could assist/interfere legitimately with the educational system of a territory under his 
control”.1027 State practice concerning occupying powers’ changes in the sphere of education has 
emerged since WWI; since they generally did not deem themselves bound by occupation law as 
embodied in the Fourth Geneva Convention, scarce information exists on their efforts to respect 
Articles 24 and 50 GCIV however.1028 From a human rights perspective, further concerns may arise 
for possible inconsistencies of the local education system with the normative content of right to education, particularly 
with core positive obligations contained in its ‘availability’, ‘accessibility’, ‘acceptability’ and 
‘adaptability’ components.1029 
As far as the rights to health and food are concerned, the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I 
provide for basic provisions to protect immediate needs, but human rights law entails looking 
beyond IHL rules. This point will be examined in next chapters. For instance, devising “public health 
strategy and plan of action” have been declared to form part of the basic obligations corresponding to 
the right to health.1030 This may be relevant when occupation endures. Moreover, the CESCR has 
considered that “the obligation to fulfil (facilitate) means the State must pro-actively engage in activities intended to 
strengthen people’s access to and utilisation of resources and means to ensure their livelihood, including food 
                                                                                                                                                            
overlaps. They include, e.g., “child welfare centres, orphanages, children’s camps, children’s homes and day nurseries, ‘medio-social’ 
reception centres, social welfare services, reception centres, canteens, etc.”, ibid., p. 286. 
1026 The occupying power “must ensure by mutual agreement with the local authorities that the persons concerned receive food, medical 
supplies amd anything else necessary to enable them to carry out their task. It is in that sense that the expression ‘the proper working’ of 
children’s institutions should be understood”, see J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention, op. cit., 1958, p. 286. 
1027 This dilemma was pointed out back in 1957 by G. Von Glahn, The occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the 
Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation, University of Minnesota Press, 1957, pp. 62-63, noting that “the accepted rules of 
international law are unfortunately silent” on this problem.  
1028 They include the German occupation of Belgium (1914-1918), the US occupation of Italy, the Indonesian 
occupation of East Timor, the USSR in Afghanistan in the Seventies and Eightes, the Turkish occupation in Cyprus, 
Israel in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, and the US occupation of Iraq. See A. Solansky, German Administration in 
Belgium, Columbia University Press, 1928, at 163; E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 1993, at 40-43, 91, 
155, 162; A. Hyman, Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964-1981, MacMillan, 1982, at 93-94. See also ECtHR, Cyprus 
v. Turkey, 25781/94, Judgment, 10 May 2001, para. 44 (“… school textbooks for use in the Greek-Cypriot primary school were 
subjected to a “vetting” procedure in the context of confidence-building measures suggested by UNFICYP. The procedure was cumbersome and 
a relatively high number of school-books were being objected to by the Turkish-Cypriot administration”).  
1029 For a detailed examination of this point, see J.T. Horowitz, “The right to education in occupied territories: making 
more room for human rights in occupation law”, YIHL, 2004, particularly at 249-274.  
1030 CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health, 11 August 2000, UN Doc. 





security”.1031 This may entail an occupying power make sure the civilian population’s access to the 
resources and means guaranteeing its own livelihood, beyond the delivery of food during the 
emergency period. Similarly, the development of international human rights law has broadened 
States’ obligation to accept and to facilitate humanitarian assistance in both international and non-
international conflicts, even where the denial of such assistance does not certainly threaten the 
survival of the civilian population.1032  
(4)  Fourthly, local laws might appear incompatible or insufficient in respect to customary or conventional 
international human rights standards. In actuality, situations of incompatibility with human rights treaties 
(as ratified by an occupying power but not in force in the occupied territory) might arise only to the 
extent that they express regional values extraneous to the cultural traditions and local customs 
existing therein. If this were to be the case, occupier’s claims to respect such standards, even in 
derogation from local laws, would end up representing a sort of “human rights imperialism”. Although 
the latter could inhibit such derogation, it does not seem reasonable to argue that it could impede 
entirely the application of human rights treaties ratified by the occupier.1033 In the same way, insofar 
as the occupier exercises, discretionally and provisionally, in the occupied territory the general 
latitude granted to States for implementing human rights obligations, its non-sovereign status should 
be taken into serious account: changes deemed absolutely necessary under binding human rights law might be 
introduced, but it should remain favourably careful to analogous local values as well as cultural, economic and 
legal customs existing in the occupied territory.1034 In any case, the occupier could refer to the procedure for 
derogation under the human rights treaty concerned in order not to apply provisions incompatible 
with local legislation, so avoiding responsibility for a breach of international law in respect to other 
States parties. 
Focusing on relevant practice, in occupied Iraq the CPA carried out a far-reaching reform of 
                                                
1031 CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food, 12 May 1999, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, para. 15. 
1032 See R. Barber, “Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law”, 91 
IRRC, 2009, pp. 371-397. 
1033 See House of Lords, Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011, para. 
78. Indeed, not all the provisions contained in regional human rights treaties express “particular” values essentially 
extraneous to the legal order of non-party States. Regarding some human rights, it is worth noting a substantial convergence 
among the guarantees provided for under universal and regional treaties. Further, it is possible that the respect for a 
right enshrined in a regional treaty, but not at the universal level, might be safeguarded infra or praeter legem, thus without 
introducing changes to the existing legal system, see R. Wilde, “Completing Occupation Law? Selective Judicial 
Treatment of the suitability of Human rights Norms”, Israel Law Review, 2009, p. 80 ff. See also Judge Bonello’s 
concurring opinion at the ECtHR, House of Lords, Al-Skeini et al., ibid., paras. 37-39. 
1034 A noteworthy consideration is that, on the one side, the exercise of such discretion remains opposed to the right to 
self-determination and to the principle that legislation has to rely on the will of the people, but, on the other side, the 
exercise of such a discretion is “inherent in the situation of occupation” until the right to self-determination can be exercised, 
see M. Sassoli, Article 43 of the Hague regulations and Peace operations in the Twenty-First century, 2004, available at 





Iraqi laws for the claimed purpose of making it compatible with international human rights law. A 
Ministry of Human Rights was established to “implement the rule of law and a system of protection for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the adoption of fundamental standards of human rights and the revival of 
traditional Iraqi standards of human treatment”.1035 Related aspects also concerned the field of criminal 
and criminal procedural laws.1036 Two cases in the area of ESC rights regarded the prohibition of 
child labour and the establishment of property reconciliation and claims institutions to decide 
property disputes mainly concerning the Kurdistan regional area, as previously mentioned in 
section 5.2.2. 
 
It is worth adding that, insofar as occupation concerns a territory part of an existing country, the 
respect for the local legal system may be basically functional to restore the full sovereignty of the 
occupied State, hence in the interest of the legitimate sovereign and, more generally, in the interest 
of the international community in view of the conservationist principle of values, which supports the 
development of international law.1037  
Conversely, insofar as occupation concerns a territory not yet part of a sovereign State, the respect of 
local legal system may impede the occupier to shape the free exercise of the right to self-
determination of the people living under occupation, which the international community promotes. 
Indeed, an occupier’s attempt to legislate to advance such an exercise appears not possible because 
this right is intimately connected to the wishes of that people (it consists of the people’s right to make 
choices). For that reason, while the respect of pre-existing legal system bounds an occupier, local 
authorities representing that people may freely adopt reforms.1038 
                                                
1035 CPA Order No. 60 adopted on 19 February 2004. In the following years it has implemented projects on human 
rights development and advancement, particularly in relation to prisons and detention centres teams, or the situation of 
women in Iraq. In 2008 the National Institution of Human Rights was set up as a specialised institute aimed at 
mainstreaming a human rights culture and capacity building of the personnel of the Ministry and other governmental 
institutions. In 2010 completed the UN Universal Periodic Review. 
1036 CPA Order No. 7 was adopted on 9 June 2003 to reform the Iraqi Penal Code, it suspended capital punishment, it 
prohibited torture and cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment as well as discrimination (CPA/ORD/9 
June 2003/07 (Sections 3 and 4), amended by CPA Order No. 31, CPA/ORD/10 September 2003/31). As for the 
reforms of procedural criminal law, the rights to remain silence and the right to defence counsel (including the funded 
scheme) were recognised, besides the requirement for the advise of rights (see Memorandum No. 3: Criminal 
Procedures, CPA/MEM/27 June 2003/03, Section 4), and the guarantee of fundamental due process for detainees (see 
CPA Order No. 10: Management of Detention and Prison Facilities, CPA/ORD/8 June 2003/10; Memorandum No. 
2: Management of Detention and Prison Facilities, CPA/MEM/8 June 2003/02). See M.J. Kelly, “Iraq and the Law of 
occupation: New Tests for an Old law”, 6 YbkHL, 2006, 127, at 139-142, highlighting how some aspects of political 
offences in the Iraqi Penal Code were suspended by the Administrator, while others were subjected to its approval. 
Under the CPA Orders, courts were required to apply the law in an impartial and non-discriminately manner. 
1037 See G. Sperduti, Lezioni di diritto internazionale, Milano, 1958, 19 ff. 
1038 While Israel is bound to respect the legislation dating back to the British Mandate as well as the administration by 





Focusing on the objective incompatibility of a situation of occupation with the right to self-
determination, respecting the latter should imply to withdraw from the occupied territory, rather 
than simply not to legislate. Nonetheless, inasmuch as this constitutes an issue of jus ad bellum, it 
cannot serve to negate the occupant’s authority to legislate therein under jus in bello. A reasonable 
possibility in this regard is the allowing for the abrogation of local laws that impede people’s exercise 
of the right to self-determination and to generate conditions indispensable to such an exercise.1039 
6. The seizure and use of enemy property  
In regulating the treatment of enemy property in the occupied territory, occupation law basically 
provides the primacy of private over public property. The occupant has different rights and duties 
regarding both types (in the forms of moveable and immovable property). The rigorous distinction 
between private and public property that featured the discipline of the Hague Regulations reflects 
the well-known laissez affaire approach of their drafters. As significantly highlighted in legal 
scholarship, however, since the 1920s decision-making policies on the regulations of the economy 
and property rights in occupied territories have been affected by the idea of a welfare state based on 
public intervention and joint (public and private) titles.1040  
In focusing on the basic question of the use of public property under occupation, the following 
appraisal puts special emphasis on natural resources, particularly considering the development of 
relevant provisions over time. For the purposes of the present research, the treatment of public 
property is narrowly explored regarding its direct or indirect implications for the protection of the 
civilian population’s ESC rights. 
6.1. The prohibition on seizure and use of public property 
In accordance with the general principle endorsed in international law that the economic weight of 
the conflict should fall on the belligerent States’ shoulders rather than on their own people, the public 
property of an occupied territory does not enjoy the same guarantees provided for private assets 
under occupation law.1041 However, certain limits to an occupier’s legitimate possibility to seize and 
                                                
1039 On this point, see M. Sassoli, op. cit., at 678. 
1040 On this aspect, see Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation, op. cit., 2009, at 195. 
1041 See the statement of Arbitrator Hines in the 1921 Award in the Cession of Vessels and Tugs for Navigation on the Danube 
Case, which involved the confiscation of private property during World War I, Judgment of 2 August 1921, RSA, vol.1, 
97 ff., at 107-108. According to Hines, “(t)he purpose of the immunity of private property from confiscation is to avoid throwing the 
burdens of war upon private individuals, and is, instead, to place those burdens upon States which are the belligerents”, adding that “(i)n 





use local public property remain functional to avoid the economic meltdown of such a territory, 
especially when occupation endures over time with serious detrimental effects for the civilian 
population. This consideration then supports the applicability of certain rules on public property to 
those properties not exclusively enjoyed by private individuals and placed in an occupied territory 
not yet part of a sovereign State;1042 indeed they essentially ensure local people the resources 
necessary to build the new State in the exercise of its right to self-determination. 
6.1.1. Movable State property 
Under Article 53(1) HRs, the occupier’s army may take possession of financial assets (i.e. “cash, funds, 
and property liable to requisition belonging strictly to the (occupied) State”) as well as of both movable property 
susceptible in nature to military use and movable property that is for dual use (“depots of arms, means 
of transport, stores and supplies”), in addition to all movable State property which may be used for 
military operations. 1043  Notably, the only generally accepted exception to this rule concerns 
movable properties belonging ex Article 56 HRs to “institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, 
the arts and sciences”; this was confirmed by Nuremberg Military Tribunal regarding the “wholesale 
seizure” of art treasures, furniture, textiles, and similar articles, which was conducted in all the 
invaded countries.1044 
A main issue raised by the formulation of Article 53(1) HRs is whether it would merely allow the 
occupant to seize/appropriate such movable State properties, or, rather, whether it would entitled it to become the 
owner concerned. Despite the word “saisir” being similarly contained in its second paragraph to qualify 
the occupier’s temporary seizure of movable properties pertaining to private individuals and usable 
                                                                                                                                                            
property to its owner, the appropriation of the property by the Enemy State would not place the burden of the loss upon the private owner, but 
would place it upon the owner’s State, which would be under an obligation to make compensation to the owner”. 
1042 The relevance of the distinction between private and public property has been confirmed in relation to territories 
not yet part of a legitimate sovereign State in the case law of the Supreme Court of Israel: “public property” has been 
deemed the one qualified as such by local norms existing on the eve of occupation (see HCJ 2285/81, El Nazer et al. v. 
Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region et al., IsrYHR, 1983, at 368 ff.) and also the property belonging to the national 
liberation movement (see HCJ 574/82, Al-Nawar v. Minister of Defence et al., IsrYHR, 1986, at 321 ff.) 
1043 Under Article 53(1) HRs “(a)n army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realisable securities which are strictly 
the property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State 
which may be used for military operations”. 
1044 See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Nuremberg, 
30 September and 1 October 1946, Official Documents, 1947, pp. 214-242, concerning the evaluation of the legitimacy or 
not of the operations by the German organization Einsatztab Rosenberg (headed by the Ministry for the occupied 
territories of Eastern Europe, i.e. the Defendant Rosenberg), which was created in 1940 as a Centre for National 
Socialist Ideological and Educational Research, but which developed into seizing and appropriating a great amount of 
cultural assets of historical value pertaining to the occupied States in Eastern Europe (especially to the Soviet Union). 
The Military Tribunal rejected the thesis that “the purpose of the seizure of art treasures was protective and meant for their 
preservation”, addressing “the intention to enrich Germany by the seizures, rther that to protect the seized objects”. On the general 
practice of Germany in occupied territories during World War II in relation to public property, see Robinson, 





for military operations,1045 it is reasonable to contend that the occupier does not obtain the 
ownership of the public movable properties of which it takes possession under Article 53(1). Indeed, 
differently from the second paragraph, the first one does not provide for an obligation to return 
these assets upon the end of the conflict.1046  
In any case, in view of the general principles of occupation law, such absence of allocation 
constraints in paragraph 1 cannot be deemed a suggestion of absolute freedom to dispose of the 
movable properties of the occupied State. The occupant’s faculty to confiscate cannot result in a 
depletion of the occupied territory for the pursuit of its own benefit1047 and detrimental for the 
welfare of the local population as well as for the recurrence of the status quo ante. Accordingly, the 
lawfulness of such seizures remains subordinated to a twofold legitimate use of these assets: as 
strictly necessary (directly or indirectly) to the immediate military exigencies of the occupying 
army,1048 or, as functional to cover the expenses for implementing its duties concerning the 
protection of the local population.1049  
This reading of Article 53(1) has been confirmed by subsequent international practice. 
According to the resolution of the London International Law Conference of 12 July 1943, “(t)he 
rights of the occupant do not include any rights to dispose of property, rights or interests for purposes other than the 
maintenance of public order and safety in the occupied territory. In particular, the occupant is not, in international aw, 
vested with any power to transfer a title which will be valid outside that territory to any property rights or interests 
which he purports to acquire or create or dispose of; this applies whether such property, rights or interests are those of the 
                                                
1045 Article 53(2) reads: “All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of 
persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, may be seized, even if 
they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made”. In addition to these two types of 
movable State properties, Article 48 HRs give the occupier the power to seize “taxes, dues and tolls imposed for the benefit of 
the State” in the occupied territory. 
1046 See Huber, “La propriété publique en cas de guerre sur terre”, RGDIP, 1913, p. 657 ff., 662; G. Morelli, “Efficacia 
del bottino di guerra nell’ordinamento italiano”, Foro italiano, 1948, I, p. 533 ff.; F. Capotorti, L’occupazione nel diritto di 
guerra, Napoli, 1949, p. 123 f.; A. Marazzi, “Bottino di guerra e patrimonio indisponibile dello Stato occupato”, in Il Foro 
padano, 1953, I, p. 1071 ff.; G. Von Glanh, The Occupation of Enemy Territory, A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent 
Occupation, Minneapolis, 1957, p. 183; Y. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge, 2009, p. 219. 
See also the majority of military manuals and national laws implementing the Hague Regulations. 
1047 For movable property not of military use, two main consequences for the occupier can be inferred: he must respect 
the property and he cannot appropriate it. See A. Cassese, “Powers and Duties”, op. cit., at 428. See also US Military 
Manual, op. cit., para 404. 
1048 As addressed by the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the assets seized cannot be used in other war contexts: 
“(j)ust as the inhabitants of the occupied territory must not be forced to help the enemy in waging the war against their own country or their own 
country’s allies, so must the economic assets of the occupied territory not be used in such a manner”, see US Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, The United States of America v. Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and Eleven Others, Judgment of 31 
July 1948, 15 AD 620, Case No. 214. 
1049 As a general principle, occupation law prohibits the occupant to dispose of the properties of the occupied State for 





State or of private persons or bodies”.1050 A further corroboration has come from the International 
Military Tribunal in 1946, holding that “[Article 49 and 52 of the Hague Regulations], together with Article 
48, dealing with the expenditure of money collected with taxes, and Articles 53, 55 and 56 dealing with public 
property, make it clear that under the rules of war, the economy of an occupied country can only be required to bear the 
expenses of the occupation, and these should not be greater than the economy of the country can reasonably be expected to 
bear”.1051 Another recent confirmation derives from some military manuals1052 and from the Bruges 
Declaration on the use of force, adopted by the Institut de droit international on 2 September 2003, 
according to which “the occupying power can only dispose of the resources of the occupied territory to the extent 
necessary for the current administration of the country and to meet the essential needs of the population”.1053 
6.1.2. Immovable State property, particularly natural resources 
The treatment of immovable State property found in the occupied territory falls under Article 55 
HRs, which applies the basic idea of the temporary nature of occupation to public buildings, real 
estates (land), forests, parks, agricultural estates and “permanent structures on land and other appurtenant to 
the real estate”.1054 As has emerged in practice the interpretation of Article 55 HRs endorses an 
extensive notion of “immovable” property, which includes mineral as well as oil deposits and other 
natural resources of an occupied territory, regardless of the qualification of these assets under the local 
laws.1055 
Indeed, the occupant’s utilisation of natural resources has been modified in the aftermath of the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.1056 This principle represents both an aspect of State 
sovereignty1057 and a corollary of the principle of self-determination of people;1058 as such it is 
                                                
1050 The complete text of the resolution is reproduced in G. Von Glahn, op. cit., p. 194 ff. 
1051 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Nuremberg, 30 
September and 1 October 1946, op. cit., pp. 238-9. 
1052 See, e.g., the US Field Manual, op. cit., para. 364; the UK Manual, op. cit., para. 11.30. 
1053 The integral text of the Declaration is available in http://www.idi-iil.org 
1054 In addition to such immovable State property which is essentially civilian in character, it is possible to distinguish the 
real property used for military purposes, albeit this distinction is not expressly provided in the Hague law. For instance, 
see UK Military Manual, op. cit., 2004, p. 303, paras. 11.85-11.86. 
1055 For a detailed analysis on the exploitation of oil in State practice, see Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation, op. 
cit., 2009, at 209-215; E.R. Cummings, “Oil resources in Occupied Arab Territories under the Law of Belligerent 
Occupation”, JILE, 1974, 533 ff., at 557; A. Cassese, “Powers and Duties of an Occupant in Relation to Land and 
Natural Resources”, in E. Playfair (ed.), International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories. Two Decades of Israeli 
Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Oxford, 1992, p. 419 ff. On the qualification of the not yet lifted oil as 
immovable property, see Court of Appeal of Singapore, N.V. De Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappli and Ors. v. The War 
Damage Commission, Judgment of 13 April 1956, reprinted in 51 AJIL, 1957, pp. 802-815. 
1056 See A. Gattini, “Occupazione bellica” in S. Cassese (ed.), Dizionario di diritto pubblico, Milano, 2006, pp. 3889 ff., 3895 
f. 
1057 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1 
May 1974, para. 4, lett. E; UN Doc. A/RES/29/3281, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 14 December 





relevant for territories not yet subject to the sovereignty of any State.1059  
Despite the acknowledgement of the customary nature of such principle in Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Uganda, the ICJ has also contended that “there is nothing in these General Assembly resolutions 
which suggests that they are applicable to the specific situation of looting, pillage and exploitation of certain natural 
resources by members of the army of a State military intervening in another State”.1060 Scholars’ related critiques 
highlight that the Court would have excluded the applicability of the principle concerned in all the 
situations of occupation.1061 The coordination of the quoted statement with another one previously 
articulated in the same judgement,1062 however, seems to indicate that the Court just excluded the 
relevance of this principle in cases in which the plundering and exploitation of natural resources are 
not part of a plan elaborated and systematically implemented by the occupant in order to deprive 
the occupied territory for the benefit of its own economy, and in which they are, instead, conducted 
by individuals for their own personal benefit, although they belong to its army.1063  
 
In this context it is worth considering that individual acts of exploitation of natural resources of the 
occupied State may constitute the different conduct of pillaging as prohibited under Article 47 HRs and 
under Article 33(2) GCIV, which encompass duties of a positive nature. Accordingly, the occupier 
should respond to the violation of these provisions as to the unlawful conduct of members of its 
army, while it should also respond to a violation of Article 43 HRs in case of negligence in preventing or 
repressing looting, plundering and exploitation on the part of private persons. 1064 Conversely, 
                                                                                                                                                            
1058 See Article 1(2) of the two 1966 UN Covenants. See also SC Res. 1483 (2003), The situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in 
which it stressed “the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources” 
(considerando 4). The twofold nature of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is affirmed also in 
GA Res. 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 on “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources”. 
1059 See, i.e., GA Res. 3175 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973, entitled “Permanent sovereignty over national resources in 
the occupied Arab territories”, in which it recalled that “the right of the Arab States and peoples whose territories are under foreign 
occupation to permanent sovereignty over all their natural resources”. In this respect, see aldo the report of the Secretary General, 
Implications Under International Law of the United Nations Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources on the Occupied 
Palestinian and Other Arab Territories and on the Obligations of Israel Concerning its Conduct in These Territories, A/38/265- UN 
Doc. E/1983/85, 21 June 1983. 
1060 See ICJ, Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 
19 December 2005, para. 244. 
1061 R. Kolb and S. Vitè, Le droit de l’occupation militaire. Perspectives historiques et enjeux juridiques actuales, Bruylant, 2009, p. 
433 ff. 
1062 See ICJ, Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, op. cit., para. 242: “Having examined the case file, the Court finds that it does 
not have at its disposal credible evidence to prove that there was a governmental policy of Uganda directed at the exploitation of natural 
resources of the DRC or that Uganda’s military intervention was carried out in order to obtain access to Congolese resources. At the same time, 
the Court considers that it has ample credible and persuasive evidence to conclude that quarterrs and soldiers of the UPDF, including the most 
high-ranking quarterrs, were involved in the looting, plundering and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources and that the military 
authorities did not take any measures to put an end to these acts”. 
1063 On this point, see Y. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge, 2009, p. 217 f.  
1064 The ICJ recognised that Uganda had to take adequate measures to ensure that the Uganda People’s Defence Force 





systematic exploitation of economic resources of the occupied territory may constitute a war crime.1065 Notably, 
in dealing with the issue of extensive economic exploitation of occupied territories during the 
Second World War, a US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg did not give a definition of the war 
crime of “plunder of public or private property” by referring to specific provisions of the Hague 
Regulations (like the prohibition of pillage in Article 47 HRs); instead, it delivered in general terms 
“the outside limits of permissible economic exploitation” of occupied territories by belligerent occupants.1066 
 
Refocusing on Article 55 HRs, as has been anticipated in the previous section 2, being as the 
occupant is a “trustee” of the occupied territory, its job consists of being the “usufructuary” of 
immovable public property placed therein, operating in accordance with the rules of “usufruct” and 
filling a provisional administrative role to preserve the “capital of assets” placed therein. In this 
regard, a certain notion of usufruct under Article 55 HRs has been consolidated through the 
practice surfaced over the years.1067  
Therefore, without obtaining the title and the ownership of such property, the occupant only 
acquires possession; this means it is prohibited to alienate (sell or transfer) immovable State 
properties,1068 even though it is permitted to dispose of, and to sell, their wares (e.g. crops and minerals) 
under certain circumstances.1069 The occupant is nonetheless allowed to use immovable State 
properties in a way that safeguards their capital according to the basic idea of “picking the fruits without 
                                                                                                                                                            
resources in the occupied territories, and it emphasised that the duty of preventing such conduct is extended to cover 
private persons (including commercial entities), see ICJ, Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, op. cit., paras. 245-249. 
1065 See Article 6 (b) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution 
and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (usually referred to as the Nuremberg Charter or 
London Charter) refers to “systematic plunder of public or private property”; Article 3(e) ICTY Statute counts, among war 
crimes, “plunder of public property”; Article 8(2) ICC Statute refers to “[e]xtensive […] appropriation of property, not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”. 
1066 See U.S. Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, The United States of America v. Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, 
Judgment of 31 July 1948, 15 AD 620, Case No. 214, at 622, holding that “(T)he Articles of the Hague Regulations … are clear 
and uniquivocal. Their essence is: if, as a result of war action, a belligerent occupies a territory of the adversary, he does not, thereby, acquire 
the right to dispose of property in that territory, except according to the strict rules laid down in the Regulations”. See also the post-World 
War II cases cited in B.M. Claggett and O.T. Johnson, “May Israel as a Belligerent Occupant Lawfully Exploit 
Previously Unexploited Oil resources of the Gulf of Suez?”, 72 AJIL, 1978, 558, at 584 (see note 126). 
1067 The application of the Roman law concept of usufruct to public immovable property under the international law of 
belligerent occupation was conceived in the Brussels Conference of 1874 that formulated the original draft of Article 55 
HRs. The concept was then applied by the Franco-Chilean Arbitration Tribunal, which examined the effect of the 
Chilean occupation of the Peruvian territory of Tarapaca as to the legal position of the guano deposits in that occupied 
province. See Guano case (Chile/France), Award of 5 July 1901, 15 Report of International Arbitral Awards, at 367: according 
to the Tribunal, if the guano was treated as immovable State property, Chile was entitled as a “usufructuary” to “les fruits, 
tant naturels que civils” of the property; further, until Chile had extracted the guano, it remained Peruvian property.  
1068 The violation of this prohibition exposes the buyer of the relevant state property to the risk of eviction by the 
legitimate sovereign at the end of occupation. On this point, see G. Von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A 
Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation, 1957, at 178. Y. Dinstein, “The International Law of Belligerent 
Occupation and Human Rights”, 8 IsrYbkHR, 1978, 104, at 129. 





cutting down the tree”: any measures to decrease the value of such properties is hence prohibited.1070  
This obligation to safeguard the capital of immovable public property embodies a negative 
aspect (i.e. refraining from harming the capital) and a positive one (i.e. initiating measures to 
preserve the capital). This rule may then raise basic and delicate issues of interpretation in relation 
to certain natural resources of occupied territories and their economic development. Indeed, the 
literal interpretation of Article 55 HRs definitely prohibits the use of the capital itself, thus not 
admitting “reasonable” or “proportionate” use of the capital of natural resources such as “land”, “forests”, 
“rivers”: these are exhaustible resources and their exhaustion is irreversible. 
A restrictive interpretation of the duty to safeguard the capital would absolutely exclude an 
occupant’s possibility to exploit exhaustible resources of the occupied territory, as their 
appropriation determines necessarily a diminution of the capital.1071 However, a more flexible 
interpretation has surfaced in practice, with the aim of guaranteeing upon a belligerent occupant a 
limited faculty to use or lease immovable public property and enjoy its fruits (e.g. use, consume or 
sell them) insofar as the capital is not depleted.1072 In this manner it would be permitted to exploit 
mineral and oil deposits;1073 in particular, the possibility to take over the exploitation of mines and 
oil wells already in use has been allowed for, but the option to open new ones has been excluded.1074  
In view that such use must not be reckless and avoid wastage or the complete depletion of 
                                                
1070 See J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the Dynamics of Disputes and War Law, Rinehart, 1954, at 
714, observing that the occupant’s power as governing authority pro tempore “is measured not by his own needs but by the duty to 
maintain integrity of the corpus”. See G. Von Glahn, op. cit., at 176-177, in which it is explained that the occupant can 
exercise both the jus utendi (i.e. billeting of armies in buildings owned by the occupied State) and the jus fruendi 
(consumption of fruits, like the crops picked from agricultural lands belonging to the occupied State). 
1071 See Arbitral Tribunal, Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company, ILR, vol. 27, 117 ff., at 157. 
1072 See Y. Dinstein, op. cit., 2009, at 214. 
1073 On this issue, see A. Crivellaro, “Oil Operations by a Belligerent Occupant: The Israel-Egypt Dispute”, IYIL, 1977, 
p. 171 ff.; A. Gerson, “Off-Shore Oil Exploration by a Belligerent Occupant: The Gulf of Suez Dispute”, AJIL, 1977, p. 
725 ff.; E.R. Cummings, B.M. Clagett, W.D. Rogers, A. Gerson, “Territories Occupied by Israel: Settlements and 
Exploration of Oil resources”, ASIL Proceedings, 1978, p. 118 ff.; B.M. Clagett and O.T. Johnson, “May Israel as a 
Belligerent Occupant Lawfully Exploit Previously Unexploited Oil Resources of the Gulf of Suez?”, AJIL, 1978, p. 558 
ff.; D. Langernkamp and R. Zedalis, “What happens to the Iraqi Oil?: Thoughts on Some Significant, Unexamined 
International Legal Questions Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields”, EJIL, 2003, pp. 417-435. 
1074 See the position taken by the US State Department in relation to the decision by Israel to begin exploratory drilling 
in the Gulf of Suez at the time of its occupation of Sinai, Memorandum of Law on Israel’s Right to Develop New Oil Fields in the 
Sinai and the Gulf of Suez, 1 October 1976, 16 ILM, 1977, 733-752. For the positions of the doctrine on this issue, see A. 
Crivellaro, “Oil Operations by a Belligerent Occupant: The Israel-Egypt Dispute”, IYIL, 1977, p. 171 ff.; B.M. Clagett 
and O.T. Johnson, “May Israel as a Belligerent Occupant Lawfully Exploit Previously Unexploited Oil Resources of the 
Gulf of Suez?”, AJIL, 1978, p. 558 ff.; E.R. Cummings, B.M. Claggett, W.D. Rogers, A. Gerson, “Territories Occupied 
by Israel: Settlements and Exploration of Oil resources”, ASIL Proceedings, 1978, p. 118 ff. On the Israeli position 
(according to which Article 55 HRs would not impede the exploitation of resources that are for the benefit of the local 
population), see Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affaires, Memorandum of Law on the Right to Develop New Oil Fields in Sinai and the 
Gulf of Suez, 17 ILM, 1978, pp. 432-442. The Israeli position is supported by Yoram Dinstein, see Dinstein, The 
International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge, 2009, at 216; A. Gerson, “Off-Shore Oil Exploration by a 





resources, the occupant is then required to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory and adhere 
to the rhythms of the preceding extraction or, in any case, to those characterising a “normal” 
exploitation of mineral resources.1075 In this regard, the “moderate” approach over depleting the 
capital under the military manuals of the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand is notable: they do 
not prohibit any use of property that decreases the capital, but at least a “wasteful or negligent” use or 
an “abusive exploitation” is proscribed.1076 The manuals of the UK and New Zealand even forbid the 
occupant from entering into commitments (such as leasing or providing mining licenses) extending 
beyond the conclusion of the occupation, adding that “mining must not exceed what is necessary or usual”.  
Bearing in mind the “conservative” starting point of the occupant’s authority to introduce 
changes in occupied territory, it may be said that Article 55 HRs “exceptionally” permits the use of 
public property (under certain limits) from the beginning of the occupation.  
Despite no allocations constraining the use of wares explicitly referred in Article 55 HRs, the 
consideration articulated above regarding the treatment of movable State property suggests the 
unlawfulness of any use of immovable State property if not strictly necessary to cover the occupant’s 
military needs and the administration of the occupied territory.1077 This seems a reasonable view, 
first of all, in accordance with a systematic reading: it would in fact be illogical that occupation law 
bounds the occupant to a certain use of movable State properties but not of the revenues of 
immovable State properties.1078 Moreover, the use of natural resources for its own benefit would run 
directly counter to the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.1079 That view, 
                                                
1075 See France Cour De Cassation, Administration of Water and Forest v. Falk, 11 February 1927, in AD, 1927-1928, at 563. 
See B.M. Clagett and O.T. Johnson, “May Israel as a Belligerent Occupant Lawfully Exploit Previously Unexploited 
Oil Resources of the Gulf of Suez?”, 72 AJIL, 1978, at 576; D. Langernkamp and R. Zedalis, “What happens to the 
Iraqi Oil?: Thoughts on Some Significant, Unexamined International Legal Questions Regarding Occupation of Oil 
Fields”, EJIL, 2003, p. 425 ff.; M. Voyame, “The Use of Hydrocarbon Resources under Belligerent Occupation, the 
Question of the Iraqi Oil”, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 22 April 2004, available at http://www.jha.ac . 
1076 These manuals indicate the work of mines within a non-exhaustive list of immovable public property whose use and 
operation are allowed under Article 55 HRs. For the US Manual, see Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 27-10: 
The Law of Land Warfare (1956), ch. 6, sec. V, para. 402, http://library.enlisted.info/field-manuals/series-
1/FM27_10/TOC.PDF. For the UK Manual, see MOD, The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004), ch. 
11, sec 11.86. For the Canadian Manual, see Quarter of the JAG, Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level 
(2003), ch. 12, sec. 1243, http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/oplaw-loiop/loac-ddca-2004/chap12-eng.asp. For 
the New Zealand Manual, see the ICRC Database on Customary IHL: Practice, Rule 51(b), 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule51_sectionb. 
1077 See previous section 6.1.1; R. Kolb and S. Vité, Le droit de l’occupation militaire. Perspectives historiques et enjeux juridiques 
actuels, Bruylant, 2009, at 430 f. 
1078 See US Department of State Memorandum of Law on “Israel’s Right to Develop New Oil Fields in the Sinai and 
the Gulf of Suez”, 1 October 1976, op. cit., at 742, holding that “certainly there would be no basis for arguing that an occupant had 
greater freedom regarding the use or disposition of oil found in the ground (public immovable property) than of oil he found already lifted (public 
movable property)”. 
1079 See I. Scobbie, “Natural Resources and Belligerent Occupation: Mutation through Permanent Sovereignty”, in 
Bowen (ed.) Human Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Territories, The Hague/Boston/London, 





however, is not unanimously supported,1080 as will be discussed below through the reference to a 
recent case law. 
 
In this context, the question as to whether the use of immovable public property must be for the benefit of the 
local population living in the occupied territory under Article 55 HRs deserves specific attention. According 
to certain scholars, the occupant might enjoy the revenues of public immovable property at its 
discretion; it could be used in accordance with its own interest including transfer to its own 
market.1081 This seems actually to conflict with the essence of occupation law (i.e. the occupant is a 
temporary administrator and trustee of the occupied territory) and with the “quasi-constitutional” 
nature of Article 43 HRs. Similarly, the aforementioned State practice permitting under Article 55 
HRs the use of property that decreases the capital (see the four military manuals above) emphasises 
that the occupant is the “guardian” or “administrator” of the property, hence entailing that the property 
should be used for the interest of the local population. Therefore, it is reasonable to posit that, inasmuch as 
the use of immovable State property under Article 55 HRs is subject to the general rule of Article 43 
HRs, such use remains carefully limited either to the occupant’s military and security needs or to 
the protection of the public welfare and the interests of the civilian population living under 
occupation.  
In any case, an additional related question arises: to what extent is the use of immovable public property 
to be for the benefit of the local population under Article 55 HRs as modified by the principle of self-determination of 
peoples? As observed in section 2, various resolutions of the UN General Assembly have in fact 
provided rules which “deviate” from the ones derived from occupation law concerning the 
exploitation of natural resources. Along the lines of developing legal concepts of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources1082 and new international economic order,1083 Article 16 of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Power] exploit the inhabitants, the resources or other assets of the territory under its control for the benefit of its own territory or population”. 
The jurisprudence of the Israeli High Court has also emphasised that “an occupied territory is not an open field for economic or 
other exploitation” and that “the Military Commander is not permitted to consider the national, economic and social interests of his State 
insofar they do not affect its security interest in the occupied territory or the interest of the local population”, see HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan 
case, para. 13, and HCJ 2164/09, Yesh Din case, para 8. 
1080 See Y. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge, 2009, at 215; A. Gerson, “Off-Shore Oil 
Exploration by a Belligerent Occupant: The Gulf of Suez Dispute”, AJIL, 1977, at 730; G. Von Glahn, The Occupation of 
Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation, 1957, at 177.  
1081 See G. Von Glahn, op. cit., 1957, at 177; A. Cassese, op. cit., 1992, at 428. 
1082 GA Res. 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. For an analysis, see A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law, 2005, at 216; I. Brownlie, “Legal status of Natural Resources in International Law (Some Aspects)”, 
162 RdC, 1979-I, 245, at 262. 
1083 See J.N. Bhagwati (ed.), The New International Economic Order – The North-South Debate, 1977; P.M. Dupuy (ed.), The New 
International Economic Order: Commercial, Technological and Cultural Aspects, Workshop, The Hague, 23-25 October 1980; J. 





Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of 19741084 and the Declaration on the Right to 
Development1085 are noteworthy. Even interpreting these resolutions as not overhauling the law of 
occupation, they make manifest the idea that the investments in an occupied territory to exploit the 
consumption of natural resources are allowed solely in a way that does not deprive the people living 
therein of the effective exercise of their rights to development and self-determination in economic affairs. 
Focusing on relevant practice, scholars’ concern as to the exploitation planned by the CPA in 
occupied Iraq (in favour of multinational companies associated with this coalition) have emphasised 
the crucial test ensuing from the right to self-determination of the Iraqis; namely guaranteeing that 
they would not have been divested of the substantial benefits of such exploitation.1086 Conversely, 
for others the occupier would be permitted to rely on the talent and supplies of companies of its 
nationality “so long as the selection is economically sound, made in good faith, and not somehow inuring to the 
occupant’s ‘own enrichment’”.1087 In any case, however, the military commander’s concern on the 
welfare of local inhabitants may result to be controversial and sometimes “may camouflage a hidden 
agenda”.1088 The following case law offers an opportunity to reflect more on both arguments. 
6.1.2.a. Case study: the quarrying activity in the occupied territory 
The occupant’s use of natural resources has been disputed in a recent case concerning the Israeli 
administration of quarrying activity in the occupied Palestinian territories. While some related 
remarks have been spelled out in section 4.2.1.c. dealing with the use of the protracted character of 
occupation in the Court’s legal reasoning, this case deserves further attention in view of its 
controversial reading of Article 55 HRs along with Article 43 HRs. 
Primarily, it is worth mentioning that in the Yesh Din judgement the Israeli High Court 
examined specifically the lawfulness of the Israeli military commander’s policy on the use and 
                                                
1084 GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, Article 16: “1. It is the right and duty of all States, individually and collectively, 
to eliminate colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, neo-colonialism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation and domination, and 
the economic and social consequences thereof, as a prerequisite for development. States which practise such coercive policies are economically 
responsible to the countries, territories and peoples affected for the restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and depletion of, and 
damages to, the natural and all other resources of those countries, territories and peoples. It is the duty of all States to extend assistance to them. 
2. No State has the right to promote or encourage investments that may constitute an obstacle to the liberation of a territory occupied by force”. 
1085 GA Res. 41/128 of 4 December 1986, Article 5. 
1086 See J.J. Paust, “The United States as Occupying Power over Portions of Iraq and Special Responsibilities under the 
Laws of War”, 27 Suffolk Transnational Law review, 2003, 1, at 12-13, in which the author expressed concern with respect 
to a contract given to the US company Halliburton in order to control and operate the Iraqi oil fields and oil supply. 
1087 See R.D. Langenkamp and R.J. Zedalis, “What happens to the Iraqi Oil?: Thoughts on Some Significant, 
Unexamined International Legal Questions Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields”, EJIL, 2003, at 434, noting that “an 
obligation to arbitrarily diversify contractors and supplies by nationality or otherwise simply does not appear in international law”. 





operation of quarries in Area C of the West Bank.1089 The Court rejected the appeal aimed at 
putting an end to the exploitation by Israeli companies of quarries placed therein.1090 While 
acknowledging that the extracted raw materials are mostly for the domestic market or for Israeli 
settlements, the Court focused on the benefits that the exploitation of quarries would bring to the 
local population; a number of allegedly positive factors were addressed: some of the quarried stone 
was used by local Palestinians; the quarry companies paid royalties to the civil administration of the 
West Bank which were used for furthering local projects; a fair number of local Palestinians were 
employed in the quarries; and development of the quarries contributed to modernization in the 
area.  
However, several significant criticisms have been made concerning this judgment, some of which 
deserve particular attention.1091 More precisely, although in the context of prolonged occupation 
quarrying activity initiated and permitted by the military commander may not be prohibited per se, 
such activity is allowed only to the extent that is proven essential for the benefit of the local population and 
the related use is not negligent or wasteful. In fact, assuming that quarrying activity deviates from the 
general conservationist premises of preserving the status quo and avoiding changes with long-term 
impacts, the occupier has to demonstrate that activity is required to safeguard the welfare of the 
local population. Insofar as the military commander fails to demonstrate that this point, in the Yesh 
Din case such activity appears to remain inconsistent with the international law of belligerent 
                                                
1089 HCJ 2164/09, “Yesh Din” - Volunteers for Human Rights v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank and others, 
Judgment of 26 December 2011. According to Yesh Din case, since the 1970 the Israeli military commander has enabled 
quarrying activity in the West Bank. Recently ten quarries in Area C2 have been operated by Israeli nationals and nine 
others by Palestinians, with most of the stone excavated (94% and 80% respectively) transferred to Israel for civilian use. 
Several quarries have been also placed in Areas A and B of the West Bank, they have been operated and/or owned by 
Palestinians and supervised by the Palestinian Authority. All quarries were opened after the beginning of the Israeli 
occupation in 1967; in the Yesh Din case the petitioners challenged only the quarrying activity in Area C operated by 
Israeli nationals. 
1090 According to the petitioner, this policy was incompatible with the occupier’s obligation under Article 55 HRs to 
manage public property as a usufruct. Further, permitting operation of the quarries could not be considered as having 
been conducted for the welfare of the local population because the great majority of the quarried stone is used in Israel, 
rather than by Palestinians in the occupied territories (see HCJ 2164/09, Yesh Din case, para. 1). The figures submitted 
to the Court by the authorities show that 94% of the stone from the quarries operated by Israeli companies was for use 
in Israel. Accordingly, by relying on Articles 43 and 55 HRs, the petitioner requested an order to cease these quarrying 
activities and to stop the establishment of new quarries or the expansion of already existing quarries in these territories, 
(see HCJ 2164/09, Yesh Din case, paras. 2-3).  
1091 This judgment has been strongly criticised among a good number of leading legal scholars. For an extensive a 
critical analysis of the case, see G. Harpaz, Y. Shany, E. Benvenisti, A. Cohen, Y. Ronen, B. Medina, and O. Ben-
Naftali, Expert Legal Opinion, opinion with regard to the issues arising from the Yesh Din judgment in support of the 
petitioners’ motion for a review of the judgment (En Banc review), January 2012, 1-54. See also I. Scobbie and A. 
Margalit, “The Israeli Military Commander’s Powers under the Law of Occupation in relation to Quarrying Activity in 
Area C”, Sir Joseph Hotung Programme for Law, Human Rights, and Peace Building in the Middle East, SOAS University of 
London, 4 July 2012, 1-11. See also D. Kretzmer, “The law of belligerent occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel”, 






Focusing on the Court’s reading of Article 55 HRs, a twofold interpretative error has been 
observed in relation to the objectives of occupation law generally and the “narrow literal-objective-
contextual plane of the article itself”.1093 As anticipated, the Court emphasised experts’ different opinions 
on Article 55 HRs, specifically on whether an occupier may allow the opening and operation of new mines or 
quarries in occupied territories.1094 In this regard, one position argued was that there was a prohibition of 
such activity because the excavation and extraction of stone decrease the capital (namely the 
amount of stone available for future excavation):1095 all quarrying activity in occupied territory 
would be barred a priori during occupation; in the Yesh Din case this would have covered both Israeli-
operated quarries and the Palestinian owned and operated quarries in Area C (and perhaps in 
Areas A and B too). Conversely, another position permitted the use of mines but the main concern 
was for the needs of the local population (rather than for the capital): as to existing mines, the 
extraction in an unreasonable accelerated rate would risk to exhaust the capital in an premature 
fashion; nevertheless, the use of more efficient methods to increase the output would be possible in a 
protracted occupation; even the opening of new mines might be allowed in such a situation because 
“as a minimum, one cannot ignore the burgeoning needs of the local inhabitants”.1096 In this context, Article 55 
HRs is not deemed to create a negative arrangement forbidding any use of public property that 
does not fall within this provision during a prolonged occupation. Specifically, compatibility of such 
use with the general authority granted to the military commander under occupation law is 
recognised, primarily under the “quasi-constitutional” Article 43 HRs. Indeed, the duration of occupation 
and a compelling need to secure the wellbeing of the local population end up as representing the two decisive 
                                                
1092 As for the military commander's policy as a whole, from the petition and the Court’s judgment it was found that 
94% of the product of the Israeli-operated quarries and 80% of the product of the Palestinian-operated quarries were 
transferred to Israel. Thus, it is reasonable to posit that quarrying activity in Area C were basically not required so as to 
provide the needs of the Palestinian market (which was apparently self-supplied by Palestinian-operated quarries in 
Areas A and B), but, rather, that it was carried out for the benefit of the Israeli market. 
1093 See G. Harpaz, Y. Shany, E. Benvenisti, A. Cohen, Y. Ronen, B. Medina, and O. Ben-Naftali, Expert Legal Opinion, 
opinion with regard to the issues arising from the Yesh Din judgment in support of the petitioners’ motion for a review of 
the judgment (Motion for En Banc Review HCJ 2164/09), 10 January 2012, 36-53. 
1094 On the disputed question on whether quarrying activity falls within the use permitted by Article 55, see I. Scobbie, 
“Natural Resources and Belligerent Occupation”, in S. Akram et al. (eds.) International Law and the  Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict: A Rights-based Approach to Middle East Peace, Taylor and Francis, 2011, 229, at 234-236; Y. Arai-Takahashi, The 
Law of Occupation, op. cit., 2009, at 210. 
1095 This view was taken (in obiter) by the Israeli High Court in the Na’ale case, para 6. The same position was also taken 
by the petitioners in the Yesh Din case, arguing the unlawfulness of quarrying activity; it was equally expressed in an 
expert opinion prepared by the mentioned Israeli scholars on the petitioners’ behalf. 
1096 See Y. Dinstein, op. cit., 2009, at 216, citing with approval the Na’ale judgment (obiter), para. 6: the Israeli High Court 
allowed the opening of a new quarry because “it is an action which is taken for the benefit of the local population or for local needs” 
and given the prolonged occupation of the territory, while the Court itself questioned whether the opening of a new 






Basing its decision of the Yesh Din case on a number of grounds, the Court ruled in favour of the 
Israeli authorities’ position that the quarries were lawful. Under a “dynamic” interpretation of the 
combined relevant rules (Arts. 43 and 55) the Court contended the need to expand the “duties of the 
military commander in the Area” (judgment, para. 10) and derived the existence of a State’s right to the 
exploitation of natural resources of occupied territories for the benefit of its domestic market 
(judgment, para. 12). Relying on the premises that the quantity of the quarried stone did not 
substantially deplete the quarry potential of the area,1098 the Court assumed that using such stone 
could be regarded as enjoying the fruits of the quarries, rather than exploiting their capital 
(judgment, para. 11). Accordingly, under the particular circumstances of the Area - especially the 
prolonged nature of occupation - the actual question was whether such activities were compatible 
with Article 43 HRs, hence whether the exploitation of quarries brought benefits to the local population. 
Especially in view of the common economic interests of the Israeli and Palestinian sides as well as 
the protracted nature of occupation, the Court rejected the petitioner’s view that the operation of 
the quarries by Israeli companies had no relation with the welfare of the local population (judgment, 
para. 13). 
 
However, the Court’s interpretation of both Articles 43 and 55 HRs raises significant doubts. Its 
reading hardly appears consistent with the general purpose and the objectives enshrined in the 
Hague Regulations in light of general methods of interpretation as set out in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law and Treaties. As has been detailed throughout the current chapter, the 
occupant does not displace the legitimate sovereignty of the occupied territory but merely executes 
its de facto authority over it and is bound to administer it primarily in the interest of the local 
population while respecting the rights of the latter. This perspective appears at odds with the 
conclusion laid down by the Court, according to which the quarrying activities concerned would be 
in line with Article 55 and with the principle of reasonableness. According to official statistics the 
scope of such activities in the area is leading to the depletion of quarries, which will be complete 
within just thirty-eight years.  
Additionally, the Court’s conclusion seems to run contrary to a combined interpretation of these 
two provisions, in view of which a basic principle cannot be overlooked: in exercising powers under 
                                                
1097 See A. Cassese, op. cit., 1992, at 426-427. I. Scobbie and A. Margalit, op. cit., 2012, at 9-10. See Na’ale case, para. 6. 
1098 An estimate submitted by the authorities contended that, even if the Israeli quarries were to continue to operate on 
the same scale for the next thirty years, they would only exploit 0.5% of the quarrying potential on the West Bank (see 





Article 55 HRs the military commander is not allowed to pursue the needs of the occupant’s own 
territory, and, accordingly, it is not permitted to benefit from the quarrying activity for the national, 
social and economic interests of its own State insofar as they do not affect the interest of the occupied 
population or its own security interests in the occupied territory. 1099  In other words, the systematic 
interpretation of Article 43 along with Article 55 suggests that a correct balance has to be ensured 
between its own interests and the local inhabitants’ rights. Therefore, the occupant’s exploiting of 
the natural resources from occupied territories under the concept of “usufruct” cannot exists as a 
form of consumption that constitutes permanent damage to the local population. As such, the long-term 
effects of quarrying activity consist of the depleting of the stone deposits in Area C; in light of this, 
the burden imposed on the military commander remains substantial.1100  
Along the same lines, as a corollary of these legal boundaries under Articles 43 and 55 HRs 
(especially the guarantee that the production derived from exploiting public property of the 
occupied territory is for the benefit of the civilian population), it might even be argued that the 
occupant is required not to interfere with the economic activity of such territory to gain economic 
benefits for itself.1101 Here, there is a significant basis to contend that the right of peoples to freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development - under Article 1(2) common to the two 1966 Covenants - 
acquires relevance in both external and internal dimensions of the right to self-determination of the 
population living under occupation. As for the economic content of such a right, where an 
occupation endures the local population should be able to exercise sovereignty over the territory 
and to enjoy its natural resources: in particular, “to confer on a people the right of ‘free choice’ in the absence 
of more substantive entitlements (to territory, natural resources, etc.) would simply be meaningless. Clearly, the right of 
self-determination cannot be exercised in a substantive vacuum”. 1102  Despite the aforementioned scarce 
attention in the Hague Regulations to the protection of the rights of the civilian population, and 
                                                
1099 As detailed several times in the present chapter, the same Israeli Court has emphasised this basic principle in its own 
jurisprudence (see HCJ 393/82, Jami’at Ascan case, para. 13). 
1100 As articulated by two experts, the export of stone from the occupied territories to Israel may be permissible inasmuch 
as Palestinians may enjoy financial gain, as well as economic and professional development; however, it is for the 
respondent State to prove that this export is actually essential for the welfare of the local population (including that 
exported products are sold at fair prices; that the Palestinian population actually enjoys the revenues, and that exports 
are not forced by the military commander), see I. Scobbie and A. Margalit, op. cit., at 10. 
1101 In this regard, see N. Corso, op. cit., 2012, at 12 ff.; A. Cassese, “Powers and Duties of an Occupant in relation to 
Land and Natural resources”, op. cit., 1992, at 421; L. Condorelli and A. Cassese, “Is the Leviathan still holding sway 
over the international society?”, in A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, Oxford, 2012, at 23 ff.; 
O. Ben Naftali, “Belligerent Occupation”, in A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, op. cit., at 
538 ff. 
1102 C. Drew, “The East Timor Story: International Law on trial”, 12 EJIL, 2001, 651, at 663. See also GA Res. 1803 
(XVII) of December 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. See also GA Res. 33/144 of December 
1983, para. 5, in which it “(e)mphasises the right of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples whose territories are under Israeli occupation to 





even the absence of references to the self-determination of people, as a peremptory norm of 
international law this principle should not be overlooked.1103 
From a more radical perspective, it may be noted that stone is a non-renewable natural resource, its 
exhaustion is irreversible, and as such it can hardly be regarded as fruit of property. Insofar as the 
Court was going to decide as to whether the issue consists of enjoying the revenues of public 
property or depleting the capital of such property, there was no logical reason for giving relevance 
(as the Court did in paragraph 11 of the judgment) to the scope of the quarried stone in relation to 
the quarrying potential.1104 
Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that the Court’s primary position was examining whether 
the declared purpose of the activity by the military commander was actually serving the welfare of 
the local population and maintaining good administration of public property in occupied territories 
in compliance with Article 43 HRs: by examining the accidental/unintended effects of economic 
activity (as the Court did in paragraph 13 of the judgment), instead of the declared purpose, the 
Court simply departed from its primary position on the issue.1105  
Then, even assuming that a significant contribution to the local economy would derive from 
opening new quarries, no reason basis exists for the occupant’s choice in allowing Israeli companies, 
rather than companies belonging to local Palestinian residents, to operate the quarries. Accrediting 
Palestinian companies to operate them could have made achievable certain benefits to the local 
population (e.g. employment, stone provision for the local construction industry, modernisation) in 
accordance to the basic duty of the military commander to ensure public welfare.1106 
                                                
1103 For the basic principle concerning the respect of the will of the people living under occupation in accordance with the right to self-
determination, see A. Carcano, L’occupazione dell’Iraq nel diritto internazionale, Giuffré, 2009, at 106; A. Annoni, 
“L’applicazione del regime giuridico dell’occupazione nei Territori palestinesi occupati”, Deporte, esuli e profughe, n. 13-14, 
2010, at 165; A. Cassese; Self-determination of Peoples - A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, 1995, at 99; E. Benvenisti, “The 
Security Council and the Law of Occupation: Resolution 1483 on Iraq in Historical Perspective”, Israel Defence Forces 
Law Review, 2003, p. 19 ff; O. Ben-Naftali, Gross, Michaeli, “Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory”, Berkeley JIL, 2005, p. 551 ff.; V. Tilley, Human Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? A re-assessment of Israel’s practices 
in the occupied Palestinian territories under international law, A study coordinated by the Middle East Project of the Democracy 
and Governance Programme, Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa, 16 May 2009, p. 55 ff; Y. Arai-
Takahashi, The Law of Occupation, op. cit., 2009, p. 65 ff. 
1104 On this point, the petitioners claimed that the exploitation of quarries by the occupant could be allowed only 
exceptionally under the conservative principle - hence only in the event such property were subject to Israeli 
exploitation already before the occupation. Conversely, the respondent State claimed that this activity should be 
allowed on the basis of the principle of reasonableness: mining activities would have been lawful as long as they would 
not lead to excessive exploitation of the property constituting a damage (Judgment, para. 8). 
1105 On this aspect, David Kretzmer critically addressed that “the Court’s approach smacks of a colonial approach, under which the 
activities of the colonial power are claimed to bring benefit to the colonized peoples”, see D. Kretzmer, op. cit., IRRC, 2012, at 222.  
1106 See Union of Stone and Marble Industry, Report on Stone and Marble in Palestine: Developing a Strategy for the Future, July 
2011, at 18, 20. The Union (which was supported by the Office of the Quartet Representative) was in favour of the 
position that the military commander did not act to serve the interests of the local population in relation the quarrying 





A distinct critical aspect of the judgment concerns the Court’s interpretation of “protected 
population” whose interests must be safeguarded under the Hague Regulations. According to the 
Court, the exploitation of quarries for implementing projects in Judea and Samaria, in relation to 
the settlements of Naale and Givat Nili, would consent the occupant to respect its basic duty to 
guarantee the benefits of the local population or the respect of local exigencies (judgment, para. 12). 
In view of its own established jurisprudence, however, the Court tends to include implicitly in the 
notion of “local population” even Israeli settlers living in the occupied territory, which runs contrary to 
Article 49(6) GC IV. 1107  This interpretative approach has often been criticised within the 
international community, including in a number of resolution adopted at the United Nations and in 
the 2004 advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice.1108 In this regard, it is reasonable to 
argue that the local population’s interest under occupation law does not refer to the interests of 
settlers which are not entitled to the status of “protected persons”, even considering that the 
establishment of settlements is in violation of international law. In actual fact, taking into account 
settlers’ interests may frustrate the minimum protections granted to Palestinians under occupation 
law.1109 
It is exactly the issue on the determination of the “local population” in the Yesh Din case that leads 
one to posit that it should have been examined even in view of Article 25 ICESCR which recognises 
“the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilise fully and freely their natural wealth and resources”, as well as 
Article 1(2) ICCPR under which “all peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit, and international law”.1110 
A further critical profile of the judgment concerns the political nature of the 1995 Israeli-
                                                                                                                                                            
Palestinians owners. An additional issue was raised in relation to the unfair competition from several large Israeli 
companies operating in Area C. Furthermore, the report revealed Palestinians’ obstacles in conducting geological 
surveys to assess the potential for stone deposits in Area C, an activity that remains essential for the planning of the 
industry from both economic and environmental aspects. 
1107 HCJ 281/11, Head of Beit Iksa Local Council et al. v. Minister of Defense et al., Judgment, 6 September 2011, para. 7. 
1108 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, op. cit., para. 89. 
1109 For development of the argument that in applying universal standards to all persons in the occupied territories the 
Court has weakened the special protection that an occupying power is supposed to extend to protected persons, see A. 
Gross, “Human Proportions: are human rights the emperor’s new clothes of the international law of occupation?”, 18 
EJIL, 2007, pp. 1-35. 
1110 See HRC, General Comment No. 12: The right to self-determination of peoples (art.1), HRI/GEN/1/ Rev.1, 13 March 1984. 
On this aspect, see Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 
Richard Falk, 10 January 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/16/72; A. Roberts, “Transformative military occupation: applying 
the laws of war and human rights”, AJIL, 2006, p. 280 ff.; A. Carcano, “The Right to Self-determination of the Iraqi 
People in the Practice of the Security Coucil Concerning the Occupation of Iraq”, in S. Bariatti and G. Venturini (eds.), 
Diritti Individuali e giustizia internazioanle, Liber Fausto Pocar, Milano, 2009, p. 95 ff; E. Mottershaw, “Economic, social and 






Palestinian Interim Agreements, under which the two parties agreed to gradually transfer the rights 
on quarries to the Palestinian Authority.1111 Despite having mentioned the commitment to such a 
transfer the Court ignored that it ever occurred and failed to conduct an evaluation as to Israeli 
mining activities being ultra vires in the occupied territories, although initially required of the Oslo 
Agreements.1112 Moreover, emphasis was placed on the alleged main political-diplomatic nature of 
such Interim Agreements to highlight that “(t)he suitable framework for deciding the issue of the future 
activities of Israeli quarries in the Area is within the framework of diplomatic agreements” (judgment, para. 6), 
and accordingly that “the Petitioners would not be an eligible party to bring claims before the State”. However, 
the Court then opted for recognising that they prevail in respect to international law obligations 
incumbent upon the State. It seems that this solution ends up acknowledging of Israeli authorities 
certain powers that overstep the boundaries provided for under international law norms applicable 
in situations of occupation. 
 
Overall, the Yesh Din case highlights the following points. Firstly, as far as the military 
commander holds merely administration powers of the territory, the preservation of the state of 
affairs existing on the eve of occupation is required along with a general duty to refrain from 
introducing changes therein. This prevents the occupant from settling the territory for its own 
market and from depriving the indigenous population of the right to enjoy local natural resources. 
Secondly, in a situation of protracted occupation some legal uncertainty may arise concerning 
the precise scope of the occupant’s authority to advance new policies in the occupied territory, and 
a more flexible interpretation of such a power may be argued for; however, changes that are not 
compelled by security needs must serve the benefit of the local population.  
Thirdly, in view that the long-term effects of quarrying activity consist of depleting the stone 
deposits, the burden imposed on the military commander to show the consistency of such activity 
with the interest of the local population remains substantial.  
Fourthly, a serious implication of a distorted implementation of legal norms - as is actually 
argued by several scholars concerning the Yesh Din judgment - are the legitimising practices in the 
West Bank that appear exploitative. The aforementioned quarrying activity benefited primarily the 
                                                
1111 On the provision concerning the utilisation of quarries and mines, see Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreements, First Addition 
to Annex 3/Civil Annex, Article 31. The Palestinian Authority was constituted, by the same agreements, for the 
administration of the occupied territory. 
1112 See V. Azarov, “Exploiting A ‘Dynamic’ Interpretation? The Israeli High Court of Justice Accepts the legality of 
Israel’s quarrying Activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, in www.ejiltalk.org, 7 February 2012. This point is 
raised also by G. Harpaz, Y. Shany, E. Benvenisti, A. Cohen, Y. Ronen, B. Medina, and O. Ben-Naftali, see Expert Legal 





occupant’s market and nationals rather than the civilian population. 
 
Within the usufructuary legal framework detailed above, another relevant issue concerns the 
execution of contractual arrangements that engage public real estate of the occupied territory. A specific question 
regards the occupant’s entitlement to grant new concessions to exploit the usufruct of immovable 
property therein. While it is generally suggested that the power to do so should be left to the 
legitimate sovereign, it is contended that the Fourth Geneva Convention allows for the enhancement of welfare 
of the protected population as one of the legitimate objectives. As articulated in previous sections, the welfare of 
local inhabitants has been included in the notion of necessity under Article 43 HRs, so constituting 
an exception to the conservationist premises of that rule.1113 In Von Glahn’s seminal work on 
occupation law it is observed that “an occupant in principle ought to be free to grant [such] concessions … with 
the obvious reservation that no such concession could exceed the duration of belligerent occupation”.1114 
In view of the principles governing the administration of la vie publics under Article 43 HRs, the 
occupant’s authority to subject State public buildings or real estate to long-term lease or other 
contractual arrangement intended to remain in force even after the end of the occupation is to be 
excluded normally; such contracts would be unlawful.1115 As already highlighted, the obligation to 
ensure the continuation of (or to further) civil life entails, in fact, a power to adopt only economic initiatives 
necessary to guarantee the level of protection required under relevant rules safeguarding the economic, social and cultural 
rights of the local population (such as international humanitarian law and international norms 
guaranteeing fundamental rights). In any case, the conclusion of new contracts should comply with 
the substantive and procedural laws in force in the occupied territory. Furthermore, as for the 
concessions already in place in the occupied territory, the principles enshrined in Article 43 HRs 
imply the occupant’s compliance with such concessions as long as they do not pose a risk to its 
security or impede the fulfilment of its own obligations under international humanitarian law and 
                                                
1113 On this issue, see P. Bordwell, The Law of War between Belligerents - A History and Commentary, Chiacago, Callaghan & 
co., 1908, at 329, observing that “Measures for the permanent benefit of the community should be left, when it is possible, to the 
legitimate power, but there may be cases where the needs of the community are so pressing as to admit of no delay, and if in such a case a 
contract is let for the work which extends beyond the period of occupation, such contract is valid even then, if it was reasonably within the scope 
of the occupant’s essentially provisional powers”. 
1114 G. Von Glahn, op. cit., at 209. 
1115 In this regard, see the aforementioned US, UK, Canada New Zeland Military Manuals. See A. Crivellaro, op. cit., 
1977, at 182 ff.; G. Von Glahn, op. cit., at 209. See M.J. Kelly, “Iraq and the Law of Occupation: New Tests for an Old 
Law”, 6 YbkIHL, 2003, at 158, noting that the occupant is allowed to subject such property to long-term lease or other 
contract which does not lead to the long-term alienation or disposal of the property. See also SC Res. 1483 (2003) on 
the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, 22 May 2003, S/RES/1483 (2003), in which the Security Council stressed in 





international human rights norms guaranteeing fundamental standards of the local population.1116 
Conversely, new concessions concluded by the legitimate sovereign during the period of occupation 
would not be enforceable against the occupant.1117 
7. Concluding Remarks  
The protection of ESC rights for the pursuit of the livelihood and well-being of the original 
inhabitants of occupied territories has become a significant dimension of the traditional concept of 
welfare of the civilian population under occupation law. However, this regime may not satisfactorily 
meet the socio-economic and cultural entitlements concerned in contemporary situations of 
occupations. On the one hand, relevant obligations upon the occupant remain contingent to 
contextual factors (such as the intensity of control exercised in the occupied territory, the resources 
available therein, and the temporal dimension of occupation). On the other hand, the scope of such 
obligations is influenced by changed international expectations as have arisen by several 
developments of international law. 
It is reasonable to contend that the conventional division between the law of war and the law of 
peace may no longer be plausible in light of the changes surfaced in modern de facto realities of 
occupation, in which civilian populations may even live an entire lifetime under it or, in any case, 
may end up facing serious damage to the occupied economy as well as to human development, 
environmental consequences and lasting damage on the landscape, challenging the possibility for 
their own future generations to benefit from it. Moreover, the traditional international law of 
occupation has been often blatantly ignored and regularly violated.  
The debated “legal vacuum” has definitively favoured claims for an adaptation in occupation law to 
evolve its protective scope concerning the civilian population. In this sense, dual application of modern 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law represents a valuable 
perspective to safeguard fundamental rights of civilians living in occupied territories. In fact, it may 
give new substance to the shift in focus regarding the beneficiaries of the ‘trust’ created by 
occupation, providing normative clarification as well as offering additional and “long-term” normative contents 
to the needs, interests and rights of those civilians, thus supporting a further departure from the Hague Law 
as already determined by Geneva Law in relation to the protection concerned. As noted in 
                                                
1116 On this issue, see US Department of State Memorandum of Law of 1 October 1976, op. cit., at 748 ff. See B.M. 
Clagett and O.T. Johnson, op. cit., 1978, at 578 ff.; A. Crivellaro, op. cit., 1977, at 182 ff. 
1117 In this respect, see the opinion of Judge Seferiades in the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 












                                                
1118 As early as the 1990s, Eyal Benvenisti emphasised that “new occupations present new challenges. Some of these challenges called 
for more effective enforcement mechanisms … Other challenges call for an adaptation of the law to contemporary perceptions and needs”; 
another significant aspect highlighted was that “the key factor for formulating an inquiry into legal criteria for recognising a status of 
occupation seems to be the attitude of the occupied population toward the changing circumstances”. See, E. Benvenisti, The International 





CHAPTER IV: CIVILIANS’ PROTECTION IN THE AREA OF ESC 
RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
1. Introduction 
In questioning the evolving legal framework for the imperative of civilian protection in the socio-
economic and cultural spheres in international law, beyond that which is afforded under the 
principles and rules of the law of armed conflict and the law of occupation, the present chapter seeks 
to determine the applicability of human rights treaties setting out ESC rights during public emergencies prompted by 
situations of armed conflict, military occupation and post-conflict collapse.  
2. Theoretical and practical grounds for reliance on human rights law 
The significance of exploring the role of modern human rights law as further normative regime 
contributing to safeguard civilians in the sphere of ESC rights under international law relies on 
several grounds.  
2.a. Elaborating upon legal preservation of civilians’ human dignity 
The applicability of international human rights law in contemporary conflict-torn and occupation-
related contexts may favour a comprehensive determination of the legal preservation of civilians’ human dignity, 
which provides the very raison d’etre and the common denominator of various relevant branches of 
international law. Indeed, the entire corpus of international humanitarian law as well as human 
rights law stems from the general principle of respect for human dignity, whose paramount importance 
permeates the whole body of international law.1119 As such, in being nurtured by this principle 
                                                
1119 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundzija (IT-95-17/1-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment, 10 December 1998, para. 183, in 
which it was held that “(t)he essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as human rights law lies in the 
protection of the human dignity of every person, whatever his or her gender. The general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic 
underpinning and indeed the very raison d’être of international humanitarian law and human rights law; indeed in modern times it has become 





human rights law and international humanitarian law are deemed to enjoy a symbiotic 
relationship.1120 
As one of the underlying principles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the human dignity of all 
individuals must be respected at all times and everything possible must be done, without any kind of 
discrimination, to reduce the suffering of persons not actively engaged in the hostilities, including 
people who have been put out of action by sickness, wounds or captivity, whether or not they have 
taken direct part in the conflict.1121 The most prominent textual incorporation of “dignity” is 
common Article 3 GCs, which prohibits inter alia “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment”. Protocol I prohibits in Article 75 “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”, and then includes in 
Article 85 - among the acts to be regarded “as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed wilfully and in 
violation of the Conventions or the Protocol” - “(c) practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices 
involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination”. A prohibition of “outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent 
assault” is also contained in Article 4 AP II. Conversely, analogous references to “outrages upon personal 
dignity” are included in the Rome Statute as well as in the ones of other international criminal 
tribunals.1122  
Similarly, the centrality of dignity to human rights is asserted in many international instruments 
having primary relevance for the present research. This is the case of the preambles and articles of 
several conventions, including the ILO Conventions,1123 the ICESCR,1124 the ICERD,1125 the 
                                                                                                                                                            
outrages upon their personal dignity, whether such outrages are carried out by unlawfully attacking the body or by humiliating and debasing the 
honour, the self-respect or the mental well being of a person”. 
1120 T. Meron, “Humanisation of Humanitarian Law”, 94 AJIL, 2000, 234, p. 245. 
1121 The significance of dignity as the basis of the approach adopted in drafting of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
emerged in the text proposed as the Preamble by the ICRC to the Powers assembled in Geneva: “respect for the personality 
and dignity of human being constitutes a universal principle which is binding even in the absence of any contractual undertaking. Such a 
principle demands that, in time of war, all those not actively engaged in the hostilities and all those placed “hors de combat” by reason of 
sickness, wounds, capture, or any other circumstance, shall be given due respect and have protection from the effects of war, and that those 
among them who are in suffering shall be succoured and tended without distinction of race, nationality, religious belief, political opinion or any 
other quality …”. See “Remarks and Proposals submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross”, Document 
for the consideration of Governments invited by the Swiss Federal Council to attend the Diplomatic Conference of 
Geneva (21 April 1949), Geneva, February 1949, p. 8. 
1122 See Article 8 ICC Statute, prohibiting “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment”. See 
also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such 
violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, Article 4. See also 
Agreement for and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, Article 3, prohibiting “[o]utrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”. 
1123 ILO Conventions, especially C156 Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981; C122 Employment Policy 
Convention, 1964; Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962; C111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 





ICEDAW,1126 the CAT,1127 the CRC, 1128 the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1129  the CPED,1130  and the 
CRPD.1131 Furthermore, as a central organizing principle of the Vienna World Conference on 
Human Rights in 1993, the concept of dignity adopted in the Declaration and Programme of 
Action has been foundational either to human rights in general or to specific areas such as 
biomedical ethics, the prohibition of gender-based violence and harassment, the treatment of 
indigenous peoples, the abolition of extreme poverty and the prohibition of torture.1132 Nonetheless, 
it was the reference of dignity in the 1948 UDHR that inspired its subsequent incorporations in 
both international and regional instruments, while the exercise culminated in a significant historical 
evolution of the concept.1133  
Notably, a certain vagueness of the concept of dignity has been the object of academic 
                                                                                                                                                            
Workers) Convention, 1955; Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952; Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951. 
1124 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification 
and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966  entry into force 3 January 1976, in 
accordance with article 27, 21 UN GAOR Supp (No. 16), at 49, A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3. See Preamble and 
Article 13 on the right to education. 
1125 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the General 
Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, Annex, 20 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, A/6014 (1966), 
660 U.N.T.S. 195, opened for signature at New York, 7 March 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force 4 January 
1969. See the Preamble. 
1126 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979, 34 UN GAOR Supp (No. 46) at 193, A/34/46 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 
33 (1980), entered into force on 3 September 1981. See Preamble.   
1127 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification and accession by GA Res. 39/46   of 10 December 1984, entry into force on 26 June 
1987, GA Res. 39/46, annex, 39 UN GAOR Supp (No. 51), at 197, A/39/51 (1984). See the Preamble. 
1128 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by GA Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 UN GAOR, Supp. (No 49), at 1667, 
A/44/49 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989), entered into force on 2 September 1990. See the Preamble. 
1129 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
GA Res. 45/158, Annex, 45 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49A), at 262, A/45/49 (1990). See Articles 17 and 70. 
1130 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, E/CN.4/2005/WG 
22/WP 1/Rev 4 (2005), adopted by GA Res. 61/177 of 20 December 2006, opened for signature on 6 February 2007, 
entered into force on 23 December 2010. See Article 19. 
1131 International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted in December 2006, entered into force 
on 3 May 2008 after having received its 20th ratification on 3 April 2008, GA Res. A/61/611 (2006). See Preamble and 
Articles 3, 8, 16, 24, and 25. 
1132 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 - 25 June 1993, 
A/CONF 157/24 (Pt 1), at 20 (1993), Preamble and Articles 11, 18, 20, 25, 55. 
1133 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III), A/810, 10 December 1948. In mentioning it twice its 
Preamble declares that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the word …”, also underling that “the people of the United Nations have in the Charter 
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women 
and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedoms ...”. Then, specific textual uses are made, 
besides providing in Article 1 that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. For instance, according to Article 22, “[e]veryone, as a 
member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international co-operation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the 





consideration, arguing that dignity provides a convenient language for adopting substantive 
interpretations of human rights guarantees that appear intentionally highly contingent on local 
circumstances.1134 However, the same meaningful opinion has recognised an important role of this 
concept in contributing to develop particular methods of human rights interpretation and 
adjudication: apparently human dignity plays a role judicially by “enabling rights to be interpreted in a 
way that domesticates them”, so enabling local context to be incorporated under the appearance of using 
a universal principle and allowing each jurisdiction to develop its own practice of human rights.1135 
In any case, these legal and judicial uses of the concept of human dignity do inspire an inquiry 
of the normative role of modern human rights law for strengthening legal protection of civilians’ 
ESC rights. This concept substantially corroborates the application of this branch of international 
law and its specific contribution in the safeguarding of ESC rights as indispensable to preserve 
human beings in conflict-affected situations. In this respect the present chapter relies on the basic 
assumption that upholding legal protection of civilians’ human dignity requires, inter alia, to 
implement the principle that the right to live a dignified life can never be attained unless all basic necessities of 
life-work, food, housing, health care, education and culture are adequately and equitably available to everyone, which 
is generally recognised as a fundamental principle of the global human rights system.1136  
2.b. Approaching coherently the integral and holistic vision of human rights 
Exploring international human rights law as an essential normative framework to afford protection 
of civilians’ ESC rights under international law is consistent with the integral and holistic vision of human 
rights at the historical origins of this regime, which implies indivisible and interdependent norms aimed at 
maximising the wellbeing of the individual and peoples.1137 In line with this vision the distinction 
between different generations of rights - which found its normative expression in the separate 1966 
international covenants and provided philosophical foundations for several discussions on human 
rights ideology during the Cold War - has not ended up in justifying any hierarchical order between 
                                                
1134 For an accurate reconstruction of the historical evolution of the concept, underlying the several main overlapping 
developments of dignity as a Western philosophical-cum-political concept, see C. McCrudden, “Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights”, 19(4) EJIL, pp. 655-724. 
1135 See C. McCrudden, op. cit., p. 720. 
1136 CESCR, Human Rights Fact Sheet No. 16 (rev. 1), Introduction. 
1137 The relevance of this approach remains notwithstanding the current financial and economic instability of States in 
the global West, and brings to bare the importance of ESC rights to all individuals, not just those living in developing 





rights that are fundamental to a dignified life of every individual.1138 Although this division has marked the 
human rights discourse,1139 the international system as formulated since the adoption of the UDHR 
in 19481140 has gradually postulated the principles of indivisibility, interdependence, equality and 
universality, which have been solemnly proclaimed during the 1993 Vienna World Conference on 
Human Rights1141 and then included in international legal documents.1142 Notably, the UDHR was 
rooted in the 1941 “For Freedoms Address” by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which equally reflected 
socio-economic alongside civil and political rights1143.  
Indeed, the structures of most international human rights law sources do not embrace the distinction 
between normative categories or generations of rights, rather covering in their texts both sets. They 
include the ICERD1144 of 1965, the ICEDAW1145 of 1979, the CRC1146 of 1989, the ICRPD of 
2006. As for regional instruments, they are not specifically delimitated to the so-called first 
generation of human rights. This is evident for the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(AfrCHPR) of 1981, which comprehensively guarantees a full range of rights, without drawing 
distinction between implementation and justiciability of different categories.1147 Notably, other 
                                                
1138 The idea of human rights as indivisible and interdependent has gained credibility through the fact that both sets of 
rights deeply relate to the preservation of human dignity, see Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/29, 19 April 
2004, para. 8 (d). 
1139 The two Covenants of 1966 were drafted with different kind of States’ obligations under each and different means 
for their implementation, without having the same enforcement mechanisms. 
1140 In the UDHR human rights are declared as “common standards of achievement for all people and all nations”, without 
making separations of any sort and, rather, they comprise in one consolidated text nearly the entire range of rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
1141 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 1993, A/CONF.157/23, Part 1, para. 5 (“All human 
rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair 
and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms”). See also GA Res. 32/130, 16 December 1977, 
para. 1 (a) and (b). 
1142 See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Preamble, para. (c): “Reaffirming the universality, indivisibility 
interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and the need for persons with disabilities to be guaranteed 
their full enjoyment without discrimination”. 
1143 UDHR, Preamble, para. 2 (“Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged 
the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear 
and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people”). See A. Eide and W.B. Eide, “Article 25”, in G. 
Alfredsson and A. Eide (eds.), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1999, pp. 523-550. As explained by the authors, the inclusion of ESC rights in the UDHR was the result of 
Western action, rather than being simply the result of Socialist States as evoked by the Cold War discourse, see ibid., pp. 
527-528. On the opposite view as to the West responsible of a sort for the rejection of ESC rights, see J. Donnelly and 
D.J. Whelan, “The West, Economic and Social rights, and the Global Human Rights Regime: Setting the Record 
Straight”, 29 HRQ, 2007, pp. 908-949; T. Evans and A. Kirkup, “The Myth of Western Opposition to Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights? A Reply to Whelan and Donnelly”, 31 HRQ, 2009, pp. 221-237.  
1144 For international legal obligations on ESC rights, see in particular Article 5 (e). 
1145 For establishing international legal obligations on ESC rights, see in particular Articles 10, 11, 12 and 14. 
1146 For establishing international legal obligations on ESC rights, see in particular Articles 22-30. 
1147 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on 27 June 1981 in Nairobi, Kenya, OAU Doc. 





African human rights instruments provide protection of more detailed ESC rights in relation to the 
child, the woman and youth.1148 As for the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), this is 
predominantly concerned with civil and political rights,1149 while it does not safeguard economic 
and social rights explicitly1150, with the exception of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR protecting 
property rights and the right to education, and Protocol No. 12 extending the Convention to cover 
discrimination on the social and economic sphere. Indeed, the Council of Europe member States 
have agreed on a separate regime of economic and social rights, which are mostly addressed in the 
1961 European Social Charter (ESC). As a sort of regional counterpart to the ICESCR, it covers a 
broad range of rights related to housing, health, education, employment, social protection and non-
discrimination, introducing one of the few international remedies for violations of ESC rights 
through its Additional Protocol.1151 Similarly, the IACHR emphasises civil and political rights, but 
its Additional Protocol of San Salvador focuses on ESC rights and introduces a partial system of 
individual complaints.1152 
Remarkably, the integral vision of human rights at the historical origins of international human 
rights law bases the more recent notions of “new rights” or “collective rights”, including the right to peace, 
the right to development and environmental rights, which supplement the traditional categorisations.  Of 
note is that the interdependence and universality of human rights as part of development - 
conceived as a multifaceted and participatory process - is emphasised in the 1986 Declaration on 
the Right to Development (DRD);1153 then, the close relationship between the latter and the 
ICESCR are therefore confirmed.1154 Although those new rights are still disputed as real human 
                                                
1148 See African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into 
force on 29 November 1999; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa, adopted by the African Union Assembly on 13 September 2000 in Maputo, CAB/LEG/66.6, entered into 
force on 25 November 2005; the African Youth Charter, adopted by the African Union Assembly on 2 July 2006. 
1149 See D.J. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights2, Oxford, 2009. 
1150 See C. Warbrick, “Economic and Social Interests and the European Convention on Human Rights”, in M. 
Banderin and R. McCorquodale (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action, Oxford, 2007, p. 241, noting how the 
ECHR safeguards economic and social aspects of the rights explicitly enshrined in this Convention. 
1151Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints, 22 June1995, 
CETS no. 158. The Protocol entered into force on 1 July 1998. It opens the possibility for collective complaints alleging 
the unsatisfactory application of the Charter, which may be submitted by international and national non-governmental 
organizations, organizations of employers, and trade unions. For a review on the progress made in the first decade or so 
of its operation, see D.J. Harris, “Collective Complaints under the European Social Charter: Encouraging Progress?”, in 
K.H. Kaikobad and M. Bohlander (eds.), International Law and Power: Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice. Essays in Honour 
of Colin Warbrick, 2009, pp. 3-24. 
1152 See Article 19 (5). The Protocol of San Salvador was adopted in 1988 and entered into force in 1999. 
1153 Its Preamble highlights that, “in order to promote development, equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the 
implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights” and that, “accordingly, the promotion of, 
respect for and enjoyment of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial of other human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”.  





rights per se, they are perceived not in isolation but in relation to a number of internationally 
recognised fundamental rights. 1155  Moreover, their realisation is deemed to require global 
cooperation based on international solidarity.1156 Significantly, these new collective dimensions of 
human rights do have certain implications for - and pose delicate challenges in - conflict-torn 
scenarios: they foreshadow a notion of human rights beyond the limited horizon of living 
generations, highlighting the long term effects of several policies on global public goods such as 
climate, water, clean air, forests. In this regard, civilians’ ESC rights affected by war-torn situations turn out 
to be cross-cutting issues related to the international protection of global public goods. 
In view of a progressive acknowledgment of human rights interdependence, unity in their 
normative structure and their broader scope acquired over time, it seems that the integral and 
holistic vision of human rights positively supports an attempt to settle the recognised application of 
international human rights law in conflict-related situations from the less debated perspective of 
ESC rights. This aspect is closely linked to the third ground articulated in the next section.  
In this context, it is also remarkable that over the past fifteen years the interest in promoting and 
protecting ESC rights has grown significantly at the level of international and regional 
organizations. For instance, a crucial leitmotiv of several policies and programmes undertaken within 
the United Nations has become “dismantling unworkable categorisations” and moving towards an agenda 
treating civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, together with the right to development, 
as truly equal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. Specific efforts to strengthen the 
integration of human rights standards and principles into UN policies and programmes have been 
                                                                                                                                                            
12 July 2011. Substantive Articles 1 to 15 ICESCR inspired and shaped basic elements of the right to development. In 
paragraph 5 the complementarity between the rights in the Covenant and the right to development in the Declaration is 
highlighted, in view of the correspondence between Articles 3 and 4 DRD regarding national and international 
responsibilities and Article 2 ICESCR on the obligations of States parties, including the duty to provide international 
assistance and cooperation; and between Article 8 (1) DRD and those provisions of the Covenant concerning, e.g., the 
empowerment and active participation of “women, disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups”; employment; basic 
resources and fair distribution of income; eradication of poverty; adequate standard of living, including food and 
housing; health services; education; and the enjoyment of culture. 
1155  See M. Scheinin, “Characteristics of human rights norms”, in C. Krause and M. Scheinin (eds.), International 
Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook, 2009, p. 25, noting that the right to peace can be “tackled in the context of the right to 
life”; that the right to development can be understood as “an umbrella concept and a policy-oriented programme, which covers most 
of the existing human rights”; that “the right to a satisfactory environment can be broken down into specific environmental rights which can be 
dealt with in the context of rights such as the protection against inhumane and degrading treatment and the right to privacy, the right to health , 
the right to participate in public affairs, the right to property, etc.”. 
1156 On the emergence of the notion of a ‘third generation’ of human rights, described as solidarity rights, see P. Alston, 
“A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights 
Law?”, 29 Netherlands International Law Review, 1982, pp. 307-322; the growing support, manifested in various 
international fora, for such a notion and the principal assumptions behind this concept are considered: (1) first and 
second generation rights are not sufficiently flexible or dynamic to be able to respond adequately to present 
circumstances; (2) there is a set of more or less homogeneous demands that are distinguished primarily by the fact that 
solidarity is a prerequisite to their realisation; (3) these new demands are presently in the process of acquiring 





carried out in relation to development, humanitarian action, peace and security, economic and 
social issues; they remain critical in contexts of armed conflict though.1157 From this perspective, a 
recent challenge has regarded as necessary new efforts to ensure available legal remedies to victims of violations 
of ESC rights and to enable meaningful participation in development processes and social justice. In this respect 
deeper integration of human rights-based approaches to development as well as human rights 
sensitive understandings of, and responses to, poverty have become common concerns.1158  
2.c. Taking seriously the evolution of the international protection of ESC rights 
Testing the potential of international human rights law as a twofold normative and accountability 
framework to safeguard civilians in the sphere of ESC rights also relies on the fact of taking seriously 
the significant developments occurred since the adoption of the UDHR1159 and the UN Charter.1160 Since the 
middle of the nineteenth century ESC rights have been proclaimed at the global, regional and 
national levels; their further elaboration and comprehension has marked the last twenty years or so, 
strengthening their quality as legal rights.  
They have been enshrined in several international conventions1161 and declarations.1162 The 
                                                
1157 E.g., OHCHR Report 2010, p. 52. Its work is undertaken through human rights field presences and the development 
and implementation of policies and operational guidance for peacekeeping and special political missions. OHCHR 
closely cooperates with other components of peace missions, and maintains and fosters partnerships with UN agencies, 
funds and programmes to ensure the adoption of a human rights-based approach to UN engagement in conflict and 
post-conflict contexts.  
1158 See OHCHR Report 2010, at 43. An emblematic initiative is the establishment of a multi-agency UNDG human 
rights mainstreaming mechanism, co-chaired by OHCHR and UNDP, to complement its engagement with 
international financial institutions, the OECD Development Assistance Committee, and the World Trade Organization, 
as well as bilateral development actors. 
1159 See GA Res. 217A (III), A/810, at 71. Under Articles 21-29, the UDHR proclaims that “everyone” has the right to 
the following: social security; work; “rest and leisure including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay”; 
adequate standard of living including food, clothing, housing and medical care; education; freedom to participate in the cultural 
life of the community; and “a social and international order” to realise the freedoms and rights concerned.  
 1160 The UN Charter obliges States to take action, individually and jointly, for the promotion and respect of human 
rights and economic and social progress; Article 55 specifies that the promotion of full employment and development is 
integral to such efforts. See also the Preamble and Articles 1 and 56 UN Charter. 
1161 Binding universal treaties on ESC rights include the ICESCR, the CRC and the optional protocols thereto, the CEDAW; 
the ICERD, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families; the CRPD; the ILO Conventions; the 1989 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (No. 169). Furthermore, key regional treaties include the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man, the 1981 ACHPR (the Banjul Charter); the 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention 
on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 1988 Protocol of San Salvador; the 1990 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; the Arab Charter on Human Rights; the 1961 and 1996 
(Revised) European Social Charter; the 1999 Inter-American Convention on The Elimination Of All Forms Of 
Discrimination Against Persons With Disabilities; the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. Others regional treaties that focus principally on civil and political rights, but 
include some ESC rights, or have been interpreted as protecting aspects of ESC rights, include the 1950 ECHR and its 
first Protocol of 1952; the 1969 ACHR and the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women. 





most comprehensive international legal framework to elaborate ESC rights is the ICESCR. Since 
1987, the practice of the treaty body mandated to monitor States parties’ implementation has 
contributed to delineate the scope and content of Covenant’s rights.1163 Its interpretative efforts 
have been mostly articulated in Reporting Guidelines and General Comments on the Covenant’s 
obligations, as detailed in the next section. Good possibilities for normative developments of ESC 
rights through an institutionalised practice of legal interpretation of treaty obligations derive from 
the three functions provided in the new Optional Protocol (OPICESCR);1164 they include: the 
receiving and considering individual and group communications claiming “a violation of any of the 
economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Covenant”;1165 the dealing with interstate communications 
to the effect that a State party to this Protocol argues that another Contracting Party is “not fulfilling 
its obligations under the Covenant”;1166  the conducting of an inquiry in cases where the received “reliable 
information” indicates “grave or systematic violations” by a State party of one or more of the rights set 
forth in the Covenant.1167  
The coming into force of the third Optional Protocol to the CRC increases the chance for 
outlining a child-specific ESC rights framework, as it provides for similar procedures against 
                                                                                                                                                            
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. A/RES/61/295, 13 September 2007. See Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, S. James Anaya, “Promotion and Protection of All 
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development”, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/9, 1 
August 2008. 
1163 For the function to receive and review State parties’ reports in its Concluding Observations, see ECOSOC Res. 
1985/17 of 28 May 1985. The CESCR is composed of 18 members (with recognised competence in this field) elected 
by ECOSOC for a renewable period of four years. Although nominated by States parties to the ICESCR, the members 
serve in their personal capacity as independent experts. The election process mirrors the UN practice of heeding the 
principle of geographical distribution and representation of different legal and social systems. Decisions are usually 
taken by consensus. It meets twice annually for three-week sessions.  
1164 The OPICESCR entered into force on 5 May 2013, three months after Uruguay became the tenth State to ratify 
the treaty, in accordance with Article 18. It was approved on 10 December 2008 (GA Res. A/RES/63/117) after the 
Human Rights Council adopted without a vote Resolution 8/2 including the text of the Optional Protocol on June 
2008. It was opened for signature on 24 September 2009. To date, forty-five States have signed it, including ten 
European Union Member States (Belgium, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain and Ireland); twelve States are parties to the Protocol (Argentina, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Finland, Mongolia, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Uruguay); none of the permanent members of the 
Security Council have signed the Protocol yet (the United States signed but has not ratified the ICESCR, while all other 
permanent members have ratified it). See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en  
1165 The State allegedly responsible must have ratified both the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol, according to Article 
1(2) OP-ICESCR (“No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party 
to the present Protocol”). 
1166 The inter-State complaints procedure is set out in Article 10 OP-ICESCR: being an opt-in procedure it only applies 
if both the claimant and the defendant have declared to accept the competence of the CESCR to hear a communication 
of this nature. See also Article 11(1) OP-ICESCR. An inter-State complaints procedure is set out also in respect to the 
ICCPR and the CERD. 
1167 The inquiry procedure is set out in Article 11(2) OP-ICESCR and Rules 21-34 of the Rules of Procedure. The 
CESCR is not allowed to undertake an inquiry unless the State concerned has declared to accept its authority to make 






violations of this Convention and its Protocols by States that have ratified this new instrument.1168 
So far children’s ESC rights have not been extensively considered by the relevant treaty body, 
which has offered a comprehensive interpretation of the obligations stemming from the CRC in 
General Comment No. 5. The new Protocol enables children and their advocates to appeal experts 
on a broader range of children’s rights than any other treaty and provides a further means of 
putting pressure on States, after having navigating the national systems to “exhaust domestic remedies”. 
Remarkably, the adoption of new complaint procedures under the ICESCR, the CRC, and the 
ICRPD1169 represent a further step supporting the highly debated justiciability of ESC rights before 
international bodies,1170 which so far has mostly developed via complaint procedures under treaties 
on civil and political rights; in particular, through the “integrated approach” in relation to the non-
discrimination clause in the ICCPR1171 and the right to a fair trial in the ECHR.1172 Another 
relevant case concerns Article 6 ICCPR: in giving the “inherent right to life” a wider scope, it has been 
interpreted as a legal basis for positive social obligations on States parties. To be precise, the second 
sentence of this provision - establishing the obligation to protect by law the right to life in 
conjunction with Article 2 - has been deemed to call for positive measures in the protection of life, 
highlighting the importance of taking “all positive measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life 
expectancy, especially adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics”.1173 Some dimensions of the 
right to housing are also seen as suitable to receive protection under the ICCPR provisions 
                                                
1168 The third OP-CRC on a communications procedure, 19 December 2011, which entered into force on 14 April 
2014 after the tenth ratification (UN Doc. A/RES/66/138), allows for individual children to submit complaints alleging 
violations of their rights under the CRC and its two Protocols (the Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict 
and the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children); it also institutes inter-state complaints and an inquiry procedure “for 
grave or systematic violations” of children’s rights. 
1169 The CRPD may consider individual communications relating to States parties to the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Right of Person with Disabilities (13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008). Under Article 
1 of this Protocol the Committee has competence “to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups 
of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of the provisions of the Convention”. 
1170 See M. Langford (ed.), “Perspectives on a New Complaint and Inquiry Procedure: The Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 27 (1) Special Issue of the Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 
2009; R. Kayess and P. French, “Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities”, HRLR, 2008. 
1171 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200 A (XXI) adopted 16 December 1966, UN 
GAOR, twenty-first session, Supp. No. 16, p. 52, A/6316 (1967). On the “integrated approach”, see M. Scheinin, 
“Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Legal Rights”, in A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights - A Textbook2, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2001, pp. 32-33. The Human Rights Committee has settled the 
applicability of the non-discrimination clause of Article 26 ICCPR even in respect to the enjoyment of ESC rights. 
Although Article 26 has been mostly applied in relation to discrimination because of sex, all the prohibited grounds for 
discrimination provided by this article, including ‘other status’, may be applied in the area of economic and social rights.  
1172 The fair trial clause in Article 6(1) ECHR and its procedural safeguards have been suitable for extending the judicial 
protection of the European Convention to aspects related to ESC rights, see M. Scheinin, ibid., p. 34. 





guaranteeing the right to life or the right to private and family life.1174 
It is worth noting that almost all the UN human rights treaty bodies may receive individual 
complaints or communications from individuals, under certain circumstances.1175 As observed 
above, regional human rights mechanisms monitoring States’ compliance with ESC rights exist in 
Europe (the European Court of Human Rights and the European Committee of Social Rights1176), 
in the Americas (the Inter-American system of human rights, both the Court and the Commission), 
and in Africa (the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights). 
Arguments countering the assumption that ESC rights do not lend themselves to judicial review 
and enforcement1177 have aptly stressed how political reticence and political choices represent the 
major causes behind the judicial reticence to enforce the rights concerned. In any case, the adoption 
of complaints procedures for relevant treaties is in line with a trend emerging since the 1980s 
towards a direct recognition of ESC rights as fundamental and justiciable legal rights in national systems.1178 
This trend has concerned many Asian countries (e.g. East Timor, Indonesia, Afghanistan, 
Cambodia) and Latin American countries (e.g. Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Costa 
                                                
1174 On the Human Rights Committee’s practice to read issues on ESC rights into specific rights enshrined in the ICCPR, 
see M. Sepulveda, The Nature of the obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Intersentia, 
2003, pp. 52-54 and 138 ff. See also M. Scheinin, op. cit., 2001, pp. 40-41.  
1175 I.e., the CESCR, the HRC, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), whose treaty 
provides individual communications relating to States parties who have made the necessary declaration under Article 14 
(1) of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination), the Committee against Torture (CAT), the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, whose treaty provides individual 
communications relating to States parties to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women), the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD), the Committee on 
Enforced Disappearances (CED), the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The individual complaint 
procedure for the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) is not yet in force though. 
1176 A collective complaints procedure under the revised ESC entered into force in 1998, see Additional Protocol to the 
European Social Charter providing for a System of Collective Complaints, 1995, ETS No. 158.  
1177 For a discussion of the necessity to face up to the practical difficulties presented by ESC rights, see M. J. Dennis and 
D. P. Stewart, “Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints 
Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing and Health?”, 98 AJIL, 2004, at 462-464, where they 
stress how “the issue that needs to be confronted, instead, is that these rights present genuinely different and, in many respects, far more 
difficult challenges than do civil and political rights … [I]t is a much more complex undertaking to ascertain what constitutes an adequate 
standard of living, or whether a State fully respects and implements its population’s right to education or right to work. Vexing questions of 
content, criteria, and measurement lie at the heart of the debate over ‘justiciability’, yet are seldom raised or addressed with any degree of 
precision”.  
1178 For a detailed analysis, see M. Langford, “Domestic Adjudication and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Socio-Legal Review”, 6 IJHR, 2009, pp. 91-122; M. Langford (ed.), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in 
International and Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press, 2008. T.J. Melish, “Rethinking the “Less as More” Thesis: 
Supranational Litigation of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Americas”, 39 N.Y.U. Journal International Law 
and Politics, 2006. F. Coomans (ed.), Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Experiences from Domestic Systems, 
Intersentia, 2006. S. Lienberg, “The Protection of Economic and Social Rights in Domestic Legal Systems”, in A. Eide, 





Rica, Nicaragua, Venezuela).1179 On the African continent several States have incorporated ESC 
rights in their bills of rights (e.g. Benin, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Burkina Faso, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Togo, Seychelles, South Africa), while others such as Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone have included directive principles.1180 In Eastern Europe, of the twenty States subject to 
reform since 1990, eleven have fully-fledged catalogues of ESC rights, seven have a limited number, 
and two have none. 1181  Overall, States have chosen three main modalities to the national 
implementation: providing specific constitutional provisions on ESC rights, laying down 
constitutional structural principles like the human dignity clause serving an umbrella function, 
leaving the realisation of the rights in question to the ordinary statutory level.1182 The remarkable 
rise in the numbers of ESC rights judgements in several domestic legal systems over the last decades 
is also linked to a more intense work conducted by NGOs in fields relevant to the enjoyment of ESC 
rights.1183  
In addition, serious reflection has been devoted to these rights in academic writing.1184 Of 
particular note are the 2011 Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations of States in the area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights attempt to clarify such obligations beyond their own borders, 
complementing the 1986 Limburg Principles for the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and on the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.1185 
                                                
1179 See B. Simmons, “Should States Ratify - Process and Consequences of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR”, in 
M. Langford (ed.), 27 Special Issue of the Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 2009, pp. 64-81. 
1180 See C. Heyns and M. Van der Linde (eds.), Human Rights Law in Africa, Vol. 5 International Human Rights Law in Africa 
and Vol. 2 Domestic Human Rights Law in Africa, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004. 
1181 W. Sadurski, Rights before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Post-communist States of Central and Eastern Europe, 
Springer, 2005, p. 177. 
1182 See E. Riedel, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, in C. Krause and M. Scheinin (eds.), International Protection of 
Human Rights: A Textbook, op. cit., pp. 146-147, seeing the next decades of ESC rights protection as focusing on national 
and regional implementation, in parallel to the universal monitoring mechanisms, reinforcing each other. For a debate 
of the various effects of using the courts to enforce socio-economic rights, see V. Gauri and D.M. Brinks (eds.), Courting 
social justice: judicial enforcement of social and economic rights in the developing world, Cambridge, 2008. 
1183 For a survey of cases evidencing a growing willingness to enforce ESC rights in domestic courts’ decision, see 
ESCR-Net online, available from http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/caselaw_list.htm; COHRE, Leading Cases on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Summaries, Working Papers No. 3, Geneva, 2006; International Commission of Jurists, 
Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative Experiences of Justiciability, Geneva, 2008. 
1184 See M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law, Hart Publishing, 2009, Chapter 4; M. 
Langford, Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press, 2008; 
M. Sepulveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Intersentia, 
2003; A.R. Chapman and S. Russell (eds.), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Intersentia, 2002. 
1185 The Maastricht Guidelines elaborate on the scope and nature of such violations and applicable remedies. They 
reflected the evolution of international law in respect to the earlier Limburg Principles. They primarily relate to the 
ICESCR, but they may be relevant to the implementation and application of other norms of international and domestic 





Relevant contributions have also come from the UN special procedures with specific related 
mandate.1186 On the one hand, certain mandate-holders have outlined the content of different ESC 
rights and ensuing State obligations, while several Special Rapporteurs and Independent Experts 
have attempted to fill normative gaps by developing analytical legal frameworks or clarifying some 
aspects of a certain right, including the application to groups such as women, 1187 children, 
indigenous people, prisoners, and people with disabilities. Noteworthy cases include: the ‘4As’ 
scheme of the first Special Rapporteur on the right to education1188 according to which “governments 
are obliged to make education available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable”; 1189  the project of the 
Independent Expert on water and sanitation to defining them from a human rights perspective and 
clarifying related State obligations;1190 the normative development in the areas of extraterritorial 
obligations and international cooperation and assistance, addressed by the first Special Rapporteur 
on the right to food and the first Special Rapporteur on the right to health and their successors. On 
the other hand, international standards and other soft law documents have been proposed by 
mandate-holders to respond to contemporary challenges on the implementation of ESC rights.1191  
Therefore, notwithstanding that internationally recognised civil and political rights have got 
more consideration and more judicial interpretation regarding application and enforceability into 
                                                
1186 For an analysis on their impact, see I. Cisma, C. Golay, C. Mahon, “The impact of the UN Special Procedures on 
the development and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights”, 15(2) International Journal of Human Rights, 
2011, 299-318. 
1187 Important policy frameworks contributing to the international regime of protection an advancement of women’s 
human rights in conflict and post-conflict situations have been set out in some resolutions of the UN Security Council. 
In SC Res. 1325 (2000), the Security Council acknowledged the critical role of women in global peace and security, 
calling on the international community to address the various impacts of conflict on women and to engage them fully in 
conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Then, Res. 1820 (2008), Res. 1888 (2009), Res. 1889 (2009) 
broadened it and linked the prevention of sexual violence, peacemaking and mediation. Res. 1960 (2010) and Res. 1983 
(2011) further strengthened the international legal framework on this issue. 
1188 See Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Katarina Tomasevski, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/49, 13 
January 1999, paras. 51-74; Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Katarina Tomasevski, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/6, 1 February 2000, paras. 32-65; Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, 
Katarina Tomasevski, E/CN.4/2001/52, 11 January 2001, paras. 64-77; Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education, Katarina Tomasevski, E/CN.4/2002/60, 7 January 2002, paras. 22-45.  
1189 K. Tomasevski, Education Denied: Costs and Remedies, Zed Books, 2003, at 51. 
1190 Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina 
de Albuquerque, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/24, 1 July 2009. 
1191 Special procedures’ involvement has been different depending on the type of process that led to the development or 
adoption of these instruments. For a process led by States, see The Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the 
right to adequate food in the context of national food security, adopted by the 127th session of the FAO Council in November 
2004. For a process led by the Special Rapporteur, see The Draft General Guidelines on Foreign Debt and Human Rights, 
submitted by the independent expert on the effects of economic reform policies and foreign debt on the full enjoyment of all human rights, 
Bernards Mudho, UN Doc. A/HRC/7/CRP.2, 4 March 2008; see the Final draft of the guiding principles on extreme poverty and 
human rights, submitted by the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, 
A/HRC/21/39, 2012. For a process fostering wide consultations with all stakeholders on an equal or quasi-equal 
footing, see The Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari, 





domestic legal systems, an increased focus on economic, social and cultural dimensions of human rights is evident. 
Significantly, the wrong assumption that only the former can be subject to violations, to measures of 
redress and to international legal analysis has aptly lost credibility in the light of a progressive conceptual 
clarification of ESC rights. 
 
All the previous considerations on such developments have certain implications in inquiring as to 
the potential of modern human rights law as regards the imperative of civilian protection in the 
socio-economic and cultural spheres under international law. Conflict-torn and occupation-related 
situations raise at least two relevant issues. The first one consists of developing a contemporary 
understanding of civilians’ needs in such evolving scenarios and a comprehensive elaboration of the obligations possibly 
incumbent upon several actors performing crucial roles therein (e.g. territorial States, foreign States, States as 
members of international organizations, non-State actors such as private persons and organisations 
or multinational corporations). The second one consists of facing the challenges of compliance with 
international norms enshrining ESC rights and of international enforcement mechanisms able to supplement and 
support domestic enforcements of those norms when national systems do not or cannot pursue 
accountability because they are lacking or fail to function.  
In this regard, potential benefits from international human rights law may be spelled out as follows. 
1. Its application may entail a better understanding of distinct dimensions of realisation of ESC rights that 
warrant - or should deserve - more consideration. In this respect, the first benefit lies on the special 
aptitude of this legal regime to tackle the normative content of the rights to be protected against the conduct of 
military operations or in periods of occupation, clarifying the nature and scope of a range of ensuing State 
obligations (particularly through basic tools such as the concept of progressive realisation or the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination). This will be articulated in the next sub-sections 2.c.i. 
and 2.c.ii. 
2. Its application may help framing the legality of a variety of controversial actions/measures affecting 
civilians: detrimental impacts may be addressed as stemming from the violations of obligations 
established by international law norms on ESC rights; in other words, the link between such impacts 
and relevant obligations  may be discovered.1192  
3. Its application may entail the beneficial provision for enforcement mechanisms to redress breaches 
concerning ESC rights. Notably, in the fight against impunity for gross violations of human rights law 
                                                
1192 On significant attempts to study a ‘violation approach’ or monitoring ESC rights, see A.R. Chapman, “A Violation 
Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 HRQ, 1996, pp. 
23-66; V. Dankwa, C. Flinterman, S. Leckie, “Commentary to the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, 





and international humanitarian law the principle of criminal or civil accountability before quasi-
judicial bodies or courts has been acknowledged at the universal1193 and regional1194 levels. As to the 
various administrative, civil, criminal or disciplinary sanctions for violations of ESC rights a main concern is the 
aptitude to be adequately efficacious. As to the victims of violations of ESC rights a key issue regards the 
access to effective remedies to grant reparation and order cessation of such violations.  
As observed above, the OPICESCR institutes new procedures for State accountability for 
breaches of the ICESCR.1195  Besides offering a chance to advance the CESCR’s jurisprudence on 
the rights concerned, the individual complaints procedure makes possible to seek justice at the 
international level after access to justice at the national level was denied or after domestic remedies 
took unreasonably long time. It is worth highlighting the “progressive approach” of this Protocol in 
granting the Committee a mandate to receive information by a wide range of third parties sources 
(Art. 8(1) and 8(3)) and in requiring this body to consider whether reasonable steps have been taken 
by the State party and how its disputed policy measures affect the complainant as well as the groups 
that are not direct parties.1196 Besides the significance of the follow-up procedure (Arts. 9 and 14), 
the provision for interim measures (Art. 5) to prevent “irreparable damage” to the victims of alleged 
                                                
1193 Preamble to the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.11, reading 
as follows: “... Recognising that, in honouring the victims’ right to benefit from remedies and reparation, the international community keeps 
faith with the plight of victims, survivors and future human generations and reaffirms the international legal principles of accountability, justice 
and the rule of law …”. 
1194 See, e.g., Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations, 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 March 2011. The Preamble reads as follows: “Considering that a lack of 
accountability encourages repetition of crimes, as perpetrators and others feel free to commit further offences without fear of punishment”. In 
para. III (7), States are recommended to “establish mechanisms to ensure the integrity and accountability of their agents. States should 
remove from office individuals who have been found, by a competent authority, to be responsible for serious human rights violations or for 
furthering or tolerating impunity, or adopt other appropriate disciplinary measures”; in para. VI the significance of public scrutiny of 
the investigation or its outcomes to ensure accountability is emphasised. 
1195 On the OPICESCR, see A. Vandenbogaerde and W. Vandenhole, “The Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural: An Ex Ante Assessment of its Effectiveness in Light of the Drafting 
Process”, 10(2) HRLR, 2010, pp. 207-237. See C. De Albuquerque, “Chronicle of an Announced Birth: The Coming 
into Life of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-The Missing 
Piece of the International Bill of Human Rights”, 32 HRQ, 2010, pp. 144-178. See C. Golay, “The Optional Protocol 
To The International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights”, CETIM, November 2008. See C. Mahon, 
“Progress at the Front: The Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights”, 8 HRLR, 2008, pp. 617-646. 
1196 Under Article 8(4) OP-ICESCR the standard by which the Committee decides complaints (and so determining 
whether an ESC right has been violated) concerns the reasonable character of the measures adopted by the State party in 
conformity with Article 2(1) ICESCR, while considering that the State party is allowed to implement the rights 
enshrined in this Covenant in a variety of ways. For the reasonableness test, the Committee could draw inspiration from 
existing jurisprudence at the national, regional and international levels, which has indeed used this test for assessing 
compliance with obligations to respect and protect ESC rights, but mainly for evaluating the degree of positive actions 
of fulfillment, or for founding a government responsible for having taken measures that discriminate in the enjoyment of 
ESC rights, or even for not having properly regulated the activities of transnational corporations. See generally, Porter, 
“The Reasonableness of Article 8(4) - Adjudicating Claims from the Margins”, 27 Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 2009, 
pp. 39-53; Griffey, “The Reasonableness Test: Assessing Violations of State Obligations under the Optional Protocol to 





violations is helpful. Conversely, the inquiry procedure presents a confidential process to address 
effectively systematic and grave violations of ESC rights insofar it gives the CESCR a chance to 
respond promptly to serious abuses without waiting the State party’s submission of periodic reports; 
it may be particularly helpful when individuals or groups are unable to submit complaints owing to 
constraints or fear of reprisals. The possibility to notify the findings on the investigation to the UN 
and other bodies (with the agreement of the State) and to indicate any need for technical advice or 
assistance has also basic importance  (Art. 14). 
 
Of note, meaningful jurisprudence on ESC rights in conflict-affected situations or transitional 
justice contexts has started to emerge from judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.1197  
Specifically, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has decided cases involving large-scale 
abuses occurred during conflicts or repressions that were often brought before it when the States in 
question (i.e. Chile, Colombia, Guatemala and Peru) had undertaken or were undertaking a 
transition. In the Mapiripán Massacre case,1198 in arguing the State obligation to adopt positive 
measures to ensure a dignified life, the Court interpreted expansively the right to life in order to 
protect, inter alia, the rights to food, health and housing of the victims of the massacre and vast 
displacement. Its examination of alleged violations of the rights of the child (Art. 19) and of freedom 
of movement (Art. 22) was also linked to the right to life (Art. 4); it argued Colombia’s failure to 
discharge positive obligations to provide children and displaced people with the necessary 
conditions to live in dignity; vulnerable conditions in which victims had to survive were identified in 
the experiencing their families’ disintegration, the witnessing of massacres, their being forced into 
poverty, the loss of their homes and jobs, the threat of serious illnesses and the lack of access to food, 
while the Court did not specify the positive obligations stemming from the right to life as relevant 
for ESC rights.  
Another case, Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, illustrates more directly the justiciability of the rights 
                                                
1197 See, e.g., AComHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan, 
Comm. Nos. 279/03 and 296/05, decision of May 2009. See particularly paras. 9-14, 205, 209 and 212. This will be 
specifically discussed in one of the next sections.  
Although not detailed here, relevant cases have been decided by the Colombian Constitutional Court, also developing 
its previous jurisprudence, within the implementation of the 2005 Justice and Peace Law; before the entry into force of 
this transitional justice framework, the Court decided on a case concerning the second highest population of IDPs in the 
world: in reviewing numerous legal issues related to the content, scope and limitation of the State policy for assisting the 
displaced population, it acknowledged internal displacement in Colombia in breach of multiple human rights, also 
determining that the lack of a coherent and holistic public policy to deal with such population constituted an 
unconstitutional state of affairs because of State authorities’ failure to respect, protect and fulfill IDPs’ rights. See 
Colombian Constitutional Court, Third Review Chamber, Decision T-025 of 22 January 2004, in particular sect. 9. 
1198 IACtHR, Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment of 15 September 2005, Ser C, No. 134; particularly paras. 96.30-





concerned.1199 Besides considering the executions of nineteen inhabitants of Aro and Granja by 
paramilitaries with the support of the army, the Court affirmed the State authorities’ failure to 
protect the population during and after their incursions in Ituango in view of the forced 
displacement, the burning down of houses, and the stealing of between 800 and 1,200 head of 
livestock. Regarding the applicants’ allegations of the violation of Article 6(2) ACHR for having 
being “detained and compelled to herd the livestock stolen”, the Court interpreted it in the light of Article 
2(1) of the ILO Force Labour Convention No. 29, which was ratified by Colombia in 1969. 
Accordingly, in recognising that the compulsory labour was exacted “under the menace of penalty” and 
performed “involuntarily” with the State participation or acquiescence, the Court found Colombia in 
breach of Article 6(2). Further violations concerned the right to property (Article 21), which was 
deemed to include all material and immaterial or movable and immovable possessions of an 
individual (e.g. houses, livestock, ancestral or communal land). An explicit reference to Article 14 
APII was also made, as it proscribes the destruction or removal of objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population.1200  
It is also worth mentioning the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina,1201 which 
dealt with several cases relating to the right to property and restitution as well as the rights to 
education, work, and social security.1202 Indeed, the displacement of more than two million people 
during the Balkan war - effectively around half of the overall population at the time - resulted in the 
loss of occupied or owned property and seriously affected their housing and property rights.1203 The 
significant role played by the Chamber in addressing these rights mostly derived from Article 8 
ECHR on the right to respect for one’s private and family life, home and correspondence, as well as 
                                                
1199 IACtHR, Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Judgment of 1 July 2006, Ser C, No. 148. See in particular paras. 125 (79), 
125 (81)-125 (82), 125 (85), 133, 141, 156-157, 160, 174, 178, 180. 
1200 Ibid., paras. 178 and 182. For the Court, the serious theft of livestock (due to the “close relationship between the [victims] 
and their livestock, because their main means of subsistence was cultivating the land and raising livestock”) as well as the destruction of 
houses impaired the social framework of the community and produced “an important financial loss” affecting their “basic 
living conditions”. 
1201 According to the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, the Chamber had jurisdiction over: violations of the ECHR 
and its Additional Protocols; alleged or apparent discrimination on any ground, where such violation is alleged or 
appears to have been committed by the Parties to the detriment of any of the rights or freedoms established in the 
appendix to annex 6, including relevant treaties on ESC rights such as the Covenant and the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; see Article II and the appendix, which provide for jurisdiction 
over discrimination “on grounds of  sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with 
a national minority, property, birth or other status”. The Chamber ceased its functions in 2003. 
1202 See Kličković et al v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska, CH/02/8923, 
CH/02/8924 and CH/02/9364, Decision of 10 January 2003, para. 15; Šecerbegovic et al. v. and Herzegovina and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CH/98/706, CH/98/740 and CH/98/776, Decision of 7 April 2000; Mile Mitrović v. 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CH/98/948, Decision of 6 September 2002, para. 54.  
1203 Accordingly, annex 7 to the Dayton Peace Agreement, on refugees and displaced persons, included the right to 





Article 1 of its first Protocol incorporating the right to property.1204  
Conversely, relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has been 
considered in other parts of the present study, particularly in Chapter III. 
 
4. In addition to the role of States in ensuring compliance with obligations under international 
human rights law, the idea that this legal regime may also create obligations for private actors has emerged 
and been the bases for a wide-ranging attempt to shift the responsibility and accountability for 
violations of human rights from the State to private actors performing across national borders. This 
attempt has been elaborated in academic literature1205 as well as in the practice of United Nations 
bodies,1206 mostly asserting the relevance of corporate social responsibility and voluntary initiatives 
as well as the potential of effective standards of human rights compliance as delivered by business 
corporations.  
Some scholars have observed, however, how such an attempt proves problematic. In essence, at 
least three reasons have been highlighted.1207 Firstly, the direct application of international human 
rights norms to private actors entails difficulties from both the perspectives of transplanting primary 
obligations from the interstate system to non-state actors and adapting secondary rules on 
international responsibility for breaches as well as enforcement procedures. 1208  Secondly, no 
                                                
1204 The importance of the Chamber’s role in this field is illustrated in M.J. v. Republika Srpska, No. CH/96/28, Decision 
on the admissibility and merits, 7 November 1997, particularly paras. 6-11 and 32-33. The applicant, a citizen of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, claimed “occupancy rights” over an apartment in Banja Luka, after he faced an illegal eviction in 1995 
and then the failure to enforce a court order for possession despite initiated court proceedings. The Chamber deemed 
an occupancy right over property a “valuable asset” that “constitutes a ‘possession’ within the meaning of Article 1 as interpreted by 
the European Commission and Court”; it found a violation of such a right inasmuch as the non enforcement of a court’s order 
for possession was a “failure by the authorities to protect the applicant against unlawful interference with his possessions by private 
individuals”. For similar judgments, see Keveševic v. the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. CH/97/46, Decision of 15 
July 1998; Onic v. the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. CH/97/58, Decision of 12 February 1999.  
1205 See A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations on Non-State Actors: The Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2006; P. Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, Oxford, 2005; S. Ratner, “Corporations and 
Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility”, 111 Yale Law Journal, 2001, pp. 443-545; M.K. Addo (ed.), Human 
Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, Kluwer Law International, 1999. 
1206 It includes the “Global Compact” launched by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 1999, the draft “Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises” adopted by the former Sub-Commission for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights in 2003, and the subsequent work of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General, John Ruggie, within the institutional framework of the Human Rights Council. 
1207 See F. Francioni, “The Role of the Home State in Ensuring Compliance with Human Rights by Private Military 
Contractors”, in F. Francioni and N. Ronzitti (eds.), War by Contract, Oxford, 2011, pp. 93-110. 
1208 In his first interim report, the new special representative John Ruggie recognised that the human rights norms 
elaborated by the Sub-Commission in 2003 “cannot also directly bind business because, with the possible exception of certain war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, there are no generally accepted international legal principles that do so. And if the Norms were to bind 
business directly, then they could not merely be restating international legal principles; they would need, somehow, to discover or invent new 
ones”, see Interim Report, April 2006. Its subsequent reports admit more flexibly that certain international human rights 





abundant judicial practice supports this direct extension/shift of obligations,1209 except the one 
related to the US Alien Tort Statute.1210 Thirdly, the market’s self-ability to generate forms of 
regulations to ensure respect for public goods (like human rights, social justice and environmental 
quality) appears not very promising, or at least not sufficiently effective, in light of recent 
outstanding failures concerning the global financial crisis, global warming, the fight against poverty.  
In this regard, in dealing with the issue of extraterritoriality in the area of ESC rights, Chapter 4 
will next examine the evolving weight and implications of the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights as a “set of politically authoritative and socially legitimated norms and policy guidance” 
within conflict-affected areas. Further, in Chapter 5 ones discusses relevant cases of allegations of 
companies’ involvement in serious breaches of international law that inhibit (directly or indirectly) 
the exercise of, or adequate access to, ESC rights by civilians. 
2.c.i. Reflecting on the nature and typologies of State obligations  
Compliance with internationally recognised human rights imposes different levels of State 
obligations.1211 Focusing on treaties setting out ESC rights, various formulations are contained in 
the general clauses about Contracting Parties’ obligations: in Article 2 ICESCR each party 
“undertakes to take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realisation of” the rights enshrined in the Covenant; Article 2 ICERD condemns racial discrimination 
and obliges parties to “undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
racial discrimination in all its forms” and its Article 5 creates a specific obligation to ensure the right of 
everyone to equality before the law; Article 4 CRPD uses the formula “to ensure and promote”.  
                                                
1209 The hearing and enforcement of human rights claims related to conduct of private actors has been systematically 
permitted only in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which grant US federal courts’ jurisdiction over 
civil suits brought by aliens for torts committed in violations of international law. However, a controversial decision of 
the Court of Appeals recently denied the applicability of international law to corporations, so removing them from the 
reach of the ATS, see U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kiobel, et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al., Docket 
Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, (argued on 12 January 2009) (decided on 17 September 2010). The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted the petition for a writ of certiorari on 17 October 2011. 
1210 On ATS case law brought against corporations for their alleged involvement in human rights violations, see, e.g., 
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009); Romero v. 
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, P.L.C., 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008); Viet. Ass’n for 
Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d 
Cir. 2007); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 
F.3d 696 (2d Cir. 2004); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th 
Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Jota v. 
Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). On ATS cases that have regarded armed conflicts, see, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 
F.3d, 232, (2d Cir. 1995) (bringing claims for abuses committed during conflict in Bosnia). 
1211 See O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 242-253. M. Nowak, UN 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - CCPR Commentary2, op. cit., pp. 37-41. See also OHCHR, “Principles and Guidelines 





A trifold classification of obligations used to characterise and assess the conducts of State parties 
to treaties on ESC rights refers to the “respect, protect and fulfil” framework.1212 The 1987 Special 
Rapporteur’s report on the right to food inspired this typology, which has then been employed and 
explained by the CESCR in its general comments in order to capture several aspects of the rights 
enshrined in the Covenant.1213 This framework has been also elucidated by experts in the field, as 
the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights exemplify.1214 Precisely, the 
obligation to respect requires States to “refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of ESC rights”; it is 
generally deemed to prohibit gross and systematic discrimination in relation to the right to food, 
health, education, housing and social security, intentional famine, forced sterilization, participation 
in cultural life, the satisfaction of favourable and fair conditions of work, forced labour, arbitrary 
forced evictions, destruction of houses and other property. Thus, States are required to protect 
individuals from interference by third parties in the enjoyment of their ESC rights; States’ failures to ensure that 
third parties comply with certain standards may amount to violations of those rights. The obligation 
to fulfil requires States to take administrative, legislative, judicial, budgetary or other measures towards the full 
realisation of ESC rights; States’ failures to provide essential standards to those in need may amount to 
violations of these rights.  
Insofar as treaties on ESC rights are applied to conflict-affected situations by monitoring bodies, 
these types may offer valuable tools to raise awareness on the appropriate matrices of state 
obligations at each stage concerning different vulnerable groups of the civilian population. They 
may acquire specific relevance for extraterritorial State conduct, by framing State obligations as 
refraining from any action that might impede the realisation of ESC rights in conflict-affected 
countries, ensuring that all other actors subject to State control respect the enjoyment of civilians’ 
ESC rights therein, providing for some form of assistance to secure ESC rights to vulnerable civilians. 
                                                
1212 See M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – A Perspective on its Development, 
Clarendon Press, 1995), at 147-150; Sepulveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Intersentia, 2003, at 373-375. 
1213 See A. Eide, Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23, 7 July 1987, 
especially paras. 66-70 and 112-116. See CESCR, General Comment No.18: The right to work (art. 6), adopted on 24 
November 2005, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (6 February 2006), para. 22; CESCR, General Comment No. 16: The equal right 
of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/4, 11 August 2005, which 
explains the diverse level of obligations in the context of non-discrimination against women (paras. 18-19-21); CESCR, 
General Comment No. 15: The right to water (art. 11 and 12), UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, paras. 21-29; 
CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health, UN Doc .E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 
2000, paras. 34-36; CESCR, General Comment No. 13: The right to education, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10, 8 December 1999, 
para. 47; CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The right to food, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 15. 






In view of the additional dichotomy as obligations of conduct and obligations of result,1215 it is 
generally acknowledged that the duties to respect, protect and fulfil cover elements of both. The first 
one entails States’ measure reasonably intended towards the satisfaction of a specific right, while the 
second one entails States’ achievement of particular objectives to satisfy the content of a specific 
right. Conversely, in light of the more traditional distinction between positive and negative 
obligations,1216 it is generally acknowledged that ‘respect’ entails negative State obligations, while 
‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’ correspond to positive State obligations, where the latter plays a major role in 
the implementation of ESC rights, which often require an institutionalised infrastructure to be 
adequately materialised.  
Furthermore, the normative framework of the ICESCR has been interpreted to include provisions 
establishing obligations of immediate effect and provisions imposing obligations to be realised progressively, so 
implying that its application goes through different stages by virtue of the very nature of the 
prescribed obligations.1217  
Yet the terminology used in Article 2(1), such as “each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
take steps”, “to the maximum of its available resources”, “with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of 
the rights recognised”, “by all appropriate means”, has been subject to various interpretations. For certain 
scholars the alleged relativity of ESC rights would have a variable content.1218 Others embrace a 
reading of Article 2 that have more practical implications: States start from different initial factual 
bases but such data about a certain country simply determine to what extent progression can be 
measured; moreover, no specific time-frame for the realisation of a certain ESC right can be made 
under Article 2, which basically requires States parties to take all measures necessary “to the maximum 
                                                
1215 See G. Goodwin-Gill, “Obligations of Conduct and Result”, in P. Alston and K. Tomasevski (eds.), The Right to Food, 
Martinus Nijoff, 1984. This typology has been then used by the CESCR (see its General Comment No. 3: The nature of States 
Parties’ obligations (Art. 2 (1)), E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 1). 
1216 For relevant case law, see, e.g., Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, in which the IACtHR interpreted Article 1 IACHR 
(providing that “States parties undertake to respect … and to ensure” the rights enshrined in the Convention) to include positive 
actions by States parties so as to prevent human rights violations and to investigate and punish related abusers. The 
ECtHR also declared positive obligations in several cases: in Airey v. Ireland the Court, asserting that human rights 
protection must be “practical and effective” (and not “theoretical or illusory”), obliged the State to take positive action to ensure 
their satisfaction; in X and Y v. the Netherlands the Court confirmed the same view by recognising the positive obligation 
upon States to modify criminal law and so remedy to an abuse suffered by a mentally disabled girl; in Z and others v. UK, 
the Court acknowledged the social services agencies’ failure to protect children from parents’ ill-treatment.  
1217 See CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States Parties’ obligations (Art. 2 (1)), 14 December 1990, paras. 1 and 
9. See Principles n. 21-22 of the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Convention on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights, June 1986, adopted by UN ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Agenda Item 8, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex (1987), 8 January  1987. See Guideline no. 8 of the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/2000/13, 2 October 2000. 
1218  M. Dennis and D. Stewart, “Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should there be an 






of its available resources” once they ratify the treaty, so acknowledging the constraints deriving from 
limited existing resources.1219 
Accordingly, the next sub-section reviews the basic concepts, principles and obligations framing 
the discourse on the rights enshrined in the ICESCR, in view of a number of clarifications provided 
by its treaty-based monitoring body in General Comments as well as in its interpretation of Article 2 
as emerged within the open-ended working group on the elaboration of the OPICESCR.1220  
2.c.ii. Focusing on the obligations stemming from the ICESCR 
States parties to the ICESCR are not allowed to defer nor deviate from implementing certain 
obligations set forth in the Covenant immediately upon its ratification. This regards the obligation to 
respect the rights concerned, which is of immediate effect, as generally is also the obligation to 
protect. Conversely, only some immediate duties (i.e. complying with minimum core obligations and 
taking deliberate and targeted steps to realise the rights) are included in the obligation to fulfil ESC 
rights, which encompasses mainly progressive duties subject to gradual implementation standards 
and a test of “reasonableness” of State performances.1221  
Some of the obligations having immediate effect and demanding immediate implementation on 
behalf of States parties are expressly referred in the Covenant.1222 In this respect they are primarily 
obliged to ensure the exercise of ESC rights without discrimination of any kind under Article 2(2);1223 being 
this guarantee is of immediate application it is deemed subject to judicial review and other recourse 
procedures.1224  
As defined by the CESCR, the immediate and cross-cutting obligation not to discriminate under 
                                                
1219 E. Riedel, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, op. cit., pp. 137-138. 
1220 E.g., CESCR, Statement on “An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the ‘maximum of available resources’ 
under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant”, E/C.12/2007/1, 21 September 2007.  
1221 See CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States Parties’ obligations (Art. 2 (1)). 
1222 E.g., Article 10 (3) establishing that “Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and 
young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions”. Other obligations having immediate effect are 
to be identified by means of interpretation. 
1223 For the principle of non-discrimination, see CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States Parties’ obligations (Art. 2 
(1)), para. 1; CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food, para. 18, stating that “any discrimination in access to 
food, as well as to means and entitlements for its procurement, on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, age, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status with the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment or 
exercise of economic, social and cultural rights constitutes a violation of the Covenant”. See also CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The 
right to water (arts. 11 and 12), paras. 13 and 16, where the requirement on discrimination is regarded as including an 
obligation to protect vulnerable members of society and those who have “traditionally faced difficulties” in exercising the 
right to water.  
1224 Under Article 2 (2) ICESCR States parties “undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be 
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status”. Article 3 enshrines the equal rights of women and men to enjoy all rights prescribed in the 
Covenant. See Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 





the ICESCR concerns “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is 
directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the intention or effect of nullifying 
or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of Covenant rights”.1225 While it entails a 
negative duty upon States parties (i.e. abstaining from discriminating against anyone on the grounds 
enunciated in Article 2), it also encompasses positive duties (i.e. preventing non-state actors from 
engaging in discriminatory acts, and taking “concrete, deliberate and targeted measures to ensure that 
discrimination in the exercise of Covenant rights is eliminated”).1226 Remarkably, a useful concept to identify 
pertinent criteria for violations of ESC rights affected by conflict-related situations is that one of 
systemic discrimination, which refers to the existence of a general pattern of discrimination against a 
particular group of people (e.g. apartheid in South Africa). 
Similarly, States parties are bound to adopt “appropriate measures” to promote the full 
application of the Covenant by virtue of Article 2(1), which imposes to immediately start on taking 
concrete and targeted steps to comply with their conventional obligations, although certain aspects of 
ESC rights may be achieved over time.1227 In this regard, “all appropriate means” is deemed to include 
legislation, the provision of judicial or other remedies, plus financial, administrative, social and 
educational measures.1228  
As emphasised by the CESCR, the existence of “inherently self-executing” obligations under the 
Covenant infers States parties are not able to refer to the programmatic nature of ESC rights to 
delay its application as a whole.1229 This may have implications for the normative framework 
binding the authorities in place during a period of military occupation and exercising effective 
control over the concerned territory or in other conflict situations affecting States parties to the 
ICESCR. Particular attention is thus required as to the obligations of immediate effect in relation to 
                                                
1225 See CESCR, General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2 (2)), UN Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/20, 25 May 2009, paras. 1 and 7. An analogous definition is contained in Article 1 ICERD, Article 1 
CEDAW, and Article 2 CRPD. A similar position was embraced in previous General Comments of the CESCR. A 
similar interpretation is found in HRC, General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, 10 November 1989, paras. 6-7.  
1226 See CESCR, General Comment No. 20, para. 36. 
1227 CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States Parties’ obligations (art. 2 (1)), 14 December 1990, para. 2. See also 
CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The right to water (arts. 11 and 12), 20 January 2003, para. 17, noting that the obligation 
to take steps refers to measures that are “deliberate, concrete and targeted towards the full realisation of the right to water”. See also 
Limburg Principles, para. 21; P. Alston and G. Quinn, “The Nature and Scope of State Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, HRQ, 1987, p.166.  
1228 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, paras. 4 and 7. See also UN Doc. E/C.12/2007/1, op. cit., 21 September 2007. 
1229 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 5 (“Any suggestion that the provisions indicated are inherently non-self-executing would seem 





vulnerable civilian individuals and groups such as children, women, refugees and internally 
displaced persons.1230  
While the notion of “progressive realisation” embodied in Article 2(1) does not apply to all the 
obligations flowing from the Covenant, it describes a central aspect of ESC rights enshrined in 
human rights treaties; clauses of this kind are included in Article 4 CRC and Article 4(2) CRPD. As 
detailed below, this concept has also influenced the drafting of Article 4 ICESCR. 
In essence, the obligation to “achieve progressively the full realisation of the rights” signifies that the 
latter takes resources as well as time, though States parties are required to “move as expeditiously as 
possible” towards it. Thus a gradual advancement in the enjoyment of any right is acknowledged, but 
under no circumstances does this notion entail a prerogative to defer ad infinitum State parties’ efforts 
towards full implementation: they are precluded from deliberately halting or retrogressing on 
progress.1231 Notably, the adoption of a deliberate retrogressive measure might not constitute an 
absolute violation if it is performed in the contexts of a limitation under Articles 4 and 5 ICESCR or 
if a State party is unable to enhance the implementation of the norm because of circumstances 
beyond its control.1232 
A major challenge becomes measuring and determining whether or not a State party has satisfied its 
conventional obligations. Related issues that may acquire importance include: knowing what percentage 
of the population enjoys the right in question, to what extent individuals enjoy that right, and 
whether or not those percentages are increasing and the enjoyment of that right is improving over 
time.  
Furthermore, the significance of the explicit reference to resource availability in Article 2(1) is at 
least threefold. Firstly, it reflects the acknowledgment that the realisation of ESC rights may be 
obstructed by lack of resources and achieved only over time. Equally, it suggests that a State party’s 
compliance with the obligation to take appropriate steps must be assessed in light of financial or any 
other existing resources. Nonetheless, it does not alter the immediacy of the obligation to take steps, 
and resource constraints alone do not excuse total inaction. Notably, the obligations flowing from 
                                                
1230 To the CESCR, “even in times of severe resources constraints whether caused by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or by 
other factors the vulnerable members of society can and indeed must be protected”, see CESCR, General Comment No. 3, op. cit., para. 12. 
1231 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 9. Also CESCR, General Comment No. 13: The right to education, para. 45 (“There is 
a strong presumption against the permissibility of any retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to education, as well as other rights 
enunciated in the Covenant. If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State party has the burden of proving that they have been 
introduced after the most careful consideration of all alternatives and that they are fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided 
for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the State party’s maximum available resources”). 
1232 Maastricht Guideline No.14 includes, among the violations of ESC rights, “the adoption of any deliberately retrogressive 
measure that reduces the extent to which any such right is guaranteed” (lett. e) and “the reduction or diversion of specific public expenditure, 
when such restriction or diversion results in the non-enjoyment of such rights and is not accompanied by adequate measures to ensure minimum 





the CRC are qualified solely by “within their means”, so their immediate effect is even more 
arguable.1233 
According to the CESCR, the drafters of the Covenant referred the wording “to the maximum of 
its available resources” to the existing resources of a State party as well as those offered by the 
international community through assistance and international cooperation.1234 This position has 
been restated within a recent interpretation of Article 2 in the context of the OPICESCR’s 
elaboration; in assessing the obligation to “take steps to the maximum of available resources” under 
a complaint procedure, the Committee has stressed that “where the available resources are demonstrably 
inadequate, the obligation remains for a State party to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights under the prevailing circumstances”.1235 In this regard although the concept of “available 
resources” is a basic qualifier of the obligation to take steps, serious efforts to improve protection are 
required and where they would prove impossible for States parties’ to meet their legal 
commitments, they still entail justifying how they have nevertheless performed to ameliorate the 
situation, besides requiring them to seek international cooperation and assistance. Additionally, 
substantial criteria have been identified for evaluating the “adequacy” of States parties’ measures.1236 
For assessing the “reasonableness” of their steps, significant is the relevance given to “transparent” and 
participatory national decision-making processes.1237 
Additionally to the dichotomy of immediate/progressive obligations, the CESCR has 
determined in general terms that every State party has “a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction 
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each rights”, emphasising that “if the Covenant were to be read in 
such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’être”.1238 
As meaningful example, the treaty-based body has consistently pointed out that “a State Party in which 
any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential food stuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic 
shelter or housing, or of the most basic form of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the 
                                                
1233 Article 27 (3), Article 28 (c), Article 42. On this point, see A. Eide, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as 
Human Rights”, pp. 9-28, in A. Eide, C. Krause, A. Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - A Textbook, Kluwer 
Law International, 2001, p. 22. 
1234 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, op. cit., para. 13. 
1235 See “An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the ‘maximum of available resources’ under an Optional 
Protocol to the Covenant”, Statement by the CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/2007/1, 21 September 2007, para. 4. 
1236 E.g., the extent to which they were “deliberate, concrete and targeted” to fulfil ESC rights; whether States parties exercise 
“discretion in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary manner”; whether States parties’ choice not to assign available resources is 
consisted with international human rights standards; whether States parties adopt the available policy option that least 
limits the rights enshrined in the Covenant, see E/C.12/2007/1, ibid., para. 8. 
1237 The role of States in formulating or adopting, funding and implementing laws and policies concerning ESC rights is 
addressed, emphasising that it “always respects the margin of appreciation of States to take steeps and adopt measures most suited to their 
specific circumstances”, see UN Doc. E/C.12/2007/1, ibid., para. 11. 





Covenant” unless a State can “demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations”.  
The rationale behind the Committee’s choice to undertake this approach is that of preventing 
States’ use of the notion of progressive realisation of ESC rights according to available resources to 
escape any binding obligation under the ICESCR. In subsequent general comments, the minimum 
core approach has been further articulated. Core obligations stemming from the “minimum essential 
levels” of the rights to food,1239 education,1240 health,1241 and water1242 have been identified. Instead, 
                                                
1239 See CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food (art.11), 12 May 1999, para. 14, concluding that “every 
State is obliged to ensure for everyone under its jurisdiction access to the minimum essential food which is sufficient, nutritionally adequate and 
safe, to ensure their freedom from hunger”. Relevant considerations are found in para. 6 (“States have a core obligation to take the 
necessary action to mitigate and alleviate hunger as provided for in paragraph 2 of article 11, even in times of natural or other disasters”); in 
para. 8 (“The Committee considers that the core content of the right to adequate food implies: The availability of food in a quantity and 
quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture; The 
accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights”); in para. 33 (“The 
incorporation in the domestic legal order of international instruments recognising the right to food, or recognition of their applicability, can 
significantly enhance the scope and effectiveness of remedial measures and should be encouraged in all cases. Courts would then be empowered 
to adjudicate violations of the core content of the right to food by direct reference to obligations under the Covenant”). 
1240 See CESCR, General Comment No. 13: The right to education (Art.13), 8 December 1999, para. 57 (“this core includes an 
obligation: to ensure the right of access to public educational institutions and programmes on a non-discriminatory basis; to ensure that 
education conforms to the objectives set out in article 13 (1); to provide primary education for all in accordance with article 13 (2) (a); to 
adopt and implement a national educational strategy which includes provision for secondary, higher and fundamental education; and to ensure 
free choice of education without interference from the State or third parties, subject to conformity with “minimum educational standards (art. 13 
(3) and (4))”). 
1241 See CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standards of health (art. 12), 11 August 2000, paras. 
43-45. In para. 43 six core obligations are indicated: “(a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a 
non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups; (b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food which is 
nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone; (c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an 
adequate supply of safe and potable water; (d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on 
Essential Drugs; (e) To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services; (f) To adopt and implement a national public 
health strategy and plan of action, on the basis of epidemiological evidence, addressing the health concerns of the whole population; the strategy 
and plan of action shall be devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and transparent process; they shall include 
methods, such as right to health indicators and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored; the process by which the strategy and 
plan of action are devised, as well as their content, shall give particular attention to all vulnerable or marginalized groups”. 
In para. 44 other five obligations are deemed of comparable priority: “(a) To ensure reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as 
post-natal) and child health care; (b) To provide immunization against the major infectious diseases occurring in the community; (c) To take 
measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases; (d) To provide education and access to information concerning the main 
health problems in the community, including methods of preventing and controlling them; (e) To provide appropriate training for health 
personnel, including education on health and human rights”. 
In para. 45 it is emphasised that “for the avoidance of any doubt … it is particularly incumbent on States parties and other actors in a 
position to assist, to provide ‘international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical’ which enable developing countries to 
fulfill their core and other obligations indicated in paragraphs 43 and 44 above”. 
1242 See CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The right to water (arts. 11 and 12), 20 January 2003, para. 37, identifying nine 
core obligations, but explicitly recognising that they are “of immediate effect”: “(a) To ensure access to the minimum essential 
amount of water, that is sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease; (b) To ensure the right of access to water and 
water facilities and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged or marginalised groups; (c) To ensure physical access to 
water facilities or services that provide sufficient, safe and regular water; that have a sufficient number of water outlets to avoid prohibitive 
waiting times; and that are at a reasonable distance from the household; (d) To ensure personal security is not threatened when having to 
physically access to water; (e) To ensure equitable distribution of all available water facilities and services; (f) To adopt and implement a 
national water strategy and plan of action addressing the whole population; the strategy and plan of action should be devised, and periodically 
reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and transparent process; it should include methods, such as right to water indicators and benchmarks, 
by which progress can be closely monitored; the process by which the strategy and plan of action are devised, as well as their content, shall give 





concerning specific country situations the Committee has called on States parties to ensure the 
enjoyment of “basic economic, social and cultural rights, as part of minimum standards of human rights”,1243 or 
to guarantee the provision of “basic services, including the health and education infrastructure”,1244 or to 
respect minimum core obligations even in contexts of developmental policies.1245  
In line with the Committee’s view, legal scholarship has emphasised that each right enshrined in 
the Covenant has - despite its inherent flexibility - an irreducible normative content to which basic 
minimum obligations correspond under all circumstances, in time of peace or war, irrespective of a 
State party’s political condition, institutional structure, economic level and scarcity of resources.1246 
It is reasonable to argue that the essential content of each ESC right establishes a limit to the flexibility allowed 
by virtue of Article 2(1), because such a core substance constitutes the starting point from which 
States parties may plan how to implement progressively the rest of their conventional obligations. 
2.d. Inquiring as to the relationship with other branches of international law  
Assessing the potential of international human rights law as to the imperative of civilians’ protection 
in the area of ESC rights cannot leave aside an inquiry of its interconnection with other relevant 
branches of international law, in particular those whose rules representing the traditional point of 
reference of such protection. Thus, the perspective of articulating its manifold relationship with the 
law of armed conflict as well as the laws of occupation gains great relevance. Several rationales 
supporting possible interactions between these legal regimes in the sphere of ESC rights will be 
discussed at the end of the present chapter. 
Notwithstanding that it is only infrequently explored in legal scholarship,1247 international 
                                                                                                                                                            
to water; (h) To adopt relatively low-cost targeted water programmes to protect vulnerable and marginalised groups; (i) To take measures to 
prevent, treat and control diseases linked to water, in particular ensuring access to adequate sanitation”. 
1243 See, e.g., CESCR, Concluding Observations on Israel, 31 August 2001, E/C.12/1/Add.69, para.12; CESCR, Concluding 
Observations on Lebanon, 9 June 1993, E/C.12/1993/10, para. 13; CESCR, Concluding Observations on Iraq, 12 December 
1997, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.17, paras. 10 and 25; CESCR, Concluding Observations on Zambia, 23 June 2005, 
E/C.12/1/Add.106, para. 10. 
1244 CESCR, Concluding Observations on the Russian Federation, 12 December 2003, E/C.12/1/Add.94, para. 38. 
1245 CESCR, “Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Statement to the Third 
United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries, 10 May 2001, E/C.12/2001/10, para. 17 (“When grouped together, the 
core obligations establish an international minimum threshold that all developmental policies should be designed to respect”). 
1246 This is emphasised in Maastricht Guideline No. 9, concluding that “such minimum obligations apply irrespective of the 
availability of resources of the country concerned or any other factors and difficulties”. See also V. Dankwa, C. Flinterman and S. 
Leckie, “Commentary on the Maastricht Guidelines”, SIM Special 20, p. 23. In the same regard, see Chapman and 
Russell (eds.), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Intersentia, 2002, p. 5. 
1247 For a discussion on whether ESC rights violations may give rise to individual criminal responsibility under the 
accepted definitions of international and transnational crimes, see E. Schmid, “War Crimes Related to Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 71(3) Heidelberg Journal of International Law, 2011, pp. 523-540; E. Schmid, 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International and Transnational Criminal Law, Geneva: IHEID, 2012; S. 





criminal justice may be also instrumental for such protection. Indeed, several international crimes 
are related to violations of ESC rights, which then may give rise to individual criminal 
responsibility. As is in part observed in other sections of the present thesis, this has been reflected in 
certain jurisprudence of international and hybrid criminal tribunals, though this matter shall not be 
considered in depth.1248 
As is generally acknowledged, the comprehensive debate on the aforementioned relationship 
have included issues such as to what degree human rights law applies, how to implement co-
application, and how convergent application of these branches may increase State accountability in 
relation to civilians’ protection. In this regard, various basic procedural issues on the applicability of human 
rights treaties on ESC rights deserve primary attention. The issue concerning the conditions (e.g. 
jurisdiction) under which the treaties concerned may apply within or beyond States parties’ national 
borders will be investigated in the next chapter. Conversely, the question of general derogability of such 
treaties alongside the issue of admissible (specific or general) limitations on ESC rights (as principally 
relevant in non-international conflicts) will be extensively examined heretofore. Subsequently, in 
assuming that they cannot be generally suspended and freely restricted by States parties, we will 
look at the principles inspiring the determination of the applicable norms in order to spell out some 
remarks on the inquired relationship from a substantial perspective at the end of the present 
chapter. 
3. The applicability of human rights treaties on ESC rights  
The occurrence of times of public emergency prompted by situations of armed conflict, belligerent 
occupation or post-conflict collapse raise some procedural issues for determining the applicability of 
treaties on ESC rights in force for the affected States. The concepts of derogation and limitation and 
their own rationale deserve primary consideration; the insertion of clauses consenting suspensions of, or 
restrictions on, the rights guaranteed in such treaties does affect and define their applicability regime 
                                                                                                                                                            
58-80; D. Marcus, “Famine Crimes in International Law”, 97(2) AJIL, 2003, pp. 245-281; M.A. Drumbl, 
“Accountability for Property and Environmental War Crimes: Prosecution, Litigation, and Development”, ICTJ Paper, 
November 2009, pp. 1-33. 
1248 For an inquiry on four groups of war crimes (against persons, against property, the use of prohibited methods, and 
the use of prohibited weapons) which could constitute a violation of the right to food, housing, education or health, see 
E. Schmid, “War Crimes Related to Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, op. cit. The author concludes 
that no legal reasons exist to argue a priori that violations of ESC rights should not or cannot be addressed by dealing 





in such settings, so shaping the protection of civilians.1249 
Several core conventions warranting ESC rights do not either allow or prohibit States parties to 
derogate in times of public emergency. Therefore, a basic issue arises as to whether and what options 
States parties have under international law to lawfully derogate from ESC rights in extraordinary circumstances, such 
as present-day scenarios of armed conflict and military occupation, notwithstanding the absence of an ad hoc clause in 
the human rights treaties concerned. In order to resolve this question properly, derogation regimes under 
human rights instruments codifying ad hoc provisions will be reviewed. Then, derogability from 
treaties on ESC rights will be investigated in the light of contributions emerged in legal scholarship, 
international jurisprudence and State practice, with additional remarks in view of relevant norms 
enshrined in the international law of treaties and general international law. 
Conversely, core treaties on ESC rights contain clauses that permit specific limitations on 
certain rights for far-reaching reasons, such as in the interest of national security.1250 Further, a 
general limitation clause in the ICESCR consents States parties to respond in a flexible way to 
extraordinary situations of tension within a democratic society. Thus, a relevant issue arises as to 
what extent States are allowed to limit ESC rights during public emergency induced by present-day scenarios of armed 
conflict and military occupation. In this regard the implications of Article 4 ICESCR will be addressed. 
3.1. Preliminary consideration on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties 
Although the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties generally regulates the termination and 
suspension of treaties, it expressly avoids ruling the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, with Article 
73 declaring that the Convention “shall not prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a treaty... from the 
outbreak of hostilities between States”.1251  
Practice and scholarly opinion have not provided a definitive answer to the basic question on 
whether in the event of an armed conflict a treaty remains in force in whole or in part. In noting heterogeneity in 
the practice of States about it, legal scholarship as expressed by the Institut de Droit International took 
                                                
1249 At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, States were also called for limiting the extent of any reservation to 
international human rights instruments, formulating them as accurately and narrowly as possible, guaranteeing that 
none is incompatible with the purpose and object of the relevant treaty, and regularly reconsidering them with a view to 
withdrawing them. 
1250 See Article 8, lett. (a) and (c) ICESCR; Articles 10 (right to leave the country), 13 (free speech), 14 (free 
manifestation of religion), and 15 (assembly and association) CRC; Articles 11 (free assembly and association), 12 
(freedom to live and return to own country) and 14 (right to property) AfrCHPR. 
1251 This echoed the International Law Commission’s view that “the outbreak of hostilities between States must be considered as an 
entirely abnormal condition, and that the rules governing its legal consequences should not be regarded as forming part of the general rules of 
international law applicable in the normal relations between States'”, see ILC, “Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with 
Commentaries”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II, commentary (2) to Draft Article 69 (then 





the opportunity to affirm some principles in international law.1252 In particular, according to Article 
4 of the resolution on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties adopted in 1985, unless a treaty 
otherwise provides, “the existence of an armed conflict does not entitle a party unilaterally to terminate or to 
suspend the operation of treaty provisions relating to the protection of the human person”.  
Significantly, this has been confirmed by the International Law Commission in the Draft articles 
on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties adopted in 2011.1253 Specifically, that clause was 
referred to by the first Special Rapporteur in the early comment on draft Article 7 that deals with 
“the continued operation of treaties resulting from their subject matter”.1254 Departing from the scheme of the 
Vienna Convention, the Draft articles of 2011 propose that whether a treaty is “susceptible to 
termination, withdrawal or suspension” once an armed conflict has broken out is a matter not only 
of treaty interpretation but also of other factors extrinsic to the treaty, and eventually subsequent to 
it. In this regard, draft Article 6 refers to “the nature of the treaty, in particular its subject matter, its object and 
purpose, its content and the number of parties to the treaty”, together with “the characteristics of the armed conflict, 
such as its territorial extent, its scale and intensity, its duration and, in the case of non-international armed conflict, 
also the degree of outside involvement”.1255  
The “treaties for international protection of human rights” are included within the list of categories of 
treaties presumed to survive an armed conflict. 1256 They are recognised as being such that the 
                                                
1252 Institut de Droit International, The Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, (Fifth Commission, Rapporteur: Mr Bengt 
Broms), Annuaire IDI, Session of Helsinki, 1985, vol. 61, tome II, pp. 219-221. For a comment on the resolution, see A. 
R. Brotons, “Los efectos del conflicto armado sobre los Tratados (consideraciones sobre la resolucion aprobada por el 
Istituto de derecho International en la Sesion de Helsinki, 1985)”, in Liber Amicorum J. Pérez Montero, Oviedo, 1988, vol. 
III, p. 1177 ff. 
1253 See “Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties”, 2011, para. 100, in ILC, Report on the Work of Its 
Sixty-third Session, UN GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10, A/66/10 and Add.1 (2011). 
1254 See First Report on the Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties by Mr. Ian Brownlie, Special Rapporteur, International Law 
Commission, Fifty-seventh session, 2005, UN Doc. A/CN.4/552, draft Article 7, para. 84 stressing that Article 4 was 
adopted by 36 votes to none, with 2 abstentions. 
1255 According to the broad definition contained in the Draft Articles, which follows the ICTY jurisprudence (Prosecutor v. 
Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ICTY-94-1, 2 
October 1995, para. 70), “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State”. The inclusion of non-
international armed conflict reflects the development of international law, but was criticised by States. See ILC, Third 
report on the Effects Of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, by Mr. Ian Brownlie, Special Rapporteur (1 March 2007), UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/578, paras. 12-15; ILC, Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, Note on Draft Article 5 and the Annex to the Draft Articles, 
by Mr. Lucius Caflisch, Special Rapporteur (18 May 2011), UN Doc. A/CN.4/645, para. 6. See also Note on draft article 5 and 
the Annex to the Draft Articles, op. cit. 
1256 These indicative categories include: “treaties on the laws of armed conflict”; “treaties declaring, creating or regulating a permanent 
regime or status or related permanent rights, including treaties establishing or modifying land and maritime boundaries”; “multilateral law-
making treaties”; “treaties on international criminal justice”; “treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation and agreements concerning 
private rights”; “treaties for the international protection of human rights”; “treaties relating to the international protection of the environment”; 
“treaties relating to international watercourses and related installations and facilities”; “treaties relating to aquifers and related installations 
and facilities”; “treaties which are constituent instruments of international organizations”; “treaties relating to the international settlement of 






subject matter implies that they continue to apply (in whole or in part) during armed conflict. 
Commentary to draft Article 7, however, highlights the eventuality that “only the subject matter of 
particular provisions of the treaty carries the implication of continuance”, despite the reference to the categories of 
treaties.1257  
It is worth noting that the distinct issue of the applicability of human rights law in armed 
conflicts was separately endorsed by involved actors such as Governments, 1258  the Special 
Rapporteur on the topic,1259 and the legal office of the UN Secretariat.1260 In this regard, in 
introducing a new draft Article 6 bis (entitled ‘The law applicable in armed conflict’), the first 
Special Rapporteur specified that “[t]he application of … treaties concerning human rights … continues in time 
of armed conflict, but their application is determined by reference to the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law 
applicable in armed conflict”.1261 As recommended by the working group, draft article 6 bis was deleted 
and this consideration was reflected in the commentaries.1262 
                                                
1257 See “Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties”, 2011, op. cit., vol. II, Part Two, Annex on the 
indicative list of treaties referred to in Article 7, commentary (2). 
1258 UN GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/60/10), para.172 (“The view was expressed [by governments] that the category of 
treaties in subparagraph (d) [human rights treaties] was one in which there probably was a good basis for continuity [during armed conflict], 
subject to the admonition of the International Court of Justice, in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, that such rights were to be applied 
in accordance with the law of armed conflict”).   
1259 See First report on the effects of armed conflict on treaties by Mr. Ian Brownlie, Special Rapporteur, (ILC, 57th sess., 21 April 
2005), UN Doc. A/CN.4/552, Draft Article 7 (1) and (2), stressing “the incidence of an armed conflict will not as such inhibit 
their operation”; Second report on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties by Mr. Ian Brownlie, Special Rapporteur, (ILC, 58th sess., 16 
June 2006), UN Doc. A/CN.4/570, paras. 30, 41, draft Article 7 (2)(d). 
1260 The Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties: An Examination of Practice and Doctrine: Memorandum of the Secretariat (1 
February 2005), UN Doc. A/CN.4/550, para. 32, stating: “[I]t is well-established that non-derogable provisions of human rights 
treaties apply during armed conflict”). The applicability of human rights treaties in times of armed conflict was explained in 
paragraph 33: “Although the debate continues whether human rights treaties apply to armed conflict, it is well established that non-derogable 
provisions of human rights treaties apply during armed conflict. First, the International Court of Justice stated in its Nuclear Weapons 
advisory opinion that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by 
operation of article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. The Nuclear Weapons 
opinion is the closest that the Court has come to examining the effects of armed conflict on treaties, including significant discussion of the effect 
of armed conflict on both human rights and environmental treaties. Second, the International Law Commission stated in its commentary to the 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts that although the inherent right to self-defence may justify non-
performance of certain treaties, ‘as to obligations under international humanitarian law and in relation to non-derogable human rights 
provisions, self-defence does not preclude the wrongfulness of conduct’. Finally, commentators are also in agreement that non-derogable human 
rights provisions are applicable during armed conflict. Because non-derogable human rights provisions codify jus cogens norms, the application 
of non-derogable human rights provisions during armed conflict can be considered a corollary of the rule expressed in the previous section that 
treaty provisions representing jus cogens norms must be honoured notwithstanding the outbreak of armed conflict”. 
1261 See ILC, Third report on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, by Mr Ian Brownlie, Special Rapporteur (59th sess., 1 March 
2007), A/CN.4/578, para. 29. In introducing that Article 6 bis, the Special Rapporteur noted that its drafting was 
specifically motivated to respond to comments made by the United States on the prior set of draft articles in the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly, see ibid., p. 11, para. 30, n. 58. In those comments the United States affirmed 
explicitly that “certain human rights and environmental principles did not cease to apply in time of armed conflict”, see UNGA, Sixth 
Cmt., Summary Record of the 20th mtg., 3 November 2005, Statement of the United States, 29 November 2005, 
A/C.6/60/SR.20, p. 6, para. 33.  
1262 See ILC, Report of the Working-Group, Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, (59th sess., 24 July 2007), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L. 
718, at 4. It recommended that the material appear in the commentaries, so making clear that the legal principles 
themselves were viewed by the working group as correct; the move was motivated out of a feeling that the article was 





The commentary relating to the precise category of human rights treaties underlines, indeed, 
how the Commission’s task was focusing on the effects of armed conflict upon “the operation or validity” of 
certain treaties - rather than considering substantial matters on the applicability. In this regard, the 
inappropriateness of the derogability test is stressed in the same commentary, because it does not 
concern the termination or continuation (but rather the functioning of treaty provisions). It is 
noticed, however, that the competence to derogate “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation” definitely confirms how “an armed conflict as such may not result in suspension or 
termination”. Ultimately, draft Article 4 is deemed the one setting the appropriate criteria: if a treaty 
contains a provision on its operation in times of armed conflict, then it will continue to apply 
according to the terms of such norm and its scope. In any case, it is specified how “the exercise of a 
competence to derogate by one Party to the treaty would not prevent another Party from asserting that a suspension or 
termination was justified on other grounds”.1263 
The commentary relating to the precise category of human rights treaties also refers to the 
potential of draft Article 11 to “moderate” the implications of Articles 4 to 7 by allowing separated 
effects on a treaty. Specifically, in relation to draft Article 11, under which particular provisions of 
international human rights treaties may not be suspended or terminated, such a result is excluded 
for the other provisions of those treaties even if the requirements are met.1264 Conversely, the 
human rights provisions contained in other categories of treaties may continue to apply albeit such 
treaties do not (or only partly) remain in force, provided that the “separability tests” of draft Article 11 
are met.1265  
3.2. The relevance of ad hoc derogation clauses  
Human rights treaties explicitly allowing States parties to derogate unilaterally and temporarily 
from certain rights - so to suspend a part of its corresponding legal obligations - in a legitimate state of 
                                                                                                                                                            
“Draft article 6 bis was a new provision. It had been included in response to a number of suggestions made both in the Sixth Committee and 
the Commission that a provision be included to reflect the principle, stated by the International Court of Justice, in the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion relating to the relation, in the context of armed conflict, between human rights and the applicable lex 
specialis, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. The Special Rapporteur noted that while 
the principle was, strictly speaking, redundant, the draft article provide a useful clarification in an expository manner”.  
1263 See “Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties”, 2011, op. cit., vol. II, Part Two, Annex on the 
indicative list of treaties referred to in Article 7, commentary (50). 
1264 Article 11 (entitled “Separability of treaty provisions”) reads: “Termination, withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of 
the treaty as a consequence of an armed conflict shall, unless the treaty otherwise provides or the Parties otherwise agree, take effect with respect 
to the whole treaty except where: (a) the treaty contains clauses that are separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their 
application; (b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that acceptance of those clauses was not an essential basis of the consent of 
the other Party or Parties to be bound by the treaty as a whole; and (c) continued performance of the remainder of the treaty would not be 
unjust”. 





emergency that is publicly declared, include the ICCPR, the ECHR, the ACHR, and the 
ArCHR.1266 Under these four treaties, situations of emergency may include, either explicitly or 
implicitly, an involvement in an armed conflict. Conversely, major human rights conventions setting 
out ESC rights do not contemplate any derogation; only the European Social Charter, in both its 
first and revised version, respectively in its Article 30 and Article F, provides the faculty for States to 
derogate “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation” from all the human rights 
obligations imposed to the Contracting Parties.1267 
The striking of a balance between the sovereign right of a government to maintain peace and 
order during public emergencies, and the protection of the individual’s rights from abuse by the 
State itself constitutes the rationale for a derogation provision. Accordingly, a State may be allowed to 
suspend individuals’ exercise of certain rights when it is necessary to deal with an emergency 
situation, provided it complies with certain safeguards against any abuse of the derogation provision 
itself. In particular, the four aforementioned human rights treaties set forth substantial as well as 
procedural limits (i.e. criteria to be met) on the extent to which States are allowed to derogate from their 
obligations.1268 For the purposes of the present research, some consideration on these derogation 
regimes may be briefly articulated as follows. 
3.2.a. The European Convention on Human Rights 
Including an explicit clause for the first time at the regional level, Article 15(1) ECHR allows any 
derogations from certain rights enshrined in this Convention “in time of a war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation” but only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”, and 
without be “inconsistent with other obligations under international law”. A communication of any derogation 
                                                
1266 For a comparative analysis of derogations clauses, see A. Vedaschi, À la guerre comme à la guerre? La disciplina della guerra 
nel diritto costituzionale comparato, Torino, 2007, p. 445 ff.; D. Kretzmer, “Emergency, State of”, Max Planck Enciclopedia of 
Public International Law. 
1267 European Social Charter, Turin, 18 October 1961. European Social Charter (Revised), Strasbourg, 3 May 1996. 
Article F reads: “1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any Party may take measures derogating from 
its obligations under this Charter to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent 
with its other obligations under international law. 2. Any Party which has availed itself of this right of derogation shall, within a reasonable 
lapse of time, keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures taken and of the reasons therefor. It shall 
likewise inform the Secretary General when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Charter which it has accepted are 
again being fully executed”. 
1268 On the international system protecting rights during a state of emergency, see R. Higgins, “Derogations Under 
Human Rights Treaties”, British Yearbook of International Law, 1976-77, at 281; T. Buergenthal, “To Respect and Ensure: 
State Obligations and Permissible Derogations”, in L. Henkin, (ed.) The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Columbia University Press, 1981, pp. 72-91; C. Schreuer, “Derogation of Human Rights in Situations of 
Public Emergency”, 9 Yale Journal of World Public Order, 1982, at 113; J.F. Hartman, “Working Paper for the Committee 
of Experts on the Article 4 Derogation Provision”, HRQ, 1985, at 89; D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, London: Butterworths, 1995, pp. 489-507; Svensson-McCarthy, The International Law 





measures to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, alongside the reasons for its adoption, 
is required to the Contracting Party availing itself of such power.1269 However, a number of ECHR 
rights are declared as non-derogable under any circumstances, namely those most vital for the 
protection of the human dignity and most likely at risk of being violated during abusive 
emergencies. In particular, Article 15(2) includes the right to life, except in respect of deaths 
resulting from lawful acts of war; the right to be free from torture and other inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; the right to be free from slavery and servitude; the principles nullum crimen 
sine lege and nulla poena sine lege. Furthermore, the principle of ne bis in idem and the prohibition of the 
death penalty have been added to the list of non-derogable rights.1270  
Notably, the notion of war is deemed to include its different forms: doubts on its applicability 
have not been expressed as regards the hostilities preceded by a formal declaration of war as well as 
regards common cases of conflicts taking place without any declaration or cases in which the parties 
to the conflict deny the existence of a state of war.1271 Despite the absence of a specific definition of 
a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation”, the European Court of Human Rights, and 
previously the related Commission, have extensively interpreted that term and provided 
jurisprudence to determine the meaning and scope of such essential condition for permissible 
derogations.1272 Regarding another requirement of any derogating measures (i.e. be permitted only 
“to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”), the Strasbourg Court expressly differentiated 
the “strictly required” standard under Article 15 from the ordinary necessity or proportionality that is 
                                                
1269 Article 15(3) ECHR. For comments, see Cataldi, “Art. 15”, in S. Bartole, B. Conforti, G. Raimondi (a cura di), 
Commentario alla Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, Padova, 2001, at 425 ff.; Cataldi, 
“Le deroghe ai diritti umani in stato di emergenza”, in L. Pineschi (a cura di), La tutela internazionale dei diritti umani. Norme, 
garanzie, prassi, Milano, 2006, at 752; M. El Zeidy, “The ECHR and States of Emergency: Article 15 - A domestic power 
from human rights obligations”, San Diego ILJ, 2003, at 277 ff.; Viarengo, “Deroghe e restrizioni alla tutela dei diritti 
umani nei sistemi internazionali di garanzia”, RDI, 2005, at 955 ff., 977 ff. 
1270 See Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  as amended 
by Protocol No. 11, of 22 November 1984, Article 4 (3); Protocol No. 6 of 28 April 1983, which abolished the death 
penalty in peacetime, and Protocol No. 13 of 2 May 2002, which abolished the death penalty in wartime. 
1271 G. Cataldi, “Art. 15”, op. cit., at 425 ff., 429; M. Mancini, Stato di guerra e conflitto armato nel diritto internazionale, Torino, 
2010, at 286. 
1272 The first substantive interpretation of Article 15 was made in Lawless v. Ireland case, where the Court defined it as “an 
exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which afflicts the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of 
which the State is composed”, see ECtHR, Lawless v. Ireland (A/3), Appl. No. 332/57, Judgment on Merits, 1 July 1961, 1 
EHRR 15, para. 28. The definition was further clarified in the Greek case, where the Commission described four elements 
featuring a public emergency under Article 15: it must be “actual” or at least “imminent”; its effects must involve the 
whole nation; the continuance of the organised life of the community must be threatened; and the danger or crisis must 
be “exceptional” in a way that the typical legitimate measures or restrictions for the maintenance of public safety, health 
and order, are clearly inadequate. See ECtHR, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece (the “Greek case”), Appl. 
Nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, Commission’s report of 5 November 1969, 12 Yearbook ECHR 1, at 81, 
para. 153; the Government of Greece did not convince the Commission regarding the existence of a public emergency 





found in some provisions of the ECHR.1273 In this regard, the stricter standard in Article 15 has 
been deemed justified by the nature of the measure that is to take a State outside the regime, rather 
than the importance of the right at stake as in Article 2.1274 Thus, the scope of any derogation 
should be proportionally indispensable to the gravity of the emergency threatening the life of the 
nation, so as to be essential to cope with such a situation.  
3.2.b. The American Convention on Human Rights 
Similarly, Article 27 of the ACHR allows each Contracting Party to derogate from specific 
obligations “in time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State 
Party”, “to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”.1275 Nevertheless, 
the rights identified as non-derogable are more numerous than the European instrument. In 
addition to the right to life, the right to humane treatment, freedom from slavery, and the principle 
of non-retroactivity of penal laws, Article 27(2) includes all rights the suspension of which cannot 
conceivably be necessary during emergencies.1276 It does not permit any suspension of the right to 
juridical personality, freedom of conscience and religion, the rights of the family, the right to a 
name, the rights of the child, the right to nationality, and finally the right to participate in 
government.  
Focusing on the criteria to derogate from ACHR, under Article 27(1) emergency measures have 
to be taken “to the extent and for the period strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”, and they must not 
be “inconsistent with other obligations under international law”. Certain forms of discrimination are 
prohibited as well, namely the ones “on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin”.1277  
Besides, a State availing itself of the power of suspension is required to provide information, through 
                                                
1273 See ECtHR, Handyside v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 5493/72, 12 January 1976, 1 EHRR 737, para. 48, articulating 
three tiers of standards found in the Convention: “reasonableness” is put in relation to Articles 5 (3) and 6 (1)), “necessity” to 
Article 10 (2), while “indispensability” is associated with “strictly required” in Article 15 and “absolutely necessary” in Article 2 
(2). 
1274 See C. Michaelsen, “The Proportionality Principle in the Context of Anti-Terrorism Laws: An Inquiry into the 
Boundaries between Human Rights Law and Public Policy”, in M. Gani and P. Mathew (eds.), Fresh Perspectives on the 
War on Terror, ANU E Press, 2008, pp. 109-124. It is highlighted that in McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, the use of 
the term “absolutely necessary” in Article 2(2) was stated to indicate that “a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be 
employed from that normally applicable when determining whether State action is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ under paragraph 2 of 
Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. In particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in sub-
paragraphs 2(a), (b) and (c) of Article 2”, see McCann and Others v. United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97, para. 149.  
1275 For comments on Article 27, see C. Grossman, “A Framework for the Examination of States of Emergency under 
the American Convention on Human Rights”, American University Journal of International Law and Policy, 1986, at 35 ff.; M. 
Ruiz, “The States of Emergency in the American Convention on Human Rights”, IsrYHR, 2003, at 105 ff. 
1276 See J. Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, at 64. 
1277 The ECHR is silent on the issue; for a recognition of the respect for the same principle by the European Court, see 






the Secretary General of the Organization of the American States, to the other Contracting Parties 
about the provisions derogated, the reasons for its decision to suspend them as well as the date set 
for its termination.  
3.2.c. The Arab Charter on Human Rights  
Even the new version of this treaty,1278 specifically in Article 4(1), permits measures derogating from 
the obligations under the Charter “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” and “to 
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situations”. States parties are allowed to avail themselves of 
these measure only if such an emergency is officially proclaimed, on condition that they are “not 
inconsistent” with other obligations under international law and not applied in a discriminatory 
manner (i.e. “solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin”). Conversely, a long 
list of non-derogable rights in Article 4(2) goes beyond the protection formally afforded by the 
regional conventions previously considered. In particular, it includes the right to life, freedom from 
slavery, freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, the right to liberty and security of person, the 
right to access to an independent court, judiciary control of detention measures, human treatment 
of prisoners, the principle nulla poena sine lege, the right to not be imprisoned for inability to pay a 
debt arising from a contractual obligation; additionally, the inherent right to recognition as a person 
before the law, the right to leave and return to one’s country, the right to seek asylum abroad, and 
the right to nationality are included. As for the notification process required by Article 4(3), a State 
party has to immediately inform the other Contracting Parties of the derogated provisions and related 
reason as well as on the date of termination of such derogation, through the Secretary General of 
the League of Arab States. 
3.2.d. The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights  
At the universal level Article 4 ICCPR1279 allows a State party to adopt measures derogating from 
its obligations under the Covenant “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed”. A reason explaining why the initial reference to war “was stuck 
in 1952” has been the intention to prevent giving the impression that the United Nations accepted 
                                                
1278 See M. Rishmawi, “The Arab Charter on Human Rights and the League of Arab States: An Update”, HRLR, 2010, 
pp. 169-178. 
1279 For comments on Article 4 ICCPR, see R. Lorz, “Possible Derogations from Civil and Political Rights under Article 
4 of the ICCPR”, IYHR, 2003, p. 85 ff.; M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - CCPR Commentary2, op. cit., 
p. 83 ff.; I. Viarengo, Deroghe e restrizioni alla tutela dei diritti umani nei sistemi internazionali di garanzia, RDI, 2005, p. 977 ff.; N. 
Rodley, “Civil and Political Rights”, in C. Krause and M. Scheinin (eds.), International Protection of Human Rights: a 





war; in any case, this has not legitimised the conclusion that derogations are not permitted in times 
of war, since “an armed, international conflict usually represents the prototype of a public emergency that threatens 
the life of the nation”, as was emphasised in the course of drafting Article 4.1280 As to the qualification, 
the contribution coming from the 1984 Siracusa Principles is noteworthy.1281  According to 
paragraph 39, “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” is a situation of exceptional and 
actual or imminent danger, where such a threat affects the physical integrity of the population, the 
political independence or the territorial integrity of the State, or the basic functioning of institutions 
indispensable to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. Then, according to paragraph 40, 
internal conflict and unrest that do not constitute a grave and imminent threat to the life of the 
nation cannot justify derogations under Article 4 ICCPR. In the same regard, the Human Rights 
Committee has stressed that “not every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a public emergency which threatens 
the life of the nation” and “that even during an armed conflict measures derogating from the Covenant are allowed only 
if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation”.1282 
Regarding the non-derogability recognised in Article 4(2), the ICCPR list of non-derogable 
rights is longer than the one under the ECHR, but does not equate with that under the ACHR or 
the ArCHR. It includes the right to life (Article 6), the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7), the prohibition of slavery (Article 8 (1) and (2)), and 
the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal offences and punishment (Article 15 (1)); additionally, 
no derogation may be authorized concerning non imprisonment for a contractual obligation (Article 
11), recognition of legal personality (Article 16), and freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(Article 18). As to the procedural guarantees inherently safeguarding such rights, the related treaty 
provisions may “never be made subject to measures that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable 
rights”.1283  Further, the rights contained in Article 4(2) would not be exclusive, since other 
                                                
1280 See M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - CCPR Commentary2, op. cit., pp. 83 ff., 89 ff. 
1281  UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Siracusa Principles), E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex, 1985, paras. 39-40. They were drafted 
by international law experts convened in Siracusa in 1984, by the International Commission of Jurists, the International 
Association of Penal law, the American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan 
Institute for Human Rights and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences. They are contained 
in ILA, Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency, reproduced as “The Paris Minimum 
Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency”, AJIL, 1985, p. 1072. 
1282 HRC, General Comment No. 29: State of Emergency (art. 4), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1Add.11 (2001), para. 3. This 
second general comment on Article 4 was adopted two months before the 11 September 2001 attack on the United 
States. 
1283 HRC, General Comment No. 29, ibid., para. 15, stressing that “Article 4 may not be resorted to in a way that would result in 
derogation from non-derogable rights. Thus, for example, as article 6 of the Covenant is non-derogable in its entirety, any trial leading to the 
imposition of the death penalty during a state of emergency must conform to the provisions of the Covenant, including all the requirements of 





obligations have been deemed not subject to permissible derogations during a state of emergency, 
although not explicitly stipulated under that provision. Firstly, the treatment of those deprived of 
liberty requires “humanity” and “respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”, since the right 
enshrined in Article 10 is interpreted as a norm of general international law. Secondly, there is a 
non-derogable prohibition of arbitrary detentions, since the absolute prohibitions against “taking of 
hostages, abductions or unacknowledged detention” are norms of general international law. 
Thirdly, it is considered that “the international protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities includes 
elements that must be respected in all circumstances”. Then, the Committee finds unacceptable the 
restrictions from Article 12 as justifying measures of “deportation or forcible transfer of population without 
grounds permitted under international law, in the form of forced displacement by expulsion or other coercive means from 
the area in which the persons concerned are lawfully present”, since such measures constitute a crime against 
humanity as confirmed by the Rome Statute. 1284   A final illustrative example concerns the 
prohibition of “propaganda for war” or “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence”.1285  
The conditions enumerated in Article 4 for permissible derogation measures coincide with those 
analysed for the ACHR, namely only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” and 
provided their consistency with States parties’ other obligations under international law. Similarly, 
derogations must not be discriminatory “on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin”, 
although certain forms of discrimination are permissible as long as they are not arbitrary.1286  
Notably, the need to apply the element of strict necessity “in an objective manner” is highlighted in the 
Siracusa Principles, declaring that each measure has to “be directed to an actual, clear, present, or imminent 
danger and may not be imposed merely because of an apprehension of potential danger”.1287  Nonetheless, the 
“exceptional and temporary nature” of derogating measures has been openly stressed,1288 implying that 
they may continue only if the threat to the life of the nation persists. Accordingly, they need to be 
scrutinised separately for each right and be accepted only if permissible limitations are no longer 
sufficient to control the situation.1289  Conversely, in aligning itself with the European Court of 
                                                                                                                                                            
CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para. 6; see also Article 4 (1) of the ArCHR. 
1284 See Article 7 (1) (d) and Article 7 (2) (d) ICC Statute. 
1285 HRC, General Comment No. 29, op cit., para. 13 (a)-(e). 
1286 Article 4 (1) is more limited than the round set out in Article 2 (1), which adds political or other opinion, national 
origin, property, birth or other status. 
1287 See Siracusa Principles, § 54. 
1288 HRC, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para. 2 (“measures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant must be of an exceptional 
and temporary nature”). 
1289 See Siracusa Principles, § 15 f. Notably, although the European Court of Human Rights’ case law has not yet explicitly 





Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence, the Human Rights 
Committee has interpreted the wording “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” to 
mean that not only may States not derogate from more provisions than necessary, but also that they 
may only take the minimum necessary measures pursuant to any derogation.1290  
In the same regard, the regime of international notification drawn up by Article 4(3) requires 
each Contracting Party to immediately inform the other parties on the derogated provisions through 
the UN Secretary General, to justify the proclaimed emergency and all related measures, and to 
immediately notify the date of their termination. This essentially permits the Human Rights Committee 
to discharge its function, and even other Contracting Parties to monitor compliance with the treaty. 
In light of many concise past notifications, the inclusion of complete information on the measures 
taken and related reasons, along with complete documentation concerning their law has been 
nonetheless emphasised. Moreover, subsequent derogating measures (e.g. extending the duration of 
the emergency situation) require additional notifications, although the Committee’s duty to monitor 
the law and States’ practice does not depend on the submission concerned.1291 Notably, the official 
proclamation of any derogations from the Covenant aims to inform affected people about the exact 
material, territorial and temporal scope of application of such measures,1292 and it allows legislative 
and judicial bodies to supervise their legality and implementation.1293  
3.2.e. Overall preliminary remarks  
In view of the examined human rights treaties, three aspects may be spelled out and taken into 
account for the purposes of the present research.  
(1) Even during an armed conflict, belligerents may derogate from human rights treaties to which 
they are party and which contain a derogations clause only under the limits and the conditions established in 
such a clause. Indeed, their derogation measures must conform to basic principles embodied in 
relevant treaties and refined through interpretation; these include the existence of an exceptional 
                                                                                                                                                            
linked to the duration of the emergency”, see ECtHR, (Grand Chamber), A and Others v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 3455/05, 
Judgment, 19 January 2009, para. 178, where it continues as follows: “Indeed, the cases cited above, relating to the security 
situation in Northern Ireland, demonstrate that it is possible for a “public emergency” within the meaning of Article 15 to continue for many 
years. The Court does not consider that derogating measures put in place in the immediate aftermath of the al’Qaeda attacks in the United 
States of America, and reviewed on an annual basis by Parliament, can be said to be invalid on the ground that they were not “temporary”. 
1290 See HRC, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para. 5; ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, Judgment, 18 December 1996; IACtHR, 
Castillo-Petruzzi et al v. Peru, Ser C No. 59, Judgment, 17 November 1999. Referred instances include the right to a fair 
trail: while Article 14 guaranteeing this right is derogable, it does not meant that a State is permitted to engage in trials 
that do not even respect the “fundamental principles of fair trial” (see General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para. 11). 
1291 HRC, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para. 17.  
1292 See, e.g., M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - CCPR Commentary2, op. cit., at 92. 
1293 See, e.g., T. Buergenthal, “To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations”, in Henkin 





state of emergency, the principle of non-derogability of certain human rights, the principle of 
proportionality, the principle of non-discrimination, and the principle of consistency with other 
State obligations under international law.  
As regards the exceptionality of the public emergency, a derogation measure is regarded as a last resort 
to such situation, hence permissible only when other restrictions of rights seem inappropriate to 
respond to the exceptional threat to the life of the nation and to maintain the functioning of States’ 
institutions. International and non-international armed conflicts may qualify as such an exceptional 
situation, as also do serious environmental or natural disasters, or attempts to overthrow the 
constitutional order.1294 Indeed, the proclamation of a state of emergency has a protecting nature 
because it is aimed at restoring normality and preserving democratic institutions, which constitute 
fundamental preconditions for protecting human rights.1295 
As to the non-derogability principle, its extent may be assessed in the light of the different number 
of non-derogable rights contained in the human rights treaties concerned, which undertake divergent 
approaches to the principle itself. In particular, whether fair trial guarantees should be generally 
non-derogable is debatable, although procedural guarantees safeguarding non-derogable rights are 
in any case widely deemed not subject to permissible derogations.1296  
Although the derogations clause theoretically affects all rights not falling under the list of the 
non-derogable ones - provided the other conditions are fulfilled - it is worth emphasising that even in 
wartime belligerent States must respect the obligations that they have not expressively derogated from as well as the 
obligations qualified as non-derogable by the treaty itself. This principle was affirmed with specific reference 
to the ICCPR in the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.1297 Further, 
in the advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, the same principle was extended to human rights conventions generally.1298 
As to the principle of proportionality, the terms used in the analysed derogation clauses are 
intended to ensure that governments not succumb to the temptation to assume authoritarian or 
                                                
1294 See M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - CCPR Commentary2, op. cit., at 89-92; Fitzpatrick, Human 
Rights in Crisis, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, at 56. 
1295  See HRC, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para.1; Final Report of Special Rapporteur Despouy, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19 (23 June 1997), para. 42. 
1296 See, e.g., HRC, General Comment No. 29, paras.13-16; Siracusa Principles, § 70. 
1297 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, at 240, para. 25 
(“the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of article 4 of the 
Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency”). 
1298 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ibid., para.106 (“the protection offered by 
human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in 





repressive powers, whether as a response to or by way of exploitation of public insecurity.1299 
Indeed, the importance of proportionality in the context of derogation powers is evident in the necessity to assess the 
seriousness and scope of the State’s interference to be taken in a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, 
which is to be limited to what is vital to overcome such a situation.1300 Then, in order to ensure derogable 
rights are not suspended arbitrarily once the state of emergency is declared, the principle of 
proportionality also requires a regular review of the temporal and territorial scope of derogating 
measures.1301 Besides, the evaluation of a proportional measure entails to consider somehow all the 
obligations under relevant treaties; as stressed by the Human Rights Committee, “no provision of the 
Covenant, however validly derogated from, will be entirely inapplicable to the behaviour of a State party”.1302 
 
(2) The specific condition contained in all human rights treaties analysed above (i.e. derogation 
measures must be consistent with States parties’ other obligations under international law) implies a 
need to assess which other obligations have been undertaken by the State concerned under international treaty law as 
well as customary international law, including any ius cogens norm. This entails respecting the following 
additional formal requirements for permissible derogations.  
As for the laws of war, a belligerent is precluded from adopting derogation measures leading to a 
compression of the rights granted to its nationals and to the enemies’ nationals under binding 
international humanitarian law.1303 Therefore, derogation measures under human rights treaties cannot be 
invoked as a ground for not respecting international humanitarian law. In particular, the rights enshrined in 
Article 75 AP I and in Article 4 AP II are relevant. As for human rights law, a belligerent is precluded 
from adopting derogation measures leading to infringe the rights recognised as inviolable and non-derogable under 
another binding human rights treaty. For instance, a derogation measure adopted under the ECHR 
cannot violate one of the rights identified as non-derogable under the ICCPR (e.g. freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion).1304 
In evaluating State responsibility for failing to conform to the obligations flowing from additional 
sources of international law, notably these sources might also include provisions permitting their own 
                                                
1299 See N. Rodley, “Civil and Political Rights”, in C. Krause and M. Scheinin (eds.), International Protection of Human 
Rights: a Textbook, op. cit., at 107. 
1300 See Siracusa Principles, § 53; M. Nowak, op. cit, 2005, at 97-98. 
1301 See M. Nowak, op. cit, 2005, at 98; Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, at 60. 
1302 See HRC, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para.4. 
1303 In this respect, according to the Human Rights Committee, “States parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the 
ICCPR as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law, for instance by taking hostages, 
by imposing collective punishments, through arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, including 
the presumption of innocence”, see HRC, General Comment No. 29, para.11. 





suspension or provisions allowing the other States parties to agree to temporarily exonerate the 
derogating State from its obligations (Article 57 VCLT). Moreover, treaty obligations could be 
terminated or suspended if performing them proves impossible (Article 61 VCLT) or because of a 
fundamental change of circumstances (Article 62 VCLT).  
 
(3) The stringency of the conditions permitting derogation measures may be moderated in the practice. In fact, treaty 
monitoring bodies have recognised that States parties bear the burden of proof in establishing the 
existence of a “public emergency”1305 as well as that their organs have a “margin of appreciation”1306 in 
establishing whether the measure taken to deal with an emergency threatening the life of the nation 
is “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”, and, accordingly, whether it is proportionate and as 
such permissible. In this regard, the jurisprudence of the European Court is emblematic. On the 
one hand, the Court has assumed that national authorities have in principle a better position than 
international judges in assessing both the size of the threat and the type of derogation measures 
necessary to avert it.1307 On the other hand, the Strasbourg Court has noted how the international 
body is well qualified to assess the proportionality of measures taken by the State concerned.1308  
                                                
1305 See EurCommHR, Greek Case, op. cit.; HRC, General Comment No. 29, op. cit., paras. 4 and 5. 
1306 The doctrine of margin of appreciation embodies the general approach of the European Court on Human Rights to 
the difficult task of balancing the sovereignty of Contracting Parties with their obligations under the Convention, see R. 
St. J. Macdonald, “The Margin of Appreciation”, in Macdonald, Matscher and Petzold (eds.), The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, at 83, noting that this doctrine allows the Court to escape the dilemma 
of “how to remain true to its responsibility to develop a reasonably comprehensive set of review principles appropriate for application across the 
entire Convention, while at the same time recognising the diversity of political, economic, cultural and social situations in the societies of the 
Contracting Parties”. 
1307 See ECtHR, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Appl. no. 5310/71, Series A No. 25, 18 January 1978, para. 207, which 
held as follows: “it falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for ‘the life of [its] nation’, to determine whether 
that life is threatened by a ‘public emergency’ and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency. By reason of their 
direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it. In this 
matter Article 15(1) leaves the authorities a wide margin of appreciation”. See also ECtHR, Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom, 
Appl. Nos. 14553/89 and 14554/89, Series A No 258-B (1993), 17 EHRR, 539, para. 43, repeating the same view and 
concluding that “in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities”. See also ECtHR, (Grand 
Chamber), A and Others v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 3455/05 (2009), para. 180. For an extensive analysis, see D. 
Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. Bates, and C. Buckley (ed.), Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights2 , Oxford, 2009, pp. 11-14, and 626. 
1308 See ECtHR (Grand Chamber), A and Others v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 3455/05 (2009). In particular 
paragraph 184 reads: “when the Court comes to consider a derogation under Article 15, it allows the national authorities a wide margin of 
appreciation to decide on the nature and scope of the derogating measures necessary to avert the emergency. Nonetheless, it is ultimately for the 
Court to rule whether the measures were ‘strictly required’. In particular, where a derogating measure encroaches upon a fundamental 
Convention right, such as the right to liberty, the Court must be satisfied that it was a genuine response to the emergency situation, that it was 
fully justified by the special circumstances of the emergency and that adequate safeguards were provided against abuse […]. The doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation has always been meant as a tool to define relations between the domestic authorities and the Court. It cannot have the 
same application to the relations between the organs of State at the domestic level. As the House of Lords held, the question of proportionality is 
ultimately a judicial decision, particularly in a case such as the present where the applicants were deprived of their fundamental right to liberty 
over a long period of time. In any event, having regard to the careful way in which the House of Lords approached the issues, it cannot be said 





3.3. Derogability from ESC rights under treaties without ad hoc derogation clause 
As anticipated above, major conventions warranting ESC rights do not contemplate an ad hoc clause 
either allowing or prohibiting States parties to derogate from all or part of their corresponding 
obligations in times of public emergency or extraordinary circumstances such as in contexts of failed 
States, armed conflicts, military occupations, or institutional collapses post-conflict. They include 
the ICESCR, the CEDAW, the CRC, the ICERD, the Rights of Migrant Workers and their 
families (ICRMW), and, in the regional sphere, three African instruments, namely the AfrCHPR, 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) and the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.1309  
It is generally agreed that the absence of a derogation provision in a treaty does not determine 
per se the permissibility or the prohibition to suspend the application and enjoyment of the rights 
enshrined in that treaty. However, reflecting on the reasons for the basis of the choice not to incorporate such a 
clause it proves meaningful to discuss the pertinence for States parties to avail themselves of 
extraordinary circumstances as valid excuses to de facto suspend the operation of certain treaty 
provisions. This remains a major concern, given that suspending a human right or one of its specific 
facets implies the complete or partial non-performance of corresponding obligations.1310  
The next three sections are intended to shed light on the legal framework under such treaties for 
the question of derogability. They will inquire whether a state of public emergency - as induced by armed 
conflicts, military occupations or post-conflict situations such as institutional collapse - can be invoked 
by States parties to suspend the ESC rights enshrined in human rights treaties that not envisage an ad hoc derogation 
clause, or, conversely, whether the treaty provisions remain fully binding anytime, and, accordingly, which 
implications derive for the protection of civilians (particularly in view of the expected lack of 
resources). This question is a legal challenge that raises issues related not only to the nature of the 
obligations imposed on States parties to treaties on ESC rights, but also related to treaty law and 
State responsibility. It particularly entails looking at the existence of any rule in international law 
that may justify the non-performance of a legal obligation by resorting to certain pleas. 
In examining the derogability issue for ESC rights, the rationale of enabling States, through the operation 
of ad hoc clauses, to depart from their treaties obligations in times of public emergency deserves primary 
consideration. As has emerged in previous discussion here, the unique purpose behind a derogation 
                                                
1309 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 
on 29 November 1999. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa, adopted in Maputo on13 September 2000, CAB/LEG/66.6, and entered into force on 25 November 2005.  
1310 On this aspect, see D. McGoldrick, “The Interface Between Public Emergency Powers and International Law”, 





clause permitting to suspend the exercise of certain rights consists in protecting or restoring a democratic 
public order in cases of exceptional threats, since the latter represents an essential precondition for 
safeguarding effective enjoyment of fundamental rights. Interestingly, references to such a rationale 
have been used to support arguments for as well as against the possibility of permitting derogations 
from human rights treaties that do not contain a specific derogation provision.1311  
On one hand, the risk of undermining the object and purpose of any human rights treaty has been referred to 
as a good reason to allow derogations, notwithstanding the absence of a specific clause, in the light 
of the inherent protective function of derogations under a strict application of the principle of 
proportionality to each exceptional derogation measures, which would prevent abusive situations of 
emergency. In particular, derogations from human rights treaties with no clauses concerned have 
been viewed necessary to protect the nation or a special kind of ordre public without which no 
protection of human rights is possible; derogations are, in that sense, “preventive” even though they 
are allowed only in case of grave and imminent danger.1312  
On the other hand, in looking at possible suspension of ESC rights in times of public emergency 
the purpose of derogations has been deemed a scarcely justified and inherently less convincing option1313. In this 
regard, the non-necessity of derogations is generally recognised in relation to basic subsistence rights, 
such as the rights to be free from hunger, basic health care, clothing and basic shelter. For instance, 
suspending the enjoyment of the right to food or the right to health appears in essence far less 
compelling than derogating from the right to peaceful assembly or the right to vote. In any times of 
emergency the suspension of basic subsistence rights hardly seems, in fact, crucial for the purpose of 
maintaining or restoring the public order essential to protect human rights, and even less for 
supporting a resolution of a conflict rather than exacerbating it.1314  
Nonetheless, realistically, times of emergency prompted by armed conflict or military 
occupation are likely to undermine the availability of resources and related capacity of the State 
                                                
1311 For a comment on this aspect, see A. Muller, “Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights”, HRLR, 2009, p. 592, noticing some agreement on the derogability of the right to strike, rights related to trade 
unions and the right to work in exceptional situations threatening the life of the nation. 
1312 This argument was prominent in the “Report of the Meeting of Experts on Rights Not Subject to Derogations 
During States of Emergency and Exceptional Circumstances”, 17-19 May 1995, in D. Premont, C. Stenresen, and I. 
Oseredczuk (eds.), Non-derogable Rights and States of Emergency (Brussels: Association for International Consultants on Human Rights 
(CID), Bruyllant, 1996, pp. 39-40, paras. 27-9. 
1313 See P. Alston and G. Quinn, op. cit., p. 217; E. Mottershaw, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed 
Conflict: International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law”, IJHR, 2008, p. 451. 
1314 See M. Sepulveda, The Nature of the obligations under the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, 
Intersentia, 2003, p. 295; A. Muller, op. cit., p. 593, noting how “nor is it easily imaginable that derogations from rights to basic 
health care and basic food can ever be regarded as proportionate, however strong the threat to the nation is”. Further, Article 15 ECHR 
only contains four non-derogable rights because they are crucial for safeguarding human dignity and almost certainly at 





concerned to provide for the implementation of every single dimension of ESC rights under relevant 
treaties such as the ICESCR. In view of this, the prerogative to resort lawfully to derogation from 
conventional obligations might become more arguable, under certain conditions though. When a 
situation is suitably severe as to warrant derogation from the ICESCR, the absence of an ad hoc 
clause might not be interpreted to foreclose such a possibility provided that the satisfaction of the 
principles and criteria regulating explicitly derogations to human rights treaties is required to the State party that 
would decide to de facto suspend the rights enshrined in the Covenant.1315 In particular, the principle 
that a hard core of fundamental aspects of ESC rights cannot be suspended any time has crucial 
importance. Moreover, the modalities of derogation have to be shaped by the aforementioned 
principles of proportionality (measures strictly required by the exigencies of the situation), non-
discrimination, and consistency with State’s other obligations under international law, which supposedly 
prevent abusive situations of emergency. As for the last requirement, this implies that the State party 
to the ICESCR ensures the conformity of derogation measures with the obligations established 
therein, in addition to further obligations stemming from customary international law or 
international treaty law. Relevant possible sources include other universal or regional human rights 
treaties (with attention to their provisions designed to be specifically applied in situations of 
emergency - e.g. Article 11 CRPD; Article 23 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child), international humanitarian law, international criminal law, refugee law treaties (1951 
Convention of the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol), ILO Conventions, UN Charter and 
binding UN Security Council resolutions, and any rule of international law with ius cogens status. 
However, the option to react to extraordinary situations of emergency without derogating from 
treaties on ESC rights may prove more reasonable. Valuable scholarly remarks in this regard, along 
with the emerging jurisprudence of relevant monitoring bodies, are now addressed. 
3.3.1. The ICESCR and the debate on derogability  
The omission of a derogation provision in the Covenant has been commented upon mostly in the 
light of three basic aspects: the nature of the rights ensured under this treaty; the flexibility of the obligations 
established in Article 2(1); and the presence of a general limitation clause in Article 4.1316  
                                                
1315 This is confirmed by the CESCR as detailed below. See, e.g., P. Alston and G. Quinn, op. cit., p. 219; M. Sepulveda, 
The Nature of the obligations under the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, Intersentia, 2003, pp. 302-304. 
1316 See “Report of the Meeting of Experts on Rights Not Subject to Derogations During States of Emergency and 
Exceptional Circumstances”, 17-19 May 1995, in D. Premont, C. Stenresen, and I. Oseredczuk (eds.), Non-derogable 





Specifically, even in view of the travaux préparatoires of the ICESCR, which do not reveal 
discussions on the necessity or the appropriateness of derogations from the Covenant, scholars for 
the most part conclude that the treaty drafters might have seen the case for derogation “less 
compelling” because of the nature of ESC rights, also noting that a derogation clause was regarded as 
unnecessary given that Article 2(1) was “sufficiently flexible” or even “more flexible and accommodating”.1317 
As detailed above, Article 2(1), in fact, requires a “progressive” realisation of such rights and 
recognises potential problems arising from limited resources by calling States parties to do no more 
what the maximum available resources permit.  
Then, the adequacy of the general limitations clause to enable States to respond to public 
emergencies such as armed conflicts is commonly highlighted.1318 Article 4 allows limitations 
provided that they are “determined by law”, “compatible with the nature of these rights” and “solely for the 
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society”. In this regard, however, emphasis is put on 
that States’ power to limit ESC rights has not been interpreted extensively and only under a “creative” 
interpretation Article 4 would permit their suspensions during armed conflicts, also considering that 
this would still not be equal to the satisfaction of substantial and procedural criteria regulating 
explicitly derogations to human rights treaties such as the ICCPR. Despite that “no clear allowance for 
derogation or restriction in such times” appears to be arguable,1319 it may be reasonable to contend that in 
conflict-related situations Article 4 ICESCR does not allow further restrictions than those ones permitted outside such 
contexts as no limitations on these rights may be grounded on the existence of an armed conflict. This 
aspect will be discussed in detail in section 3.5. 
In any case, the lack of reference in the ICESCR to any derogation prerogative specifically 
provided for in times of armed conflict has not led generally to the conclusion that such an absence 
would grant evidence that certain treaty provisions would be automatically suspended in these 
circumstances or that States parties would be allowed to derogate from their conventional 
obligations. This latter point has actually appeared a quite isolated differing opinion.1320  
                                                
1317 P. Alston and G. Quinn, op. cit., p. 217; M. Craven, The International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press 1995, p. 27. 
1318 See P. Alston and G. Quinn, op. cit., at 217-19; Rosas and Sandvik-Nylund, “Armed Conflicts”, in Eide, Krause, 
Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001, p. 347; Rosas, “Emergency Regimes: 
A Comparison”, in Gomien (ed.), Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Asbjorn Eide, Scandinavian 
University Press, 1993, p. 181 (including n. 41). 
1319 See N. Lubell, “Challenges in applying human rights law in armed conflict”, IRRC, 2005, p. 752.  
1320 See M.J. Dennis, “Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military 
Occupation”, 1 AJIL, 2005, 99, p. 140. According to the author, “the negotiation history of article 4 strongly suggests” States’ 
possibility to be free to derogate from their treaty obligations under the ICESCR during armed conflicts since the treaty 





At least three main considerations may be articulated concerning the ICESCR’s silence. A 
primary suggestion might be that derogations are not permissible, because they are not provided for and 
they would appear less persuasive given the nature of ESC rights. Another meaning might be that 
derogations are allowable only for non-core obligations where situations result so grave as to allow them, 
because they are not unequivocally prohibited. 1321  Thirdly, the ICESCR’s silence is mainly 
interpreted as the Covenant generally continues to apply in times of public emergencies induced 
both by armed conflict or natural disaster1322 and - at a minimum - States are not allowed to 
derogate from their core obligations, while the concept of derogability from non-core obligations on ESC 
rights enshrined in the Covenant has not received attention. As detailed hereafter, in actuality the 
CESCR has not made a general reference to the Covenant’s derogability, rather focusing on the 
non-derogable nature of minimum core obligations arising from ESC rights. 
3.3.2. Derogability from ESC rights in international and regional jurisprudence  
The opportunity to affirm the application of human rights treaties without an ad hoc derogation 
clause in extraordinary circumstances prompted by armed conflict and military occupation has 
been undertaken by judicial and quasi-judicial monitoring bodies, which have expressed positive 
views, in addition to less clear views, about the non-permissibility of derogations from those treaties. 
3.3.2.a. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
The human rights treaty body mandated to monitor the implementation of the ICESCR has left 
unclear the question on the scope of the permissibility or prohibition of derogations in times of emergency 
such as armed conflict and belligerent occupation.  
The CESCR has not generally referred to the issue of derogability of the Covenant, while it has 
recognised the non-derogable nature of the minimum core obligations arising from the rights enshrined in this treaty. 
In this respect the existence upon States parties of a core obligation to guarantee at least “minimum 
essential levels” of each right enshrined in the Covenant (i.e. the “survival kit” or “existential minimum” 
for everyone, including essential foodstuff, health care, water and sanitation, basic shelter and 
housing, and basic forms of education) has been posited in its General Comment No. 3.1323 
However, the Committee has rarely found that the minimum core obligations under every ESC 
                                                
1321 See M. Ssenyonjo, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, in M.A. Baderin and M. Ssenyonjo (eds.), International 
Human Rights Law. Six Decades after the UDHR and Beyond, p. 76. 
1322 See E. Mottershaw, op. cit..; Barber, “Protecting the Right to Housing in the Aftermath of Natural Disaster: 
Standard in International Human Rights Law”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2008, pp. 432-468.  





rights are per se non-derogable.1324 This view has been referred also to the right to health1325 and the right 
to water,1326 but in other general comments the Committee has remained silent on this issue.1327 
Apart from subsistence rights, a position against derogations from the ICESCR has been 
recently articulated in relation to the right of everyone to take part in cultural life. After having underlined 
the frequent interconnection among the duties “to respect and to protect freedoms, cultural heritage 
and diversity”, the Committee has addressed the States parties’ duty to “respect and protect cultural 
heritage in all its forms, in times of war and peace, and natural disasters”,1328 adding that “cultural heritage must 
be preserved, developed, enriched and transmitted to future generations as a record of human experience and aspirations, 
in order to encourage creativity in all its diversity and to inspire a genuine dialogue between cultures. Such obligations 
include the care, preservation and restoration of historical sites, monuments, works of art and literary works, among 
others”.1329 
Remarkably, the Committee’s position on the scope of the permissibility or prohibition of de facto 
derogations in extraordinary circumstances such as conflict and occupation does not seem entirely 
clarified in its concluding observations issued regarding States parties’ periodic reports. Pertinent 
cases in this regard concern the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka,1330 Turkey and Cyprus.  
In monitoring the controversial situation of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the CESCR did 
not specified whether a State party is allowed to derogate from the obligations stemming from the 
Covenant, even though it acknowledged that “the persistent instability and recurrent armed conflicts in some 
of the provinces in the State party … pose great challenges to the ability of the State to fulfil its obligations under the 
Covenant”.1331 Similarly, no reference to permissible derogations from treaty obligations was made 
                                                
1324 In its 2001 Statement on poverty and the ICESCR, the Committee held that “core obligations are non-derogable, they 
continue to exist in situations of conflict, emergency and natural disaster”. See CESCR, “Poverty and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Statement to the Third UN Conference on Least Developed Countries, 10 May 2001, 
UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/10, para. 18. 
1325 CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The right to “the highest attainable standard of health, (art. 12), 11 August 2000, para. 47 
(“it should be stressed, however, that a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core 
obligations set out in paragraph 43 above, which are non-derogable”). 
1326 CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, (art. 11 and 12), 20 January 2003, para. 40 (“A State party cannot 
justify its non-compliance with the core obligations set out in paragraph 37, which are non-derogable”). 
1327 E.g., CESCR, General Comments No. 17, 18 and 19. 
1328 CESCR, General Comment No. 21: Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a)), 21 December 2009, para. 
50 (a). 
1329 Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity, adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on 2 
November 2001. 
1330 List of issues to be taken up in connection with the consideration of the combined, second, third and fourth periodic reports of Sri Lanka 
concerning articles 1 to 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/LKA/2-4, 14 
June 2010.  
1331 CESCR, Concluding Observations on the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc. E/C.12/COD/CO/4, 20 November 





during its monitoring of Cambodia, though the CESCR addressed that “the State party’s emergence from 
the isolation and devastation brought about by more than two decades of war, has been a slow and difficult 
process”1332. In the case of Nepal, the Committee noted how “the State party’s efforts to comply with some of 
its obligations under the Covenant are impeded by the consequences of the divisive and violent conflict, namely a large 
numbers of victims and families of victims, a large numbers of displaced persons, and a severely damaged physical 
infrastructure that hinders the mobility of persons, goods and essential public services”. 1333  In the case of 
Afghanistan, the Committee acknowledged that this is a country in transition that faces a wide 
range of challenges and has been ravaged by armed conflicts for over three decades, during which it 
has experienced destruction of institutions and infrastructure that seriously impede the 
implementation of the rights enshrined in the Covenant.1334  
Further, the Committee’s silence as to derogation extends also to Turkey’s initial periodic 
report1335, which does not make reference to the unresolved conflict on the island of Cyprus and the 
related military occupation. As far as the situation in the northern area is specifically concerned, 
however, it is worth highlighting that significant examples of Turkey’s actions affecting the cultural 
heritage (both tangible and intangible) of Cyprus were reported by the Association of Cypriot 
Archaeologists, which criticised Turkey’s report on the implementation of Article 15 ICESCR as 
not reflecting the post 1974 situation; the association then emphasised the necessity that Turkey put 
an end to the destruction of such cultural heritage and allowed the conduct of the necessary saving 
interventions, coordinated and monitored by the competent authorities, for the preservation of the 
cultural property that survived the thirty-seven year Turkish occupation. 1336  Remarkably, in 
commenting on the CESCR’s Concluding Observations on Cyprus, the Government of Cyprus 
observed that “the division of the country that resulted from the 1974 Turkish invasion and subsequent continued 
military occupation is not merely “a major difficulty which hinders the ability of the State party to ensure the 
                                                                                                                                                            
exploitation of the country’s natural resources, including by foreign companies, constitute major obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social 
and cultural rights in the State party. The Committee reiterates the primary responsibility of the State party for ensuring security in its territory 
and protecting its civilians with respect to the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law”. 
1332 CESCR, Concluding Observations on Cambodia, UN Doc. E/C.12/KHM/CO/1, 12 June 2009, para. 11. Notably in 
paragraph 12, the Committee regrets how “despite the constitutional guarantees, Cambodia has not been established that Covenant 
provisions can in practice be invoked before or directly enforced by the State party’s national courts, tribunals or administrative authorities”. In 
this regard, the Committee is concerned as to “the lack of effective remedies for violations of human rights including economic, social 
and cultural rights, thereby undermining the State party's ability to meet its obligations under the international human rights treaties that it has 
ratified including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”.  
1333 CESCR, Concluding Observations on Nepal, UN Doc. E/C.12/NPL/CO/2, 16 January 2008, para. 10. 
1334 CESCR, Concluding Observations on Afghanistan, UN Doc. E/C.12/AFG/CO/2-4, 7 June 2010, para. 12. 
1335 CESCR, Concluding Observations on Turkey, UN Doc. E/C.12/TUR/CO/1, 12 July 2011. 
1336  See “Document With the Comments of the Association of Cypriot Archaeologists concerning Turkey’s Report on 





implementation of the Covenant throughout the country” but also generates new obstacles to its effective 
implementation”.1337  
3.3.2.b. The International Court of Justice 
In its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, the ICJ ruled for the applicability and relevance of a number of rights contained in the 
ICESCR, CRC and ICCPR, stating that “the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in 
case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in article 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.1338 This wording appears to support the view that, in 
the absence of any provisions allowing for derogation, the guarantees provided under human rights treaties remain in 
force. In this sense, the Court observed that Israel is bound to respect the ICESCR as well as the 
CRC (both ratified on 3 October 1991), in addition to its obligation to respect the ICCPR with the 
exception of Article 9 whose derogation had been notified by Israel at the time of the ratification of 
the ICCPR.1339  
As far as ESC rights are specifically concerned, the Court recognised that the construction of the 
wall and its associated regime “impede the exercise by the persons concerned of the right to work, to health, to 
education and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the ICESCR and in the CRC”,1340 besides 
restricting the freedom of movement of local inhabitants (excepting Israeli citizens and those 
assimilated thereto) under Article 12(1) ICCPR, destroying or rendering inaccessible property 
belonging to those Palestinians, interfering with their privacy, family, home or correspondence 
under Article 17.1341 Significantly, the use of the verb “impede” entails that the rights in question 
were applicable in the occupied territory in the first place. It remains regrettable, however, that, 
                                                
1337 Comments by the Government of Cyprus on the Concluding Observations (E/C.12/CYP/CO/5), E/C.12/CYP/CO/5/Add.1, 
24 March 2009, paras. 5-6, additionally noting that “approximately 99% of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers arrive to the 
Government controlled area, through the part of the Republic that is under occupation by another State party to the Covenant, Turkey. The 
Declarations and Reservation made by the latter when ratifying the Covenant, does not exonerate it from its obligations under the Charter of the 
United Nations and the provisions of the Covenant, the Geneva Conventions and international law. In addition, the continuing presence of its 
occupation army on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is by itself the source of systematic violations of the human rights of the island’s 
population”. 
1338 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, at 
178, para. 106, and at 192, para. 136. 
1339 ICJ, ibid., at 180, paras. 111-113, and at 187, para. 127. According to the Court, the ICESCR applies to the 
territories over which a Contracting Party has sovereignty as well as to ones over which that State exercises territorial 
jurisdiction; it invoked especially Article 14 of the Covenant on the right to education, which provides for transitional 
measures (para. 112). 
1340 ICJ, ibid., at 191, para. 134. From the perspective of the relationship between international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, the Court’s analysis of the impact of the wall on a number of ESC rights enshrined in 
the ICESCR is indicative of the fact that there are no rights that can be defined by international humanitarian law in 
the way that the ICJ indicated that the right to life could be in the nuclear weapons opinion. Paragraph 134 makes clear 
that the Court gives more weight to the ICESCR as a means of defining these rights. 





after acknowledging the applicability and relevance of ESC rights as guaranteed under the ICESCR 
(Articles 6 and 7 relating to work, Article 10 on the protection and assistance to families and 
children, Article 11 concerning an adequate standard of living, Article 12 on health, Articles 13 and 
14 on education) as well as dealing with the relevance of analogous rights enshrined in the CRC 
(Articles 16, 24, 27 and 28),1342 the advisory opinion ended up being less helpful in revealing which 
of these rights have actually been violated. Notably, a right to a cultural identity was not mentioned 
in the advisory opinion; however, the Court referred to certain elements that somehow allow the 
cultural dimension to emerge.1343 
It is worth briefly highlighting that the legality of the construction of the wall was assessed in 
view of both human rights law and international humanitarian law, although the Court analysed 
separately the relevant rules and limitation clauses. In addition to the aforementioned human rights 
law sources, it observed that international humanitarian law contains rules “enabling account to be taken 
of military exigencies in certain circumstances”.1344 By referring to Article 46 HRs and Articles 47, 49 and 
53 GCIV, the Court considered the possible deportation of protected persons and the possible 
destruction of personal property exclusively for “imperative military reasons” or as “absolutely necessary by 
military operations”; nevertheless it stressed the prohibition to transfer the occupant’s population into 
occupied territory; then it determined that the destruction of property was not justified by the 
claimed defence of military exigency. The Court concluded that the route chosen for the wall was 
not justified by military exigencies,1345 but this finding was not substantiated according to a proper 
legal reasoning: it did not detail the criteria fitting the meaning of military necessity, particularly the 
proportionality criteria and what it requires in such situation.1346  
A second opportunity taken by the ICJ to acknowledge the application in times of armed 
conflict of human rights treaties that do not contain a derogation clause was in its judgment 
                                                
1342 ICJ, ibid., at 189, paras. 130-131. 
1343 ICJ, ibid., para.133, citing the Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human 
Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, 22 August 2003, para. 26, which refers to 
practices related to “olive trees, fruit trees, water wells, citrus grows and hothouses upsands”; also citing the Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories (E/CN.4/2004/6, 8 September 2003, para. 9) alongside the 
Report by the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Jean Ziegler, The Right to Food, 
Addendum, Mission to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2, 31 October 2003, para. 49), 
which pointed out that “many fruit and olive trees had been destroyed in the course of building the barrier”. 
1344 ICJ, ibid., para. 126, referring to Articles 43, 46, 52 HRs and 47, 49, 52, 53 GC IV.  
1345 ICJ, ibid., paras. 135 and 137. 
1346 As stated by Judge Buergenthal, “Lacking is an examination of the facts that might show why the alleged defences of military 
exigencies, national security or public order are not applicable to the wall as a whole or to the individual segments of its route”, see 
Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, para. 7. Conversely, according to Judge Owada “no justification based on the ‘military 
exigencies”, even if fortified by substantial facts, could conceivably constitute a valid basis for precluding the wrongfulness of the act on the 





concerning the territory of eastern DRC occupied by Uganda. 1347 The Court in fact cited and 
applied the same principle affirmed in the advisory opinion on the wall, by deeming applicable to 
this case the AfrCHPR, the CRC and its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict of 25 May 2000, in addition to the ICCPR, which have been all ratified by both the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda.1348 Therefore the ICJ found that Uganda violated 
Articles 4 and 5 AfrCHPR, Article 38(2) and (3) CRC as well as Articles 1, 2, 3(3), (4), (5), (6) of its 
Optional Protocol, in addition to Articles 6(1) and 7 ICCPR.1349 These treaties include ESC rights, 
but the Court did not find direct violations of these rights. Conversely, it examined the exploitation 
of natural resources by Ugandan officers and soldiers and the failure of the Ugandan forces to 
respect the applicable provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights law,1350 
finding that the looting, plundering and exploitation of Democratic Republic of the Congo’s natural 
resources constituted concurrent violations of Article 21 (1) (2) ACHPR. 
Of particular note in both cases is that the ICJ analysed human rights law separately from 
international humanitarian law as applicable to the same situation. It found violations of the 
relevant provisions of both branches of law. This illustrates that they may rule out equivalent 
conducts without influencing each other in the determination of unlawfulness. 
3.3.2.c. The Committee on the Rights of the Child 
The CRC is another universal human rights treaty without a general derogation clause. The 
application in its entirety during peacetime and war has been acknowledged by its treaty-based 
monitoring body, addressing the relevance of all its provisions - not only Article 38 and 39 relating 
specifically to the protection and care of children in armed conflicts - at all times. By covering a 
broad range of civil, economic, social and cultural rights, the CRC is roughly equivalent to the 
combined content of the 1977 Covenants. In this vein, the comprehensive set of rights enshrined in 
the CRC and stressed by the Committee includes basic care and assistance, access to health, food 
and education, the protection of the family environment, the protection of the child’s cultural 
environment, the prohibition of torture, abuse or neglect, the right to a name and a nationality, the 
need for protection in cases of deprivation of liberty, access to and provision of humanitarian 
                                                
1347 ICJ, Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005. 
1348 ICJ, ibid., para. 217. 
1349 ICJ, ibid., para. 219. 
1350 ICJ, ibid., paras. 178-179, 242, 245. It relied on Article 47 HRs and Article 33 GC IV relating to the prohibition of 





assistance and relief, the prohibition of the death penalty.1351 As has underlined by the Committee, 
the most positive interpretation of this Convention is implemented with a view to guaranteeing the 
widest possible respect for children’s rights. Nonetheless, emphasis is put on the provisions 
containing the four general principles underpinning the CRC and that do not allow for any kind of 
derogation: Article 2 (prohibiting discrimination of any kind), Article 3 (requiring the best interests 
of the child as main consideration) and Article 6 (the right to life, survival and development), Article 
12 (the right of children to have their views heard and given due weight in all decisions affecting 
them). As was clearly expressed by its former vice-President Hammarberg, “the child has a right to a 
family environment, to go to school, to play, to get health care and adequate nutrition also during the armed conflict. 
The principles of the Convention are valid as well: that all children without discrimination should enjoy their rights, 
that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration in decisions, that the right to life, survival and development 
be protected”.1352  
Notably, the Committee considers IHL protection as interconnected with, and forming an 
integral part of, that which is afforded under the CRC. In this sense, its monitoring of violations of 
children’s rights in conflict-torn situations has also relied on certain rules and principles concerning 
the means and methods of warfare, ending up contributing to the determination of their scope. A 
clear example of such a monitoring approach concerns the right to education. Generally, States parties 
to the CRC has been recommended to protect schools from military attacks or seizures alongside 
from use as centres of recruitment, and to criminalise such attacks as a war crime according to the 
Rome Statute.1353 Specifically, in situations concerning Burundi, Israel, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, 
the Committee has considered a range of interferences with the right to education in accordance to 
what is addressed in the Forth Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocols of 1977.1354   
                                                
1351 See Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, Report of the Export of the Secretary-General, Ms. Grac’a Machel, submitted pursuant to 
General Assembly Resolution 48/157, UN Doc. A/51/306, 26 August 1996, p. 52, paras. 227-229, citing the annual Report 
of the Committee on the Right of the Child to the General Assembly, 49th Session, UN GAOR Suppl. No. 41, 
A/49/41, 19 May 1994. 
1352 See C. Hamilton and T. Abu El-Haj, “Armed Conflict: The Protection of Children under International Law”, 
International Journal of Children’s Rights, 5, Kluwer, 1997, p. 38. On the application of the CRC even in armed conflict, see 
also Maslen, “Relevance of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to Children in Armed Conflict”, TLCP, 1996, p. 
329 ff. 
1353 As previously discussed in Chapter I, Article 8(2)(b)(i), Article 8(2)(b)(ii), and Article 8(2)(e)(i) ICC Statute prohibit the 
intentional direction of attacks against the civilian population and against civilian objects in times of international and 
non-international armed conflict respectively. A textual reference to the prohibition of intentionally directing attacks 
against buildings dedicated to education is contained in Article 8(2)(b)(ix) and Article 8(2)(e)(iv). 
1354 See CRC, Concluding Observations: Burundi, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.133, 16 October 2000, paras. 64-65; CRC, 
Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add. 195, 9 October 2002, para. 52; CRC, Concluding Observations: 
Ethiopia, UN Doc. CRC/C/ETH/CO/3, 1 November 2006, paras. 27-28; CRC, Concluding Observations: Afghanistan, UN 





3.3.2.d. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
CEDAW’s objective consists in removing all forms of discrimination against women on the basis of 
gender. In particular, women are safeguarded in the equal recognition, enjoyment and exercise of 
“human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political economic, social, cultural, civil, domestic or any other field”, 
regardless of marital status and in view of equality with men. 
The application of CEDAW during conflicts or states of emergency has been affirmed and 
clarified by its treaty-based monitoring body. Indeed, the Committee’s concerns have been 
reiterated as to the gendered impacts of such situations alongside women’s exclusion from conflict 
prevention efforts, post-conflict transition and reconstruction processes. Additional critical concerns 
have regarded the insufficient information provided in States parties’ reports on the application of 
the Convention in such contexts. 
A basic recognition of this view is contained in General Recommendation no. 28 aimed at 
clarifying the scope and meaning of Article 2.1355 In providing ways for States parties to implement 
domestically CEDAW substantive provisions, Article 2 prohibits discrimination against women 
caused directly or indirectly by States parties and, additionally, it enacts a due diligence obligation 
to prevent such discrimination by private actors. Appropriate measures in this regard have been 
deemed to comprise the regulation of private actors’ activities regarding education, employment 
and health policies and practices, working conditions and work.1356 As affirmed in paragraph 11, 
“the obligations of States parties do not cease in periods of armed conflict or in states of emergency resulting from 
political events or natural disasters”. These contexts have a serious impact on, and wide consequences 
for, the equal satisfaction and exercise of women’s fundamental rights; the Committee has expressly 
called for States parties to adopt strategies and measures addressed to their specific needs in such 
times. Of note, in paragraph 12, the application of CEDAW obligations is understood as covering 
without discrimination both citizens and non-citizens (including refugees, asylum-seekers, migrant 
workers and stateless persons) who are within States parties’ territory or under effective control, 
even when not situated within the territory. As further elaborated in the same paragraph, “States 
parties are responsible for all their actions affecting human rights, regardless of whether the affected persons are in their 
territory”. 
This position has been broadly articulated in General Recommendation no. 30,1357 whose 
                                                
1355 See General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 December 2010. 
1356 Ibid., para. 13. 
1357  See General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict and Post-conflict Situations, UN Doc. 





significant purpose deserves particular attention.1358 It aims at providing authoritative guidance to 
States parties to the CEDAW on “legislative, policy and other appropriate measures to ensure full compliance 
with their obligations under the Convention to respect, protect and fulfil women’s human rights” during times of 
international and non-international armed conflict, situations of foreign occupation as well as other 
forms of occupation, and the post-conflict phase including various peace-building processes.1359 A 
number of the points addressed to determine the application of the CEDAW are noteworthy.  
Firstly, States are deemed bound to apply the Convention and other sources of international 
human rights and humanitarian law “comprehensively in the exercise of territorial or extraterritorial 
jurisdiction”, whether acting individually (e.g. in unilateral military action) or as members of 
international or intergovernmental organizations and coalitions (e.g. as part of an international 
peacekeeping force) (see paragraph 9). In this regard, CEDAW is deemed applicable to a broad range of 
situations, including: occupation and other forms of administration of foreign territory; national 
contingents as part of an international peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation; persons 
detained by State agents, such as the military or mercenaries, outside its territory; lawful or unlawful 
military actions in another State; situations of bilateral or multilateral donor assistance for conflict 
prevention and humanitarian aid, mitigation or post-conflict reconstruction; cases of involvement as 
third parties in peace or negotiation processes; and finally in the formation of trade agreements with 
conflict-affected countries. 
Secondly, States parties are recommended to regulate the activities of domestic non-State actors 
who are within their effective control and operate extraterritorially, ensuring they respect the 
Convention entirely. In this regard, States parties are required to “exercise due diligence to prevent, 
investigate, punish and ensure redress” for acts of private individuals or entities that impair vested rights; 
in addition to constitutional and legislative measures, adequate administrative and financial support 
for treaty implementation are emphasised (see paragraph 15).  
Thirdly, States as occupying powers are recommended to respect, protect and fulfil the rights 
                                                
1358 The debate for elaborating this recommendation relied on certain CEDAW provisions: Articles 2 (a - g) on the core 
obligations of States parties to the Convention; Article 4 on temporary special measures; Article 5 (a) on the 
modification of social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men; Article 6 on the suppression of trafficking 
and exploitation of women; Article 7 and 8 on women’s participation in political and public life and their representation 
in government and at the international level; Article 9 on women’s rights to a nationality; Article 10 on the right to 
education; Article 11 on the right to work; Article 12 on the right to health; Article 15 (1) on women’s equality with men 
before the law. See Concept Note, General Discussion on the protection of women’s human rights in conflict and post-conflict contexts, 
July 2011, www.peacewomen.org. See also Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Summary of 
the General discussion on the protection of women’s human rights in conflict and post-conflict contexts, www.peacewomen.org  





enshrined in the CEDAW that applies extraterritorially in situations of foreign occupation.1360 
Notably, guidance has been specifically given in relation to certain issues directly addressing the 
socio-economic dimensions of conflict-related situations. They include gender-based violence under 
Articles 1-3 and 5(a) (see paras. 34-38), access to education, employment and health, and rural 
women under Articles 10-12 and 14 (see paras. 48-52), displacement, refugees and asylum-seekers 
under Articles 1-3 and 15 (see paras. 53-57), marriage and family relations under Articles 15-16 
(paras. 62-65), access to justice under Articles 1-3, 5(a) and 15 (see paras. 74-81). Indeed, in drafting 
phase the Committee was called to explicitly recognise in the document the relevance of ESC rights 
as an integral part of protecting women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict situations.1361 As for the 
guidance given for constitutional and electoral reforms within post-conflict situations, in paragraph 
73 (c) States parties are recommended to “ensure that new constitutions provide for temporary special measures, 
apply to citizens and non-citizens, and guarantee that women’s human rights are not subject to derogation in states of 
emergency”. 
Focusing on the Committee’s elaboration of the application of CEDAW in respect to different actors 
within conflict and post-conflict processes, the following points are noteworthy. The Convention 
applies to States parties acting individually (e.g., “as the State within whose borders the conflict arises, 
neighbouring States involved in the regional dimensions of the conflict or States involved in unilateral cross-border 
military manoeuvres”) or to States parties acting as members of international or intergovernmental 
organizations (e.g., “by contributing to international peacekeeping forces or as donors giving money through 
international financial institutions to support peace processes”).  
As to non-state actors such as armed groups, paramilitaries, corporations, private military 
contractors, organized criminal groups and vigilantes, they cannot become parties to the CEDAW. 
Nonetheless, according to the Committee they are obliged to respect international human rights 
under certain circumstances, especially “where an armed group with an identifiable political structure exercises 
                                                
1360 The factors deemed most pertinent to the realisation of women’s rights under occupation, as reinforced in the 
seminal SC Res. 1325 (2000) on women and conflict, include, inter alia: accessing ESC rights, ensuring the rights of 
internally displaced persons and refugees, protection from violence and the absolute prohibition of sexual exploitation 
by those in occupation with criminal sanction, prosecuting sexual violence, facilitating participation in political dialogue. 
See WILPF, Written Statement to the CEDAW Committee prior to 18 July 2011, “General discussion on women in 
armed conflict and post-conflict situations”. 
1361 During the discussion the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) emphasised that one of 
key factors in the continued under representation of women in political life is the highly gendered nature of family and 
work relations: women are the main caregivers in society, are more likely to work in the informal sector, and have less 
access to remunerated employment. Access to ESC rights (particularly health, education, access to land and 
employment) was viewed as fundamentally important in providing women with the possibility of participating in systems 
of governance. As far as international financial institutions play a vital role in post-conflict reconstruction and the 
reactivation of economic activities, these actors should ensure that women are fully included in the design, development 





significant control over territory and population”. Emphasis is put on “gross violations of human rights and serious 
violations of humanitarian law could entail individual criminal responsibility, including for members and leaders of 
non-State armed groups and private military contractors”.1362 In this respect explicit recommendations have 
regarded the respecting women’s rights in conflict-affected areas in line with the Convention and 
the performing under codes of conduct on human rights, particularly stressing the prohibition of all 
forms of gender-based violence (see paragraph 18). 
As openly underlined by the same treaty-based body, State responsibility under the CEDAW 
arises insofar as a non-State actor’s act or omission may be attributed to a State party under 
international law. Conversely, in cases of a State party acting as member of international or 
intergovernmental organizations, it remains responsible for its obligations under the Convention 
within its territory and extraterritorially, and also for adopting measures that make the policies and 
decisions of those organizations conformed to its treaty obligations.1363 
3.3.2.e. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
At the regional level, the African Commission has repeatedly endorsed the view that the occurrence 
of an international or civil war as well as other emergency situations in the territory of a State party 
is not invokable as a justification for violations of any of the rights set forth in the AfrCHPR.1364  
Besides insisting explicitly that, in the absence of a derogation clause from the African Charter, 
no derogations by States parties are allowed at any time,1365 the African Commission has also 
expressed the position that “limitations on the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter cannot be justified by 
emergencies or special circumstances”.1366 Significantly, this view has been expressed not only in its 
                                                
1362 See General Recommendation No. 30, ibid. para. 16. 
1363 See General Recommendation No. 30, ibid. para. 14. 
1364 See, e.g., AfComHPR, Article 19 v. The State of Eritrea, Comm. No. 275/2003, May 2007, AHRLR 73 (ACHPR 
2007), para 87. On the application of the African Charter in armed conflict, see F. Ouguergouz, “L’absence de clause 
de dérogation dans certains traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme: Les réponses du droit international general”, Revue 
générale de droit international public, 1994, p. 289 ff.  
1365 See AfComHPR, Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. Chad, Comm. No. 74/92, (1995), (2000) 
AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 1995), para. 21, observing that “the African Charter, unlike other human rights instruments, does not allow for 
States parties to derogate from their treaty obligations during emergency situations. Thus, even a civil war in Chad cannot be used as an excuse 
by the State violating or permitting violations of rights in the African Charter”. The African Commission has then confirmed that 
view in Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, Comm. Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 - 196/97 and 
210/98, (2000) AHRLR 149 (ACHPR 2000), para. 84. See also AfComHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre 
on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan, Comm. Nos. 279/03- 296/05, (2009) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009), 
paras. 165 and 167. Conversely, in other jurisprudence it seems to have moved closer to the position under general 
international law, see AfCmHPR, Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan, Comm. Nos. 48/90, 50/91, 52/90, 89/93 
(1999), (2000) AHRLR 297 (ACHPR 1999), paras. 42 and 79 ff. 
1366 See AfComHPR, Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organization and Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 
105/93, 12th Activity Report 1999/2000, at 64; Comm. No. 104/94, 141/94, 145/95, (2000) AHRLR 227 (ACHPR 
1999), para. 41, reading: “[I]n contrast to other international human rights instruments, the African Charter does not contain a derogation 





decisions on communications but also in its Resolution on Rights to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance 
in Africa.1367  
For the purpose of the present study, an important case concerns the armed conflict in the 
Darfur western region of Sudan and the engagement of Janjaweed militia in raping, forcibly evicting 
and displacing, indiscriminately killing thousands of black indigenous people and destroying their 
property since February 2003. In Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan, the complainants alleged that those acts constituted a failure of the 
government of Sudan to respect and protect the rights of the people of Darfur and particularly 
violated Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12 (1), 14, 16, 18 (1) and 22 AfrCHPR. The Republic of Sudan had 
been under a state of emergency since 1989 but whether derogations from specific provisions of the 
Charter had been undertaken is not clear from the case.1368 At any rate, in quoting its decisions in 
earlier communications (para. 41, Constitutional Rights Project et al v. Nigeria; para. 21, Commission 
Nationale des Droits de l’Hommme et Libertes v. Chad), the African Commission reminded States that they 
have a duty to respect human and peoples’ rights under the Charter at all times including armed 
conflict.1369  
Of particular note is that this decision offers seminal jurisprudence on violations of certain ESC 
rights under the AfrCHPR in situations of armed conflict. Firstly, the Commission ruled that the 
forced eviction of thousands of indigenous tribes breached the implicit right to adequate housing as 
enshrined in Article 14 (right to property), Article 16 (right to the best attainable state of mental and 
physical health) and Article 18(1) (rights of the family).1370 Additionally, it ruled that forced evictions 
and destruction of housing amounted to a violation of Article 4 (right to integrity of the person) and 
also Article 5 (prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment); in this regard, the 
                                                                                                                                                            
The only legitimate reasons for limitation of the rights and freedoms of the African Charter are found in Article 27(2), that is, that the rights of 
the Charter ‘shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest”. See also 
AfComHPR, Media Rights Agenda and Others v. Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998), para. 67.  
1367 See Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2003), para. R, entitled 
“Non-derogability clause” (“No circumstances whatsoever, whether a threat of war, a state of international or internal armed conflict, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked to justify derogations from the right to a fair trial”). 
1368 The Sudanese government challenged the case on admissibility, contending that the claimants failed to resort to 
“existing legal, judicial or administrative means within the Respondent State to address the allegations” (see Sudan Human Rights 
Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, ibid., para. 75) and asserting that other international 
mechanisms (i.e. SC Res. 1509, 1591, 1592 on the situation in Darfur; the UN Commission on Human Rights Res. 
2005/85 that assigned a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan) had settled the case, which was 
as such inadmissible. According to Sudan’s counterclaims, the conflict in Darfur resulted from the “instability in 
neighboring countries”, the intensified violence and increased influx of IDPs and refugees were attributable to the armed 
conflicts in Chad, Congo, and Central African Republic, and claimants’ allegations were disputable as determined in 
several resolutions of Security Council.  
1369 See also AComHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, Comm. Nos. 
279/03- 296/05, (2009) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009), paras. 165 and 167. 





respondent State was found to have actively participated in the forced eviction of the civilian 
population from their homes and villages and to have failed to protect the victims against those 
violations as perpetrated by its agents or third parties,1371 also failing to “provide immediate remedies to 
victims”.1372 
Secondly, the Commission confirmed the right to water and sanitation as an implicit right enshrined 
in Articles 4, 16 and 22 AfrCHPR.1373 In looking at the obligations to respect and to protect upon 
Sudan, it ruled that “the destruction of homes, livestock and farms as well as the poisoning of water sources, such as 
wells” rose to a violation of Article 16 (right to the highest attainable standard of health).1374 This 
was elaborated by referring to the CESCR’s General Comment No. 14, in which the right to health 
is interpreted as extended “not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the underlying determinants 
of health, such as access to safe and portable water, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition, and housing …”. In 
relying on the obligations articulated in the aforementioned general comment, the African 
Commission underlined not only that  “violations of the right to health can occur through the direct action of 
States or other entities insufficiently regulated by States”, but also that “States should ... refrain from unlawfully 
polluting air, water and soil, ... during armed conflicts” and “should also ensure that third parties do not limit 
people’s access to health-related ... services”, noting that “failure to enact or enforce laws to prevent the pollution of 
water [amount to a violation of the right to health]”.1375 
Thirdly, the Commission held Sudan accountable for a violation of the collective right to all peoples 
to their economic, social and cultural development, which is set forth in Article 22.1376 In this regard, in 
determining whether the victims constituted a “people” under the African Charter, the Commission 
admitted that the jurisprudence defining the content of “peoples’ rights” is “still very fluid” and that 
“in defining the content of the peoples’ rights, or the definition of ‘a people’, it [was] making a contribution to Africa’s 
acceptance of its diversity”.1377 According to the Commission, “it is unfortunate that Africa tends to deny the 
                                                
1371 It relied on the Committee Against Torture jurisprudence to the effect that “forced evictions and destruction of housing 
carried out by non-state actors amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, if the State fails to protect the victims from 
such a violation of their human rights” (Hijrizi v. Yugoslavia, Communication No. 161/2000: Yugoslavia, 
CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 (2 December 2002); and on the ECtHR jurisprudence to the effect that “even in the most 
difficult circumstances, such as the fight against organised terrorism and crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment” (Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey, Judgment, 24 April 1998, paras. 27-30). 
1372 AComHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, ibid., para. 168. 
1373 In Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v. Zaire, the African Commission ruled that the failure to provide essential 
services such as electricity and safe drinking water amounted to a violation of the right to health enshrined in Article 16. 
1374 AComHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, para. 212. 
1375 AComHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, para. 210. 
1376 Article 22 AfrCHPR reads: “All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to 
their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, 
to ensure the exercise of the right to development”. 
1377 AComHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, para. 220. A relevant 





existence of the concept of a ‘people’ because of its tragic history of racial and ethnic bigotry by the dominant racial 
groups during the colonial and apartheid rule”; its position, however, was that “racial and ethnic diversity on the 
continent contributes to the rich cultural diversity which is a cause for celebration” and should not be “seen as a source 
of conflict” 1378. In this regard, Article 19 AfrCHPR guarantees “the right of all people to equality, to enjoy 
same rights, and that nothing shall justify a domination of a people by another”. Under a combined reading of 
Article 2 and Article 19 AfrCHPR, the Commission acknowledged that the Charter “protects the rights 
of every individual and peoples of every race, ethnicity, religion and other social origins” and found that “the people 
of Darfur in their collective are ‘a people’, as described under Article 19”. Then, in establishing that the 
respondent State, “while fighting the armed conflict, targeted the civilian population, instead of the combatants”, 
the Commission decided that this rose to “a form of collective punishment, which is prohibited by international 
law”. Significantly, it ruled that “the attacks and forced displacement of Darfurian people denied them the 
opportunity to engage in economic, social and cultural activities”, that “the displacement interfered with the right to 
education for their children and pursuit of other activities”, and that “instead of deploying its resources to address the 
marginalisation in the Darfur, which was the main cause of the conflict, the Respondent State instead unleashed a 
punitive military campaign which constituted a massive violation of not only the economic, social and cultural rights, 
but other individual rights of the Darfurian people”.1379 
It is worth mentioning that criticisms have made of the African Commission jurisprudence as 
well as the African Charter. Despite appraisal for the Commission’s position on derogation, the 
absence of an ad hoc clause has been seen as decreasing States parties’ powers only in theory: by 
failing to set any standards, the Charter provides States with more discretion.1380 For others, the 
treaty silence on derogation cannot be understood as a prohibition to derogate from the Charter1381 
and States parties are “reserved the right to invoke the derogations which may be possible under general 
international law”1382, arguing that they could invoke fundamental change of circumstances to 
suspend provisions of the African Charter1383 and rely on the rules relating to termination and 
suspension of treaties under international law.1384 Conversely, the weakness that results from the 
                                                                                                                                                            
themselves, “through the principle of self identification, or be used by other people to identify them”. The Commission identified 
characteristics such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, culture, territory they occupy in a State, common history, and 
ethno-anthropological factors. 
1378 AComHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, para. 221. 
1379 AComHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, para. 223. 
1380 Murray, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Law, Hart Publishing, 2000, p.  
1381 Ouguergouz, op. cit., p. 477. 
1382 Ouguergouz, op. cit., p. 427. 
1383 Ouguergouz, op. cit., p. 449. 
1384 Ouguergouz argues that fundamental change of circumstances (Art. 62 VCLT) would be most applicable for 
African States derogating from the Charter obligations, see Ouguergouz, op. cit., p. 467. Hartman argues that the 





omission of an ad hoc clause has led to the recommendation that an amendment of the Charter be 
made to incorporate it, calling upon the African Commission and the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights to lay down “the conditions for legitimate derogation”.1385 In the same regard, it has been 
stressed that, while “the system of derogation brings with it specific guarantees of protection”, its deficiency in 
the Charter “renders exceptional circumstances commonplace, leading to their improper perpetuation”.1386  
Nevertheless, the failure of these previous arguments to take into account relevant factors that 
may explain that omission has also been highlighted. They concern the expansion of non-derogable 
rights in human rights treaties adopted before the African Charter, the inclusion of ESC rights 
under the AfrCHPR (which further expanded non-derogable rights), and the failure of many 
African States to comply with the stringent requirements of derogation under the ICCPR alongside 
their misuse of the tool of emergency to retain extraordinary powers and their regular invocation of 
domestic provisions allowing for a state of emergency.1387 
Moreover, it is apt to note that both specific and general limitation clauses included in many 
provisions of the AfrCHPR have been considered broad enough to explain the absence of a 
derogation clause in the Charter.1388 Thus, the use of specific limitation clauses taking the form of 
right-specific claw-back clauses (e.g. Articles 6, 8, 9(2), 10(1), and 12(1)) would allow for far-reaching 
restrictions of the protected rights, thereby making a derogation clause superfluous. 1389 The 
confusion that a limitation clause could serve the purpose of derogation under the AfrCHPR has 
been criticised however.1390 In any case, notable in the African Charter is that the economic and 
social rights are formulated neither with claw-back clauses nor with such core modifiers/restraints 
as “progressive realisation” or “within available resources”.  
                                                
1385 Heyns, “Civil and political rights in the African Charter”, in M. Evans and R. Murray (eds.), The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. The system in practice, 1986-2000, Cambridge, 2002, pp.139 and 162. 
1386 L. Sermet, “The absence of a derogation clause from the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A critical 
discussion”, 7 African Human Rights Law Journal, 2007, pp. 153-154. To the author, jurisprudential inclusion of a 
derogation clause might remedy that deficiency, see ibid., p. 155. In the same regard, see Allo A.K., “Derogation or 
limitation? Rethinking the African human rights system of derogation in light of the European system”, 2 Ethiopian 
Journal of Legal Education, 2009, p. 52. 
1387 A.J. Ali, “Derogation from Constitutional Rights and Its Implication Under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights”, 17 Law, Democracy and Development, 2013, pp. 84-89. The author refers to the practice of misusing the 
state of emergency in relation to Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Zambia and Ethiopia. 
1388 See “Report of the Meeting of Experts on Rights Not Subject to Derogations During States of Emergency and 
Exceptional Circumstances, 17-19 May 1995”, in D. Premont, C. Stenresen, and I. Oseredczuk (eds.), Non-derogable 
Rights and States of Emergency, op. cit., at 36, para. 21. 
1389 See Wessels, “Derogation from human rights: a possible dispensation for Africa and Southern Africa”, African 
Yearbook of International Law, 2002, pp. 132-133. See also R. Murray, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
International Law, Hart Publishing, 2000, p. 126. 
1390 According to Ouguergouz the limitation clause cannot be used as a derogation clause, see F. Ouguergouz, The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for human dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa,  Martinus 





3.3.3. Additional remarks in the light of general international law  
The determination of the obligations of States parties to human rights treaties not encompassing an 
ad hoc derogation clause and affected by a situation of public emergency, such as conflict or 
occupation, also entails taking into consideration the existence of any rule in international law that 
would permit State parties’ suspension of the rights concerned and thus non-compliance with the 
corresponding obligations.1391 
At first glance, the pacta sunt servanda rule suggests that no derogations should be allowed from a 
treaty that does not expressly provide for such a possibility, and State parties should unconditionally 
respect its terms and perform it in good faith.1392 Nevertheless, general international law allows 
States to resort to certain justifications to excuse non-compliance with their international 
obligations. In this respect, circumstances precluding the wrongfulness of States’ conduct that would 
otherwise not conform to States’ international obligations have been recognised in Chapter V 
(Article 20-27) of the ILC’s Draft Articles of 2001.1393 For the present study, state of necessity and 
force majeure are of pertinence.1394 
In this regard, some practice may be found in the ILO’s jurisprudence on Conventions No. 87 
and No. 49, which do not encompass provisions permitting derogation in times of public 
emergency. In two complaints brought against Greece and Poland respectively, ILO monitoring 
bodies used the doctrine of force majeure as the principal source for justifying the adoption of 
measures incompatible with the obligations stemming from these treaties, by also referring to key 
principles of international treaty law on derogation (i.e. temporariness, exceptional threat and 
proportionality).1395  
                                                
1391 See Report of the Meeting of Experts on Rights Not Subject to Derogations During States of Emergency and Exceptional Circumstances, 
17-19 May 1995, in D. Premont, C. Stenresen, I. Oseredczuk (eds.), op. cit., paras. 36-39; Oraà, Human Rights in State of 
Emergency in International Law, Oxford University Press, 1992, Part II, Chapters 8-10; Rosas, Sandvik, Nylund, “Armed 
Conflicts”, in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2001, p. 414; P. Alston and G. 
Quinn, op. cit., p. 218, where they do not exclude such a possibility. 
1392 Article 26 VCLT. In support of this conclusion is the mentioned savings clause common to all the major human 
rights treaties expressly allowing derogations, which provides that the emergency measures authorized by those 
provisions must not be inconsistent with their other obligations under international law, see Article 4 (1) ICCPR, Article 
15 (1) ECHR, Article 27 (1) ACHR. 
1393 “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, A/56/10 (Suppl. 10), Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), pp. 71-86. 
1394 On the doctrine of force majeure in public international law, see ILC, “Survey on ‘Force Majeure’ and ‘Fortuitous 
Events’”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1978, Vol. II, (Part One); Article 23 and accompanying commentary 
of the ILC 2001 Draft Articles, op. cit., at 76. On the doctrine of necessity, see Article 25, ibid., at 80; and ICJ, Case 
concerning the Gabckovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, 25 September 1997, paras. 51-52.  
1395 See also Report of the Meeting of Experts on Rights Not Subject to Derogations During States of Emergency and Exceptional 





Specifically, in 1971 the ILO Special Commission of Inquiry, established to examine the 
observance of ILO’s Freedom of Association Conventions by Greece, observed that “(t)he position of 
pleas of emergency or necessity in international custom may be said to correspond essentially, within the peculiar 
framework of the international community, to the place given to pleas of force majeure or legitimate self-defence in 
national systems of law. A plea of force majeure generally requires a showing of irresistible force of circumstances. A 
plea of legitimate self-defence requires a showing both of imminent danger and of a proportionate relationship between 
the danger and the measures adopted for defence. Both the general principles of law derived from national practice and 
international custom are based on the assumption that the non-performance of a legal duty can be justified only where 
there is impossibility of proceeding by any other method than the one contrary to law. It must also be shown that the 
action sought to be justified under the plea is limited, both in extent and in time, to what is immediately necessary”.1396 
The Commission concluded that measures incompatible with those conventions would be 
acceptable if they were “strictly necessary given the exigencies of the situation”. Even the Commission of 
Inquiry investigating violations of the same Conventions by Poland recognised that in principle force 
majeure could have been invoked, but Poland was required to prove that the derogation measures 
had been justified by “circumstances of extreme gravity” and were “limited in scope and duration to what is 
strictly necessary given the exigencies of the situations”.1397  
Legal scholarship commenting on these cases has pointed out that the doctrine of necessity may 
fit better as excuse for non-compliance with human rights obligations in situations of public 
emergency.1398 Reliance on force majeure is appropriate when there is a material impossibility to 
comply (i.e. when the State, in facing the occurrence of “an irresistible force” or “an unforeseen event”, 
beyond its control, has no other option but to act in violation of an international obligation).1399  In 
this regard, during public emergencies States may however be in the position to opt for different 
policies to handle serious situations, and that there may exist no material possibility to perform 
                                                
1396 See Report of the Commission appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the 
Complaints concerning the Observance by Greece of the Freedom of Association and Right to Organise Convention 1948 (No. 87, and of the 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (No. 98), International Labour Office Official Bulletin, Special 
Supplement Vol. LVI. No. 2 (1971), p. 26, para. 110. 
1397 See Report of the Commission appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation to examine the 
Complaints concerning the Observance by Poland of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 1948 (No. 
87), and the Rights to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (No. 98), made by a member of the delegates to the 
52nd sess. of the ILO Conference, International Labour Office Official Bulletin, Special Supplement LXVII, Series B 
(1984), at 126-127, para. 479. 
1398 See Oraà, op. cit., pp. 221-6; the author also refers to other cases under the supervision of ILO monitoring organs 
that confirms the ILO position. See Svensson-McCarthy, The International Law of Human Rights and States of Exception, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, p. 348. 





certain human rights obligations may be easily invoked.1400 Conversely, reliance on the plea of 
necessity is possible where failure to comply with an international obligation is the only way a State 
has “to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril” and “does not seriously impair an essential 
interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole”1401. 
Nonetheless, a public emergency prompted by a situation of armed conflict may well make it 
impossible for the State concerned to conform to certain positive human rights obligations, 
particularly those calling for the provision of goods and services. Indeed, the relevance of the plea of 
force majeure has been admitted among scholars.1402 In this vein, the Maastricht Guideline 14(f) 
includes among the examples of violations of ESC rights “(t)he calculated obstruction of, or halt to, the 
progressive realisation of a right protected by the Covenant, unless the State is acting within a limitation permitted by 
the Covenant or it does so due to a lack of available resources or force majeure”. Yet it is noteworthy that, as 
formulated in the ILC’s Draft Articles of 2001, force majeure cannot be invoked if the unforeseen 
event “is due either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or […] the State 
has assumed the risk of that situation occurring”.  
In any case, if a State decides to refer to the notion of force majeure to justify non-compliance with 
its legal human rights commitments, an obligation to do the utmost to remedy the situation still 
remains in force, and compliance with this obligation may include asking and receiving foreign 
assistance. 
3.4. The relevance of ad hoc limitation clauses  
Several core human rights conventions openly grant States parties the possibility to subject them to 
certain limitations for far-reaching reasons. These clauses are legally distinct from derogation 
provisions in terms of nature, scope, and conditions justifying their use. Limitation clauses represent an 
usual component of the human rights treaties system, allowing States parties to restrict flexibly the 
free exercise of enshrined rights in order to safeguard certain public interests or to solve possible conflicts 
between rights - rather than constituting a response to narrowly determined situations of public 
emergency that threaten the life of the nation. In serving such a distinct purpose, the concept of 
limitation also emphasises that rights are not absolute and must be balanced between individual and 
                                                
1400 See Report of the Meeting of Experts on Rights Not Subject to Derogations During States of Emergency and Exceptional Circumstances, 
Annex I, in E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/20, 26 June 1995, para 27.  
1401 See Article 25 ILC’s Draft Articles of 2001. Necessity “does not involve conduct which is involuntary or coerced”, see 
Commentary, p. 80.  
1402 For authors admitting the relevance of force majeure, see Rosas-Sandvik-Nylund, “Armed Conflicts”, in Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2001, p. 414. M. Sepulveda, The Nature of the obligations 





public interests. As to the scope of application, limitation measures refer to one-off restrictions on 
the right in question, while derogation measures entail a temporary total suspension or exclusion of 
the operation of the right in question. 
In fact, limitation and derogation clauses may resemble each other when a limitation is based on 
national security, as will be further analysed below. Nevertheless, the protection of a strictly limited set 
of well-defined public interests is required for justifying States’ imposition of a limitation, including public 
safety or national security, public morals, public order, public health, or the respect for fundamental 
rights of others.1403 As such, three different conditions are necessary to substantiate a limitation: it has to be 
established by law, compatible with the nature of the rights in question, and designed to further the 
general welfare. Moreover, a proportionate relationship between the restriction on the right as such 
and the reason behind that restriction is required where imposing such a limitation: the faculty of 
limiting a protected right is given only in accordance with clearly established criteria preventing States’ arbitrariness. 
Therefore, as in the case of derogations, the proportionality principle ensures that limitations may 
not permit States to disregard their human rights obligations altogether.1404 Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that, consistently with the object and purpose of human rights treaties to protect the 
individual, the burden falls upon States parties to prove the legitimacy of a limitation imposed upon 
the enjoyment of a certain right. 
Relevant instances of ad hoc limitation clauses are those permitting States parties to restrict the free 
exercise of a specific right in the interest of national security, which might be invoked in war-torn situations. 
Specifically, the ICESCR includes a clause for the limitation of the right of everyone to form trade unions and 
join the trade union of his choices (Article 8, lett. a) as well as the right of trade unions to function freely (Article 
8, lett. c), which explicitly allows for restrictions imposed by law and necessary “in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. As it will 
further discussed below, this is the only case in which the ICESCR explicitly permits limitations of 
some of the enshrined ESC rights for far-reaching reasons. Articles 13 and 15 CRC allows for laws 
limiting the rights of the child to freedom of expression and to freedom of association when this would be 
                                                
1403 See Article 29(2) UDHR, and Articles 12(3), 13, 14, 18(3), 19, 21 and 22(2) ICCPR, concerning respectively the 
right to freedom of movement, limitations on expulsions of aliens, due process guarantees, the right to freedom of 
religion, freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly, and freedom of association. For instance, limitations for 
reasons of public order have often affected the right to freedom of movement when a society faces threats of terrorist 
attacks or non-international armed conflicts in order to guarantee people’s safety; and the imposition of curfews may be 
justified, see M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – CCPR Commentary2, op. cit., p. 278; Lockwood, Finn and 
Jubinsky, “Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on Limitation Provisions”, HRQ, 1985, pp. 56-63; Siracusa 
Principles, paras. 22-24 on public order. 
1404 See H.J. Steiner, P. Alston, R. Goodman (eds.), International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals3, Oxford, 





necessary for, inter alia, national security. Finally, according to Articles 11 and 12 AfrCHPR, 
restrictions on the exercise of, respectively, the right to assemble freely with others and the right to leave any 
country including his own, and to return to his country, are allowed only if they are provided by law and they 
function with respect to certain interests, including national security. 
Conversely, Article 4 ICESCR contains a general limitations clause deserving attention. It does not 
openly consent States parties to avail themselves of permissible restrictions on the rights guaranteed 
in the Covenant during extraordinary circumstances such as armed conflict and belligerent 
occupation. Nevertheless, in these contexts the protection of civilians’ ESC rights may be challenged 
by certain measures that restrict  - or even de facto suspend - them or by certain policies resulting in 
gross and systematic abuses. Special concern exists for violations of the right to an adequate standard of 
living, which entails, at a minimum, that everyone shall enjoy the necessary subsistence rights, such 
as adequate food and nutrition, clothing, housing and the necessary conditions of care when 
required.1405 Equal concern is for violations of the right to health,1406 which includes a range of socio-
economic determining factors of health, such as nutrition, potable water, housing, safe and healthy 
working conditions, as well as healthy environment. Similarly, of great concern are violations of the 
right to education,1407 or violations of the right to social security and social protection.1408  
These concerns support a careful examination of Article 4 ICESCR to address its implications 
in conflict-related settings in the light of the most common understanding that this limitation clause 
permits States to respond “flexibly” to extraordinary circumstances of tension within a democratic 
society.  
3.5. The ICESCR’s general limitation clause and its implications in conflict-affected 
situations 
The literal interpretation of the general limitation provision of Article 4 ICESCR allows States 
parties to subject the rights set forth in the Covenant “only to such limitations as are determined by law only 
in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general 
                                                
1405 Article 11 ICESCR. The CESCR has issued several General Comments explaining the components of this right 
including the right to adequate housing (General Comments Nos. 4 and 7), the right to food (General Comment No. 12), the right 
to water (General Comment No. 15) as well as the right to social security (General Comment No. 19). The Committee has 
elaborated on the criteria to be met to fulfil the rights to housing, food and water, providing comprehensive 
interpretation of these rights under international law. For the adequate standard of living in periods of occupation, see 
Report of the Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the 
Occupied Territories, UN Doc. A/58/311, 22 August 2003, paras. 44 ff. 
1406 Article 12 ICESCR, stating that everyone has the right to “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”. 
Article 12 (b) identifies four steps the State has to take so as to promote conditions for an healthy life, including inter alia 
the improvement of environmental hygiene, preventive health care and the prevention of occupational diseases. 
1407 Article 13 and 14 ICESCR. 





welfare in a democratic society”. For the purposes of the present research relevant issues arising in this 
regard are at least twofold. Firstly, it seems crucial to explore the extent to which States parties are permitted 
under the ICESCR to limit ESC rights in conflict-affected situations; accordingly, the scope of admissible 
limitations under Article 4 will be examined. Secondly, it seems pertinent to scrutinise States parties’ 
possibility to resort to derogations from some of the obligations stemming from the Covenant, 
notwithstanding the absence of an ad hoc clause.  
Aside from interesting aspects featuring the travaux préparatoirs of ICESCR, these issues are 
inquired mainly in view of various approaches undertaken by the CESCR as well as States in the 
reporting procedure under the ICESCR.1409 In actual fact, the available information as to the 
CESCR and States’ interpretations of Article 4, or about their opinion and practice on possible 
derogations from the Covenant is not so abundant. This is essentially due to the fact that the first 
version of the Committee’s general guidelines did not mentioned Article 4;1410 thus was absent a 
requirement of States parties to report on limitations eventually imposed on ESC rights and any 
reference to derogations alongside the related national and international legal basis. Nonetheless, 
positive developments derive from the new guidelines.1411 States parties are currently required to 
include, in core documents sent to all treaty bodies, information explaining the scope of “derogations, 
restrictions or limitations; the circumstances justifying them; and the timeframe envisaged for their withdrawal”.1412  
3.5.1. The scope of admissible limitations on ESC rights  
As anticipated, the three explicit requirements legitimising restrictions under Article 4 ICESCR 
include determination by law, compatibility with the nature of the rights, and promotion of general welfare as the sole 
purpose. In order to shed light on the scope of admissible limitations, some features of this general 
clause are discussed below. 
                                                
1409 In accordance with Article 17 ICESCR, the ECOSOC (by Resolution 1988 (LX) of 11 May 1976) established a 
programme under which the States parties to the Covenant would furnish in stages the reports referred to in Article 16; 
at the Human Rights Council’s request the Secretary General subsequently drew up a set of general guidelines.  
1410 CESCR, Revised general guidelines regarding the form and contents of reports to be submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 17 June 1991, UN Doc. E/C.12/1991/1. In response to 
the introduction of a new reporting cycle, at its fifth session (26 November - 14 December 1990) it adopted revised 
general guidelines that replaced the Secretary General’s original ones.  
1411 ECOSOC, The Guidelines on Treaty Specific Documents to be submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/2008/2, Annex, 24 March 2009. The Committee in 
fact decided to replace the revised general guidelines with the harmonised guidelines on reporting under human rights 
treaties (see The Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports, HRI/GEN/2/Rev.5, 29 May 2008) as well as its 
evolving practice on the application of the ICESCR as reflected in Concluding Observations, General Comments and 
Statements. 





3.5.1.a. Article 4 as a protective clause of ESC rights 
Article 4 was intended to function as a protective clause of the individuals’ ESC rights, rather than as a 
permissive provision in relation to States parties’ power to impose limitations. Furthermore, it was 
not meant to refer to limitations prejudicing the “subsistence or survival” of the person or her/his 
integrity.1413 In comparison with the specific limitation clause of Article 8, the terminology used in 
Article 4 reduces the reasons as well as the way under which a restriction may generally affect the ESC 
rights enshrined in the Covenant.1414 Valuable considerations in this regard may be determined in 
the light of the travaux préparatoirs of the ICESCR.  
In particular, Article 4 was not meant to apply to “retrogressive measures” (i.e. restrictions imposed 
by a State for reasons of lack of resources) since they felt under Article 2(1) ICESCR.1415 As 
underlined by the Committee, a State party has the burden to prove that any retrogressive measure 
was adopted only after having cautiously considered all the alternatives, having substantially 
justified it for all the rights enshrined in the Covenant (an impact assessment), and having fully used 
its maximum available resources.1416 Indeed, a “deliberate retrogressive measure” is understood to imply a 
step back in the protection afforded to these rights and result from an intentional decision of a State 
party.1417  
Therefore, the protective function of Article 4 ICESCR may leads us to argue that a State party 
seeking to excuse the adoption of a retrogressive measure is required to guarantee that the decrease in 
resources does not give rise to a violation of its obligations under the Covenant, above all those under Article 4. In fact, 
                                                
1413 This is clarified by the Limburg Principles No. 46-47.  
1414 The difference may be understood in light of the character of the rights protected under Article 8, which resembles 
civil and political rights than any of the other rights protected in this Covenant. A relevant question is whether the far-
reaching reasons enumerated in Article 8 (public order, national security, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others) 
might permit limitations of any other rights protected under the ICESCR, beyond the promotion of general welfare that 
is actually the sole purpose explicitly stated in the general limitation clause of Article 4. For extensive discussion on this 
point, see A. Muller, op. cit., at 557-601. 
1415 The issue on the possible ways to limit ESC rights for legitimate interests of the community was a focus during the 
debates of the 234th-236th and 306th-308th meetings of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1951 and 1952. See, 
e.g., the explicit statement made by the UK representative that “Article 32 [now Article 4] solved the problem of limitation which 
was not solved by Article 1 [now Article 2]”, see Summary Record of the 308th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 6 June 
1952, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.308, at 5. Other States’ representatives made similar statements: for example, Australia, 
ibid., at 5; Chile, ibid., at 6; USSR, Summary Records of the 306th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 6 June 1952, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.306, at 11; France, Summary Record of the 307th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 6 June 
1952, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.307, at 5; and Pakistan, ibid., at 13.  
1416 See CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 9. 
1417 Examples may include: the adoption of any legislation/policy having a direct or collateral negative effect on the 
enjoyment of ESC rights or any legislation discriminating the enjoyment of these rights; the abrogation of any legislation 
or policy in accordance with these rights (unless obsolete) without replacing it with equally or more consistent laws or 
remedial measures; the unjustified reduction in public costs devoted to realising ESC rights without adequate 





insofar as a retrogressive measure results in a limitation on an ESC right, it may be posited that 
compliance with the requirements set forth in Article 4 is still required upon that State.1418 
3.5.1.b. Article 4 as a clause intrinsically linked to “progressive realisation” 
The drafting of Article 4 was intrinsically related to the notion of “progressive realisation” embodied in 
the general implementation clause of Article 2(1), hence to the specific nature of ESC rights,1419 
which is deemed partly programmatic since they set objectives that may be achieved in stages and 
over time. As highlighted in section 2.c.ii., however, the notion of “progressive realisation” entails a 
“continuous improvement” approach. While this is a necessarily flexible tool reflecting possible 
difficulties of States parties in ensuring ESC rights, the same notion must be interpret in view of the 
general object (the raison d’être) of the ICESCR, namely setting up States parties’ obligations towards 
a full realisation of the rights in question. Accordingly, “progressive realisation” has been deemed a 
concept requiring them to move promptly and efficiently towards that aim.1420  
Remarkably, the decision to include a general limitations clause into the Covenant was adopted 
by a narrow majority within the Commission on Human Rights during the drafting process.1421 
Moreover, other reasons such as “public order”, “public morals” and “the respect for rights and freedoms of 
others” were rejected by States representatives, because they were deemed inappropriate for limitations 
on ESC rights, despite their relevance for limitations on civil and political rights.1422  
                                                
1418 Among the violations of ESC rights that arise through direct action of States, Maastricht Guideline No. 14 includes, 
in lett. (f), “the calculated obstruction of, or halt to, the progressive realisation of a right protected by the Covenant, unless the State is acting 
within a limitation permitted by the Covenant or it does so due to a lack of available resources or force majeure”. 
1419 For an analysis of the travaux préparatoires of Article 4, see P. Alston and G. Quinn, op. cit., at 194. 
1420 See CESCR, General Comment No. 3, op. cit., para. 9, which concludes by stressing that “any deliberately retrogressive 
measures in that regard would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources”. 
1421 The issue on whether the UN Commission on Human Rights wanted to incorporate a general limitation clause into 
the ICESCR (rather than clauses for specific rights) was determined favourably by nine votes to eight, and one 
abstention, see Summary Record of the 308th meeting of the Commission on Human Rights, 6 June 1952, E/CN.4/SR.308, at 8. 
Specifically, at that session, the Commission, at request of the USSR representative, cast a vote as to the suitability of 
including a general limitation clause: by a compact roll-call vote, the Commission decided to include it, see UN 
Commission on Human Rights, report of the Eighth Session (14 April to 14 June 1952), ECOSOC, Final Records: Fourteenth Session, 
Supplement No. 4, E/2256, at 24, para.159. In favour: Australia, Belgium, China, France, Greece, India, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, United States of America. Contra: Chile, Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan, Poland, Ukraine, USSR, Yugoslavia. 
Abstention: Uruguay. At the same meeting, draft Article 32 (present Article 4) as a whole was adopted in a roll-call vote by 
ten votes to six, with 2 abstentions, see ibid., at 25, para.160. In favour: Australia, Belgium, China, France, Greece, India, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay. Contra: Chile, Lebanon, Poland, Ukraine, USSR, 
Yugoslavia. Abstentions: Egypt, Pakistan. 
1422 For Lebanon, see Summary Record of the 234th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 2 July 1951, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.234, at 20; for India, ibid, at 23; for Yugoslavia, Summary Record of the 235th meeting of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, 2 July 1951, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.235, at 5; for U.S.S.R., ibid., at 7; for Pakistan, ibid., at 17; for Chile, 
Summary Record of the 307th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 6 June 1952, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.307, at 6; for 





Thus, it may be argued that a State party seeking to excuse a failure to comply with the 
obligation to take steps due to resources constraints is still required to guarantee that it is acting 
within a limitation allowed under Article 4.  
3.5.1.c. Article 4 as a clause not appealing to “public order” 
The notion of “national security” was never suggested as a reason for possible restrictions under the 
general limitation clause of the ICESCR. Furthermore, the rejection of the wording of Article 29(2) 
UDHR1423 led Article 4 of the Covenant not to allow explicitly limitations “for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public 
order”.1424 
All the previous considerations regarding the travaux préparatoirs of the ICESCR inspire a further 
reflection on the rejected reason of “public order”, which may be significant in war-torn contexts 
where several human rights treaties may be applicable at the same time. It may be the case that the 
ICESCR applies to a certain situation in which the applicability of another relevant human rights 
treaty such as the ICCPR may be legitimately restricted. In such a situation, the issue arises as to 
what extent a permissible limitation of a right protected under the ICCPR (such as freedom of movement) may 
negatively affect the people’s ability to enjoy certain rights protected under the ICESCR (such as basic subsistence 
rights to food, health, housing or clothing) to which no limitations seem justifiable under this Covenant beyond 
the promotion of general welfare. In facing such a problematic interplay between different rights, the 
widely accepted interdependence of human rights gains relevance even where we might reflect upon 
a further observation. On the one hand, the promotion of general welfare is the sole purpose 
explicitly incorporated in Article 4 ICESCR, and, on the other hand, the protection of human life 
may base certain restrictions of the rights enshrined in the ICCPR. Thus, such interplay entails 
acknowledging the importance of conformity to the fundamental principles of necessity and proportionality, as 
general welfare certainly does not exclude the protection of human life. 
                                                
1423 Article 29(2) UDHR limits the exercise of rights in the following manner: “(2) In the exercise of his (sic) rights and 
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society”. 
1424 In this respect, the US proposal based on Article 29 UDHR (UN Doc. E/CN.4/610/Add.2) was amended, see 
Summary Record of the 236th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 2 July 1951, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.236, at 14. 
Moreover, the terms “respect for the rights and freedoms of others” and “legitimate requirements of morality and public order” were 
reintroduced by France as reasons for limitations of ESC rights, but this proposal was withdrawn as it was not broadly 
supported, see Summary Record of the 308th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 6 June 1952, UN Doc. 





Relevant practice includes the case of the “security wall” separating Israel and the occupied 
Palestinian territories, from which has arisen the delicate issue of the impact of the limitations to 
freedom of movement on the enjoyment of a number of ESC rights (health, education, work, adequate standard of 
living including food, clothing and housing) of Palestinians living therein. As recognised by the ICJ, the 
construction of the wall, the established closed area between the latter and the Green Line, and the 
created enclaves have “imposed substantial restrictions on the freedom of movement” of local inhabitants 
(excepting Israeli citizens and those assimilated thereto); serious repercussions for agricultural 
production have also emerged, alongside “increasing difficulties for the population concerned regarding access 
to health services, educational establishments and primary sources of water”.1425  
In considering the applicability of exceptions provided for in applicable human rights 
conventions, examining the provisions permitting derogation from them or qualifying the rights 
enshrined therein, the ICJ found that the conditions laid down by the relevant norms were not met in this 
case.1426 Israel was deemed bound to respect all the provisions of the ICCPR, except Article 9 on the 
right to freedom and security of person. Further, although Article 12(3) permits some restrictions on 
freedom of movement, to the ICJ the latter not only must be “directed to the ends authorized” (i.e. the 
protection of public health or morals, public order, national security), but also be “necessary for the 
attainment of those ends”. Besides, they “must conform to the principle of proportionality” and “must be the least 
intrusive instrument” available. In its conclusion, these conditions were not met in this case1427.  
Focusing on ESC rights, the restrictions following the construction of the wall and placed on their 
enjoyment by the Palestinians living in the occupied territories were deemed to fail to meet the condition 
specified in Article 4 ICESCR (i.e. they must be “solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a 
democratic society”).1428 On this point, however, it is worth observing that the ICJ could have 
articulated that the restrictions (resulting from a wall aimed at protecting life and limb of civilians) would not 
contradict Article 4 ICESCR: accepting the view that promoting general welfare does not exclude 
protecting life, in actual fact, would not acknowledge the legitimacy of restrictions under the 
ICCPR, but any limitations on ESC rights (even if meeting the condition of Article 4) would 
                                                
1425 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, paras. 133-134. 
1426 As highlighted in other parts of the present study, the ICJ declared, “on the basis of the information made available to it”, 
the applicability of the ICCPR and the ICESCR to the OPT by restating and supporting the long-standing positions of 
the corresponding treaty-based bodies. Furthermore, in using their views as the basis for its statement on the matter, this 
advisory opinion has reinforced their status as basic sources for the understanding of international human rights law, 
though not as judicial bodies. 
1427 ICJ, ibid., para. 136, referring to the HRC, General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement (art. 12), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, para. 14. 





nonetheless have to be consistent with the principles of proportionality and necessity.1429 In this 
sense, testing the proportionality of the restrictions on freedom of movement implies evaluating the 
seriousness of the harm made to the impediments to ESC rights such as work, education and health. 
Accordingly, a critical question remains as to why the ICJ did not consider such principles, and, 
instead, it found a violation based on the purpose of the restrictions concerned. Indeed, the ICJ 
would have probably observed the disproportionality of the harm - as did the Israeli High Court of 
Justice in reviewing particular sections of the barrier1430 - and then the ICJ would have still 
determined the violation of these rights.1431  
Nonetheless, in expressing doubts as to the specific route chosen for the barrier as “necessary to 
attain its security objectives”, the ICJ observed that “the wall, along the route chosen, and its associated 
regime gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel” and “the 
infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national 
security or public order”.1432  
3.5.1.d. The significance of “the general welfare” under Article 4 
The preceding considerations support a restrictive interpretation of this expression, although the travaux 
préparatoires have not elaborated its meaning and the CESCR has not yet commented directly on its 
understanding of general welfare.  
The Limburg Principles’ comment on the phrase “promoting general welfare” only underlines the 
necessity to construe it “to mean furthering the wellbeing of the people as a whole”.1433 As authoritatively 
underlined, while such a term is broadly defined in general legal usage (i.e. indicating the 
government’s concern for health, peace, morals and safety of its citizens), the drafters of Article 4 
were concerned to ensure that limitations could not be lightly justified; in this respect, an extensive 
                                                
1429 On this aspect, see also N. Lubell, “The ICJ Advisory Opinion and The Separation Barrier: A Troublesome 
Route”, 35 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 2005, 283, pp. 307-8. In particular, the author considers the case of the right 
to health in light of the view expressed by the CESCR in its General Comment: “Such restrictions must be in accordance with 
the law, including international human rights standards, compatible with the nature of the rights protected by the Covenant, in the interest of 
legitimate aims pursued, and strictly necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in a democratic society. … In line with Article 5(1), 
such limitations must be proportionate, i.e. the least restrictive alternative must be adopted where several types of limitations are available. Even 
where such limitations on grounds of protecting public health are basically permitted, they should be of limited duration and subject to review”, 
see CESCR, General Comment 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), paras. 
28-29. 
1430 HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, 30 June 2004. 
1431 See N. Lubell, op. cit, 2005 p. 308. 
1432 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, para. 137. 





interpretation has been deemed inappropriate, and its principal significance has been viewed more 
as related to the protective function of Article 4.1434 
Further implications derive from the notion that “general welfare” is the exclusive purpose contained 
in the general limitations clause of the ICESCR. For instance, concerns such as ‘national security’, 
or imperatives such as ‘economic development’, which are likely to be referred to by governments 
affected by times of emergency to justify non-satisfaction of economic and social rights, gain 
relevance. Firstly, invoking these types of reasons might be legitimate in so far as they are genuinely 
synonymous with “the general welfare”. The treaty body mandated to monitor compliance with the 
ICESCR might be the appropriate organ for reviewing the eventual reasoning articulated by a 
government to determine what constitutes the general welfare. Secondly, open-ended concepts like 
“economic development” might not prove sufficiently adequate to limit the implementation of ESC 
rights such as education, health, and social security unless the concerned State is able to prove that 
in a certain situation such a fluid concept coincides with “the general welfare”.1435 Legal scholarship has 
referred to another significant case regarding internal or international armed conflicts which 
featured a context of general scarcity of food, by which a State might be able to justify non-
discriminatory rationing of food by arguing that this was necessary for maintaining general welfare 
(even though this would be at the same time a measure to maintain public order through ensuring 
equitable distribution).1436 
Notably, these views on “the general welfare” of Article 4 have been supported by the CESCR in a 
number of its General Comments, although its understanding of this exclusive purpose explicitly 
incorporated in that clause has never been directly articulated. In particular, a State party is allowed to 
impose limitations of various aspects of the right to health for reasons of national security or public 
order by “justifying such serious measures in relation to each of the elements identified in Article 4”, hence by 
showing that those limitations would be imposed for reasons of “promoting general welfare”1437. Similarly, its 
                                                
1434 See P. Alston and G. Quinn, op. cit., pp. 201-202. 
1435 See P. Alston and G. Quinn, op. cit., pp. 201-202, noting the Chilean representative’s statement (Mr. Santa Cruz) 
during the drafting of article 4, according to which the limitations clause should not justify a State “delaying implementation 
of such rights as those to education, health and social security in order to concentrate all its resources on economic development, thus sacrificing 
the interests of the present generation to those of the next”, see Summary Record of the 235th meeting of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.235 (1951), at 13. 
1436 See A. Muller, op. cit., p. 573. 
1437 CESCR, General Comment No. 14: Right to the highest attainable standards of health (art. 12), 11 August 2000, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/4, para. 28, reading: “Issues of public health are sometimes used by States as grounds for limiting the exercise of other 
fundamental rights. The Committee wishes to emphasise that the Covenant’s limitation clause, article 4, is primarily intended to protect the 
rights of individuals rather than to permit the imposition of limitations by States. Consequently a State party which, for example, restricts the 
movement of, or incarcerates, persons with transmissible diseases such as HIV/AIDS, refuses to allow doctors to treat persons believed to be 
opposed to a government, or fails to provide immunization against the community’s major infectious diseases, on grounds such as national 





emphasis that Article 4 is mainly meant to protect individuals’ ESC rights (instead of permitting 
States parties to impose restrictions) has led the Committee to stress that “a State party which closes 
educational institutions on grounds such as national security or the preservation of public order has the burden of 
justifying such a serious measure in relation to each of the elements identified in Article 4”.1438 Furthermore, in 
some statements on national and international development policies, such as poverty reduction 
strategies or structural adjustment programmes, the Committee has shared the opinion that broad 
concepts such as “economic development” may not easily justify restrictions on the rights guaranteed under the 
ICESCR, since policies introduced in the name of open-ended notion may often impede the 
implementation of the Covenant’s provisions by restricting disproportionately the ESC rights of the 
most vulnerable groups without “promoting general welfare”.1439 
Interestingly, within war-torn contexts “the general welfare” purpose of Article 4 may raise another 
issue regarding States parties’ use of resources for investments in the defence field. It is generally 
observed that “national security” and “public order” are not mentioned as purposes permitting 
limitations on ESC rights; moreover, this element entails that States parties would be required to 
demonstrate that upholding such concepts is clearly equivalent to upholding “general welfare”. Nonetheless, States’ 
arguments that in times of armed conflict “general welfare” would be more effectively promoted by 
spending on defence (including on anti-insurgency operations) rather than on food, health-care, 
housing or social security programmes has been questioned.1440 Despite a possible positive answer 
being suggested where a State faces an attack by a foreign aggressor, it is commonly and 
appropriately commented that limitations on the minimum core of each right enshrined in the ICESCR are not 
justifiable, given that the minimum core obligations do describe “the nature of these rights”. Such 
limitations would indeed deprive the Covenant of its essential content.  
                                                                                                                                                            
article 4. Such restrictions must be in accordance with the law, including international human rights standards, compatible with the nature of 
the rights protected by the Covenant, in the interest of legitimate aims pursued and strictly necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in a 
democratic society”. 
1438 CESCR, General Comment No. 13: Right to education (art. 13), 8 December 1999, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10, para. 42. 
1439 See, e.g., CESCR, Concluding Observations on Egypt, 23 May 2000, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.44, para. 10, where the 
Committee found that “some aspects of structural adjustment programmes and economic liberalisation policies introduced by the 
Government of Egypt, in concert with international financial institutions, have impeded the implementation of the Covenant’s provisions, 
particularly with regard to the most vulnerable groups”. Equally, see CESCR, Concluding Observations on Kyrgyzstan, 1 September 
2000, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.49, para. 29, stressing the duty of Kyrgyzstan to assess the impact of its economic 
reforms on the well-being of the population and reminding “the State party of its obligation, even under severe resource constraints, 
to protect the vulnerable groups of society, as stated in paragraph 12 of the Committee’s General Comment No. 3”. See CESCR, 
“Statement on Globalisation and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, May 1998, para. 7. See CESCR, “Poverty 
and the ICESCR”, Statement by the Committee to the Third United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries, 10 May 2001, 
para. 11.  
1440 See A. Muller, op. cit., at 574-5, noting that the CESCR has indirectly touched upon aspects of this question under 
Article 2(1) ICESCR in addressing the justification of retrogressive measures occurring due to lack of resources, which 
has not been regarded as a limitation falling under Article 4; thus, this question seems related to finding a reasonable 





3.5.1.e. Further implications from the qualifications under Article 4 
Other qualifications to be satisfied by any restriction on ESC rights under the general clause of 
Article 4 deserve attention, since they comprehensively define the scope of admissible limitations of 
the Covenant even in war-torn contexts. In particular, the condition that any limitation must be 
acceptable “in a democratic society” plays a great role, being textually and inherently linked to the 
understanding of “general welfare”. As highlighted during the drafting process, its absence might have 
led, in fact, to the general limitation clause to “very well serve the ends of dictatorship”.1441 Significantly, 
this view emphasises that any States parties’ determinations on what constitutes “general welfare” need to be taken 
in the context of conditions prevailing in a democratic society, which may be regarded as a society recognising 
and respecting the human rights set forth in the UN Charter, the UDHR and the relevant treaties 
subsequently adopted, although no single model of a democratic society seems to be identifiable. A 
further implication emerges in the Limburg Principles’ comment on Article 4, stating that the burden 
is upon the State to demonstrate that the limitation on ESC rights do not impair the democratic functioning of the 
society.1442 
Another independent standard of legitimacy under Article 4 is that any limitation on the rights 
protected under the Covenant is to be “determined by law”. This condition obliges States parties to define 
such a limitation in national law in a way that it must be consistent with relevant human rights treaties 
as well as it must be in force at the time when the restriction is imposed.1443 Similar implications are 
underlined in the Limburg Principles, of which the comment on Article 4 indicates that the laws 
imposing limitations on the exercise of a certain right should not be “unreasonable” or 
“discriminatory” or “arbitrary”, nor be understood or applied so as to put at risk its essence1444. 
Moreover, such laws should be understandable, besides providing guarantees and effective remedies 
against unlawful and abusive application of limitations on ESC rights.1445  
It is worth referring to the 2011 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in 
the area of ESC rights, which recognise in Principle No. 42 that States may impose on ESC rights 
only limitations which are legitimate under international law and which satisfy substantive and 
                                                
1441 See the statement by the Greek representative, Summary Record of the 235th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 
2 July 1951, E/CN.4/SR.235, at 20. 
1442 Limburg Principle, No. 54. 
1443 This view is confirmed by the CESCR for the right to adequate housing, referring extensively to the Human Rights 
Committee’ understanding of “law”, see General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing (art. 11(1)): forced evictions, 20 
May 1997, UN Doc. E/1998/22, Annex IV, para. 15, referring, inter alia, to General Comment No. 16: The right to privacy (8 
April 1988, UN Doc. A/43/40, para. 4). See also CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The right to water (arts. 11 and 12), 20 
January 2003, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, para. 56, stating that “any action that interferes with an individual’s right to water … 
[must be] performed in a manner warranted by law, compatible with the Covenant”. 
1444 Limburg Principles, Nos. 48, 49, 56. 





procedural guarantees. The latter have been elaborated in relation to restrictions on the right to 
water, forced evictions, and retrogressive measures impairing the right to social security.1446 
3.5.1.f. The required compatibility “with the nature of these rights” 
A condition exclusively incorporated in Article 4 requires any restriction to be “compatible with the nature 
of these rights”. This prerequisite for legitimacy gains relevance for the purposes of the present 
research. While some basic considerations are highlighted here below, further reflections on its 
several implications are articulated through out the chapters of this work. Firstly, the travaux 
préparatoires of Article 4 reveal how the aim expressed in the Chilean proposal of this phrase consists 
in assuring that the impact of any limitations of the ICESCR is studied with regard to each right proclaimed in the 
Covenant individually in order to inhibit their nullification.1447 Secondly, no direct references to this 
expression are found in the CESCR’s General Comments or Concluding Observations. 
Nonetheless, the elaboration of a “minimum core obligations approach” in its General Comment on the 
nature of States parties’ obligations (particularly para. 10, see next section 2.c.ii.) reveals at least 
three aspects of its understanding about “compatibility with the nature” of ESC rights. The Committee 
appears to consider that (1) the minimum core obligations to secure minimum essential levels of 
each right enshrined in the Covenant represent the ‘nature’ of ESC rights, (2) States parties are 
required to comply with core obligations, and (3) they are non-derogable. According to this line of 
interpretation, the condition that any limitation has to be “compatible with the nature of these rights” does not 
to permit restrictions touching upon the minimum core obligations of the rights enshrined in the 
Covenant.  
As detailed in section 2.c.ii., the minimum core obligations approach has been further 
articulated; the CESCR has identified the core obligations arising from “minimum essential levels” of 
the rights to food, education, health, and water. Moreover, in its view States are not permitted to remain 
passive in cases of deprivation of individuals’ basic rights such as health or water, and non-compliance with their 
minimum core obligations is deemed a violation of the corresponding right under the ICESCR.1448 Significantly, it 
                                                
1446 See General Comment No. 15: The right to water, para. 56; General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing, paras. 13-16; 
General Comment No. 19: The right to social security, para. 5. 
1447 Summary Record of the 235th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.235 (1951), at 13. This 
proposal was made by the Chilean representative and was adopted by the Commission without any further discussion, 
see Summary Record of the 236th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 2 July 1951, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.236, at 11. 
1448 See General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standards of health (art. 12), 11 August 2000, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/4, paras. 47-48. Paragraph 47 reads: “In determining which actions or omissions amount to a violation of the right to 
health, it is important to distinguish the inability from the unwillingness of a State party to comply with its obligations under article 12. This 
follows from article 12.1, which speaks of the highest attainable standard of health, as well as from article 2.1 of the Covenant, which obliges 
each State party to take the necessary steps to the maximum of its available resources. A State which is unwilling to use the maximum of its 





has openly affirmed the non-derogability of the minimum core obligations deriving from the rights 
to health and water in the two General Comments just mentioned.1449 This recognition seems to 
corroborate its understanding of the core obligations as describing the ‘nature’ of the corresponding 
rights. Then, the notion of “non-derogability” has led the same Committee to underline that “because 
core obligations are non-derogable, they continue to exist in situations of conflict, emergency and natural disaster”.1450  
Overall, this treaty-based body clearly supports the argument that a limitation established by a State 
party under Article 4 cannot affect the Covenant’s minimum core obligations because it would be contrary to the 
“nature” of their corresponding rights.  
 
Interestingly, the Limburg Principles comment on the compatibility with the nature of ESC 
rights under Article 4 similarly highlights that such a condition requires a limitation to “not be interpreted 
or applied so as to jeopardize the essence of the right concerned”.1451 Even in legal scholarship debating this 
clause the necessity to respect the compatibility with the nature of ESC rights has been emphasised along 
with the need to reject any restrictions on the minimum core obligations deriving from these rights. Some scholars 
have emphasised the importance of not departing from “a minimum standard of livelihood and health, even 
in times of armed conflict” regarding permissible limitations under Article 4.1452 As to the right to food, 
                                                                                                                                                            
impossible for a State to comply fully with its Covenant obligations, it has the burden of justifying that every effort has nevertheless been made 
to use all available resources at its disposal in order to satisfy, as a matter of priority, the obligations outlined above. It should be stressed, 
however, that a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core obligations set out in 
paragraph 43 above, which are non-derogable”.  
See General Comment No. 15: The right to water (arts. 11 and 12), 20 January 2003, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, paras. 40, 42, 
44 (c). In para. 40 it affirms that: “To demonstrate compliance with their general and specific obligations, States parties must establish 
that they have taken the necessary and feasible steps towards the realisation of the right to water. In accordance with international law, a 
failure to act in good faith to take such steps amounts to a violation of the right. It should be stressed that a State party cannot justify its non-
compliance with the core obligations set out in paragraph 37 above, which are non-derogable”.  
See CESCR, General Comment No. 19: The right to social security, 4 February 2008, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/19, para. 65, 
reading: “Violations through acts of omission can occur when the State party fails to take sufficient and appropriate action to realise the right 
to social security. In the context of social security, examples of such violations include the failure to take appropriate steps towards the full 
realisation of everyone's right to social security; the failure to enforce relevant laws or put into effect policies designed to implement the right to 
social security; the failure to ensure the financial sustainability of State pension schemes; the failure to reform or repeal legislation which is 
manifestly inconsistent with the right to social security; the failure to regulate the activities of individuals or groups so as to prevent them from 
violating the right to social security; the failure to remove promptly obstacles which the State party is under a duty to remove in order to permit 
the immediate fulfilment of a right guaranteed by the Covenant; the failure to meet the core obligations (see paragraph 59 above); the failure of 
a State party to take into account its Covenant obligations when entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with other States, 
international organizations or multinational corporations”. 
1449 In other fields this issue has remained unexplored, see General Comment No. 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author (art. 
15 (1)(c)), 12 January 2006, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/17; General Comment 18: The right to work (art. 6), 6 February 2006, UN 
Doc. E/C.12/GC/18; General Comment 19: The right to social security, 4 February 2008, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/19. 
1450 CESCR, “Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Statement adopted at the 
3rd UN Conference on Least Developed Countries, 10 May 2001, E/C.12/2001/10, para. 18. 
1451 Limburg Principles, June 1986, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17 (and UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/13), para. 56. 
1452 A. Rosas and M. Sandvik-Nylund, “Armed Conflicts”, in Eide, Krause, Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural 





any limitations that “could result in death by starvation” have been regarded as unacceptable.1453 
However, the possible extent of the scope of the minimum core obligations corresponding to the 
right to food as well as the right to health may remain not easily determinable.1454  
 
In conflict-related settings the argument that the required compatibility with the nature of ESC rights 
under Article 4 does not permit restrictions touching upon the minimum core obligations of States parties has certain 
implications. In particular, subsistence rights such as the right to basic food, a basic level of health care, 
clothing and basic shelter gain relevance. The ICESCR’s applicability to contexts of armed conflict 
or military occupation would imply that any policy limiting the minimum core obligations corresponding to 
basic subsistence rights enshrined in the Covenant should be deemed not “compatible with the very nature” of the rights 
in question, hence in violation of Article 4. Indeed, restricting the minimum core obligations of basic 
subsistence rights would undermine the vital interests of the individuals affected by such contexts, 
thus reflecting a de facto extinction of those rights in such times.1455  
Notably, in undertaking the ICESCR application to armed conflict in General Comment on the 
right to adequate housing, the Committee has expressively underlined that even when restrictions 
on this right may be needed “full compliance with Article 4 of the Covenant is required so that any limitations 
imposed must be determined by law only insofar as this may be compatible with the nature of these (i.e. economic, 
social and cultural) rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society”.1456 As 
is observed by the same Committee, forced evictions occurring “in connection with forced population 
transfers, internal displacement, forced relocations in the context of armed conflict, mass exoduses and refugee 
movements” may violate the right to adequate housing. In particular, a risk in such contexts concerns 
the breach of both the right and the prohibition through a variety of acts or omissions of a State 
party to the Covenant.  
                                                
1453 P. Alston, “International law and the Human Rights to Food”, in Alston and Tomasevski (eds.), The Right to Food, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1984, p. 21. 
1454 Kunnemann, “The Right to Adequate Food: Violations Related to its Minimum Core”, in Chapman and Russell, 
op. cit., pp. 161-83. See Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law, Intersentia, 1999, pp. 284-8; 
Chapman, “Core Obligations Related to the Right to Health”, in Chapman and Russell, op. cit., pp. 185-214.  
1455 This point seems coherent with the general understanding that the “power to impose restrictions on fundamental rights is 
essentially a power to ‘regulate’ the exercise of these rights, not to extinguish them”, see Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human 
Rights Law: National, Regional and International Jurisprudence, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 187. 
1456 CESCR, General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing (Art. 11.1): forced evictions, 20 May 1997, E/1998/22, Annex 





3.5.2. De facto derogations from ESC rights? 
In view of the previous analysis on the general limitations clause contained in the ICESCR, it seems 
pertinent to reflect on the controversial prerogative of States parties to derogate in any case from their 
obligations under the Covenant notwithstanding it not offering any express legal basis allowing or 
proscribing to suspend ESC rights.  
As observed above, de facto derogations from the ICESCR have been debated in academic 
literature, determining it too ambitious to expect that every dimension of ESC rights might be 
implemented during times of public emergency. The analysis conducted on Article 4 and especially 
on its drafting history appears to confirm the view that the absence of an explicit derogation clause 
is not per se determinative of whether suspensions of ESC rights are or not admissible. Nonetheless, it 
seems reasonable to argue that the general limitation clause of Article 4 alongside the flexibility of the obligations 
established in Article 2(1) may sufficiently enable a State party to respond to extraordinary circumstances such as 
armed conflict or military occupation. In this regard, a State party is allowed to impose no further 
restrictions on ESC rights than the ones permitted outside such situations, since no limitations on 
ESC rights may be justified on the grounds of an existing armed conflict.  
As revealed in the previous section, the CESCR has not made a general reference to the 
Covenant’s derogability. Instead, it has focused on the non-derogable nature of minimum core obligations of 
ESC rights under a soft approach: it has acknowledged that States parties cannot excuse non-
compliance with the core obligations flowing from the right to health and the right to water, while 
this wording has not featured its General Comments on other rights (like the right to social security 
or the right to work). Yet, in view of statements such as “because core obligations are non-derogable, they 
continue to exist in situations of conflict, emergency and natural disaster”,1457 apparently the Committee 
considers per se non-derogable also the minimum core obligations under each of the rights of the 
Covenant. 
In this regard, an additional point gains relevance. The Committee’s recognition of non-derogable 
minimum core obligations in the sphere of basic subsistence rights may be seen in line with the idea that in 
situations of armed conflict basic subsistence human rights (e.g. to adequate food, to health care and prevention 
measures, to basic shelter) must not be suspended under the ICESCR, and, instead, States parties are called to 
respect, protect and fulfil them. Thus, the extent to which States affected by conflict-related situations are 
required to implement such obligations ends up constituting the main issue. 
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The emphasis on the non-derogability of minimum core obligations corresponding to basic 
subsistence rights acquires further significance in view of their close connection with the right to life, which 
has been pointed out by other monitoring bodies such as the Human Rights Committee1458 and 
even explained in the CRC1459, in addition to further references in academic debate. In particular, 
the social dimension of the right to life has been meant to entail a basic State obligation to guarantee conditions 
that are not an immediate threat to life and livelihood. It has been emphasised that “survival rights, based on a 
combination of the right to life contained in the ICCPR, and the right to food and health contained in the ICESCR” 
should be regarded as non-derogable under these Covenants.1460 Then, States parties’ ability to 
justify both limitations on and derogations from ESC rights relating to food, health care, clothing  
and housing has appeared to be difficult.1461  
In the same vein, a noteworthy opinion was expressed in the Street Children Case, where the right 
to life was defined to also encompass the life conditions that guarantee a dignified existence.1462 In 
the words of the former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: “[…] The arbitrary 
deprivation of life is not limited to the illicit act of homicide; it extends itself to the deprivation of the right to live with 
dignity. This outlook conceptualises the right to life as belonging, at the same time, to the domain of civil and political 
rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights, thus illustrating the interrelation and indivisibility of all human 
rights”.1463 Therefore, it may be emphasised that the perspective of focusing on the direct connection 
between ESC rights and the non-derogable right to life gives greater consistency to the view of excluding 
States parties the possibility of suspending basic subsistence rights in conflict-torn and occupation-
related situations. 
It is worth mentioning that the practice emerging in the reporting procedure under the 
Covenant varies. Some States parties have outlined the possibilities to derogate from Articles 6, 7, 
and 8 ICESCR in their reports to the Committee, so appearing to assume the derogability of the 
right to strike or other rights related to labour issues.1464 Conversely, some States have been silent on 
                                                
1458 HRC, General Comment No. 6: Right to life, 30 April 1982, para. 5. 
1459 See Article 6 CRC, which connects children’s right to life with their right to survival that comprises an obligation to 
guarantee at all times available adequate nutrition and basic health care for children, see General Comment No. 7: 
Implementing child rights in early childhood, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, 20 September 2006, para. 10.  
1460 On the social dimension of the rights to life, see F. Menghistu, “The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements”, in B.G. 
Ramcharan, The Right to Life in International Law, Nijhoff Dotrecht, 1985, pp. 63-83; Rosas and Sandvik-Nylund, “Armed 
Conflicts”, in Eide, Krause, Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, op. cit., 2001, p. 414. 
1461 See also P. Alston and G. Quinn, op. cit., p. 217 (regarding derogations) and pp. 196-7 (regarding limitations). 
1462 IACtHR, Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment of 19 November 1999, Ser C No. 63, para. 144. 
1463 Ibid., Opinion of Judges Cançado Trinidade and Abreu-Burelli, para. 4. 
1464 E.g., Second Periodic Report, Azerbaijan, 1 December 2003, E/1990/6/Add.37, para. 154; Combined Second-Fifth Periodic 
Reports, India, 1 March 2007, UN Doc. E/C.12/IND/5, para. 173; Fifth Periodic Report, Ukraine, 14 August 2006, UN 
Doc. E/C.12/UKR/5, paras. 195 and 199. For instance, the performance by workers of compulsory labour during 





possible derogations from ESC rights in their reports to the Committee, while others States have 
explicitly argued that the derogation exercised from the ICCPR do not extend to the ICESCR 
rights as well as it do not affect the enjoyment of ESC rights.1465  
3.6. The relationship with international humanitarian law 
Assumed that ESC rights enshrined in the just examined treaties cannot be generally suspended or 
freely restricted by States parties in situations of armed conflict and periods of military occupation, 
the legal effect of the applicability of international human rights law deserves specific scrutiny in relation to the 
law of armed conflict and the laws of occupation.  
As observed in previous chapters, the laws and customs of war were developed to apply during 
armed conflicts and provide a minimum level of humanity, acknowledging such special circumstances, 
allocating responsibilities and entitlements to the various actors involved, and addressing duties of 
Contracting Parties (rather than articulating rights of individuals). For its part, international human 
rights law emerged later to govern the relationship between the State and individuals within its 
jurisdiction, providing a framework of State obligations to ensure fundamental and indivisible rights. 
They both share a concern for the principle of human dignity but under different mechanisms and 
scopes of application: one only in war-torn scenarios, the other at all times; one applies to all 
belligerents including non-state armed groups, the other formally obligates only States; one was 
drafted to protect enemy combatants and non-combatants, the other was drafted to confer rights 
essentially to nationals.  
As they emerged as responses to different sets of issues and originally intended to apply to 
different situations, they have been generally regarded as mutually exclusive under the principle lex 
specialis derogat lex generalis, with the laws of armed conflict constituting the specialized version. The 
three occasions in which the International Court of Justice has echoed this view are well known.1466 
However, that separation has gradually eroded, especially as human rights treaties have been 
increasingly regarded as founding a universally applicable regime in both international and non-
                                                                                                                                                            
State under a direct military threat, have been contemplated in a procedure under Slovenian law, see Initial Report, 
Slovenia, 26 May 2006, E/1990/5/Add.62, paras. 53 and 99-105. See also Initial Report, Kyrgyzstan, 26 February 1999, 
E/1990/5/Add.42, para. 14; Initial Report, Tajikistan, 31 May 2006, UN Doc. E/C.12/TJK/1, para. 150. 
1465 E.g., Initial Report, Algeria, 28 July 2000, E/1990/6/Add.26, para. 46. 
1466 ICJ, Legality or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 25; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 106; ICJ, Case concerning armed 





international armed conflict. 1467  The advanced jurisprudence on human rights law and the 
consequent relevance acquired by the normative concept of human rights has favoured such an 
erosion. 
It is noteworthy that certain proximity of international human rights law is acknowledged by 
international humanitarian law. As affirmed in the official commentary, the minimum standard 
contained in common Article 3 GCs “merely ensures respect for the few essential rules of humanity which all 
civilized nations consider as valid everywhere and under all circumstances and as being above and outside war 
itself”.1468 Furthermore, according to the preamble of Protocol II “international instruments relating to 
human rights offer a basic protection to the human person”. Then, in delineating the field of application of 
Protocol I, Article 72 API establishes that “(t)he provisions of this Section are additional to the rules concerning 
humanitarian protection of civilians and civilian objects in the power of a Party to the conflict contained in the Fourth 
Convention, particularly Parts I and III thereof, as well as to other applicable rules of international law relating to the 
protection of fundamental human rights during international armed conflict”. 
No agreement on the exact meaning of the lex specialis principle has emerged though.1469 
Moreover, under Article 31(3)(c) VCLT State treaty obligations have to be interpreted in 
accordance with the whole of international law as a system. In echoing such a technique of 
systematic interpretation, the special rule may be deemed to represent the application of the general rule in a given 
setting (rather than an exemption to it). In this regard, lex specialis may be deemed a “contextual 
principle”1470. In determining the specialized norm “the most important indicators are the precision and clarity 
of a rule and its adaptation to the particular circumstances of the case”.1471  
Contemporary contexts of armed conflict as well as periods of occupation have made the option 
to treat the two regimes as mutually exclusive ever more debatable; the lex specialis rule in those 
situations appears not to dictate a priori precedence to any body of law anymore, being that the 
matter is rather contexts-dependent or interests-dependent. Of value is a consensus favouring the position 
                                                
1467 Little disagreement on the applicability of human rights law has resulted among practicioners and scholars, see F. 
Hampson, “The relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law from the perspective of a 
human rights treaty body”, 90 IRRC, 2008, pp. 549-557. 
1468 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1958, at 60. 
1469 In particular note, two main meanings of the principle have been distinguished by the Study Group of the UN 
International Law Commission on Fragmentation of International Law: “In the first instance, a special rule could be considered 
to be an application, elaboration or updating of a general standard. In the second instance, a special rule is taken, instead, as a modification, 
overruling or setting aside of the general standard (i.e. lex specialis is an exception to the general rule). […] It was often impossible to say 
whether a rule should be seen as an “application” or “setting aside” of another rule”. See ILC, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of International Law, 28 July 2004, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.663/Rev.1, para. 13. 
1470 See H. Krieger, “A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in 
the ICRC Customary Law Study”, 11(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 2006, pp. 265-291, at 269. 





that in such times human rights law applies entirely alongside international humanitarian law has 
actually evolved.1472 In this respect, these legal regimes may be applied and clarified in view of one another 
particularly when they afford norms covering common fields. According to an approach of “reciprocal-
influence” or “cross-interpretation”, human rights law can be read in view of international 
humanitarian law (as already observed in the ICJ Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion1473) and the latter 
can be understood in view of the former too. Otherwise, one branch can substitute, displace or 
restrain the other.  
The consequent meaning of lex specialis as a tool to interpret norms belonging to distinct branches but 
interacting in a complementary relation entails determining the applicable norms on a case-by-case basis. 
In the sphere of ESC rights, approaching the principle of lex specialis as complementarity of norms 
may have positive implications particularly in situations of non-international armed conflicts and 
periods of occupations. It seems reasonable to argue that a constructive coordination in dealing with 
civilians’ ESC rights may be developed between such regimes, either when they concur (for existing 
overlapping norms within each branch) or when they diverge. In imposing concurrent obligations, 
the extent of their mutual influence may vary. In any case, the question arises as to whether that 
coordination provides civilians with a greater degree of protection. This may certainly occur when 
such regimes deal with different issues concerning the same right: as they do not clash, there is no 
need to favour one over the other or to ascribe to one of the two a special status.  
Significantly, a legal basis for such coordination may be found in Article 5(2) ICESCR whereby 
“no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognised or existing in any country in 
virtue of law, conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not 
recognise such rights or that it recognises them to a lesser extent”. Thus, States parties are required to apply 
other “law, conventions, regulations or custom” that afford better protection than the Covenant. Equally, 
under Article 75(8) API, “no provision of this Article may be construed as limiting or infringing any other more 
favourable provision granting greater protection under any applicable rules of international law, to persons covered by 
paragraph 1”. Furthermore, in Article 158(4) GCIV the applicability of the “laws of humanity” is 
underlined irrespective of the actual obligations under the Geneva Convention.1474 
                                                
1472 See J. Cerone, “Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The Application of International Human Rights Law During 
Armed Conflict, Occupation and Peace Operations”, 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2006, 1447, at 1453. 
1473 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., para. 25. 
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3.6.(1) Noteworthy rationales supporting the importance to apply and employ the concepts and 
standards pertaining to international human rights law of economic, social and cultural nature in situations of 
armed conflict and belligerent occupation may be outlined as follows.  
Many IHL provisions protect vital conditions to the enjoyment by civilians of ESC rights by dealing 
mostly with the ways to accomplish efficiency in humanitarian relief supplies, public health services, 
and food security.1475 Conversely, IHL provisions ruling on the relationship between a belligerent 
party and civilian persons/objects under its control have been developed only for situations of 
military occupation, with some limitations however. Nonetheless, IHL rules afford an exhaustive 
protection in dealing with the treatment of public or private property.1476 In any case IHL 
mechanisms to monitor, implement and enforce the applicable law may as a result be weak.  
On the other hand, human rights monitoring bodies at the universal and regional level have 
progressively given normative content and force to the ESC rights enshrined in human rights treaties, drawing 
basic guidelines to explain how their notions have undergone substantial changes and have widened 
in scope even in conflict-torn contexts, thus “surpassing” what international humanitarian law 
provides for. 1477  Indeed, human rights violations of persons found in such situations - and 
independently of their IHL status - can fall under their judicial or quasi-judicial scrutiny; generally 
they have jurisdiction to apply human rights law, even in view of IHL, but sometimes the other way 
around may be provided for, such as in Article 38 CRC. 
In this regard, human rights treaties conferring ESC rights to individuals not only may cover 
                                                
1475 On this aspect, see N. Lubell, “Challenges in Applying Human Rights law to Armed Conflict”, 2005, 87 IRRC, p. 
751; N. Lubell “Human rights obligations in military occupation”, 94 IRRC, 2012, pp. 329-334. See also Y. Arai-
Takahashi, The Law of Occupation, op. cit., 2009, p. 371, who exemplifies this point by referring to the FAO’s Voluntary 
Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, in which the 
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see also Articles 46-56 HRs. See Article 33(2) GCIV and Article 47 HRs, which establish limits to its appropriation or 
requisition by the occupation forces. For a recent contribution, see S. Vité, “The interrelation of the law of occupation 
and economic, social and cultural rights: the examples of food, health and property”, 80 IRRC, 2008, pp. 629-651. 
1477 In addition to the human rights treaty bodies, several reports by UN human rights experts have dealt with the 
safeguarding of ESC rights in such contexts, clarifying relevant treaty obligations, also referring to the IHRL/IHL 
relationship, although without delivering fully complete and accurate legal analysis being their main role to inform the 
former Commission on Human Rights or the Human Rights Council about the human rights situations in the countries 
concerned. Noteworthy cases regard the rights to food, education, and housing, in times of armed conflict. See Report to 
the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Vernor Muno Villalobos, Right to education in emergency situations, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/8/10, 20 May 2008. See Report to the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate 





subjects scarcely if at all mentioned under international humanitarian law, but also afford “overlapping subjects” 
further normative details not found in the law of armed conflict or merely touched by occupation law. This is evident 
in relation to the right to health,1478 the right to food,1479 and the right to water and sanitation,1480 
the right to education.1481 In this sense, obligations flowing from human rights treaties are essentially 
not echoed in IHL rules. For instance, IHL generally encompasses the “respect” and “protect” 
facets of ESC rights, while the “fulfil” facet is not determined.1482 The latter provides for broader 
State obligations (i.e. taking legislative, administrative, judicial measures towards a complete 
realisation of the rights in question); its importance in conflict-torn situations is emblematically 
shown as to the right to health: while investment and protection in the health sector would be 
required towards the progressive realisation of this right as well as non-retrogressive measures, in 
conflict-related situations plans on disease control frequently are critically compromised in relation 
to patients’ ability to search for care, drug supply, and distraction of economic funds to military 
ends.1483  As regards education 
                                                
1478 For interpretation of the nature and scope of the right to health alongside the corresponding obligations under the 
ICESCR, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 14: Right to the highest attainable standards of health (art. 12), 11 August 2000, 
particularly para. 12 and paras. 43-45. See also Chapman, “Core obligations related to the right to health”, in 
Chapman and Russell, Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2002, pp. 185-215. For a 
contribution on the argument that, while international humanitarian law offers a critically important set of rules for 
addressing obligations regarding health in armed conflict, also human rights law acts as “a powerful complement to it”, see 
K.H.A. Footer and L.S. Rubenstein, “A Human Rights Approach to Health Care in Conflict”, IRRC, 2013, pp.1-21. 
1479 For interpretation of the nature and scope of the right to food and the corresponding obligations under the 
ICESCR, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food (arts. 11), 15 May 1999, particularly paras. 6-13, 
paras. 14-20. 
1480 E.g., the CESCR has derived an implicit human right to water from other rights explicitly guaranteed under the 
ICESCR: under Article 11(1) the right to water is interpreted as falling “within the category of guarantees essential for securing an 
adequate standard of living” (e.g. adequate housing, adequate food, and adequate clothing) principally because “it is one of the 
most fundamental conditions for survival”; under Article 12 (1) the right to water is interpreted as “inextricably related to the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health” and it is indicated that “water should be treated as a social and cultural good, and not primarily 
as an economic good”. For the normative content of the right to water, see CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The right to water 
(arts. 11 and 12), 20 January 2003, particularly paras. 3, 6-8, 18. See also R. Kunneman, “The Right to adequate food: 
violations related to its minimum core content”, in Chapman and Russell (ed.), op. cit., pp. 161-183. 
1481 See Articles 13-14 ICESCR, Articles 28-29 of CRC. 
1482 For example, the right of aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict to claim the same standard of health care as 
afforded to the State’s own nationals is guaranteed under Article 38 GCIV, but this Convention does not contain a 
correspondent right for protected persons in occupied territory except Article 56 for health measures; particularly in 
cases in which the occupation is prolonged, no rules of the scope of health measures are provided for. See N. Lubell, op. 
cit., pp. 752-753.  
1483 In this regard, some scholars have addressed the endemic status of polio in countries like Afghanistan, Nigeria, and 
Pakistan that have experienced several conflicts and where vaccination programs have been interrupted. See K.H.A. 
Footer and L.S. Rubenstein, “A Human Rights Approach to Health Care in Conflict”, IRRC, 2013, p. 14. The authors 
emphasises that, in addition to “avoid interfering directly with polio immunisation programmes” and “to take steps to prevent interference 
with the right by third parties”, in order to ensure the realisation of the right to health States are required to implement 
policies that guarantee polio immunisation programmes even in times of conflicts or other disturbances. It is reported 
that, following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health actively 
cooperated with the Taliban (through the ICRC’s intermediary) in order to enable the movement of vaccinators and 
intensify access to children living in Taliban strongholds. The campaign was administered with the support of the WHO 





This comprehensive rationale thus renders more debatable the view that international 
humanitarian law provides for sufficient protection of ESC rights beyond conditions having ‘emergency 
connotations’ and for sufficient guidance on substantial needs to ensure healthcare, food and water safety, education 
and labour conditions in contemporary settings of armed conflict, especially those having a non-
international nature, and present-day periods of military occupation. Remarkably, a human rights 
approach to deal with them encompasses significant elements such as the principles of non-
discrimination and equality as well as the entitlements to availability, accessibility, acceptability, and 
quality in the enjoyment of ESC rights. In this sense, the prohibitions of discrimination in 
employment, the prohibitions of discrimination in education and racial discrimination represent 
further issues not addressed under international humanitarian law while being carefully considered 
under human rights law, being that their relevance is recognised for all human beings regardless of 
living conditions.1484 
In focusing on present-day scenarios of occupation, it seems reasonable to argue that human rights law 
is inherently relevant and arguably applicable since the occupying power is expected to facilitate the 
continuation of civilian life and the founding of a legal relationship between the civilian population 
and the occupying army. Given its very nature as “midway between war and peace”, belligerent 
occupation brings forth an actual need of redetermining the scope of relevant State obligations.1485 
In the area of ESC rights, this implies referring to States parties’ minimum core obligations arising from 
essential levels of each right in all circumstances, in addition to the obligations of immediate effect (i.e. 
taking deliberate and targeted steps to guarantee the most comprehensive possible enjoyment of 
ESC rights “under the prevailing circumstances”; ensuring their exercise without discrimination of 
any kind), and the obligations to be progressively implemented towards the full realisation of these rights.1486  
Overall, several legal effects of the applicability of modern international human rights law on ESC 
rights may be articulated: influencing the interpretation of relevant IHL norms; clarifying elements or 
elaborating aspects referred to in IHL norms when the latter come to (negative or positive) obligations 
that remain vague in their effects for actual guarantees to civilians; filling normative gaps in the 
                                                                                                                                                            
expectations: Polio vaccination programs amid political and armed conflict”, United States Institute of Peace, 64 Peace 
Brief, November 2010, p. 2. 
1484 In this vein, see A. Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli Occupied Territory, 1967-1988”, in E. 
Playfair, International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories: Two decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 25 and 53. The application of international human rights standards is “highly desirable” 
for such issues according to the author, also referring to the absence in the laws of war rules of those procedures 
(contained in human rights treaties) enabling individuals to raise a matter directly with an outside institution. See also A. 
Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupations: the Israeli-Occupied Territories since 1967”, 84 AJIL, 1990, p. 73. 
1485 See D. Campanelli, “The law of military occupation put to the test of human rights law”, 90 IRRC, 2008, at 654. 





scope of protection afforded by IHL; and corroborating the legitimacy of international human rights 
supervisory mechanisms in contexts of armed conflicts and occupation.  
 
3.6.(2) Nonetheless, it is worth highlighting that direct or indirect references to IHL rules and principles is 
found in the practice of monitoring bodies to determine or clarify a certain normative content of ESC rights; 
similarly, the unlawfulness of conducts not explicitly set out in the human rights treaties concerned has 
been addressed by taking note of duties stemming from international humanitarian law. Of note, 
the CESCR has done so in its General Comments and Concluding Observations with regards to the 
right to health, the right to housing, the right to food, the right to water, the right to take part in 
cultural and religious life. As shown in chapter one, the CRC has also considered that in armed 
conflicts the right to education is “further protected” by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention and the 
1977 Protocols, reflecting on the impacts of attacks on schools and related military use in several 
countries.1487 
In particular, a “wider definition of health” has been proposed by taking into account also “such 
socially-related concerns as violence and armed conflict” and explicitly referring to common Article 3 GCs, 
Article 75 (2) (a) API and Article 4 APII.1488 According to the CESCR, “the right to treatment” also 
includes “the creation of a system of urgent medical care in cases of accidents, epidemics and similar health hazards, 
and the provision of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in emergency situations”. 1489  Further, the 
obligation to respect is understood, inter alia, as requiring States to refrain “from … limiting access to 
health services as a punitive measure, e.g. during armed conflicts in violation of international humanitarian law” as 
well as “from unlawfully polluting air, water and soil, e.g. through industrial waste from State-owned facilities, from 
using or testing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons if such testing results in the release of substances harmful to 
human health”.1490  In considering States duty to cooperate in providing humanitarian assistance, 
primacy to marginalised or vulnerable groups of the population is emphasised for “international 
medical aid, distribution and management of resources, such as safe and potable water, food and medical supplies, and 
                                                
1487 CRC, “The rights of all children in the context of international migration”, 28 September 2012, para. 3. CRC, 
Concluding observation: Burundi, UN Doc. CRC/C/15Add.133, 16 October 2000, paras. 64-65; CRC, Concluding 
Observations: Ethiopia, UN Doc. CRC/C/ETH/CO/3, 1 November 2006, paras. 27-28; CRC, Concluding 
Observations: Israel, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.195, 9 October 2002, para. 52; CRC, Concluding Observations: 
Moldova, UN Doc. CRC/C/MDA/3, 10 July 2008, para. 423, 435; CRC, Concluding Observations: Afghanistan, UN 
Doc. CRC/C/AFG/CO/1, 8 April 2011, paras. 60-61; CRC, Concluding Observations: Nepal, UN Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.261, 21 September 2005, para. 10. 
1488 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health, 11 May 2000, para. 10. 
1489 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health, 11 May 2000, para. 16. 





financial aid”.1491  
As regards the right to housing, the CESCR has underlined the connection of many instances of 
forced eviction “with violence, such as evictions resulting from international armed conflicts, internal strife and 
communal or ethnic violence”.1492 The practice of “forced eviction and house demolition as a punitive measure” is 
deemed inconsistent with the ICESCR, but the Committee takes also note of the obligations 
ensuing from the1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols “concerning prohibitions on 
the displacement of the civilian population and the destruction of private property as these relate to the practice of forced 
eviction”.1493 Equally, the exercise of the right to take part in cultural and religious life of Palestinians 
living in the occupied territories has been understood “without restrictions other than those that are strictly 
proportionate to security considerations and are non-discriminatory in their application, in accordance with 
international humanitarian law”.1494 In relation to the right to food, related violations occurring via “the 
direct action of States or other entities insufficiently regulated by States” have also been interpreted to include 
“the prevention of access to humanitarian food aid in internal conflicts or other emergency situations”.1495 In this 
vein, in monitoring the armed conflict in Sri Lanka in 2009, the deliberate deprivation of access to 
food, medical care and humanitarian assistance to civilians were qualified as breaches of Article 11 
ICESCR along with “a grave violation of international humanitarian law” which prohibits starvation and 
may consist of a war crime.1496  
As regards the right to water (which is not expressly set out in the ICESCR) the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1977 Protocols have been referred in order to widen or delineate its scope, 
particularly in view of rules on means and methods of warfare.1497 In this sense, during armed 
conflicts and emergency situations this right is interpreted to embrace “those obligations by which States 
parties are bound under international humanitarian law”.1498 In elaborating the content of the obligation to 
                                                
1491 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health, 11 May 2000, para. 40 (“… States 
parties have a joint and individual responsibility, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and relevant resolutions of the United 
Nations General Assembly and of the World Health Assembly, to cooperate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of 
emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons …”). 
1492 CESCR, General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing (art. 11.1): Forced Evictions, 20 May 1997, para. 6. In 
paragraph 4 the practice of forced evictions is also deemded to result in violations of civil and political rights (e.g. “the 
right to life, the right to security of the person, the right to non-interference with privacy, family and home and the right to the peaceful enjoyment 
of possessions”). 
1493 CESCR, General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing (art. 11.1): Forced evictions, 20 May 1997, para. 12. 
1494 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, 16 December 2011, para. 36. 
1495 CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food (art. 11), 12 May 1999, para. 19. 
1496 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, E/C.12/LKA/CO2-4, 9 December 2010, para. 28. 
1497 CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, 20 January 2003, para. 4. 
1498 CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, 20 January 2003, para. 22, adding that “this includes protection of 
objects indispensable for survival of the civilian population, including drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, protection 
of the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage and ensuring that civilians, internees and prisoners have access to 





respect the right to water, States parties are required, inter alia, to refrain from “limiting access to, or 
destroying, water services and infrastructure as a punitive measure, for example, during armed conflicts in violation of 
international humanitarian law”, in line with the aforementioned ICRC Resolution II of 1996; in the 
same vein, States must refrain from “unlawfully diminishing or polluting water, for example through waste from 
State-owned facilities or through use and testing of weapons”. 1499 
Therefore, in framing the application of ESC rights within the IHL regime, their scope may be 
construed to prevent a clash of distinct norms or it may be widened to define external bounds of 
such rights. A cross-elaboration upon legal validity and content of binding obligations on ESC rights under both 
regimes thus remains worthy. In this regard, military conduct unlawful under international 
humanitarian law may infer ESC rights violations under human rights law, while a military conduct 
consistent with IHL may preclude such violations. Indeed, although the applicability of human 
rights norms on ESC rights may provide in depth guidance to the parties to the conflict, legitimate 
restrictions of such norms may derive either from the aforementioned regime of limitations or from 
international humanitarian law.  
 
A noteworthy situation in view of all the previous remarks concerns the right to food in Lebanon 
(as was impacted by the war that took place from 12 July to 14 August 2006 between Israel and the 
armed forces of the Lebanese political party Hezbollah), which was dealt with by the former Special 
Rapporteur Jean Ziegler in considering the relevant legal framework as including all the applicable 
provisions of international human rights and humanitarian law protecting the right to food of the 
Lebanese population.1500 Indeed, Israel and Lebanon are parties to two main human rights 
instruments guaranteeing this right (i.e. the ICESCR and the CRC) as well as to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. In the same respect, although only Lebanon is a party to the 1977 Protocol I, most of 
its relevant provisions reflect customary international law, so binding all States and all parties to a 
conflict regardless of status and ratification.  
(a) Specifically, the definition of “the right to be able to feed oneself through physical and economic access to food” was 
reiterated. The right to food was deemed to entail obligations upon Israel and Lebanon under the ICESCR 
and CRC towards their people but also towards people living in other countries in view of their undertakings 
                                                
1499 CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, 20 January 2003, para. 21.  
1500 Report to the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, on his mission to Lebanon, UN Doc. A/HRC/2/8, 29 
September 2006, paras. 1-7. Reportedly during the thirty-four days of war the Israeli forces launched more than 7,000 
air attacks and 2,500 attacks by sea as well as heavy artillery shelling. According to the Government of Lebanon, the 






to cooperate - “without any territorial or jurisdictional limitations” - to realise the right to food.1501 In this regard, a 
key State obligation was identified in the respect of the right to food in time of armed conflict, namely refraining from 
restricting, inhibiting or preventing people’s access to food. As this right also comprises access to clean, safe drinking 
water and irrigation water necessary for subsistence production, the relevance of a minimum obligation to 
refrain from restricting access to water or destructing water infrastructure was equally stressed. Another state obligation 
ensuing from the right to food concern ensuring access to humanitarian assistance to any individual or group 
affected by the war and deprived of access to productive resources.1502 
(b) In considering IHL rules protecting the right to food and applicable to the war in Lebanon, several 
provisions of the four Geneva Conventions and two Additional Protocols were mentioned1503. Firstly, the 
core rule prohibiting indiscriminate attacks under article 51(4) API as well as the special protection afforded 
to objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population under article 54(2) API were taken into 
account; the prohibition from attacking civilians as well as the infrastructure for food, water and agricultural 
production necessary to their survival was addressed, also underlining that “failing to respect this obligation would 
constitute a grave breach of international humanitarian law and a war crime”.1504 Similar considerations were made for 
the destruction of drinking water installations and the systematic destruction of roads, bridges, ports and food 
factories, which could constitute war crimes (although perceived on one side as military objectives) when it 
produces excessive loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, or it causes “widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment”. 
Secondly, the IHL rule limiting methods or means of warfare was referred to, including the prohibition 
to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering.1505 Possible violations resulting from the use of cluster munitions in populated civilian areas 
were addressed given their effects that do not discriminate between military and civilian objectives. 
Remarkably, in this context serious concerns were expressed for the dispersal of unexploded bomblets from cluster 
bombs: besides immediate affects on civilian life, “after-effects” include damage to agricultural fields, life and 
civilian infrastructure.  
Thirdly, the protection of the right to food of civilian populations caught in armed conflict was addressed 
by referring to IHL rules covering both the affected civilians’ right to receive aid and the right of humanitarian agencies to 
deliver it. As observed in chapter 2, under Articles 70 and 71 API the parties to the conflict are required to 
“allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel”; they have to 
                                                
1501  UN Doc. A/HRC/2/8, ibid., para. 8-9, also referring to considerations made in his previous report 
(E/CN.4/2006/44 of 16 March 2006, paras. 28-38). 
1502 UN Doc. A/HRC/2/8, ibid., para. 9, also referring to considerations made in the following previous reports: 
Preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, A/56/210 of 23 July 
2001; Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler,  in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 2002/25, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/54 of 10 January 2003. 
1503 This aspect was already outlined in the Report by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Mr. Jean Ziegler, submitted in 
accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/25, E/CN.4/2002/58 of 10 January 2002, paras. 72-106. 
1504 UN Doc. A/HRC/2/8, ibid., para 11. See Article 85(3) API; Article 8(2)(b) Rome Statute of the ICC. 





“encourage and facilitate effective international coordination of the relief actions and ensure the safety of medical and humanitarian 
personnel”; they have to enable and defend these operations, without diverting or obstructing the passage of 
humanitarian assistance. As aptly underlined, deliberately obstructing humanitarian operations as well as 
targeting “personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in humanitarian assistance” may constitute 
war crimes.1506 
(c) In view of the whole framework, certain findings and concerns on the enjoyment of the right to food and 
water during and after the war in Lebanon were highlighted.1507 In considering the right to food “not primarily about 
food aid”, but instead “as the right to be able to feed oneself through an adequate livelihood”, the key concern was the long-
term impacts of the war on livelihoods of a large part of the population: the core warning to the future well-being of 
many thousands of families was identified in “the loss of livelihoods and sources of income”.  
(d) Subsequent recommendations made in light of such findings and in view of the international 
obligations addressed upon the parties to the conflict are noteworthy as well.1508 Aimed at improving the 
realisation of the right to food of the whole Lebanese population, they evidence the Special Rapporteur’s 
attempt to frame the discourse of the legality of the parties’ conducts by determining the link between the 
impacts on civilians and the violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.  
Significantly, this “violation approach” for monitoring the right to food led to the recommendation that 
further investigation determine whether those violations “constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 and Additional Protocol I thereto and possible war crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court”. In the regard it led to advocate the acceptance by the two Governments of Israel and Lebanon of the 
International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (established in accordance with Additional Protocol I) 
to investigate IHL violations of the right to food. Then, in view of the ICJ jurisprudence1509 it led to advocate 
                                                
1506 UN Doc. A/HRC/2/8, ibid., para. 13. See Article 8(2)(b) ICC Statute. 
1507 UN Doc. A/HRC/2/8, ibid., paras. 14-30. Some examples of the findings include: “a combination of destruction of road 
and transport infrastructure and repeated denial of safe transit by the Israeli armed forces made it very difficult for humanitarian agencies to 
transport food and other relief”; “the forced displacement of a vast number of people from their homes and agricultural lands disrupted normal 
access to food and left tens of thousands dependent on food aid”; since the war occurred at the fishing and fruit harvest season, 
people earning their livelihood from these sectors were affected both directly in terms of damage and indirectly in terms 
of lost markets and revenues; bombing and unexploded bombs affected farmland, also making access to many fields 
impracticable; it was reported that “more than 1.2 million cluster bombs were dropped by the Israeli forces, noting that about 90 per 
cent were allegedly dropped in the last 72 hours of the war when the Israeli forces were already aware that a ceasefire was imminent”; further 
long-term impacts on livelihoods and access to food and water derived from “the destruction by the Israeli forces of infrastructure 
essential to the survival of the population, particularly agricultural, irrigation and water infrastructure”; “fishing was heavily affected by the 
massive oil spill following Israeli bombing of the four Jiyyeh fuel tanks on 14 July 2006”. 
1508 UN Doc. A/HRC/2/8, ibid., para. 31. 
1509 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, op. cit., paras. 152, 153 and 163. 
Significantly, for the first time in its case law, the Court introduced the right to individual reparations for violations of 
international human rights and international humanitarian law, giving basic importance to the return of individual 
property in relation to such violations. To be precise, the Court recognised that the construction of the wall resulted in 
“the requisition and destruction of homes, businesses and agricultural holdings”, thus obliging Israel to “make reparation for the damage 
caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned” (para. 152). It remarked that Israel is “under an obligation to return the land, 
orchards, olive grove and other immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction of the wall” in the 





Israel’s responsibility under international law for any violation of the right to food of the Lebanese civilian 
population, openly addressing “the obligation to ensure that all victims receive adequate reparation and compensation for the 
losses suffered during the war as well as for ongoing losses due to the disruption of livelihoods”. Another international law 
obligation addressed upon Israel concerned the reimbursement of the Government of Lebanon “for the clean-
up of the oil spill from the Jiyyeh power plant and the fisherfolk for their economic losses caused by the spill”.  
Conversely, Lebanon was recommended to accelerate, with bilateral and multilateral donors, the 
clearing of hundreds of thousands of pieces of unexploded ordnances (UXO) - mainly cluster bombs (anti-
personnel weapons spraying bomblets indiscriminately over a wide area) - from agricultural fields. In order to 
facilitate the clearing of concerned areas, the Government of Israel was recommended to provide details on 
the use of cluster munitions. Finally, a series of recommendations to the Government of Lebanon - in 
cooperation with UN agencies and international and national NGOs - focused on the central role to assign to 
the rights to food and water within reconstruction efforts. They concerned designing programmes in support 
of farmers, agricultural labourers and fishermen, ensuring transitional measures to guarantee access to food 
for all vulnerable groups, prioritizing the reconstruction of agricultural infrastructure, water wells and water 
distributions networks.  
 
3.6.(3) The duration of contemporary conflict-torn and occupation-related scenarios also deserves 
attention. Their short or long terms are likely to influence the extent of potential “cross-
interpretation” between the legal regimes. In particular, a human rights approach to civilians’ ESC 
rights - which generally widen the range and scope of relevant State obligations under international 
law - may prove more suitable to handle the challenges featuring situations of persistent armed 
conflict as well as cases of prolonged occupation, with positive effects for the conduct of other actors 
involved.  
 
3.6.(4) A further relevant issue may be articulated as to whether the potential co-application of these 
two legal regimes facilitates or impedes the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In other words, 
possible tensions as well as opportunities may derive from the intersection between human rights 
law, international humanitarian law and the humanitarian action. In fact, for the organizations with 
both humanitarian and human rights-related mandates, the commonalities and differences between 
these two bodies of international law may raise challenges for short-term and long-term 
humanitarian protection strategies implemented across the dynamic contexts of armed conflicts. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural and legal persons having suffered any form of material 










CHAPTER V: THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS VIA 
EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF TREATIES ON ESC RIGHTS 
 
1. Introduction  
The aptitude of States alongside other actors to adversely impact human rights far from home has 
definitely become a frequent feature of conflict-related scenarios, where it is not unusual that States’ 
conduct (undertaken wholly beyond national borders or resulting from decisions and policies 
assumed on the sovereign territory) are carried out under certain modalities and produce certain 
consequences which inhibit the exercise of - or lead to the lack of access to - the ESC rights of 
civilian individuals or groups living therein, and which would be qualified as violations of relevant 
human rights treaties had they been undertaken on sovereign territory.  
Specifically, instances of conduct which have the potential to put seriously at risk, nullify, or 
impair civilians’ ESC rights include non-territorial State’ acts or omissions related to military 
operations, to belligerent occupations, to activities undertaken during the reconstruction of post-conflict societies 
and the rehabilitation of failed States (i.e. development projects financed by State parties to relevant 
treaties), to activities of a business enterprise in a war-torn host State while such a corporation or its parent or 
controlling company is registered or domiciled under the law of the home State concerned (so covered by several 
States’ jurisdictions), or, furthermore, to sanctions and equivalent measures decided by States as policy 
instruments for achieving a certain conduct by the target State (in addition to economic - trade and 
financial - sanctions, military, diplomatic or cultural sanctions have been undertaken to fulfil other 
international legal obligations).  
In looking at the extraterritorial dimensions of the protection of civilians’ ESC rights under 
human rights treaties, the present chapter will be for the most part explored on the basis of what criteria 
and to what extent the obligations stemming from States’ international commitments in this area can 
apply to foreign territories as well as to civilians (non-nationals) placed therein as affected by 
situations of armed conflict and periods of military occupation which involve non territorial States 





In inquiring this supplementary perspective, the present research will preliminary examine key 
soft law norm-setting efforts that have recently emerged on the subject of extraterritorial obligations of 
States in relation to ESC rights. The aim is to explore their potential implications as well as actual 
relevance for the protection of civilians within the evolving practice of conflict-affected situations, 
including also their weight in shaping the legal discourse on effective and adequate remedies in 
favour of civilian victims of related violations.  
The issue of extraterritorial human rights obligations is framed according to several key aspects in 
the present chapter. It is primarily taken into account that even within conflict-affected scenarios the 
access to, and enjoyment of, ESC rights is inevitably impacted by the phenomenon of globalisation, 
the increased interdependency of States and the ever-greater interactions between several actors 
having considerable imbalanced powers within the international community. This entails bringing 
into the present narrow inquiry some basic considerations progressively developed around the 
broad discourse on the challenges posed by globalisation. Specifically, the emerging principal idea 
that human rights as global public goods or standards can gradually turn into a guide for the reshaping of the 
international legal order,1510 and the connected basic idea of taking seriously the twofold content of 
extraterritorial human rights obligations of States: obligations as they relate to States’ conduct that impact 
the enjoyment of human rights beyond their sovereign territories, but also obligations as set out in 
the UN Charter and in other instruments to act separately and in cooperation to realise them. 
As to the theoretical legal foundations for extraterritorial obligations, these are considered as part of 
States’ duty to comply with internationally recognised human rights standards under several sources 
of international law, including the UN Charter, the UDHR and treaties guaranteeing ESC rights. 
In inquiring as to the extraterritorial scope and application of the latter, three aspects will be for the 
most part examined for the purpose of assessing the potential legal basis for extending relevant 
obligations beyond the territorial State. They concern the concept of jurisdiction, the notion of 
international cooperation, and the application of economic sanctions or equivalent measures. The aim is 
investigated through their distinct and specific, though controversial, relevance for the protection of 
civilians’ ESC rights in contemporary situations of armed conflict and belligerent occupation.  
The content and structure of extraterritorial State obligations on ESC rights are considered in the 
light of several typologies conceptualised by scholars and articulated by monitoring bodies, as well 
as in view of more evaluative legal doctrines used in ESC rights jurisprudence for determining more 
                                                
1510 For an inquiry of the possibilities and disadvantages of applying the idea of public goods in a global context, with an 
explanation of the history of the concept and its significance for human rights, see E.A. Andersen and B. Lindsnaes 
(eds.), Towards New Global Strategies: Public Goods and Human Rights, Brill, 2007. See also “Symposium: Global Public Goods 





acutely States’ compliance (i.e. the doctrine of “justification and due process” for interferences with these 
rights or for retrogressions in their realisation;1511 the “due diligence” rule for assessing the degree of 
protection in the forms of preventing, minimising and remedy human rights violations; the 
“reasonableness” test for assessing the degree of fulfilment). Another significant emerging idea is that of 
“shared obligations” in situations of multiple duty holders. It is also posited that at least three relevant 
parameters frame the discourse on the nature of human rights obligations (i.e. the beneficiaries or 
duty holders,1512 the range of rights, the types of obligations).  
As to the notion of violations of ESC rights as result of extraterritorial conducts, various legal 
qualifications have been used to address cases of non-fulfilment of relevant obligations flowing from 
the treaties concerned.1513 These include expressions such as States’ policies or acts that lead to a 
violation of ESC rights, result in harm or damage inflicted on individual or groups, have a negative impact on the 
enjoyment of ESC rights, result in a deprivation of ESC rights. Clearly, all of them evidence the difficulty to 
establish a direct and casual link between the violations of ESC rights taken place in a certain country 
and the internationally wrongful act attributable to a non-territorial State under international law 
and constituting a breach of an international legal obligation in force for that State at that time (so 
entailing its international responsibility and the obligations incurred as the legal consequences of 
such act).1514 Nonetheless, other principles becoming relevant to determine the contributions by 
non-territorial States include the “proximity” to a certain act/omission, the “foreseeability” of the effects 
of a certain conduct, the “influence” over a certain decision, and the “precautionary principle”. In this 
                                                
1511 See, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 7 on forced evictions. 
1512 Certain human rights treaties (e.g. the ICESCR) and relevant declarations (e.g. American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man) do not indicate the rights-holders. Besides assuming that the beneficiaries of the obligations 
concerned are the rights-holders under a legal and factual power of a State party, the obligations to guarantee such 
rights may be also considered as owed erga omnes to the whole international community (as far as safeguarding human 
rights is in the interest of all States), even without a particular connection between a State and their denial in other 
States. See ICJ, Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain) (second phase - merits), 5 
February 1970, ICJ Reports, 3, paras. 33-34; HRC, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 29 March 2004, paras. 2 and 10.  
1513 According to paragraph 16 of the 1998 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, violations are “in principle imputable to the State within whose jurisdiction they occur”. Examples with an extraterritorial 
dimension are the following: “the active support for measures adopted by third parties which are inconsistent” with ESC rights (para. 
14 (c)), “the failure to regulate activities of individuals or groups so as to prevent them from violating” ESC rights (para. 15 (d)), and the 
State’s failure to consider its international obligations regarding ESC rights in the context of “bilateral or multilateral agreements with other 
States, international organizations or multinational corporations” (para. 15 (j)). 
1514 It is worth referring to the ILC’s Draft Articles of 2001. In particular Articles 4-11 concern the conduct which can 
be regarded as an act of State and attributed to a State for the purposes of State responsibility: by State organs (Art. 4), 
by other entities authorised by the State (Art.5), by organs of another State when found at the disposal of the State (Art. 
6), by State officials acting ultra vires in official capacity (Art.7), by private parties acting under the instruction, control or 
direction of the State. Conversely, Articles 12-15 deal with further circumstances under which a conduct can be 
attributed to a State: the issue of ratione temporis (Art. 13), the distinction continuing effect/continuing violation (Art.14), 
the issue about attribution of “composite acts” (Art. 15). Then, Articles 16-19 outline a range of forms of complicity by 





respect, war-torn scenarios may raise the basic question of the attribution of extraterritorial conduct 
leading to violations of civilians’ ESC rights and therefore attract the issue of the international 
responsibility of non-territorial States.  
2. Extraterritoriality under international human rights law in legal 
scholarship: preliminary considerations of research  
The comprehensive issue of extraterritorial application of international human rights law has become a 
serious matter of debate in legal scholarship recently.1515 The addressed basic idea is that a conduct in 
contrast to such application challenges the effective protection of individual rights, which is the very purpose of 
this branch of international law.1516 Subsequent academic studies have investigated the issue of 
extraterritorial application of universal and regional human rights treaties by focusing on several 
aspects: the interpretation of applicable treaty law; 1517  the theoretical legal foundations for 
extraterritorial obligations; 1518  the challenges posed by international economic structures to 
international human rights law (i.e. in the context of processes of economic globalisation as featured 
by an increased number of transnational corporations, an amplified role for international financial 
institutions and a large amount of multilateral arrangements).1519 Moreover, in the field of global 
                                                
1515 For the first contribution on the scope of obligations under the ICCPR, see T. Buergental, “To respect and to 
ensure: State obligations and permissible derogations”, in L. Henkin (ed.), The International Bill of Rights: the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Columbia University Press, 1981, at 72-91.  
1516 On the applicability of the ICCPR to the US intervention in Haiti, see also T. Meron, “Extraterritoriality in human 
rights treaties”, 89 AJIL, 1995, at 78-82, concluding that “narrow territorial interpretation of human rights treaties is anathema to 
the basic idea of human rights, which is to ensure that a State should respect human rights of persons over whom it exercises jurisdiction”. See 
also J. Cerone, “Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo, EJIL, 2001, 469-488, at 
475. 
1517 For the first collection of essays debating the extraterritorial application of a number of human rights treaties, see F. 
Coomans and M. Kamminga (eds.) Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Intersentia, 2004. See also R. 
Lawson, “The Concept of Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Acts of States”, in G. Kreijen, State, Sovereignty and International 
Governance, OUP, 2002. For a recent contribution tackling the subject in an integrated way and attempting to develop a 
flexible approach to be applied generally to extraterritorial application of human rights treaty law, see M. Gondek, The 
Reach of Human Rights in a Globalizing World: Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Intersentia, 2009. 
1518 See S.I. Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation, Intersentia, 2006; S.I. 
Skogly, “The obligation of international assistance and cooperation in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights”, in B. Morten (ed.), Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden, Essays in Honour of Osborn 
Eide, Kluwer Law International, 2003, at 403-420. See M. Sepulveda, “Obligations of “International Assistance and 
Cooperation” in an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 24 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2006, at 271-303. See W. Vandenhole, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
the CRC: is there a legal obligation to cooperate internationally for development?”, 17 The International Journal of 
Children’s Rights, 2009, pp. 1-41. 
1519 See M.E. Salomon, “International Economic Governance and Human Rights Accountability”, LSE, Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers, Paper No. 9/2007. See V.P. Nanda, “Accountability of International Organizations - Some 
Observations”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 2005, p. 379 ff. See B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below: 





social justice, “transnational obligations” have been posited in relation to economic and social rights 
through legal, ethical and economic arguments.1520  
With regard to terminology, a certain diversity of opinions has been a feature of the debate on 
the subject. Besides the prevailing terms of “extraterritorial” applicability of human rights treaties and 
“extraterritorial” human rights obligations,1521 other terms used with regard to ESC rights include 
“transnational obligations”,1522 “international obligations”,1523 “external obligations”1524 and “third States 
obligations”.1525 However, the terms “extraterritorial application” and “extraterritorial obligation” seem to 
capture entirely the main feature of the situations in question, namely that the victims are situated outside 
the sovereign territory of the State party to the relevant treaty whose conduct has affected their human rights.  
Remarkably, systematic treatments of extraterritoriality concerning ESC rights have been 
carried out in respect to the ICESCR.1526 The meaning of extraterritorial obligations has been 
explored by relying mostly on the CESCR’s readings.1527 On this basis, certain needs have been 
                                                                                                                                                            
of the World Bank and the IMF”, in W. Van, P. Hunt and S. Marks (eds.), World Bank, IMF and Human Rights, Wolf 
Legal Publishers, 2003, pp. 45 - 78. 
1520 See International Council for Human Rights Policy 2003, Duties sans Frontières. Human Rights and Global Social Justice, 
at http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/43/108_report_en.pdf. See S. Skogly and M. Gibney, “Economic Rights and 
Extraterritorial Obligations”, in S. Hertel and L. Minkler (ed.), Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement, And Policy Issues, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
1521 See S. Skogly and M. Gibney, “Economic Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations”, S. Hertel and L. Minkler (eds.), 
Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement and Policy Issues, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 267. 
1522 See S. Skogly and M. Gibney, “Transnational Human Rights Obligations”, HRQ, 2002, p. 781, meaning 
obligations of States “relating to the human rights effects of their external activities, such as trade, development cooperation, participation in 
international organizations, and security activities”. 
1523 See F. Coomans, “Some remarks on the extraterritorial application of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights”, in Coomans and Kamminga (eds.) Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, 
Intersentia, 2004, p. 185-186, stressing the appropriateness of ‘international obligations’ (rather than ‘extraterritorial’) since the 
ICESCR does not use jurisdiction and territory language. See Künnemann, “Extraterritorial application of the 
international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights”, in Coomans and Kamminga (eds.), op. cit., at 201, 
distinguishing between internal (towards victims in its own territory), external (towards victims outside its own territory), 
and international (as members of the governing body or decision-making majority of an international organisation 
towards victims inside and outside its territory) obligations.  
1524 See M. Craven, The International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its Development, Clarendon 
Press, 1995, p. 150. 
1525 On the concept and terminology, see S. Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International 
Cooperation, Intersentia, 2006, at 5; W. Vandenhole, “Third State Obligations under the ICESCR: a Case Study of EU 
Sugar Policy”, 76 Nordic Journal of International Law, 2007, 73-100; Gibney, Tomasevski and Vendsted-Hansen, 
“Transnational State responsibility for violations of human rights”, 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1999, pp. 269-273; 
M. Gibney, “On Terminology: Extraterritorial Obligations”, in M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin and W. 
Van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extra-Territorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International 
Law, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 32-50. 
1526 See M. Craven, The International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its Development, Clarendon 
Press, 1995, at 144-152; M. Gibney, K. Tomasevski and J. Vedsted-Hansen, “Trans-national State Responsibility for 
Violations of Human Rights”, 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1999, at 273; S. Skogly and M. Gibney, “Transnational 
Human Rights Obligations”, HRQ, 2002, pp. 781-798; Künnemann, “Extraterritorial application of the international 
covenant on economic, social and cultural rights”, in Coomans and Kamminga (eds.), op. cit., pp. 201-231. 
1527 See Langford, Coomans, Gómez, “Extraterritorial Duties in International Law”, in M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, 





emphasised: further widening the notion of the international scope of treaties on ESC rights,1528 better 
explaining the legal basis for extraterritorial obligations flowing from such treaties, as well as specifying the 
nature of such obligations according to different layers.1529 The Committee’s use of the notion of the 
extraterritorial scope of the ICESCR in various documents has been criticised though, having 
outlined solidly obligations to respect ESC rights while leaving obligations to protect and fulfil as 
largely undefined and consequently weak in different contexts (e.g. trade, development cooperation, 
actions by international organizations, sanctions).1530  
Overall, the legal framework of extraterritorial obligations of States in the area of ESC rights is still under 
elaboration in both its normative and accountability dimensions, and it has thus a partly soft law 
nature.  
As for human rights treaties on ESC rights, a major controversial aspect for extending the legal 
obligations stemming from them beyond the territorial State is represented by the frequent absence 
of provisions specifying their general scope of application, as will be examined in section 4. In actual 
fact, this textual ambiguity has favoured disagreement on the existence of extraterritorial obligations 
on ESC rights, with a tendency to differentiate the typologies of duties and examine which ones 
may be reasonably implemented beyond the national borders of States parties to the treaties in 
question. This approach has been nonetheless useful to develop the conceptual and interpretative 
understanding of extraterritorial obligations in scholarship and in comments or statements by UN 
human rights treaty bodies and other supervisory mechanisms, especially articulating obligations 
according to the respect-protect-fulfil paradigm.1531 This line has been recently developed in one the 
most valuable attempts enunciating the legal parameters for discharging extraterritorial obligations, 
namely the Maastricht Principles on Extra-territorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social 
                                                                                                                                                            
Rights in International Law, Cambridge, 2012; W. Vandenhole, “EU and Development: Extraterritorial Obligations under 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, in Salomon, Tostensen, Vandenhole (eds.), 
Casting the Net Wider: Human Rights, Development and New Duty-Bearers, Intersentia, 2007, pp. 85-106, pp. 92-97.  
1528 See F. Coomans, “The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, HRLR, 2011, at 1-35. 
1529 See S. Skogly, “Extraterritoriality - Universal Human Rights without Universal Obligations?”, in S. Joseph and A. 
McBeth (eds.), Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2010.  
1530 See M. Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, 
Intersentia, 2009, p. 
1531 For instance, see Committee on the Rights of the Child, Day of General Discussion on “Resources for the Rights of the Child – 
Responsibilities of States, investments for the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights of children and international cooperation, 
Forty-sixth session, 21 September 2007, para. 51. See also UNHRC, Report off the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, “State responsibilities to 
regulate and adjudicate corporate activities under the United Nations core human rights treaties: an overview of treaty 





and Cultural Rights,1532 as highlighted in section 3.2.   
It is worth anticipating that the negative obligation to respect ESC rights is commonly seen as 
territorially unlimited,1533 thus requiring States to desist from unlawful direct or indirect interferences 
with existing access and enjoyment of ESC rights. Conversely, the positive obligation to protect ESC 
rights has been firstly deemed to require the exercise of territorial jurisdiction conceived as control over 
a spatial area, being this functional to their actual realisation; 1534  though under its deeper 
conceptualisation States have to prevent third parties (“individuals, groups, corporations and other entities, 
agents acting under their authority”,1535 whose conduct is extraterritorial or has extraterritorial effects) 
from interfering with ESC rights when States are in a position to do so under certain bases. A 
further aspect has developed for States acting as members of international organizations. In this 
respect, the positive obligation to fulfil ESC rights has been the most embryonic, largely seen as an 
issue de lege ferenda; but under its deeper conceptualisation States are supposed to assist individuals as 
well as communities to satisfy ESC rights overseas, through measures of facilitation, promotion and 
                                                
1532 They were developed between 2009 and 2011 and then adopted in September 2011. Signatories comprise Special 
Rapporteurs of the Human Rights Council, members of UN human rights treaty bodies, academics and legal advisers 
of leading non-governmental organizations. For a commentary aimed at setting out the legal authority of these 
Principles, see O. De Schutter, A. Eide, A. Khalfan, M. Orellana, M. Salomon, I. Seiderman, “Commentary to the 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 
HRQ, 2012, pp. 1084-1169. For an overview, see Salomon and Seiderman, “Human Rights Norms for a Globalized 
World: The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights”, 3 Global Policy Journal, November 2012, pp. 458-462. 
1533 As Theodor Meron aptly noted, “in view of the purposes and objects of human rights treaties, there’s no a priori reason to limit a 
State’s obligation to respect human rights to its national territory. Where agents of the State, whether military or civilian, exercise power and 
authority (jurisdiction, or de facto jurisdiction) over persons outside national territory, the presumption should be that the State’s obligation to 
respect the pertinent human rights continues”, see T. Meron, “Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties”, 8 AJIL, pp. 80-81. 
1534 In this regard, see M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties. Law, Principles, and Policy, Oxford, 
2011, p. 228, taking as example the Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colombia) case before the ICJ. On 31 March 2008 
the Republic of Ecuador applied to the ICJ and alleged that Colombia had been engaged since 2000 in aerial spraying 
of toxic herbicides “at locations near, at and across its border with Ecuador”. In this regard, the author considers Colombia’s 
obligation towards Ecuadorians living across the border to respect their right to health and food, which would be in 
principle violated by the aerial herbicide spraying over coca leaf plantations in Colombia; however, the author notes 
that the obligation to actually provide food or health care services to the population of Ecuador would not rise upon 
Colombia, which does not exercise jurisdiction over the relevant part of Ecuador.  
It is worth considering that in its application Ecuador stated that “the spraying has already caused serious damage to people, to 
crops, to animals, and to the natural environment on the Ecuadorian side of the frontier, and poses a grave risk of further damage over time”. 
Accordingly, it requested the Court “to adjudge and declare that Colombia has violated its obligations under international law by 
causing or allowing the deposit on the territory of Ecuador of toxic herbicides that have caused damage to human health, property and the 
environment”. In September 2013 this case was consensually discontinued as the parties reached an agreement on 9 
September 2013. Inter alia, the latter “establishes, an exclusion zone, in which Colombia will not conduct aerial spraying operations, 
creates a Joint Commission to ensure that spraying operations outside that zone have not caused herbicides to drift into Ecuador and, so long as 
they have not, provides a mechanism for the gradual reduction in the width of the said zone; … sets out operational parameters for Colombia’s 
spraying programme, records the agreement of the two Governments to ongoing exchanges of information in that regard, and establishes a dispute 
settlement mechanism”. 





provision1536, within their available resources and capacities.1537  
3. The potential of soft-law norm-setting efforts on extraterritorial 
obligations  
For the purposes of the present research, noteworthy considerations are found in the current 
broader academic debate over the relevance of the notion of extraterritorial obligations as useful tool to 
address the challenges of globalisation and the dramatic growth of interactions between States, 
international organizations and other multilateral institutions, multinational or transnational private 
actors.1538  
The decentred position of the State and the increased impact of powerful public and private 
non-state actors have raised, inter alia, questions about the affects of globalisation on ESC rights and 
the extent to which additional methods need to be explored “in order to ensure that developments relating to 
globalisation are conducive to the promotion of those rights”.1539  Accordingly, threats of the regressive 
protection of ESC rights have been addressed along with a progressive weakness of the shield of 
national sovereignty and a gradual emptiness of the concept of State responsibility. 
A clear leitmotiv of scholars’ contributions debating extraterritoriality is the acknowledgment that 
globalisation has challenged fundamental principles governing international law - especially with 
respect to State sovereignty and international relations - and that it has significantly impacted 
various areas of law and regulation - such as the practice of trade law, financial regulation, and 
                                                
1536 See CESCR, General Comment No. 11: Plans of Action for Primary Education, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/4 (1999), para. 9. 
See CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, E/C.12/1999/5 (1999), paras. 36, 38, 39.  
1537 Special emphasis has concerned the realisation of minimum core obligations, which have been placed at the centre 
of international cooperation, especially regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance for emergency situations or 
disasters, see CESCR, General Comment No. 12, para. 38; CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 40; CESCR, General 
Comment No. 15, para. 34. On the idea of prioritizing assistance according to human rights concerns, see CESCR, General 
Comment No. 2, International Technical Assistance Measures (Article 22 of the Covenant)), UN Doc. E/1990/23, para 7. For an 
emblematic emphasis of the idea that “donor countries should prioritize assistance to States most affected by the food crisis”, see 
CESCR, Statement on the World Food Crisis, UN Doc. E/C.12/2008/1, paras. 9 and 11. 
1538 For a thorough study on the issue, see Kinley, Civilizing Globalization. Human Rights and the Global Economy, Cambridge, 
2009; M. Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of International Law, Oxford, 2007. 
For an examination of four different possible intellectual approaches to the development of a theory of international 
responsibility for breaches of human rights committed by transnational activities of corporations (i.e., the responsibility 
of the host State, individual responsibility of corporate officials, the direct liability of the corporation, the international 
responsibility of the home State), see F. Francioni, “Alternative Perspectives on International Responsibility for Human 
Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations”, in Benedek, De Feyter, Marrella (eds.), Economic Globalization and 
Human Rights, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 245-265. 
1539 See CESCR in its first Statement on Globalization and its Impacts on the Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see 





environmental law - but with modest effects in human rights law.1540 Critically, the “inflated” 
reference to the international legal system still modelled on sovereign States has been seen as 
impeding crucial developments for the extraterritorial application of international human rights 
norms, which would be more coherent with other areas of law related to rights holders.1541 Thus, a 
number of challenges in the interpretation of the law as well as some obstacles of a political nature have 
been addressed in relation to extraterritoriality: re-thinking the position of sovereignty with regard to 
international human rights law generally, and revising some key concepts such as State jurisdiction, 
State responsibility, and accountability, in order to “operationalize” extraterritorial obligations.1542  
Within the attempt to “re-conceptualise” the basic tenet of international human rights law that 
places the obligations mainly on the territorial State, a growing academic debate has searched for 
widening the circle of human rights duty-bearers beyond the territorial State. This is deemed 
functional to make this branch of law more responsive to “what is taking place on the ground” and 
capable to operate as a “corrective to power regardless of the identity of the power holder”. 1543  Some 
noteworthy efforts for elaborating principles, policy and regulatory options have led to develop a 
multi-duty-bearer framework. For foreign States, the aforementioned 2011 Maastricht Principles on 
Extra-territorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are of particular 
note. For international organizations, it is worth referring to the 2002 Tilburg Guiding Principles on the 
World Bank, IMF and Human Rights.1544 For corporations, the 2003 Norms on the Responsibilities of 
                                                
1540 S. Skogly and M. Gibney (eds.), Universal Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2010, 1-9. Issues covered include the right to life, the right to food, the rights to health, the right to water, the right to 
housing, refugee law, environmental rights. In exploring the theoretical foundation for States’ human rights obligations 
that extend beyond national borders, the book raises the question of a need for greater accountability for States’ foreign 
policies. The general argument consists in that human rights must be seen to apply not merely to States’ domestic 
actions but also to their conduct abroad as well as to the action of intergovernmental organizations and private 
international entities that operate globally. 
1541 T. Howland, “Multi-State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 
in M.A. Baderin and M. Ssenyonjo, International Human Rights Law. Six Decades After the UDHR and Beyond, Ashgate, 2010, 
at 386-387.  
1542 See M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin, W. van Genugten (eds.), Global justice, State duties: the extra-territorial 
scope of economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Cambridge University Press, 2012. See Coomans, “The 
Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Work of the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, HRLR, 2011, at 1-35. See S. Skogly and M. 
Gibney (eds.), Universal Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010. See M. 
Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Intersentia, 
2009, at 56, 168. See R. Higgings, Problem and process - International Law and How We Use It, Clarendon Press, 1994, at 146. 
1543 See W. Vandenhole, “Emerging Normative Frameworks on Transnational Human Rights Obligations”, EUI 
Working Paper, RSCAS - Global Governance Programme-15, 2012/17. 
1544 They were drafted by a group of experts, at Tilburg University, The Netherlands, in October 2001 and April 2002. 
See Willem van Genugten and Kees Flinterman (eds.), World Bank, IMF and Human Rights, Nijmegen: Wolf, 2003, pp. 
247-255. They deal with possible human rights obligations upon international financial institutions, examining the 





Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights1545 and 
the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN Guiding Principles)1546 are 
among the most recent efforts aimed at defining and regulating business-related human rights 
practices.1547 Notably, all these efforts have been questioned on a theoretical basis, or on whether 
the fragmented approach to elaborate principles for each diverse actor risks being unsuccessful in 
dealing with a global phenomenon with its many players, or indeed whether a holistic method is 
preferable and how reasonable it would be.1548  
In the present chapter those efforts are explored narrowly for their relevance to conflict-affected 
situations, in view of some specific textual reference and generally insofar as they allow further 
reflection on what implications for the protection of ESC rights in such challenging situations may 
derive from a progressive development of international law’s normative and accountability 
frameworks, though taking into due account international law de lege lata. In particular, a couple gain 
relevance.  
Firstly, the UN Guiding Principles are examined in section 3.1.1549 Their stated normative 
                                                
1545 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 
2003. Although adopted in 2003, the UN Commission on Human Rights rejected them in 2004 (because of an 
unreceptive business community). Under para. 3, “Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall not engage in nor 
benefit from war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, forced disappearance, forced or compulsory labour, hostage-taking, 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, other violations of humanitarian law and other international crimes against the human person 
as defined by international law, in particular human rights and humanitarian law”. 
1546 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework”, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011. This was the outcome 
of Ruggie’s six year effort, following his appointment by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2005 “to identify and 
clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability regarding human rights; elaborate on State roles in regulating and adjudicating 
corporate activities; clarify concepts such as ‘complicity’ and ‘sphere of influence’; develop methodologies for human rights impact assessments 
and consider State and corporate best practices”, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/69. On 6 July 2011, the Human Rights 
Council endorsed the Guiding Principles, see UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4. For a background explanation to the 
Guiding Principles, see OHCHR, “The corporate responsibility to respect human rights: an interpretive guide”, 2012.  
1547 For previous soft law instruments that dealt with the responsibility of transnational corporations to respect human 
rights, see the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, adopted by the ILO 
Governing Board at its 204th session (including representatives of the member States’ employers and workers) (Geneva, 
November 1977), particularly Article 8; the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, first drawn up in 1976, revised in 
2000, and updated in 2011. 
1548 See W. Vandenhole, op. cit. The author analyses the different sets of principles by questioning their legal nature and 
legal sources, the scope of the duties concerned, and the responsibility as divided between the domestic State and the 
other actors. In addition to comparing some features and weaknesses of these principles, the author marks some 
prospects for research and conceptual evolution. 
1549 For an overview of these principles, see R. Mares, “Business and Human Rights After Ruggie: Foundations, the Art 
of Simplification and the Imperative of Cumulative Progress”, in Mares (ed.), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights - Foundations and Implementation, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 1-50; N. Jagers, “UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making Headway towards Real Corporate Accountability?”, 29/2 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2011, pp. 159-163; M. Martin, “The Guiding Principles on Human Rights and 
Business - Implementation in conflict-affected countries”, Paper for the CSDN Meeting on Private Sector and Conflict 





contribution lies in elaborating the implications of existing standards and practices for States and companies 
regarding business-related human rights impacts, in integrating them “within a coherent and comprehensive 
template” while identifying shortfalls and improvements.1550 Within the international community, 
however, responses to those Principles have varied from fervent endorsement (at governmental and 
intergovernmental levels as well as among corporations) to vigorous criticism (especially by several 
leading human rights non-governmental organizations). In particular, the European Commission’s 
renewed policy on corporate social responsibility has included in its action agenda 2011-2014 a 
better implementation of the UN Guiding Principles to improve the coherence of EU policies 
relevant to business and human rights.1551 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development incorporated a new related chapter in its revised Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises. 1552  Key elements of the UN Guiding Principles were integrated also in the IFC 
Sustainability Framework and Performance Standards, and in the International Organization for 
Standardization ISO 26000 Guidance on Corporate Social Responsibility.1553 An acknowledgment even 
came from the UN Global Compact. Nonetheless, the critical stance vis-à-vis the Guiding Principles 
have touched several aspects: inter alia, the sliding-scale approach for corporations based on their 
size and location (see the report, para. 15); the appearance of being informed by a narrow 
interpretation of human rights as expressed solely in “the International Bill of Human Rights and the 
principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work”, so devaluing other core human rights treaties (e.g. CRC, 
CERD, CEDAW, CPMW) which mark the international community’s commitment to elaborate a 
normative framework beyond that Bill and which detail safeguards for traditionally vulnerable 
                                                                                                                                                            
conflict-affected areas: State obligations and business responsibilities”, 94 IRRC, 2012, pp. 961-979; R.C. Blitt, “Beyond 
Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate Human 
Rights Compliance”, 48 Texas International Law Journal, 2012, pp. 33-62. 
1550 UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, ibid., para. 14 
1551 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A Renewed EU strategy 2011–14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’, 25 
October 2011, COM(2011) 681 Final, para. 4.8.2, p. 14, in which it calls on all European enterprises to meet the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights, as defined in the UN Guiding Principles, and inviting EU Member 
States to develop national plans for the implementation of the same Principles, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/index_en.htm  
1552 The OECD is an intergovernmental organization established in 1961 and dedicated to promoting policies to 
“improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world”. See OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 25 May 
2011, particularly the additional new human rights chapter that closely echoes these Principles, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/oecdguidelinesformultinationalenterprises.htm. 
1553 See International Organization for Standardization, ISO 26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility, 2010, which also 
mirrors the Guiding Principles in its human rights provisions, available at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_standards/iso26000. See International Finance Cooperation, IFC 
Sustainability Framework and IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, 1 January 2012, available at  
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+Sustainability/Sust





groups and have immediate relevance to businesses practices; the inadequate tackling of key 
corporate accountability issues in view of their failures to mandate a due diligence approach, to 
prevent and punish extraterritorial human rights abuses, and to recognise the right to a judicial 
remedy as a human right. 1554  The following section, 3.1, explores the evolving weight and 
implications of the UN Guiding Principles as a “set of politically authoritative and socially legitimated norms 
and policy guidance” in conflict-affected areas. 
Conversely, the Maastricht Principles on Extra-territorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights will be examined in view of their declared purpose to clarify the scope of 
human rights obligations of States beyond their own borders in the area of ESC rights.1555 Their (potential) 
relevance for a broad range of conflict-related situations negatively impacting on such rights is 
investigated in the following section, 3.2. 
3.1. The UN Guiding Principles: normative contributions to conflict-affected 
situations and evolving implications 
In identifying the challenges posed by conflict-affected situations as one of the most major “governance 
gaps” existing at the international level, the SRSG Ruggie has progressively portrayed the 
relationship between business and human rights as part of both the problem and the solution. In 
actual fact, this is in line with the entire set of the foundational and operational Guiding Principles, 
which distinguish the respective roles of governments and businesses and which build on the 2008 
“protect, respect and remedy” policy framework, which was proposed by the same UN Special 
Representative and addressed the “what” question.1556 Indeed, being the latter deemed part of the 
                                                
1554 See FIDH, UN Human Rights Council Adopts Guiding Principles on Business Conduct, yet Victims Still Waiting for Effective 
Remedies, 17 June 2011; Human Rights Watch, UN Human Rights Council: Weak Stance on Business Standards, 16 June 2011; 
Amnesty International, Public Statement, United Nations: A Call for Action to Better Protect the Rights of Those Affected by 
Business-Related Human Rights Abuses, 4 June 2011; Child Rights Information Network (CRIN), Business and Human Rights: 
CRIN Response to Adoption of the Guiding Principles, 21 June 2011. 
1555 However, in some of the Principles the drafters’ appeal towards other actors emerges (i.e. corporations and other 
business enterprises, or international organizations): e.g., Principle 16 reads: “Obligations of international organizations. The 
present Principles apply to States without excluding their applicability to the human rights obligations of international organisations under, 
inter alia, general international law and international agreements to which they are parties”. 
1556 That framework affirmed, firstly, the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties via proper policy, 
regulation, and adjudication; secondly, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights (i.e. acting with due diligence to 
prevent any infringements on the rights of others and to address occurring adverse impacts); thirdly, improved access for 
victims to effective remedy (both judicial and non-judicial). On 18 June 2008 this framework was unanimously approved by 
the Human Rights Council, which extended Ruggie’s mandate until 2011 to cover its implementation and promotion, 
see UNHRC, Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/7, 18 June 2008. 
Ruggie’s rationale has given priority to the host States’ obligations: international law requires them to protect against 
corporations’ human rights abuses that affect persons within their territory or jurisdiction. There is a certain 
disagreement on whether international law calls for home States to help prevent violations by corporations based within 





global context, the potential of corporate actions and activities is emphasised in contributing 
positively to worldwide solutions besides originating crises and prolonging their negative impacts.1557  
Ruggie’s second pillar on corporate responsibility to respect human rights is seen as a decisive 
factor in founding sustainable forms of peace, especially where conflicts are connected to land and 
the exploitation of scarce natural resources (e.g. minerals, water). In the same regard, the extractives 
industry (e.g. oil and gas exploration and development) is emblematically featured by a vast and 
intrusive social and environmental footprint: extractive companies that operate in challenging socio-
political scenarios related to conflict-affected countries do pose several risks to human rights on 
micro and macro levels; specifically, locally they are likely to impact on human security, nationally 
they are likely to influence the activities of those in power by creating wealth for governments 
through taxes and profits. 1558  Therefore, Ruggie’s acknowledgement of a “negative symbiotic 
relationship” between companies’ involvement in human rights abuses and conflict-affected areas, in 
view of the fragility of governmental writs therein, is emphasised by requiring enhanced due 
diligence.1559 Indeed, while externally sourced private investment is deemed crucially important to 
transition dynamics in countries moving from conflict to peace, the potential of its negative impact 
on vulnerable societies and the intensified risks of gross human rights abuses are perceived as 
demanding adequate safeguards and checks in line with international standards.1560  
In order to control such a “negative symbiotic relationship”, the UN Guiding Principles set forth 
specific recommendations on how States and business enterprises should concurrently support 
“corporate responsibility to respect” in conflict-related zones. Additional practical guidance and 
suggestions about sector-specific benchmarks result from a specific project on “Business and Human 
Rights in Conflict-affected Regions: The Role of States”, which was launched by the same Special 
Representative in October 2009, aimed to identify measures for host, home and neighbouring 
States for preventing, mitigating and deterring corporate human rights abuses in conflict zones, and 
included three confidential brainstorming sessions (based on real scenarios) with interested 
                                                                                                                                                            
condition: the existence of a recognised basis of jurisdiction and a positive overall reasonableness test is met by the 
actions of the home State (including the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs), see A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 
2008, paras. 18-19. 
1557 See Working Group Report 2012, Section II, para 8. 
1558 On the micro level, their influence on human security may be related to the hiring of local security forces for the 
protection of their operations in the host country and also to the required awareness about community concerns. On the 
macro level, see Whittemore, “Intervention and Post-Conflict Natural Resource Governance: Lessons from Liberia”, 
Minnesota Journal of International Law, 2008, pp. 387-434. 
1559 Under the UN Guiding Principles (particularly 17-21), “human rights due diligence” involves a constant management 
process that a reasonable and prudent enterprise needs to carry out, in the light of several factors (including sector, 
operating context, size), to meet its responsibility to respect human rights.  
1560 See UN Working Group Report 2012, Section II, para 11. See also “Business and Human Rights: Interview with 





governments representatives and experts.1561 
3.1.a.  Some remarks on the State’s duty to protect  
The basic contours of this standard of expected conduct may be drawn through the position 
expressed in the commentary to fundamental Principle 1, according to which “States may breach their 
international human rights obligations where such abuse can be attributed to them, or where they fail to take 
appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress private actors’ abuse”. Under operational Principle 3, 
prevention of abuse comprises enforcing laws and periodically measuring the adequacy of such 
legislation to address any gaps, with awareness of, and response to, “evolving circumstances”. 
Conversely, fundamental Principle 2 embraces the position whereby “States are not [at present] generally 
required under international human rights law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their 
territory and/or jurisdiction”. It is nevertheless recommended that home States “set out clearly the 
expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout 
their operations”. 
In spelling out the policy implications of States’ existing duties under international human rights 
law for the protection against business-related human rights impacts, operational Principles 3-10 
include several aspects. Inter alia, States should ensure “policy coherence” between States’ human rights 
obligations and their several actions regarding businesses by improving the enforcement of existing 
laws, by identifying and addressing key policy or regulatory gaps, and by providing effective 
guidance to businesses. Then, States are required to foster business respect for human rights both at 
home and abroad, including where there is a State-business nexus (such as with State-owned or 
State-controlled enterprises, or when a State engages in commercial transactions such as 
procurement). States are also called to experience their duty to protect in their roles as participants 
in multilateral institutions. 
As part of the States’ duty to protect against business-related human rights abuses occurred 
within their territory and/or jurisdiction, foundational Principle 25 contemplates State-based judicial 
                                                
1561  See http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-conflict-project-note-Oct-2009.pdf. For comments on first 
meeting held with the relevant States, see Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: Further steps toward the 
operationalization of the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework”, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/27, 9 April 2010, Section 
III.D on “Conflict affected areas”. For the subsequent outcome, see the companion Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, “Business and 
human rights in conflict-affected regions: challenges and options towards State responses”, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/32, 
27 May 2011. This report concerns the three workshops convened by the SRSG and involving States officials (from 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Guatemala, Nigeria, Norway, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, the United 





and non-judicial grievance mechanisms for ensuring that effective remedy is available to victims. 
Unambiguously, having an effective and fair judicial system is recognised as the bedrock of the access 
remedy pillar; this specially requires States to avoid barriers (i.e. legal, practical, procedural) to 
prevent legitimate cases from being brought before courts in situations where judicial recourse is an 
indispensable part of accessing a remedy, or alternative sources of effective remedy are 
unavailable.1562 
For the purposes of the present research it is operational Principle 7 that deserves greater 
consideration. It identifies additional steps through which States ought ensure that companies 
operating in conflict-affected areas do not commit, or contribute to, or are not involved in “gross 
human rights abuses”.1563 It refers to early intervention and mitigation,1564 provision of assistance,1565 a 
“carrot and stick” approach of non-judicial penalties,1566 and effective measures addressing the risk of 
involvement.1567  
In situations of transnational corporations’ involvement in gross human rights violations in 
conflict-related areas, the UN Guiding Principles are inclined to recognise a human rights responsibility 
upon the home State, which appears however feebly defined in the commentary to Principle 7, by also 
scarcely elucidating the respective roles of host and home States. In this regard, its accompanying 
commentary specifies that “[i]n conflict-affected areas, the “host” State may be unable to protect human rights 
adequately due to a lack of effective control. Where transnational corporations are involved, their “home” States 
therefore have roles to play in assisting both those corporations and host States to ensure that businesses are not involved 
with human rights abuse [...]”. 
Furthermore, in order to attain policy coherence and adequately assist business enterprises in 
such cases, home States are recommended to “foster closer cooperation among their development assistance 
                                                
1562 See UN Guiding Principles 26-30. As to the legal barriers, the following are mentioned: attribution of legal 
responsibility to members of a corporate group under domestic criminal and civil laws in such a way that avoid 
accountability; denial of justice for the claimant in a host State followed by inaccessibility to the courts of the home State 
irrespective of the merits of the claim; exclusion for certain groups (e.g. indigenous peoples and migrants) from the same 
level of legal protection of human rights which applies to the rest of the population. 
1563 Violations of ESC rights may amount to gross human rights violations insofar as they are grave and systematic (e.g. 
those occurring on a large scale or targeted at particular groups). Many claims of human rights abuses by transnational 
corporations have concerned environmental degradation and pollution. 
1564 Under Principle 7 (a), States should engage “at the earliest stage possible with business enterprises to help them identify, prevent 
and mitigate the human rights-related risks of their activities and business relationships”. See Guiding Principles, op. cit., UN Doc. 
A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011. 
1565 Under Principle 7 (b), States should provide “adequate assistance to business enterprises to assess and address the heightened risks 
of abuses, paying special attention to both gender-based and sexual violence”. See Guiding Principles, op. cit. 
1566 Under Principle 7 (c), States should deny “access to public support and services for a business enterprise that is involved with gross 
human rights abuses and refuses to cooperate in addressing the situation”. See Guiding Principles, op. cit. 
1567 Under Principle 7 (d), States should ensure “that their current policies, legislation, regulations and enforcement measures are 





agencies, foreign and trade ministries, and export finance institutions in their capitals and within their embassies, as 
well as between these agencies and host Government actors; [...]; and attach appropriate consequences to any failure by 
enterprises to cooperate in these contexts, including by denying or withdrawing existing public support or services, or 
where that is not possible, denying their future provision”.1568  
Importance is also given to States’ own evaluations of their enforcement capabilities to be 
equipped to proceed for improving their eventual inadequacy. Specifically, States are recommended 
to review whether their policies, legislation, regulations and enforcement measures effectively 
address the heightened risk of being involved in gross violations of human rights in conflict-related 
areas. Significantly, suggested steps to tackle any identified gaps include “exploring civil, administrative 
or criminal liability for enterprises domiciled or operating in their territory and/or jurisdiction that commit or contribute 
to gross human rights abuses”. Moreover, multilateral approaches are evoked as functional to prevent 
and address such abuses, besides supporting effective collective initiatives.1569 
 
As briefly indicated in commentary to Principle 7, all these measures are additional to the States’ 
obligations under international humanitarian law and international criminal law.  
Nonetheless, the significance of such obligations as regards international crimes allegedly 
committed by legal persons such as corporations, or in which they are complicit, is not easy to draw. 
It is worth specifying, firstly, that States are bound to take preventive measures in peacetime such as 
disseminating international humanitarian law as well as they are obliged “to respect and to ensure 
respect for” its rules in all circumstances.1570 Moreover, States are required to enact national 
                                                
1568 See Guiding Principles, op. cit., UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, Principle 7, p. 11. 
1569 Ibid. 
1570 Common Article 1 GCs and AP I. In the ICRC Commentary, the duty to “ensure respect” is deemed as not limited to 
behaviour by parties to a conflict, rather including the requirement that States do all in their power to ensure that 
international humanitarian law is respected universally, see J.S. Pictet (ed.), Commentary: III Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, ICRC, 1960, p. 18; Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), op. cit., para. 45.  
Regarding any positive obligations imposed by this duty to ensure compliance with the standards contained in these 
instruments, it is generally agreed that the resulting obligation is an obligation to use the best efforts and that all States 
have a right to require respect for international humanitarian law by parties to any conflict. Being erga omnes norms, all 
States have a “legal interest” in their observance and consequently a legal entitlement to demand their respect, see ICTY, 
Furundžija case, Judgment (para. 47) and Kupreškić case, Judgment (para. 48). See also ICJ, Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, paras. 155-156,158 and 159. 
States’ measures implementing this duty, thereby exercising their influence to stop IHL violations, have included in 
particular either States’ objections through diplomatic protest (in international fora or by means of resolutions of 
international organizations) or collective measures (in the forms of organizing international conferences on specific 
situations, investigating possible violations, establishing ad hoc criminal tribunals and courts, creating the ICC, imposing 
international sanctions and sending of peacekeeping or peace-enforcement forces). On State practice, see Rule 144 of 
the ICRC Study on Customary IHL.  
Conversely, it remains doubtful whether the duty to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law extends so 





legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering the 
commition of, grave breaches of international humanitarian law, besides being obliged to investigate 
and prosecute before domestic courts persons suspected to have ordered to be committed, or to 
have committed, such particularly serious war crimes, irrespective of where they occurred as well as 
the nationality of the suspected offenders, or even to hand such persons over for trial to another 
State, provided it has made out a prima facie case:1571 an aggregate total of nine “grave breaches” are 
contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions,1572 while additional thirteen are contained in 1977 
Protocol I1573 (Protocol II extends the war crimes applicable to non-international armed conflicts 
without adding the list of grave braches). Additionally, States’ implementation of subsequent sources 
on international criminal law such as the Rome Statute has led to the inclusion of further violations 
of international humanitarian law in national criminal law provisions permitting to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes (even if they occurred outside their sovereign territory, and regardless 
of the nationality of the perpetrators or the victims). In this regard, the application of those domestic 
provisions to legal persons may be possible, either because as a matter of principle national criminal 
law contemplates the possible commission by legal persons of the offences it defines, or because it 
                                                                                                                                                            
The legal consequences for third States’ breaches of IHL can arise in two ways: 1) from the obligation not to recognise 
the resulting unlawful situation (including the entering into treaty relations with such a situation; the invoking or 
applying existing treaties which involved intergovernmental cooperation in relation to the unlawful situation; the 
sending diplomatic mission, consular agents or special missions to the non-recognised regime; the entering into 
economic and commercial dealings concerning the unlawful situation which might set the non-recognised regime’s 
authority); 2) from the obligation not to render assistance or aid in preserving or maintaining the unlawful situation (to 
be responsible by way of complicit under the strict rules of Article 16 of the ILC’s Draft Articles, States must do so with 
actual knowledge of the circumstances and intention to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct). 
1571 Art. 49 GC I; Art. 50, GC II; Art. 129 GC III; Art. 146 GC IV. While the 1949 Geneva Conventions impose these 
obligations in principle only on the Contracting Parties to these instruments, they are recogniSed as part of international 
customary law, applicable to all State. See ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986 (merits), para. 220 (“The Court considers that there is an obligation on the United 
States Government, in the terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to 'respect' the Conventions and even 'to ensure respect' for them 'in all 
circumstances', since such an obligation does not derive only from the Conventions themselves, but from the general principles of humanitarian 
law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression”). 
1572 Article 50 GCI (“willfully killing”, “torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments”, “wilfully causing great suffering 
or serious injury to body or health”, and “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly”); Article 51 GCII (same as GCI); Article 130 GCIII (same as GCs I and II, excluding the last 
clause on destruction and appropriation of property, but adding “compelling a prisoner of  war to serve in the forces of the hostile 
Power” and “wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention”); Article 147 GCIV 
(same as GCs I and II, but adding “unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person”, “wilfully depriving 
a  protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention”, and “taking of hostages”).  
1573 Article 11(4)(2) API deals with medical experimentation. Article 85(3)(3) API deals with: attacking individual civilians 
(indiscriminately attacking the civilian population or civilian property; attacking “works or installations containing dangerous 
forces” (e.g. dams) knowing that civilians would be harmed; attacking non-defended and demilitarized zones; attacking 
persons who are hors de combat; perfidious use of the symbols of the Red Cross, Red Crescent, or Red Lion and Sun. 
Article 85(4) API deals with: transferring one’s own population into occupied territory; deportation of the population of 
an occupied territory; apartheid and other practices based on racial discrimination; attacking works of art, historical 
monuments, or places of worship that are not in military use by the opposing forces; depriving certain persons of the 





comprises in the specific acts relating to international crimes legal persons alongside natural persons. 
Conversely, the just referred imposition of the principle out dedere aut judicare is drawn by the 
broader principle of international cooperation in combatting international crimes. It is an objective 
of the international community that such crimes are effectively investigated and the perpetrators put 
on trial and punished if found guilty. In this regard, although primary responsibility lies on the 
territorial State, the obligation to cooperate on a bilateral and multilateral basis to halt and prevent 
such crimes entails both States’ domestic measures and international measures for the purpose of 
mutual assistance in detecting, arresting and bringing to trial suspected offenders, in addition to 
punishing them if found guilty.1574 
These considerations have some implications regarding the case of a territorial (host) State 
suffering from a governance gap, thus exhibiting an ineffective and permissive regulatory or 
legislative environment to oversee businesses and their representatives, thereby encountering 
difficulties in engaging in respect of the liability of a foreign company that operates within its 
borders and has allegedly committed or was complicit in committing international crimes. In such a 
hypothesis, the aut dedere aut judicare principle might become the basis for an “optional” exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by the forum State; this would mainly be in the interest of the 
international community and it may be understood as deriving from the obligation of international 
cooperation in fighting international crimes; possible sanctions would include the confiscation of 
assets or the imposition of financial penalties. 
 
Of note, operational Principle 7 partly resulted from the work conducted on the challenges 
posed by the implementation of the State duty to protect in conflict-affected zones. This focus relied 
on the basic recognition that where grievous business-related human rights abuses are likely to take 
place in conflict-affected areas and other situations of widespread violence, they may actually induce 
or intensify conflicts, which may in turn lead to further injury.1575 In urging States to take action for 
clarifying innovative policies and tools in this regard, Ruggie’s additional attempts to generate 
practical guidance for States in response to actual and potential abuses in conflict-affected settings, 
has in turn led to identifying an important series of States’ public policy options, as shall be 
                                                
1574 See the Principles of international co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity adopted by the UN GA Res. 3074 (XXVIII) of 3 December 1973, UNGAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. 
No. 30, at 78, A/9030 (1973). The Preamble to the ICC Statute contains similar references to the obligation of 
international cooperation. 
1575 See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, John Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Regions: Challenges and Options for 






3.1.b. Some remarks on subsequent States’ policy options  
A key aspect of the range of policy approaches identified for preventing, deterring and mitigating 
corporate abuses in conflict-related contexts is a “proactive engagement” of States. This includes home 
States (where a multinational company is incorporated or has its headquarters), host States (a place 
other than the home State where the company has operations), and neighbouring States in close 
proximity to the relevant host State. The assistance or advisory role to be played by home States, 
even as a preventive role, appears central as far as host States are likely to be unable to meet their 
duty to protect in such circumstances (e.g. for a lack of effective control over their territory).  
Specifically, basic policy options include: (1) engaging with business enterprises that are 
physically present in conflict zones; (2) engaging with business involved in foreign investment and 
trade activities that encompass conflict zones; (3) fostering corporate accountability through States’ 
individual or collective roles, specially States’ responses to corporations that reject constructive 
engagements.1576  
While other previous initiatives mostly addressed the role of business enterprises in conflict-
affected zones and provided guidance for responsible companies to avoid contributing to human 
rights harms in such environments,1577 the focus here is on the practical policies and tools States should 
acquire for preventing or mitigating corporate-related abuses of human rights therein. Emphasis is put 
on their ability to engage or advise business enterprises about “acceptable conduct” in, or connected to, 
conflict-affected regions. This is deemed to require adequate regulatory frameworks, clarified 
applicability to business entities, and State agencies properly resourced to address businesses’ 
involvement in international or transnational crimes (e.g. corruption, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity).1578 In doing so, a constructive interaction between States and businesses is encouraged 
according to a “carrot and stick” approach and “public sector mechanisms” to be implemented by 
States. They include, inter alia, rules which require companies to implement a human rights and 
conflict sensitivity policy, the provision of public information about the human rights situation in a 
particular conflict area and “white listing” cooperating enterprises for State procurement markets, 
                                                
1576 UN Doc. A/HRC/17/32, 27 May 2011, ibid. 
1577 They include the United Nations’ efforts on conflict and natural resources; the work by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank on weak governance zones and fragile States; 
the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds; initiatives such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights, the Guidance on Responsible Business in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas of the Global Compact, or the 
publication on business and international humanitarian law by the ICRC. 





investment, export credit eligibility and other States’ transactions based on their due diligence 
policies and practices.1579  
Conversely, available policy options to respond to “uncooperative enterprises” vary1580. They refer to 
cases of companies disregarding recognised standards, or not implementing in good faith 
recommended processes, or refusing to refrain from risky behaviors. Relevant measures include, inter 
alia, investigation requests to embassies or other State agencies, the withdrawal of consular and/or 
business development support, missions appointed for investigation and reporting to the Parliament, 
the involvement of partners countries in investigation, conciliation and mediation (e.g. via the 
European Union, the African Union or the Organization of American States).  
Further measures are addressed for the most extreme situations in which enterprises cause or 
contribute to gross human rights abuses and disrespect any advice to diminish or remedy their impact. 
They include: considering civil, administrative or criminal liability; imposing unilateral or 
multilateral sanctions (targeting a person or a business entity); investigation and indictment for 
international crimes both senior managers and the business enterprise itself; issuing asset freezes, 
detention or arrest warrants for key individuals suspected in connection with international crimes; 
considering “multilateral approaches” to prevent and address business-related gross human rights 
abuses and support effective collective initiatives. As main concluding proposal, a “standard setting 
exercise” is recommended whereby States would work towards “multilateral agreement on risks and 
prohibited activities with respect to business in conflict or other high-risk situations”. This is justified by an 
explicit acknowledgment of States’ major inclination to adopt policies establishing standards that do 
not put their own businesses at an unfair disadvantage.1581 
3.1.b.i. Reflecting on evolved forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction as tools to 
influence corporate conduct overseas 
One of the basic needs finally identified in elaborating the studies and consultations conducted 
under Ruggie’s mandate regards the clarification of international legal standards applying to businesses’ 
involvement in gross human rights abuses, by advocating in particular further development of international 
law regarding the complex subject of extraterritorial jurisdiction.1582  
                                                
1579 See UN Doc. A/HRC/17/32, 27 May 2011, paras. 15-16. 
1580 See UN Doc. A/HRC/17/32, 27 May 2011, paras. 17-18. 
1581 See UN Doc. A/HRC/17/32, 27 May 2011, paras. 19-21.  
1582 See Ruggie’s note submitted to the Human Rights Council, see “Recommendations on follow-up to the mandate”, 
11 February 2011. See Presentation of Report to United Nations Human Rights Council Professor John G. Ruggie Special Representative 
of the Secretary General for Business and Human Rights Geneva, 30 May 2011. The same aspects were addressed again in 





As highlighted in Guiding Principle 2, international human rights law does not generally impose 
a State to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses entities domiciled within its jurisdiction. 
As previously noted, an exceptional situation in which States are required under international law to 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction concerns the commission of certain international crimes as far as 
such exercise is functional to repress effectively those crimes perpetrated on the territory of State loci 
delicti. Remarkably, an additional emerging State obligation to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
debated in case of violations of ESC rights where States are in a position to prevent them by controlling 
private actors contributing to such violations beyond their sovereign territories. In this regard, the 
interdependencies between States and transnational actors’ activities have been emphasised 
alongside the need to act jointly for coping with collective problems faced by the international 
community. 1583 In development theory the concept of global public goods has acquired central 
importance and in international human rights law the obligation of international cooperation has been 
revitalised. This aspect will be properly detailed in section 3.2 in the context of the Maastricht 
Principles. 
Despite the absence of such a general “obligation to regulate”, emphasis has been put on the 
notion that States are not precluded from performing so provided there is a jurisdictional basis. As detailed in 
section 3.2.d.ii, indeed several judicial and non-judicial human rights bodies (e.g. the Committees of 
ICESCR, the ICCPR, the CERD; the European Court of Human Rights, European Committee of 
Social Rights of the Council of Europe; the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) have pushed for States’ proactive contribution in the 
promotion and protection of internationally recognised human rights standards outside their 
national borders, in order to expect businesses domiciled in their territory or jurisdiction to act in 
accordance with human rights.1584   
In any case, various forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction have started to function as tools to 
influence the spectrum of corporate conduct overseas. On the one hand, States have approved 
domestic legislations/regulations with extraterritorial implications, which are addressed to decisions and 
                                                                                                                                                            
December 2012, see 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/ForumSession1/SubmissionsStatements/OpeningJRuggie.pdf . 
1583 As Mr El Hadji Guissé articulated, “(t)he violations committed by the transnational corporations in their mainly transboundary 
activities do not come within the competence of a single State and, to prevent contradictions and inadequacies in the remedies and sanctions 
decided upon by States individually or as a group, these violations should form the subject of special attention. The States and the international 
community should combine their efforts so as to contain such activities by the establishment of legal standards capable of achieving that 
objective”. See “The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Final report on the question of the impunity of 
perpetrators of human rights violations (economic, social and cultural rights), prepared by Mr. El Hadji Guissé, Special Rapporteur, pursuant 
to Sub-Commission resolution 1996/24, UN Doc.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/8, 27 June 1997, para. 131. 
1584 For a primary theoretical contribution, see F. Francioni, Imprese Multinazionali, Protezione Diplomatica e Responsabilità 





operations made and carried out ‘at home’ and which support the prevention of corporate-related 
human rights abuses abroad; thus, such measures rely on territory as the jurisdictional basis although 
they can have extraterritorial effects.1585 On the other hand, a growing number of domestic courts have 
accepted to hear cases against corporations for conduct by overseas affiliates because of the potential negligence 
(through omission or commission) of the parent company itself; this judicial exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, directly in relation to actors or activities abroad, relies on clear links as the jurisdictional 
basis, so demanding solid legislative or executive support. The rapid evolution at national levels of 
public policies, prescriptive regulations and enforcement actions in relation to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction seems directly attached to States’ acknowledgement that what is at sake is “the social 
sustainability of globalisation”.  
Nevertheless, a tricky aspect of a high priority has been identified in the national jurisdictions’ 
diverging interpretations of the applicability to business enterprises of international standards prohibiting gross human 
rights abuses, potentially amounting to international crimes. As stressed by Ruggie, typically the allegations 
involve corporate complicity in acts committed by third parties and those abuses often arise in the context of 
armed conflict or similar conditions of intensified risk in a host country whose international human 
rights regime cannot possibly function since effective institutions may not exist. Despite an 
intensified number of cases in which claimants resort to the home State’s judicial system, domestic 
courts of civil and common law systems have not shared consistent understandings of what exactly 
the international standards require; such a discrepancy increases uncertainty for victims of the 
abuses, for companies facing operational troubles and finding themselves sued for decades, but also 
for host States that may lack the capacity of dealing with the consequences and for home States 
whose reputations remain on the line.   
In order to advance greater consistency in legal protection, a “multilateral approach” has been 
suggested. It covers several aspects, including: the standards as to appropriate investigations, 
punishment and redress where companies cause or contribute to such abuses; what constitutes 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; when the extension of national jurisdiction over 
corporate activities abroad (counting foreign subsidiaries and commercial partners) may be 
appropriate, and the acceptable bases for the exercise of such jurisdiction. This could also foster 
international cooperation, coordination, and consultation, even in resolving jurisdictional disputes 
                                                
1585 A case underlined by Ruggie concerns export credit agencies requiring companies to conduct human rights due 
diligence as a condition for public support; another example is that of governmental measures requiring the corporate 





and providing for technical assistance.1586 
In the following section the advocated clarification of international legal standards applying to 
businesses’ involvement in gross human rights abuses, and the related emphasis on the subject of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, is considered in view of the implications resulting from the concept of 
“corporate responsibility to respect” under the UN Guiding Principles. 
3.1.c. Some remarks on the corporate responsibility to respect  
The UN Guiding Principles do not clarify per se the multi-layered regime of responsibility of States 
and transnational corporations. The concept of “corporate responsibility to respect human rights” entails 
avoidance to infringe on the human rights of others, either in the form of causation or contribution1587, 
plus addressing the adverse human rights impacts arising from its own activities (acts or omissions) 
and preventing or mitigating those resulting from its business relationships with partners, entities in its 
supply chain, and any other non-state or state actors “directly linked” to its business operations, products or 
services (even though it has neither caused nor contributed to those impacts) (Principle 11 and 13).  
Further, three recommended mechanisms to evaluate and face such distinct modes of 
involvement in adverse impacts are included in Principle 15, namely a formal policy commitment to 
respect human rights to be reflected in the corporate policies and procedures, a due diligence 
process that entails drawing on external expertise and the results of stakeholder consultation 
(Principle 18), and a remediation process for any negative impacts the company directly causes or 
contributes to. 
This “global standard of expected conduct”, which commentary to Principle 11 conceives as applicable 
to all business enterprises wherever they run, is understood not only as independent from States’ ability 
or willingness to implement their own human rights obligations, but also as incapable of weakening 
them. The autonomy of corporate social norms is emphasised in Principle 12, which refers to the 
responsibilities directly bestowed upon companies to respect internationally recognised human 
rights as contained “at a minimum” in the International Bill of Human Rights (i.e. the UDHR, the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR) coupled with the principles concerning fundamental rights in the eight 
ILO core conventions as set out in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
                                                
1586 An appropriate precedent and model for such an effort has been considered the UN Convention against 
Corruption, adopted by GA Res. 58/4 of 31 October 2003 and entered into force in December 2005. Under Article 
42(2)(b) a State party may found its jurisdiction over an offence set up under the Convention if it was committed by one 
of its nationals. 
1587 “Contribution” can arise in two different ways: firstly, where a decision or an action by the business enterprise 
produces an incentive for a third party (supplier or a government) to abuse human rights; secondly, where a business 





Significantly, commentary to Principle 12 specifies that the concept of corporate responsibility is 
“distinct” from issues of legal liability and enforcement that are primarily defined under domestic 
laws or regulations in relevant jurisdictions.1588 Nonetheless, the need for business enterprises to 
consider “additional standards” depending on the circumstances is explicitly referred: not only 
respect for individuals’ human rights as further elaborated for specific groups or populations (e.g. 
indigenous people, national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities), but also respect for the 
standards of international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict (commentary to Principle 12). 
Corporations’ need to take into account this additional branch of international law may pose 
particular challenges, as is highlighted heretofore. 
3.1.c.i. Elaborating on businesses’ respect for international humanitarian law 
This branch of international law does bind all actors whose activities are closely linked to an armed 
conflict, even though States and other parties to the hostilities may have the ultimate responsibility 
for ensuring its implementation. As clearly addressed by the ICRC, “it is not necessary for business 
enterprises and their managers to intend to support a party to the hostilities for their activities to be considered to be 
closely linked to the conflict”. 1589 In this regard, their activities do not have to take place necessarily on 
the battlefield or throughout fighting. Their actual impact may count regardless of whether or not 
there was such intent. While international humanitarian law grants protection to both their 
personnel (provided they do not take part directly in armed hostilities) and their assets and capital 
investments, it also requires those acting on their behalf not to breach its applicable rules and 
exposes them (and the enterprises themselves) to the risk of criminal as well as civil liability in the 
event that they do so.  
Specifically, violations of international humanitarian law may give rise to corporate civil liability 
before national courts, whether they stems from the company’s own activities, or whether they stems 
from the wrongful acts of others (e.g. committed by its employees, another business entity, an armed 
group, a State) insofar as the latter is substantially connected to the company’s conduct, or whether 
the company’s acts amount to complicity in the violations concerned. However, the willingness of 
                                                
1588 Although it is often reflected (at least in part) in domestic law or regulations corresponding to international human 
rights standards, corporate responsibility is deemed as not limited to compliance with these national law provisions: “It 
exists over and above legal compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights”. Accordingly, it occurs 
independently of an enterprise’s own commitment to human rights. It is reflected in other soft law instruments such as 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Emphasis is then put on the fact that where business enterprises 
pose a risk to human rights and fail to meet their responsibility to respect, they also pose a risk to their own long-term 
interests, since a range of legal, financial and reputational consequences become possible. 
1589 See Business and International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Rights and Obligations of Business Enterprises under 





domestic courts to acknowledge the applicability of international law to claims brought against 
businesses in order to hold them responsible for violations of international humanitarian law is 
infrequent. For the purposes of the present research, some recent civil cases filed in French,1590 
Canadian1591 and US1592 courts are of particular interest and will be examined in Chapter 5.  
                                                
1590 See the Court of Appeal of Versailles decision of 22 March 2013, in Association France Palestine Solidarité “AFPS” and 
Organisation de Libération de la Palestine “OLP” v. Societé Alstom Transsport SA, Societé Alstom SA and SA Veolia Transport, which 
ruled against the civil liability under international law of two French corporations for their involvement in the alleged 
illegal construction of a light rail system that has become active since July 2011 between West Jerusalem (inside Israel’s 
internationally recognised borders) and East Jerusalem (inside the Palestinian territory of the West Bank) where several 
Israeli settlements are located. According to the French Court, the international law provisions relied on do not create direct 
obligations that may be placed upon private companies, which are not subjects of international law and do not have international 
legal personality. For the Court, neither Geneva and Hague Conventions nor the relevant customary international 
humanitarian law are directly addressed to the companies in question; even if the Court seems to assume that the State 
of Israel is prima facie involved in the internationally unlawful settlements enterprise, this would have no bearing on the 
validity of the construction and operation contracts signed by the two French companies and on the civil liability of 
private companies under French law. 
1591 See the Quebec courts judgments of September 2009 and August 2010, in Bil’in (Village Council) and Ahmed Issa 
Abdallah Yassin v. Green Park International Inc., Green Mount International Inc. and Annette Laroche, which declined jurisdiction on 
the ground of forum non conveniens and dismissed a corporate liability suit against the two Canadian-based Green Park 
Internationals Inc. and Green Mount Internationals Inc. for having participated in the commission of war crimes 
allegedly committed in the West Bank in view of their involvement in the construction and selling of buildings on the 
land of Bil’in Palestinian village as part of an Israeli settlement. 
1592  Although a criminal law concept, complicity has been applied in civil claims of violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law.  
See Doe v. Unocal Corp., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Judgment of 18 September 2002, which ruled that a 
corporation could be held liable under the federal Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) for its complicity in a violation of 
international criminal law occurring outside the United States. Unocal was sued by citizens of Myanmar who had been 
subjected to forced labour, physical injuries, torture, rape and murder at the hands of the Myanmar military security 
unit that was under contract to a consortium of international energy companies, in the context of oil and gas extraction 
operations and the building of a pipeline. The Government of Myanmar had a mandate, inter alia, to provide security 
and manpower for that joint venture involving Unocal, Total and the Government itself. The two companies were 
accused of complicity in committing grave breaches of human rights because they had allegedly provided material 
support to the military unit and had done nothing to limit the abuses. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., F. Supp. 2d,  (C.D. 
California 2000), at 1294-1296, 1303.  
The federal district Court of California dismissed the claim against the Myanmar military unit on sovereign immunity 
grounds (see Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 886 (C.D. Cal. 1997) and it also dismissed the claim against Total 
for lack of personal jurisdiction (see Doe I v. Unocal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Conversely, although 
the district court recognised that a company could possibly be liable for complicity in the crimes concerned, it granted 
summary judgment to Unocal on the grounds that the applicable test under international law for complicity had not 
been met, because there was insufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate Unocal’s “active participation in the unlawful 
conduct”, while it found that Unocal and the government of Myanmar had only the common design of running the 
project profitably (see District Decision at 1310).  
In the second-instance judgment of this case, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the district 
Court of California should have applied the “complicity theory” borrowed from international criminal law, instead of 
applying the “joint action theory” (under which the plaintiff had to show that the parties participating in the joint action, i.e. 
Unocal and the government of Myanmar, had the precise common design of violating the victims’ rights). The Appeals 
Court found that there was sufficient evidence to hold Unocal liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). 
See also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 f. Supp. 2d 289, US District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, 19 March 2003. The Canadian oil company Talisman was sued for collaborating with the Sudanese 
Government in violations of human rights and war crimes committed in the context of the international armed conflict 
taking place in Sudan. The use of the aiding and abetting standard was challenged by Talisman by arguing that this was 
not applicable to civil liability actionable under the ATCA. According to the District Court, Talisman’s contention was 
incorrect and its analysis misapprehended the fundamental nature of the ATCA. The Court underlined that “the ATCA 






Conversely, as already mentioned, criminal liability may arise for those who commit grave breaches 
of international humanitarian law or other serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
including where business enterprises and their representatives (i.e. officers, directors, employees or 
agents) commit such violations or are indirectly involved in the commission of such violations 
performed by others (e.g. parent and subsidiary corporations, clients such as States). Even when 
international humanitarian law is incorporated into domestic legislations, however, States may 
approach the principle of criminal liability of corporations as well as the nature of the applicable 
legal sanctions differently. A pertinent criminal complaint brought to the public prosecutor in the 
Netherlands1593 will be examined in Chapter 5.  
Furthermore, it is worth considering that several international or hybrid criminal tribunals have 
jurisdiction over natural persons individually responsible and criminally liable for punishment for 
international crimes either as principal perpetrators or accomplices. In this regard, accomplice 
liability may be particularly relevant given the complex nature of international crimes and the 
number of people and entities who may participate in the commission.1594 The principal modes of 
participation applied under international criminal law to punish individual offenders where they are 
not the actual perpetrators include “conspiracy”, “aiding and abetting”, “joint criminal enterprise” (also 
referred as “common purpose”), and “superior responsibility” (also referred as “command responsibility”). 
Indeed, none of the international criminal tribunals from the IMT to the ICC have had jurisdiction 
over legal persons such as corporations.1595 Despite this, the ICC could adjudicate corporate 
involvement in international crimes by focusing on the individuals acting on behalf of a certain 
                                                                                                                                                            
courts must look to international law. Thus, whether or not aiding and abetting and complicity are recognised with respect to charges of 
genocide, enslavement, war crimes, and the like is a question that must be answered by consulting international law”, see, ibid., at 320. In 
looking to international law, the Court found that businesses could be held liable for aiding and abetting where they 
have provided substantial assistance to the government with the purpose of aiding the government’s unlawful conduct, see 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2nd Cir. 2009).  
1593 The Dutch National Public Prosecutor’s Office dismissal (14 May 2013) of the case against Lima Holdings (the 
Dutch parent) for Riwal’s role in the construction of the wall in the occupied Palestinian territories.  
1594 Accomplice liability is incorporated into the Statutes of several international or hybrid criminal courts. See Article 
7(1) of the ICTY Statute; Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute; Article 6(1) of the SCSL Statute; Article 29 of the Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chamber for Cambodia with inclusions of amendments as promulgated on 27 
October 2004; Article 3 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Under Article 25 (3) (c)-(d) of the Rome Statute any natural 
person who “aids, abets or otherwise assists” or “contributes” in the attempted commission or commission of crimes articulated in the Statute is 
individually responsible for such crimes. Thus a two-pronged test is established, including (1) practical assistance or 
encouragement that have a substantial contribution or effect on the commission of the crime and (2) knowledge and 
purpose in facilitating or assisting the crime. 
1595 See IMT Charter, Article 5 (“The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which 
there shall be individual  responsibility”); IMTFE Charter, Article 5 (tracking the language of the IMT Charter); ICTY Statute, 
Article 6 (“The International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present Statute”); ICTY 
Statute, Art. 5 (tracking the language of the ICTY Statute); Rome Statute, Art. 25(1) (“The Court shall have jurisdiction over 





corporation. Historical precedents regard German industrialists who were brought before the US 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Allied Control Council Law No. 10.1596 
The controversies concerning the enforcement of these types of criminal and civil liability issues 
will be discussed in Chapter 5, in a narrow sense, in relation to cases of allegations of companies’ 
involvement in serious breaches of international law that inhibit (directly or indirectly) the exercise 
of, or adequate access to, the ESC rights of civilians.  
3.2.c.ii. Reflecting on businesses’ approach to risks of gross human rights abuses as 
“a legal compliance issue” 
Refocusing on the position embraced by the UN Guiding Principles on the concept of “corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights”, Principle 23 is noteworthy.1597 In providing three basic guiding 
rules for companies “in all contexts”, it ends up referring to scenarios that are likely to concern 
conflict-affected zones: weak or silent applicable laws, direct conflict between national requirements 
and internationally recognised human rights, a company’s involvement in gross human rights 
abuses.  
Significantly, this elaboration of the basic principle that “all business enterprises have the same 
responsibility to respect human rights wherever they operate” may support its emergence as an international 
public order principle (similarly to others such as the prohibition on corruption and the good faith 
obligation). In the commentary to Principle 23 companies that enter or carry on operating in 
                                                
1596 See Trial of Friedrich Flick and Five Others, US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 20 April-22 December 1947, Law 
Reports of the Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, 1950, Vol. IX, pp. 1-68; The I.G. 
Farben Trial, Trial of Carl Krauch and Twenty-two Others, US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 August 1947-29 July 1948, 
op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 1-68; The Krupp Trial, Trial of Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and Eleven Others, US 
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 August 1947-29 July 1948, op. cit., Vol. X, pp. 69-181.  
In the Krupp case, twelve top managers of the German industrial entity were indicted of, inter alia, war crimes for 
spoliation and plunder of public and private property in occupied territory as well as of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity for employing prisoners of war, foreign civilians and concentration camp inmates in arms factories in 
inhumane conditions. 
In the I.G. Farben case, twenty-four corporate executives of the German chemical and pharmaceutical company were 
indicted of “planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression and invasions of other countries”; plunder and spoliation 
of public and private property in occupied territory; slavery and mass murder; the indictment issued on 3 May 1947 
further alleged that I.G. Farben was responsible for assisting Nazi soldiers at the Auschwitz extermination camp. These 
corporate executives were convicted as criminal accomplices of the aforementioned egregious violations of international 
law, see United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al., Judgment, 29, 30 July 1948, particularly at 1132-33 and 1140. I.G. 
Farben was the largest company assisting the furtherance of Hitler’s programmes and racial extermination agenda. The 
scale of its contribution to the Nazi-Germany’s military-economic war preparations led the Allied Control Council to 
order its dismantling and the seizure of its assets, see Control Council Law No. 9 pmbl., Seizure of Property by I.G. 
Farbenindustrie and the Control Thereof (30 November 1945), in Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and 
Coordinating Committee, at 225.  
1597 Principle 23 reads: “In all contexts, business enterprises should: (a) Comply with all applicable laws and respect internationally 
recognised human rights, wherever they operate; (b) Seek ways to honour the principles of internationally recognised human rights when faced 






settings featured by uncertain protection regimes are called for examining carefully the extent of 
potential contradictions with international human rights standards because, as such, they are likely 
to face reputational and legal consequences. In fact, conflict-affected zones intensify corporations’ 
potentials of causing or contributing to gross human rights abuses committed by third parties.1598 
Accordingly, they have been recommended to regard such risk as “a legal compliance issue” in view of 
the increasing possibility of corporate liability, which may result not only from extraterritorial civil 
claims but also from the implementation of the ICC Statute in national jurisdictions that impose corporate criminal 
responsibility. Such incorporation may broaden the scope of the Rome Statute beyond individual 
corporate officers to the company itself. This theoretical possibility supplements the risk of corporate 
executives and employees to be exposed to individual liability for acts amounting to gross violations. 
In order not to exacerbate conflict-affected zones, business enterprises have been finally 
recommended to draw on internal consultation and expertise as well as to consult with reliable 
experts from governments, civil society, national human rights institutions and relevant 
stakeholders.1599  
Insisting on the required prioritizing actions to address actual and potential adverse impacts on 
human rights, Principle 24 recommends business enterprises, “in the absence of specific legal guidance” to 
begin with the “most severe” impacts and to recognise that “a delayed response may affect remediability”. 
Of note is that the Human Rights Council recently requested the ‘Working Group on the issue 
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ “to launch an inclusive 
and transparent consultative process with States in 2015, open to other relevant stakeholders, to explore and facilitate 
the sharing of legal and practical measures to improve access to remedy, judicial and non-judicial, for victims of 
business-related abuses, including the benefits and limitations of a legally binding instrument, and to prepare a report 
thereon and to submit it to the Human Rights Council at its thirty-second session”.1600  The same Working 
Group was also requested “to include as an item of the agenda of the Forum on Business and Human Rights the 
issue of access to remedy, judicial and non-judicial, for victims of business-related human rights abuses, in order to 
achieve more effective access to judicial remedies” (para. 10). 
                                                
1598 Commentary to Principle 17, which defines the parameters for human rights due diligence of business enterprises, 
refers to complicity in its twofold legal (i.e. substantially contributing to a harm) and non-legal (i.e. benefiting from an 
abuse committed by others) meanings. As a legal issue, complicity in the commission of a crime is prohibited in the 
majority of national jurisdictions, which may also allow for criminal liability of business enterprises in such cases. 
Generally, an enterprise’s alleged contribution to harm may also be the foundation for civil actions, which may not be 
framed in human rights terms however. 
1599 See Guiding Principles, op. cit., UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 of 21 March 2011, Principle 23, p. 21. 
1600 UN Doc. A/HRC/26/L./1, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 23 
June 2014, para. 8. The resolution was drafted by Ecuador and South Africa and was supported by twenty members 
States (including India, China, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Russia). Argentina and Brazil abstained from voting, while others 





As mentioned above, Chapter 5 examines a number of recent lawsuits regarding companies’ 
involvement in serious breaches of international law norms that directly or indirectly inhibit the 
exercise of, and adequate access to, ESC rights in conflict-afflicted situations. The evaluation of 
emerging judicial approaches to the legal determinations of corporate liability for such breaches will 
consider Guiding Principle 23. In this regard, it will inquire whether and to what extent national 
and international judicial mechanisms have started to translate the theoretical corporate legal 
liability (the “expanding web of potential corporate legal liability”) into tangible accountability for wrongs as 
regards ESC rights. Accordingly, it examines the ways courts have handled corporate liability and 
assesses which realistic prospects exist for legal redress at national or international level, whether 
action on the part of criminal prosecution and law enforcement bodies is attractive, or whether the 
possibility of civil liability towards affected persons is effective, and whether the scope of basic 
liability concepts has acquired a certain legal certainty. 
 
3.2. The Maastricht Principles: contributions to the normative framework of human 
rights obligations of foreign States 
Emanating from a long course of debate on the extraterritorial obligations of States in the area of 
ESC rights, the Maastricht Principles complement and are built on other notable interpretative 
documents by human rights experts, as observed in Chapter 3. While the Preamble explains the 
need for such tenets and vaguely indicates the legal sources they draw on1601, seven sections, in a dry 
and direct style, deal with general principles (Principles 1-7), the scope of extraterritorial obligations 
of States (Principles 8-18), the extraterritorial obligations to respect (Principles 19-22), protect 
(Principles 23-27) and fulfil (Principles 28-35), accountability and remedies (Principles 36-41), and 
final provisions (Principles 42-44).  
3.2.a. A twofold conceptual foundation of extraterritorial obligations  
By defining extraterritorial obligations, two grounds are identified in Principle 8, which addresses 
them together since they may overlap or arise simultaneously. One relates to the State acts or 
omissions (within or beyond its territory) that have (real and foreseeable1602) effects on human rights 
beyond its sovereign territory. The other one refers to “obligations of a global character” (such as those 
                                                
1601 Under paragraph 8 of the Preamble, “(d)rawn from international law, these principles aim to clarify the content of extraterritorial 
State obligations to realise economic, social and cultural rights with a view to advancing and giving full effect to the object of the Charter of the 
United Nations and international human rights”. See also Principle 6, which stipulates territorial and extraterritorial obligations 
are included in international human rights law sources. 





set out in the UN Charter and human rights instruments) to take action via international 
cooperation (separately or jointly) so as to realise human rights. The basic view behind that second 
key foundation is that safeguarding socio-economic rights in the age of economic globalisation 
cannot be exclusively got through unilateral or bilateral efforts of States. Rather, the global setting 
may be conducive to their realisation through international arrangements in several regulatory 
spheres such as development, environment, investment, trade, and finance.  
3.2.b. A progressive interpretation of the notion of jurisdiction  
An advanced understanding of the notion of jurisdiction in the context of obligations to respect, 
protect, fulfil ESC rights is elucidated in Principle 9. Its broad scope includes not only situations in 
which States exercise “authority or effective control”, but also situations in which “acts or omissions bring 
about foreseeable effects” on the enjoyment of ESC rights, and even situations in which States (acting 
through their executive, legislative or judicial branches) “exercise decisive influence” or “take measures to 
realise” ESC rights extraterritorially in accordance with international law.  
While Principle 9 sets forth the bases for exploring the application of human rights obligations to 
States’ conduct affecting ESC rights extraterritorially, subsequent Principle 10 emphasises that the 
duties concerned should not be referred in support of measures that violate the UN Charter or general international law. 
This is in line with Article 2(4) of the Charter, which imposes on Member States to “refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. In the same regard, basic 
limits may derive from the principles of the sovereign equality of all States and the sovereignty over 
national territory, as examined heretofore. 
3.2.c. The general obligation to avoid causing harm 
The overall meaning of States’ extraterritorial obligations is typified by the general and negative 
“obligation to avoid causing harm”. Principle 13 enunciates the State duty to desist from conduct that 
generate “a real risk” of impairing or nullifying the enjoyment of ESC rights beyond its sovereign 
territory. Without setting up a threshold of intensity or gravity of the risk, the adjective “real” 
underlines the probability that it will occur, rather than the nature of the effects once it has 
materialized.  
Notably, international tribunals have dealt with the prohibition of transboundary harm. The 





a neighbouring country was primarily maintained in the Trail Smalter arbitration case.1603 In this respect, 
“the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond national control” was reiterated by the International Court of Justice.1604 
Furthermore, the principle concerned is embodied in basic sources of international environmental 
law, such as the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (principle 21) and the 
1992 Rio Declaration (principle 2).  
The duty articulated in Principle 13 is in accordance with what Article 74 of the UN Charter 
requires in the context of Non-Self-governing Territories, namely adhering to “the general principle of 
good neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and wellbeing of the rest of the world, in social, economic, 
and commercial matters”.  
3.2.c.i. The foreseeability rule 
A relevant condition articulated regarding the “obligation to avoid causing harm” is foreseeability, which is 
actually emphasised even in the aforementioned Principle 9. Under Principle 13, State responsibility 
is triggered when the prejudice to ESC rights (in breach of the obligation to avoid causing harm) 
was “a foreseeable result of their conduct”. In other words, State responsibility may be based on whether 
its authorities are aware of, or should have been aware of, the risks to ESC rights.1605 Thus the 
relevance of the notion of foreseeability relies on that it functions as an incentive for States to 
evaluate in advance the influence of their activities or decisions on the enjoyment of ESC rights 
beyond their national territories.  
This focus on the knowledge of State authorities about the results of their conduct acquires 
significance also in view of the ILC’s Commentary to Article 23 of its Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, where two dimensions of foreseeability 
are laid down (“To have been ‘unforeseen’, the event must have been neither foreseen nor of an easily foreseeable 
                                                
1603 See Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 3 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 16 April 1938 and 11 
March 1941, Vol. III, at 1905-1982. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry to the ICJ advisory opinion on 
the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, in which it was affirmed that New Zealand’s claim about prohibiting nuclear 
tests where they could risk impacting on the State’s population should be determined in light of the “deeply entrenched 
principle, grounded in common sense, case law, international conventions, and customary international law” that “damage must not be caused 
to other nations”. 
1604 See ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996 (I), 241-
242, para. 29. See also ICJ, Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Ungheria c Slovacchia), Judgment of 27 September 1997, ICJ 
Reports 1997, 78, para. 140; ICJ, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Request for the indication of 
Provisional Measures, Order of 13 July 2006, ICJ Reports 2006, 132, para. 72. 
1605 Conversely, in the Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ remarked that due diligence obligations “are based … on certain general 
and well-recognised principles, namely: … every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights 
of other States”, see ICJ, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, 






kind”).1606 Accordingly, State responsibility may be engaged when the resulting impairment of ESC 
rights was readily predicted by its authorities, or when this should have been predicted and they 
failed to search for the information that would have permitted to estimate better the risks.  
Of further note, Principle 13 also reflects the evolution of the questions of foreseeability and 
causality (i.e. the relation of conduct and result) as addressed in the ILC’s Commentary to Principle 
4 of its 2006 Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising 
out of Hazardous Activities.1607 In this respect, a violation of ESC rights may be attributable to a 
State provided that it was foreseeable that its conduct could have given rise to it even if other causes 
were also present.1608 
3.2.c.ii. The precautionary principle   
A final significant reference in Principle 13 is reserved to the precautionary principle, which is 
articulated by emphasising that “[u]ncertainty about potential impacts does not constitute justification for said 
conduct” (namely a conduct that entails the risk of infringing ESC rights). 
This principle has been acknowledged in relation to international environmental law as well as 
international humanitarian law;1609 its programmatic nature result clearly from Article 191(2) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, where it is laid down among specific principles 
of the EU environmental policy (precaution and prevention, the rectification of environmental 
impairment at source and the polluter-pays principle). It also represents a basic principle in the 
regulation of biotechnology.1610 As highlighted by the ILC in relation to Article 3 of the 2001 Draft 
Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, the precautionary 
principle is commonly viewed as “taking such measures as are appropriate by way of abundant caution, even if 
                                                
1606 See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of the fifty-third session, UN Doc. A/56/10, 21 
August 2001, Article 23 Force majeure, Commentary, at 184, para. 2.  
1607 According to the ILC’s commentary, “(T)he principle of causation is linked to questions of foreseeability and proximity or direct 
loss. Courts in different jurisdictions have applied the principles and notions of proximate cause, adequate causation, foreseeability and 
remoteness of the damage. This is a highly discretionary and unpredictable branch of law. Different jurisdictions have applied these concepts 
with different results. It may be mentioned that the test of proximity seems to have been gradually eased in modern tort law. Developments have 
moved from strict condicio sine qua non theory over the foreseeability (“adequacy”) test to a less stringent causation test requiring only the 
‘reasonable imputation’ of damage”. See the text adopted by the ILC in 2006 and submitted to the General Assembly as a 
part of the ILC’s report on the work of that session, Report of the International Law Commission, UN GAOR, 58th sess., paras. 
44-46; Principle 4 Prompt and adequate compensation, Commentary, A/61/10 (2006), at 157, para. 16. 
1608 On this point, see O. De Schutter, A. Eide, A. Khalfan, M. Orellana, M. Salomon, I. Seiderman, “Commentary to 
the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 
HRQ, 2012, at 1113-1114. 
1609 See Article 57 AP I. See also Principle 15 of the Declaration on Environment and Development, Report of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, I, (New York, 1992), A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1.  
1610 See F. Francioni, “International law for Biotechnology: Basic Principles”, in Francioni and Scovazzi (eds.), 





full scientific certainty does not exist, to avoid or prevent serious or irreversible damage”.1611  
Therefore, Principle 13 primarily implies that the absence of certainty as to threats or potential 
threats of serious effects on ESC rights should not be the basis for the approval of planned critical 
activities or the application of preventive measures combined with effective remedies. A 
representative example of a situation would concern oil exploitation activities causing water and soil 
pollution that potentially has negative impacts on the right to health and the right to an adequate 
standard of living of the people living in the area concerned. Notable support for the precautionary 
principle has recently come from international jurisprudence.1612 
3.2.c.iii. The prior assessment requirement 
A procedural duty inherently related to the obligation to avoid causing harm is articulated in 
Principle 14, under which States are required to conduct prior assessment to inform themselves 
about “the risks and potential extraterritorial impacts of their laws, policies and practices” on the enjoyment of 
ESC rights abroad:1613 this valuation is needed to inform States to enact preventive measures, to 
guarantee the cessation of violations, and to adopt effective remedies.1614 Significantly, this assessment 
is understood as conducted with public participation and through making public the access to 
related results, thus making operative the right of access to information as acknowledged by human 
rights bodies.1615 Existing human rights impact assessments may serve as reference to develop the 
                                                
1611 Under Article 3 “(t)he State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to 
minimise the risk thereof”, see Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, Report 
of the International Law Commission on the work of the fifty-third session, UN Doc. A/56/10, 21 August 2001, in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, p. 155, Article 3, Commentary para. 14. 
1612 In the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay the ICJ observed that “a precautionary approach may be relevant in the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute”, see Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment 
of 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, 14, para. 164. Equally, in the Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and obligations of 
States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea observed that “the precautionary approach has been incorporated into a growing number of 
international treaties and other instruments, many of which reflect the formulation of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. In the view of the 
Chamber, this has initiated a trend towards making this approach part of customary international law”, see Seabed Disputes Chamber 
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with 
Respect to Activities in the Area, 1 February 2011, ITLOS Reports 2011, para. 135.  
1613 Similarly, the duty to acquire information to ascertain and evaluate the possible effect of States’ conduct is mentioned 
in the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities of 2001, commentary 
of Article 3 (Prevention). 
1614 For a recent methodology of human rights impact assessment, see Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments 
of Trade and Investment Agreements, Report of the Special rapporteur on the Right to Food, Oliver De Schutter, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 (2011). Commentators on Principle 14 highlight the experience of other impact assessments, 
such as the work by the Special Representative of the Secretary General on human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, see O. De Schutter, A. Eide, A. Khalfan, M. Orellana, M. Salomon, I. 
Seiderman, “Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, HRQ, 2012, p. 1117. 
1615 See HRC, General Comment No. 34: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression (art. 19), UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), 





content of prior appraisal on ESC rights;1616 in the environmental field several international 
agreements already require this.1617  
3.2.d. The normative content of extraterritorial obligations on ESC rights 
In order to specify the normative facets of extraterritorial obligations, the Maastricht Principles rely 
on the position that States have to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights both within and beyond 
their territories (Principle 3). The extraterritorial obligations to respect and to protect are conceived 
as complementary and simultaneous to those to be complied with in the territorial State; while the 
extraterritorial obligation to fulfil is regarded as subsidiary. 
3.2.d.i. Respecting ESC rights 
The obligation to respect is clarified under the headings of both direct and indirect interference as well 
as by reference to sanctions and equivalent measures (Principles 19-22). In enucleating what is 
already provided for in Article 56 of the UN Charter, such a general obligation comprises duties to 
take action separately and jointly through international cooperation to found institutional 
arrangements required to respect ESC rights (Principle 19).   
As to direct interferences, the obligation to respect is understood to require States to refrain 
from conduct that nullify or impair the enjoyment and exercise of ESC rights in relation to individuals or groups 
outside the States’ national territories. State conduct having a potential impact on ESC rights entails 
positive measures to ensure that State authority is discharged without interfering with their 
fulfilment (Principle 20). Emblematic cases of unlawful interference with existing access and 
enjoyment of ESC rights would concern a foreign State dumping toxic water in the territory of 
                                                                                                                                                            
C No. 151, para. 77, founding that, “by expressly stipulating the right to ‘seek’ and ‘receive’ ‘information’, Article 13 of the Convention 
protects the right of all individuals to request access to State-held information, with the exceptions permitted by the restrictions established in the 
Convention. Consequently, this article protects the right of the individual to receive such information and the positive obligation of the State to 
provide it, […]”. See ECtHR, Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, Appl. No. 37374/05, Judgment, 14 April 2009 - Final 
14 July 2009, para. 26, addressing its consistent recognition that “the public has a right to receive information of general interest”, 
also referring to its case law in this field as developed in relation to press freedom which serves to impart information 
and ideas on such matters (see the Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, para. 59, Series A 
No. 216; Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, para. 63, Series A No. 239).  
1616 See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, John Ruggie, “Business and Human rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the ‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’ Framework”, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, paras. 18-21; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, Oliver De Schutter, “Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade and Investment 
Agreement”, A/HRC/19/59/Add.5, 19 December 2011. See, e.g., also International Business Leaders Forum, Guide to 
Human Rights Impact Assessment and Management, 2010; Danish Institute for Human Rights, The Human Rights Compliance 
Assessment, available at https://hrca2.humanrightsbusiness.org . 
1617 See the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, adopted on 22 May 1992), the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC, entered into force on 21 March 1994), and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 





another country, or a foreign State restricting access to health facilities and services as punitive 
measure in the course of an armed conflict, or a foreign State depriving objects indispensable for 
civilians’ survival, for example. 
Conversely, as to indirect interferences, the same obligation to respect is understood to require 
States to desist from any conduct (a) that weaken the capacity of a State or an international 
organization to realise their duties regarding ESC rights, or (b) that “aids, assists, directs, controls or 
coerces” a State or an international organization in breaching such duties (Principle 21). This repeats 
the content of Articles 16-18 of the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts.1618 An emblematic case would concern a foreign State involved in a biofuel project 
in another country, impacting on ESC rights therein. It is worth stressing that conflicts revolving 
around large-scale bioenergy projects have been increasingly reported in recent years.1619 
As to the issue of sanctions, under Principle 22 States must refrain from adopting a wide range 
of measures that impair or nullify the enjoyment of ESC rights, adding that the design, implementation 
and termination of any regime of sanctions adopted to accomplish other international legal obligations 
must respect human rights obligations.1620 In any case, economic sanctions such as embargoes 
cannot regard the provision and transfer of “goods and services essential to meet core obligations”. This point 
will be considered in section 5.3.  
3.2.d.ii. Protecting ESC rights  
The obligation to protect the ESC rights of any persons within and beyond sovereign territory is basically 
elaborated as a State duty to regulate the conduct of non-State actors (natural persons as well as legal 
persons, including organizations, transnational corporations and other business enterprises), to 
exercise influence on such conduct, and to take action separately and jointly through international 
cooperation (Principle 23).  
In Principles 24 and 25, the function of regulation is worded robustly (“must”), under 
                                                
1618 As addressed by the ILC, specific rules of international law embody this principle, see the first principle of the 
Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the UN Charter, GA Res. 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex, 
A/8028/(1970); Article 3 (f) of the Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974. 
1619 See J. Arevalo, R. Ochieng, B. Mola-Yudego and D. Gritten, “Understanding bioenergy conflicts: Case of a 
jatropha project in Kenya’s Tana delta”, Land Use Policy 14, 2014, pp. 138-148. For a study on biofuel production in 
Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean region, and its impacts on “three pillars of 
sustainability” (i.e. social, economic and environmental systems), see D. Berry, Salomon, Bailis, Robert (eds.), Sustainable 
Development of Biofuels in Latin America and the Caribbean, Springer, 2014. 
1620 Relevant criteria based on human rights law have been developed by monitoring bodies, as examined in the section 
5.3. E.g., see CESCR, General Comment No. 8: The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural 





preventive as well as reactive dimensions, regulation is deemed exercisable through several means 
(administrative, legislative, investigative, adjudicatory measures or even absent legal measures, 
including diplomatic measures), which a State adopts and enforces when it is in a position to do so 
according to certain circumscribed positions (“bases for protection”), in compliance with international law, in 
order to guarantee that non-state actors’ activities do not impair or nullify ESC rights, while all 
other States should refrain from overturning or prejudicing the discharge of such a duty.  
Specifically, three of the identified “bases for protection” - justifying a foreign State’s extraterritorial 
jurisdiction (prescriptive as well as adjudicative/executive) - echo the active personality principle: (a) 
the harm or threat comes from or takes place on the territory of the State concerned; (b) the same 
nationality between the non-state actor and the State in question; (c) for business enterprises, if the 
corporation or its parent or controlling company has in the national territory its “centre of activity, 
place of registration or domicile, or main place of business or substantial business activities”.  
An additional basis spelled out in Principle 25(d) consists in the existence of a “reasonable link” 
between the State and the conduct it aims to regulate. Reasonableness demands the identification of 
a sufficiently close connection.1621 Conversely, compliance with international law entails subjecting 
reasonableness to the respect for the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the 
territorial State (the host State), non-interference with its sovereign rights, and equality of all 
sovereign States. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting that, since compliance with internationally 
recognised human rights is no longer a matter belonging to the exclusive national domain of the 
territorial State, the foreign State’s regulation aimed at promoting non-state actors’ compliance with 
human rights may call for a flexible understanding of the restrictions imposed by international law 
on prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
The final basis spelled out in Principle 25(e) aims at justifying the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction as a tool to support coexistence between States as well as their cooperation in dealing 
with situations that are of importance to the whole international community. It refers to any 
conduct impairing ESC rights and constituting a violation of a peremptory norm of international 
law or even a crime under international law. Accordingly, the meaning of the obligation to protect 
                                                
1621 Three examples of reasonableness in which the non-territorial State would be required to protect ESC rights under 
Principle 25 (d) are mentioned in the Commentary to the Maastricht Principles: 1) if a non-state actor suspected of 
human rights abuses abroad has properties that may be seized to apply the decision of a competent court in view of 
witnesses or pertinent evidence; 2) if there are relevant officials suspected of criminal liability; 3) if the non-state actor 
has done a part of the conduct that gave rise to the violation. See O. De Schutter, A. Eide, A. Khalfan, M. Orellana, M. 
Salomon, I. Seiderman, “Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, HRQ, 2012, at 1141. See also ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 





is explained by requiring States to exercise universal jurisdiction over those bearing responsibility 
(thus allowing their national courts to prosecute the relevant crime regardless the nationality of the 
offender or the victim and where it took place) or to lawfully extradite them to an appropriate 
jurisdiction.1622  
As far as the conduct of transnational corporations is concerned, apparently the Maastricht 
Principles go beyond the UN Guiding Principles analysed above. They define more broadly the 
bases for allowing the State of origin to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. In particular, they 
elucidate in more detail how the forum (home) State and corporations may be connected under the 
principle of active personality.1623 Conversely, the existence of “a reasonable link” between the 
conduct concerned and the home State is equally addressed under Ruggie’s Principles.  
 
It is worth mentioning that international and regional courts as well as non-judicial human rights bodies 
have contributed to affirm and articulate the notion of State duty to protect under human rights instruments (i.e. 
demanding to prevent the violations in the private sphere, to regulate and control private actors, to 
investigate the violations, to punish the perpetrators and provide effective remedies to victims).1624 
This jurisprudence includes the CESCR,1625 the HRC,1626 the Committee on the Elimination of 
                                                
1622 On the principle aut dedere, aut judicare, see: crimes against humanity (the ius cogens nature of their prohibition is 
generally understood as implying a duty to contribute to their supression universally); war crimes (Art. 49 GCI; Art. 50 
GCII; Art. 129 GCIII; Art. 146 GCIV); genocide (see Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, 15, at 23, noting that “the principles underlying the 
Convention are principles which are recognised by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation” and that 
“both … the condemnation of genocide and … the co-operation required ‘in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’ (Preamble 
to the Convention) have a ‘universal character’”; see also Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, 
ICJ Reports 1996, 595, at 615-616, para. 31, stating that “the obligation each State … has to prevent and to punish the crime of 
genocide is not territorially limited buy the Convention”); torture (CAT, Art. 5(2); and enforced disappearances (ICPAPED, Art. 
9(2)). 
1623 Conversely, according to the UN Guiding Principles, the bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction include situations 
where the actor or victim of a human rights violation is a national of that State, where the acts have substantial adverse 
effects on the State, or where specific international crimes are involved, see UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, para. 
19, and note 12, which also cites the Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Addendum on corporate responsibility under international law and issues in 
extraterritorial regulation: summary of legal workshops, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add.2, 15 February 2007. 
1624 Some of the decisions are referred in the commentary to Principle 24, see O. De Schutter, A. Eide, A. Khalfan, M. 
Orellana, M. Salomon, I. Seiderman, “Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of 
States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, HRQ, 2012, at 1134-1135, particularly note 126. 
1625 E.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food (Art. 11), UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, para. 15 (“The 
obligation to protect requires measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to adequate 
food”).  
1626 See HRC, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 2004, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 8 (“the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully 
discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed 
by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between private 





Racial Discrimination,1627 the European Court of Human Rights,1628 European Committee of 
Social Rights of the Council of Europe,1629 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,1630 the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.1631 In developing a legal basis for State 
                                                                                                                                                            
Covenant’s rights, including the obligation to regulate corporate entities, see HRC, Concluding Observations: Germany, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6, 31 October 2012, para.16 (“While welcoming measures taken by the State party to provide remedies 
against German companies acting abroad allegedly in contravention of relevant human rights standards, the Committee is concerned that such 
remedies may not be sufficient in all cases (art. 2, para. 2). The State party is encouraged to set out clearly the expectation that all business 
enterprises domiciled in its territory and/or its jurisdiction respect human rights standards in accordance with the Covenant throughout their 
operations. It is also encouraged to take appropriate measures to strengthen the remedies provided to protect people who have been victims of 
activities of such business enterprises operating abroad.”).  
A controversial case has been that concerning Neumann Kaffee Gruppe, a Hamburg-based German company 
operating in Uganda through its subsidiary, Kaweri Coffee Plantation Ltd. In August 2002 a group of Ugandans filed a 
civil lawsuit against the latter and the Ugandan Government, claiming that human rights violations were committed 
against them in several villages of Mubende district; in particular, they alleged that in August 2001 Ugandan military 
officials forcibly evicted 392 peasant families (approximately 2,041 persons) from their land, mistreated them and 
burned down their homes, in order to make way for a large-scale coffee plantation owned by Kaweri. The plaintiffs 
called for an independent land survey to determine the land’s real ownership, the restitution of their land, or adequate 
compensation. On 28 March 2013 the Court of Uganda decided that they were illegally evicted without being 
compensated adequately and then ordered compensation of approximately €11 million for the evictees 
concerned. Although the defendant’s behavior was condemned and the Court held that Kaweri officials were informed 
that the plaintiffs were to be evicted, both defendants were acquitted. The requirement for compensation was imposed 
on the Ugandan Investment Authority’s lawyers for allegedly misadvising the Government to purchase the land. Finally, 
the Court criticised German investors for neglecting their human rights duty to perform due diligence, stating: “The 
German investors had a duty to ensure that our indigenous people were not exploited. They should have respected the human rights and values of 
people and as honorable businessman and investors they should have not moved into the lands unless they had satisfied themselves that the 
tenants were properly compensated, relocated and adequate notice was given to them”. Since the defendants and the lawyers appealed 
the verdict, the execution of the judgment was provisionally suspended by the Court of Appeal in April 2013.  
1627 States that were explicitly called to “regulate” the extraterritorial conduct of third parties registered in their national 
territory include the United States and Canada. See Concluding Observations: United States, UN Doc. 
CERD/C/USA/CO/6, 8 May 2008, para. 30 (“In light of Article 2, paragraph 1 (d), and 5 (e) of the Convention and of its 
General Recommendation No. 23 (1997) on the rights of indigenous peoples, the Committee encourages the State party to take appropriate 
legislative or administrative measures to prevent acts of transnational corporations registered in the State party which negatively impact on the 
enjoyment of rights of indigenous peoples in territories outside the United States. In particular, the Committee recommends that the State party 
explore ways to hold transnational corporations registered in the United States accountable”). See Concluding Observations: Canada, UN 
Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18, 25 May 2007, para. 17 (calling upon Canada to “take appropriate legislative or administrative 
measures to prevent acts of transnational corporations registered in Canada which negatively impact on the enjoyment of rights of indigenous 
peoples in territories outside Canada”, especially recommending that the State party “explore ways to hold transnational corporations 
registered in Canada accountable”). 
1628 See ECtHR, Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 7601/76; 7806/77, Judgment of 13 August 
1981, Series A, No. 44, para. 49, or ECtHR, X and Y v. the Netherlands, Appl. no. 8978/80, Judgment of 26 March 1985, 
Series A, No. 91, para. 27. 
1629 See European Committee of Social Rights, collective complaint no. 30/2005, Marangopoulos Foundation for Human 
Rights (MFHR) v. Greece, decision on admissibility of 30 October 2005, para. 14 (“the State is responsible for enforcing the rights 
embodied in the Charter within its jurisdiction. The Committee is therefore competent to consider the complainant’s allegations of violations, 
even if the State has not acted as an operator but has simply failed to put an end to the alleged violations in its capacity as regulator”).  
1630 See IACtHR, Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras (Merits), Judgment of 29 July 1988, Ser C No. 4, para. 172 (“An illegal 
act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or 
because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but 
because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention”).  
1631 See AfComHPR, Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. Chad, Appl. 74/92 (ACHPR 1995-96), 
para. 20 (“The Charter specifies in Article 1 that the States parties shall not only recognise the rights, duties and freedoms adopted by the 
Charter, but they should also ‘undertake … measures to give effect to them’. In other words, if a State neglects to ensure the rights in the 
African Charter, this may constitute a violation, even if the State or its agents are not the immediate cause of the violation”). See also 
AfComHPR, SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria, Appl. 55/96 (ACHPR 2002), para. 46 (“the State is obliged to protect right-holders 





responsibility for human rights violations by non-state actors abroad, this jurisprudence has 
acknowledged the principle that the conduct attributable to the State also include its failure to discharge 
the obligation to protect by adopting regulations or by implementing them effectively insofar as this infringes its human 
rights undertakings.1632 Typically due-diligence failures are qualified as omissions; under Article 2 of 
the ILC’s Draft Articles the conduct attributable to a State may consist of both acts and 
omissions.1633 
Remarkably, the general principle of international law at the basis of due diligence obligations 
was formulated early as 1949 in the Corfu Channel Case, in which the International Court of Justice 
recognised “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of 
other States”.1634 This principle has led to emphasise that States’ duty to control private actors’ 
activities within their territory (or jurisdiction/control) also cover the harm produced to human beings or 
legal interests in the territories of other States.1635 
 
As previously anticipated, the Maastricht Principles articulate additional dimensions of the State 
obligation to protect the ESC rights of persons within and beyond its national territory. In 
particular, the exercise of influence on the conduct of non-state actors is worded feebly 
(“should”) but it is deemed a minimal legal obligation with a protective function, which persists even when a 
State does not regulate their conduct. Indeed, Principle 26 refers to the ability to influence such 
conduct under various forms (such as public procurement system or international diplomacy) in line 
                                                                                                                                                            
of the protected rights against political, economic and social interferences. Protection generally entails the creation and maintenance of an 
atmosphere or framework by an effective interplay of laws and regulations so that individuals will be able to freely realise their rights and 
freedoms”). 
1632 For relevant cases regarding ESC rights, see A. Nolan, “Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Non-
State Actors through the Role of the State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the ‘Obligation to Protect’”, 8 
HRLR, 2009, pp. 225-255. For the argument that the doctrine of State responsibility represents an under-utilised device 
for ensuring that private actors respect ESC rights, see also Chirwa, “The doctrine of State Responsibility as a potential 
means of holing private actors accountable for human rights”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2004, pp. 1-36. 
1633 It is worth remembering that situations where the conduct of private actors is directly imputable to the State are 
exceptional. Under the ILC’s Draft Articles of 2001, any organ of the State apparatus may engage the international 
responsibility of the State (Art. 4), while the conduct of non-state actors will be not attributed to the State unless (i) they 
are authorized by state law to exercise governmental authority and has acted in that capacity in the specific 
circumstance (Art. 5), or (ii) they has acted under the direction or control of, or the instructions of, the State in 
implementing the conduct (Art. 8), or (iii) the State has recognised and adopted the conduct concerned as its own (Art. 
11). See “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, op. cit.. See also ICJ, Case of 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (merits), Judgment of 27 June 
1986, para. 108. 
1634 See ICJ, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), Judgment of 9 April 1949 (Merits), 
ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 22, at 18. 





with general principles of international law and the UN Charter.1636  
As regards the ICESCR, such a position to influence has been emphasised for the right to health, 
the right to water, and in relation to corporations, maintaining that States parties have “to prevent third 
parties from violating the right in other countries if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or 
political means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law”.1637 This 
position is supported by scholars arguing that this Covenant requires States parties - as a minimum - 
to refrain from adopting measures that could adversely affect ESC rights beyond national borders and to control 
private actors’ activities to ensure they do not violate ESC rights.1638 
 
A noteworthy attempt to define the parameters of due diligence concerning non-state 
entities placed in foreign territory is found in the Genocide judgement of 2007.1639 Even though the 
International Court of Justice gave guidance on the due diligence standard in the context of a 
State’s duty to prevent genocide outside national territory, the principles it sets out are valuable to 
discuss the application of the due diligence standard in extraterritorial scenarios where human rights 
violations occur.  
Specifically, the Court undertook to determine the scope of the Serbian authorities’ duty to 
prevent genocide with a view to its influence over the Bosnian-Serb forces in Bosnia. The Court 
considered the substantive obligations not to commit and to prevent and punish genocide (under 
Articles I and III of the Genocide Convention) as “not on their face limited by territory” and, rather, to 
apply “to a State whenever it may be acting or may be able to act in ways appropriate to meeting the obligations in 
question”. The precise content of the obligation of due diligence was addressed at length, but the 
Court emphasised that it did not intend to “establish a general jurisprudence applicable to all cases where a 
                                                
1636 Commentary to Principle 26 mentions the reliance of human rights-based conditions in “public procurement 
schemes” or “export credit agencies”, “fiscal incentives”, “the use of indicators to monitor progress”, or “other forms of 
social labelling”, see ibid., at 1144. 
1637 See CERSC, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standards of health, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para. 
39. See CERSC, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, 20 January 2003, para. 31. See CESCR, “Statement on the 
Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 
E/C.12/2011/1, 12 July 2011, para. 5 (“State parties should also take steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by 
corporations that have their main seat under their jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obligations of host States 
under the Covenant”). Other human rights treaty bodies have done so as well.  
1638 See S. Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation, Intersentia, 2006, at 69-
70, 191; M. Sepulveda, “Obligations of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ in an Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 24 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2006, pp. 
271-303, at 282, addressing that the preventive and protective function entails States’ duty to discourage practices by 
non-state actors under their jurisdiction which may violate ESC rights in other countries. See M. Craven, The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective of its Development, Oxford, 1995, at 147-150. 
1639 ICJ, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 





treaty instrument, or other binding legal norm, includes an obligation for States to prevent certain act”.1640  
Then, in articulating that the obligation in question is one of conduct (States parties have to 
employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide as far as possible), the 
Court underlined that responsibility is incurred “if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent 
genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide”.  
In emphasising that the notion of due diligence “calls for an assessment in concreto”, various 
parameters were considered as operating in the valuation as to whether a State properly met the 
relevant obligation. The “capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already 
committing, genocide” is the first one identified. This ability then depends, inter alia, “on the geographical 
distance of the State concerned from the scene of the events” and “on the strength of the political links, as well as links 
of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the main actors in the events”. Further, since every 
State may only act within the limits permitted by international law, the ability to influence has to be 
assessed by “legal criteria”, thus implying that this capacity will vary depending on the State’s 
particular legal position vis-à-vis the situations and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of 
genocide.1641 
 
Conversely, cooperation is addressed in Principle 27 in relation to the measures traditionally 
identified in human rights jurisprudence as dimensions of the obligation to protect: preventing 
human rights violations by non-state actors, holding them accountable, and guaranteeing effective 
remedies.  
Regarding all the aforementioned articulations of the obligation to protect ESC rights under the 
Maastricht Principles, it is worth underlining that a crystallization of the extraterritorial dimension 
of such obligation in the present evolution of international law is still controversial. The attitude of 
the CESCR is explicitly in favour of this duty on States parties to the ICESCR.1642 In the same 
                                                
1640 Ibid., ICJ Reports 2007, at 183 and 429. 
1641 Ibid., ICJ Reports 2007, para. 430. 
1642 See CESCR, “Statement on the obligations of States parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, social 
and cultural rights”, Report of the forty-sixth and forty-seventh sessions, Suppl. 2, UN Doc. E/C.12/2011/3, Annex 
VI. In para. 3, it emphasised that “States parties have the primary obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the Covenant rights of all 
persons under their jurisdiction in the context of corporate activities undertaken by State-owned or private enterprises. This derives from article 
2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, which defines the nature of the obligations of States parties, referring to legislative and other appropriate steps 
towards implementation, which include administrative, financial, educational and social measures, domestic and global needs assessments, and 
the provision of judicial or other effective remedies”. In para. 5, it articulated the meaning of the duty to protect by stating that 
“States parties effectively safeguard rights holders from infringements of their economic, social and cultural rights involving corporate actors by 
establishing appropriate laws and regulations, together with monitoring, investigation and accountability procedures to set and enforce standards 
for the performance of corporations”. It also underlined that “non-compliance with this obligation can come about through action or 
inaction”. It then addressed that “States parties ensure access to effective remedies for victims of corporate abuse of economic, social and 





respect, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has recurrently 
emphasised that CEDAW requires Contracting Parties to regulate non-state actors under the duty 
to protect: they are called for exercising due diligence to prevent, investigate, punish and ensure 
redress for private individuals or entities’ acts impairing the rights guaranteed in this 
Convention.1643 Notably, the CEDAW has been interpreted to require States parties “to regulate the 
activities of domestic non-State actors, within their effective control, who operate extraterritorially” and to ensure full 
respect of the Convention by them.1644 Also the former UN Special Rapporteur of the right to food 
expressed a positive view in this regard.1645 Conversely, the former UN Special Representative of 
the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises deemed the extraterritorial dimension of the duty to protect still unsettled in 
international law, as emerged in the 2011 UN Guiding Principles.1646 Different opinions have also 
been expressed in legal scholarship. Regarding trade or investment agreements, the recognition of 
                                                                                                                                                            
also take steps to prevent human rights contraventions committed abroad by corporations which have their main offices under their jurisdiction, 
without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obligations of the host States under the Covenant”. 
1643 See General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women, 29 January 1992, UN Doc. A/47/38, para. 9; General 
Recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, 19 October 2010, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2, paras. 13 and 19. It outlined due 
diligence obligations in protecting women from violence and discrimination by any person, organization or enterprise, 
stressing that, alongside constitutional and legislative measures (i.e. the regulation of the activities of private actors in 
relation to “education, employment and health policies and practices, working conditions and work standards, and other areas where they 
provide services or facilities”), States parties must provide adequate administrative and financial support for the 
implementation of the CEDAW. 
1644 General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations, 18 October 2013, UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/GC/30, para. 10. It gives specific guidance on States parties’ obligation of due diligence in respect of 
crimes against women by non-State actors.  
1645 See Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food Jean Ziegler, E/CN.4/2006/44, 16 March 2006. In reviewing 
the definition and understanding of the right to food in an era of globalisation, Ziegler affirmed that the primary 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the right to food of their people will always rest with national governments; the 
need to extend a State’s obligations under human rights to include extraterritorial obligations towards the right to food 
of people living in other countries was also addressed. See particularly para. 36 (“The extraterritorial obligation to protect the 
right to food requires States to ensure that third parties subject to their jurisdiction (such as their own citizens or transnational corporations), do 
not violate the right to food of people living in other countries. This puts a duty on the State to regulate its corporations and non-State actors in 
order to protect the inhabitants of other countries. With the increasing monopoly control by transnational corporations over all components of the 
food distribution chain, from production, trade and processing to marketing and retailing of food, and control over the majority of concessions 
worldwide (see E/CN.4/2004/10, paras. 35-52), it is becoming more difficult for less powerful national Governments to regulate 
transnational corporations working within their territory to respect human rights, making it essential that the often more powerful “home” 
States engage in adequate regulation. In privatization, for example, steps should be taken by “home” States to ensure that the policies and 
activities of transnational corporations respect the right to of all people in the countries where they are working”). 
1646 According to John Ruggie, “at present, States are not generally required under international human rights law to regulate the 
extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they generally prohibited from doing so, provided 
there is a recognised jurisdictional basis. Within these parameters some human rights treaty bodies recommend that home States take steps to 
prevent abuse abroad by business enterprises within their jurisdiction”, and that an overall test of reasonableness is met. See the 
final report “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect 
and Remedy’ Framework”, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, commentary to para. 2, at 7. See also UN Doc. 
A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2009, para. 15. On this subject, see R. McCorquodate and P. Simons, “Responsibility 
Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights 





extraterritorial obligations to protect upon the home State of private actors has been seen as a 
logical correspondent to complement the rights afforded to foreign investors under international 
law.1647 Some scholars remain in general more cautious.1648  
3.2.d.iii. Fulfilling ESC rights 
The States’ obligation to fulfil ESC rights beyond their sovereign territories has a subsidiary nature, being that 
emphasis is put on the primary responsibility of the territorial State  (Principle 28). Accordingly, in 
Principle 31 it is addressed as an obligation “to contribute” to the realisation of ESC rights, in 
accordance with the States’ “economic, technical and technological capacities, with their available resources and 
their influence in international decision-making processes”.  
Significantly, certain priorities are set out in Principle 32: realising “the rights of disadvantaged, 
marginalised and vulnerable groups”, giving effect to “core obligations to realise minimum essential levels” of ESC 
rights, adhering to international human rights principles and standards, moving “as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards the full realisation” of these rights and avoiding retrogressive measures.  
In Principles 29 a positive duty of all States is clarified as taking “deliberate, concrete and targeted 
steps”, separately and jointly, to generate “an international enabling environment conducive to the universal 
fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights, including in matters relating to bilateral and multilateral trade, 
investment, taxation, finance, environmental protection, and development cooperation” (a non-exhaustive list, and 
with emphasis added). Notably, this need has been consistently recognised in basic international 
sources such as the UN Charter, several human rights treaties, and some resolutions of the General 
Assembly;1649 the related commitments embody a certain States’ practice that may influence the 
interpretation of relevant treaty provisions. Furthermore, indicative forms and ways to comply with 
the extraterritorial duty to fulfil include “the elaboration, interpretation, application, and regular review” of 
international standards and binding agreements. As clarified in Principle 29, “means of compliance” 
                                                
1647 See F. Francioni, “Alternative Perspectives on International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by 
Multinational Corporations”, in Benedek, De Feyter, Marrella (eds.), Economic Globalization and Human Rights, 
Cambridge, 2007, pp. 262-263; M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment2, Cambridge, 2004, Chapter 4, 
p. 169. 
1648 See O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 162-163, according to which there is not a 
general obligation imposed on States to exercise extraterritorial prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction to contribute to the 
promotion and protection of internationally accepted human rights abroad. This is so even in relation to private actors 
that have the nationality of the State in question. See also S. Joseph, “Scope of Application”, in D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. 
Sivakumaran (eds.), International Human Rights Law, Oxford, 2010, at 166, who emphasises that maintaining the existence 
of an extraterritorial obligation to protect is easier when a State actively facilitates or supports the activities of 
corporations abroad by providing export credits. 
1649 See GA Res. 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1 May 1974; 
GA Res 41/128, Declaration of the Right to Development, 4 December 1986, Article 3(1); GA Res 55/2, The 





embrace either policies in the context of foreign relations and within international organizations, or 
unilateral domestic measures having external effects. 
Principles 30 and 33 specify, respectively, the duties to “coordinate cooperation” and “provide 
international assistance”, which would depend on a legitimate request from a State incapable to ensure 
and realise ESC rights within the sovereign territory “despite its best efforts”. The latter duty is 
described as contributing to the fulfilment of ESC rights, and this has been a font of regret.1650 Such 
a situation of inability would require the State concerned to seek international assistance and 
cooperation. Principle 35 clarifies that States (which receive this request and are in a position to 
assist or to cooperate) “must consider the request in good faith, and respond in a manner consistent with their 
obligations to fulfil ESC rights extraterritorially”; conversely, the requesting State is expected “to ensure that 
assistance provided is used towards the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights”.  
3.2.e. The accountability dimension of extraterritoriality 
Principles 11 and 12 “replicate” some basic circumstances which may connect the international 
responsibility of a State to its extraterritorial obligations, reiterating the rules of attribution as 
reflected in the ILC’s Draft Articles and in line with customary international law.1651  
Accordingly, under Principle 11 a conduct attributable to a State, “acting separately or jointly 
with other States or entities”, which constitutes a violation of one of its international human rights 
obligations (“whether within its territory or beyond it”) engages State responsibility.  
Then, under Principle 12 State responsibility covers two well-known circumstances. Under lett. 
(a), it extends to “acts and omissions of non-state actors acting on the instructions or under the direction or control of 
the State”. In this regard, it is generally highlighted that, despite a strong State’s support to such de 
facto state organs or their close connections, the attribution of their conduct to the State primarily 
relies on its effective control over them in the particular circumstance.1652 Conversely, under 
Principle 12(b) State responsibility extends to “acts and omissions of persons or entities which are not State 
                                                
1650 See W. Vandenhole and W. Benedek, “Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide”, in 
M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin, W. van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 332-363. 
1651 See Articles 2, 5 and 8 of the ILC’s Draft Articles of 2001, op. cit.. Conversely, the Maastricht Principles do not 
undertake the distinct perspective of holding non-state actors directly accountable for a wrongful act before 
international or national procedures. 
1652 The notion of effective control was articulated early on the judgment Nicaragua v. United States of America, in which the 
ICJ determined that the conduct of rebel contras could only be attributed to the United States “had effective control of the 
military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed”, see ICJ, Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, para. 115. This notion was 
re-stated in the Genocide case, see paras. 398 and 406. In commentary to Article 8 of the 2001 Draft Articles the ILC 





organs, such as corporations and other business enterprises, where they are empowered by the State to exercise elements 
of governmental authority” as long as they are under such a capacity in the specific situation.1653 In this 
regard, delegated functions to private entities, which may be seen as requiring “elements of governmental 
authority” and so engage State responsibility, may inter alia include the provision of basic 
infrastructures, the supply of certain public services (such as electricity and water), or the delivery of 
traditionally public functions (such as health and education).  
 In identifying the profiles of State responsibility, apparently the issue as to the imputability of 
violations of ESC rights carried out in the implementation of projects on development and 
cooperation, particularly in relation to broader positive obligations, is left unresolved. 
Finally, a weak aspect may be underlined. The Maastricht Principles do not pay proper 
attention to the increasingly debated issue of allocation of responsibility between States,1654 whether 
between the territorial State and third States as well as among third States. As for the responsibility 
between third States, they tend to reiterate the view that all States “must take action, separately and jointly 
through international cooperation”,1655 they have to cooperate to protect ESC rights extraterritorially,1656 
and they “should coordinate with each other in order to cooperate effectively in the universal fulfilment of economic, 
social and cultural rights”. However, slight textual references are made on what specific foreign States 
should do.1657  
                                                
1653 See also the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, particularly 
Guidelines 16-19 on “Responsibility for violations”. Under Guideline 18, “The obligation to protect includes the State’s 
responsibility to ensure that private entities or individuals, including transnational corporations over which they exercise jurisdiction, do not 
deprive individuals of their economic, social and cultural rights. States are responsible for violations of economic, social and cultural rights that 
result from their failure to exercise due diligence in controlling the behaviour of such non-state actors”. 
1654 For a recent attempt to clarify the distribution of responsibility between States, see W. Vandenhole and W. 
Benedek, “Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide”, in M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, 
M. Scheinin, W. van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in International Law, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 332-363. The authors refer to the classical tripartite typology of 
obligations. While they do not challenge the primary responsibility of the territorial State, their argument is that the 
extraterritorial obligations to respect and to protect are similar in scope and meaning to territorial obligations, and so 
qualifying them as “complementary” and “simultaneous”; conversely, the obligation to fulfil is qualified as “subsidiary” as it is 
not immediate, but rather it is qualified by time and resources. See also A. Khalfan, “Division of Responsibility between 
States”, in M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin, W. van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties, op. cit., pp. 
299-331. 
1655 See Principles 19, 23, 28, and 29. 
1656 See Principle 27.  
1657 For the obligation to protect extraterritorially, Principle 24 and 26 refer to States in a position to regulate or to 
influence. For the obligation to fulfil and principally the duty to coordinate, Principle 33 and 35 refer to States that are 
“in a position to do so”, and specify that lack of coordination “does not exonerate a State from giving effect to its separate extraterritorial 





4. The general scope of application of treaties on ESC rights in view of 
their textual vacuum or ambiguity  
The major treaties on ESC rights contain no provisions specifying their general scope of application 
ratione personae or ratione loci. They do not delimit the extent of States parties’ obligations to territory 
or jurisdiction, but they include explicit references and commitments to international cooperation 
and assistance. 
At the universal level, the first one was the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in 
Education of 1960.1658 Then, the ICESCR does not indicate that territorial boundaries apply to its 
provisions, apart from conceiving the obligations concerning the provision for, and immediate 
fulfilment of, the right to free primary education as limited to “metropolitan territory or other territories 
under its jurisdiction”.1659 Even the CEDAW is silent on this point. Territorial limitations are also 
omitted in most provisions of CERD, including Articles 2 and 5 that protect a wide range of 
substantive rights; exceptions concern the prevention, prohibition and eradication of all practices of 
apartheid and racial segregation “in territories under their jurisdiction” (Article 3) and the provision of 
effective national remedies against racial discrimination (Article 6). Last but not least, the CRPD 
contains no express reference to its territorial scope, rather detailing “appropriate and effective measures” 
for international cooperation “between and among States and, as appropriate, in partnership with relevant 
international and regional organizations and civil society” (see Article 4 (2) on general obligations and Article 
32 on international cooperation).1660  
At the regional level, the AfrCHPR as well as the inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women do not contain any jurisdiction clause.  
 
Therefore, apparently the application of treaties on ESC rights is neither confined to the 
                                                
1658 It was adopted in Paris on 14 December 1960 and entered into force on 22 May 1962. 
1659 Article 14 ICESCR reads: “Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able to 
secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two 
years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in 
the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of charge for all”. 
1660 Under Article 32 CRPD, “1. States Parties recognise the importance of international cooperation and its promotion, in support of 
national efforts for the realisation of the purpose and objectives of the present Convention, and will undertake appropriate and effective measures 
in this regard, between and among States and, as appropriate, in partnership with relevant international and regional organizations and civil 
society, in particular organizations of persons with disabilities. Such measures could include, inter alia: (a) Ensuring that international 
cooperation, including international development programmes, is inclusive of and accessible to persons with disabilities; (b) Facilitating and 
supporting capacity-building, including through the exchange and sharing of information, experiences, training programmes and best practices; 
(c) Facilitating cooperation in research and access to scientific and technical knowledge; (d) Providing, as appropriate, technical and economic 
assistance, including by facilitating access to and sharing of accessible and assistive technologies, and through the transfer of technologies. 2. 





sovereign territory of a State party nor to the territories or persons over which a State party has 
jurisdiction. Customary international law as reflected in Article 29 VCLT qualifies the territorial 
scope of international treaties by establishing that, “unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is 
otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory”. However, this general 
presumption does not automatically exclude that a treaty applicable on the sovereign territory of 
States parties can be applied also beyond national borders and that an explicit provision is required 
for such purpose. In other words, Article 29 VCLT does not exclude a priori the possibility to trigger 
States parties’ obligations outside the sovereign soil in relation to persons or territories on the basis 
of a factual connection that brings them into an actual relationship; it thus remains as necessary an 
explicit statement to achieve such a negative effect.1661 The typical situation is that of a conduct 
taking place within the territory of the State party, which has an adverse effect on human rights in 
another State. 
A potential counterweight could derive from the jurisdiction clause provided for in the individual 
complaints mechanisms established for the treaties concerned, which determines who has the right to 
submit communications to the treaty-monitoring bodies. Specifically, the Committee the on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination may consider individual petitions alleging violations of the CERD by a 
Contracting Party under Article 14;1662 the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
may consider individual communications alleging violations of the CRPD by States parties to the 
OP-CRPD;1663 the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women may consider 
individual communications alleging violations of the CEDAW by States Parties to the OP-
CEDAW,1664 and the CESCR may consider individual communications alleging violations of the 
ICESCR by States parties to the OP-ICESCR.1665 However, it seems reasonable to contend that 
                                                
1661 On the need of an explicit statement excluding such possibility, see Künnemann, “Extraterritorial application of the 
international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights”, in Coomans and Kamminga (eds.), op. cit., pp. 201-202. 
1662 Article 14(1) CERD reads: “A State Party may at any time declare that it recognises the competence of the Committee to receive and 
consider communications from individuals or groups of individuals within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by that State 
Party of any of the rights set forth in this Convention. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which 
has not made such a declaration”. 
1663 See Article 1(1) of the First Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008, GA 
Res. 61/106, Annex II, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 80, UN Doc. A/61/49 (2006). Article 1(1) reads: “A 
State Party to the present Protocol (“State Party”) recognises the competence of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“the 
Committee”) to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who 
claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of the provisions of the Convention”. 
1664 See Article 2 OP-CEDAW, adopted by GA Res. 547/4 on 6 October 1999, Annex, 54 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) 
at 5, A/54/49 (Vol. I) (2000), entered into force 22 December 2000. 
1665 See Article 2 OP-ICESCR, A/RES/63/117 of 10 December 2010. Also see Rules of Procedure of the Optional Protocol to 
the ICESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/49/3, 3 December 2012, Rule 4. Article 2 reads: “Communications may be submitted by or on 
behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victim of a violation of any of the economic, 





the restriction of complaints to the “jurisdiction of the State party”, as existing in several international 
complaints procedures of human rights treaties, basically serves to put the complainant under a 
factual connection with the State against which the victim claims a violation of a right enshrined in those 
treaties, wherever they occurred. Although this will be usually the case of a citizen and resident, 
whether or not another individual can be considered under the jurisdiction of the State concerned 
will have to be decided once the specific issue arises. 
As detailed heretofore, pertinent positions in favour of the extraterritorial application of the 
aforementioned human rights treaties have been actually articulated by supervisory judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies. Certain legal scholarship has also elaborated some noteworthy views in that 
regard. 
4.a. The ICESCR  
The extraterritorial application of the major treaty on ESC rights remains a contentious issue given 
the absence of any reference to territory or jurisdiction in its main clause on the scope of States 
parties’ obligations and protected persons, namely Article 2.  
Nonetheless, its treaty-based monitoring body has cautiously but progressively developed the 
idea that the Covenant may have an effect beyond States parties’ borders in several of its general comments 
adopted in the early 1990s, in some of its statements,1666 and in some of its concluding observations 
on States’ reports. The perspective of development cooperation and technical or other types of assistance have 
been mainly emphasised. However, those non-binding sources of interpretation have not equally 
developed the discourse on the extraterritorial application of all ESC rights enshrined in the 
Covenant. Besides, the emergence of case law that could shed light on its extraterritorial reach has 
not been certainly favoured by the lack of a complaint procedure in this treaty. 
Additional contributions extend from the UN Special Rapporteurs of the Human Rights 
Council and even of the former Commission on Human Rights, particularly concerning the right to 
food and the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health.  
In legal scholarship, at least two arguments have been developed to read extraterritorial 
                                                
1666 E.g., CESCR, “General Statement on Globalization and its impact on the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights”, UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/26, 15 May 1998, para. 515 (3); “Statement on Poverty and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/10, 10 May 2001; “Statement on the 






obligations into the ICESCR in view of its textual vacuum.1667 Firstly, the Covenant applies 
extraterritorially if a State party’ jurisdiction is exercised through effective control over individuals or 
territorial areas beyond its national borders. However, the doctrine of effective control as advanced by the 
jurisprudence on civil and political rights may prove too restrictive (limited to situations of 
occupation or control over armed forces). Secondly, the concept of international assistance and 
cooperation in the ICESCR1668 and in other relevant sources like the UN Charter triggers certain 
extraterritorial dimensions of treaty obligations, irrespective of any exercise of jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, this second argument might prove too expansive and imprecise in providing guidance 
for States to understand their obligations.1669 In any case, as aptly highlighted by some scholars, on 
these two grounds the realisation of ESC rights under the ICESCR would be not conceivable 
exclusively as “a function of action or inaction of States parties in isolation, but also of the interaction between 
States”.1670 
4.b. The ICERD and CEDAW  
As for the major human rights treaties on the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of 
race or gender, the extraterritorial scope of both the ICERD and CEDAW may not easily be 
determined since they primarily set out comprehensive obligations concerning the policies to be 
followed by States parties in order to remove discrimination.  
Nonetheless, a noteworthy consideration of positive extraterritorial obligations deriving from the 
CERD is found in the Order indicating provisional measures of the International Court of Justice 
in the case on the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.1671 The Court was asked to address the scope of this Convention regarding alleged 
                                                
1667 F. Coomans, “Some remarks on the extraterritorial application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights”, in Coomans and Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human rights treaties, Intersentia, 
2004, p. 185; Coomans and Kamminga “Comparative introductory comments on the extraterritorial application of 
human rights treaties”, in Coomans and Kamminga (eds.), op. cit., p. 2; R. Kunnemann, “Extraterritorial Application of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, in Coomans and Kamminga (eds.), op. cit., p. 
203; S. Skogly, op. cit., 2006, p. 83, 145. 
1668  The ICESCR refers to international assistance and cooperation in Articles 2(1), 11(2), 15(4), 22 and 23. 
1669 But cf. P. Alston, “Ships Passing in the Night the Current State of Human Rights and Development Debate Seen 
Through the Lens of the Millennium”, 27 HRQ, 2005, pp. 755-829, p. 778, arguing that an international duty of 
cooperation in the fulfilment of the MDGs may eventually crystallise into customary international law. See also Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Oliver De Schutter, The Role of Development Cooperation and Food Aid in Realizing the Right to 
Food: Moving from Charity to Obligation, 11 Febbruary 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/5. 
1670 C. Courtis and M. Sepulveda, “Are Extra-Territorial Obligations Reviewable under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR”, Nordisk Tidsskrift for Mennekerettigheter, 27(1), 2009, p. 56. 
1671 ICJ, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian 






racial discrimination performed and encouraged by Russian authorities in some regions of Georgia, 
both before and in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgia conflict in 2008. Particularly, the 
complaint concerned both the activities of Russian State agents operating in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia and the potential duties of due diligence upon Russia in relation to separatist forces in 
those contested regions. In its decision ordering provisional measures, the Court concluded that the 
Convention governed Russia’s conducts, leaving aside the issue of establishing whether any forms of 
jurisdiction (authority and control over the residents) was exercised by Russia over such regions.1672 
In particular, according to the Court “there is no restriction of a general nature in CERD relating to its 
territorial application” and “in particular, neither Article 2 nor Article 5 of CERD, alleged violations of which are 
invoked by Georgia, contain a specific territorial limitation”. Therefore, the Court found that “these provisions of 
CERD generally appear to apply, like other provisions of instruments of that nature, to the actions of a State party 
when it acts beyond its territory”.1673 Significantly, the Court approached the extraterritorial application 
issue by referring broadly to human rights treaties in general and by presuming such application 
unless a treaty provision specifies a territorial limitation. Then, in the indication of provisional 
measures the Court referred to a number of positive obligations, ordering Russia and Georgia to “do 
all in their power to ensure that public authorities and public institutions under their control or influence do not engage 
in acts of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions”.1674   
In some few cases the extraterritorial application of the CERD has been addressed by its treaty-
based body. It occurred for Israel’s activities in the occupied Palestinian territories, as examined 
afterward. Further, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recognised that the 
CERD applies to the State’s conduct in regulating the extraterritorial actions of third parties under 
their jurisdiction, calling on the United States to “take appropriate legislative or administrative measures to 
prevent acts of transnational corporations registered in the State party which negatively impact on the enjoyment of rights 
of indigenous peoples in territories outside the United States”.1675  
Similarly, the applicability of the CEDAW to States parties’ actions beyond sovereign territories 
has been recognised by its treaty-based body, as underlined in Chapter 3. An explicit position is 
taken in its General Recommendation no. 28 by addressing that, although under international law 
States primarily exercise territorial jurisdiction, States parties’ obligations also apply extraterritorially to 
                                                
1672 The Court did not develop a test for determining the reach of the CERD, though it considered unquestionable that 
it was not limited to a State party’s territorial borders. In this context, the notion of jurisdiction was not deemed an 
obstacle in the consideration of extraterritorial obligations. 
1673 Ibid., para. 109. 
1674  Ibid., para.149. 
1675 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States of America, 8 May 2008, UN 





persons within their “effective control, even if not situated within the territory”; their application without 
discrimination is referred to both citizens and non-citizens (e.g. “refugees, asylum-seekers, migrant workers 
and stateless persons”). Emphasis is also put on the position that “States parties are responsible for all their 
actions affecting human rights, regardless of whether the affected persons are in their territory”.1676  
Notably, this position is reiterated and elaborated in its General Recommendation no. 30 
concerning women in conflict and post-conflict situation.1677 Paragraph 9 essentially affirms that in 
such settings States parties are bound to apply the Convention and other sources of international 
human rights and international humanitarian law “when they exercise territorial or extraterritorial 
jurisdiction”, whether “individually” (e.g. in unilateral military action) or “as members of international or 
intergovernmental organizations and coalitions” (e.g. as part of an international peacekeeping force). In this 
regard, CEDAW is expressly deemed applicable to several situations, including: occupation and 
other forms of administration of foreign territory; national contingents as part of an international 
peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation; persons detained by State agents, such as the 
military or mercenaries, outside its territory; lawful or unlawful military actions in another State; 
situations of bilateral or multilateral donor assistance for conflict prevention and humanitarian aid, 
mitigation or post-conflict reconstruction; cases of involvement as third parties in peace or 
negotiation processes; and finally in the formation of trade agreements with conflict-affected 
countries.  
In addressing the due diligence obligations of protecting women from violence and 
discrimination, the Committee makes clear that CEDAW requires States parties “to regulate the 
activities of domestic non-State actors, within their effective control, who operate extraterritorially” and to ensure full 
respect of the Convention by them.1678 The eradication of discrimination by any public or private 
actor under Article 2(e) is interpreted as covering also the acts of national corporations operating 
extraterritorially1679. Furthermore, this requirement is also seen to cover cases in which they “extend 
loans to projects in conflict-affected areas that lead to forced evictions” and “which call for the establishment of 
                                                
1676 General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, 16 December 2010, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28, para. 12.  
1677 General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict and Post-conflict Situations, 18 October 2013, UN 
Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30, paras. 8-12. 
1678 See General Recommendation No. 30, ibid., paras. 10 and 17. 
1679 This aspect was also mentioned in General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, ibid., para. 36, in which the Committee concluded 
that “(t)he obligations of States parties requiring them to establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to 
ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination and 
to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise, also extend to acts of 





accountability and oversight mechanisms for private security and other contractors operating in conflict zones”.1680 
Then, States as occupying powers are also openly recommended to respect, protect and fulfil the 
rights enshrined in the CEDAW that applies extraterritorially in situations of foreign occupation.1681 
Significantly, the potential of cases in which States parties to CEDAW have extraterritorial 
obligations of international cooperation is also taken into consideration. The Committee refers to similar 
obligations set out in international law, including in treaty law on women with disabilities (Article 32 
CRPD), girls in armed conflict (Article 24 (4) CRC and the first two Optional Protocols thereto), 
and the non-discriminatory enjoyment of ESC rights (Articles 2 (1), 11 (1), 22 and 23 ICESCR). In 
such cases, the extraterritorial application of CEDAW entails States parties’ compliance with the 
Convention in the implementation of those obligations.1682 
4.c. The CRC 
The rights enshrined in this Convention are subject to a jurisdictional clause under Article 2(1) 
whereby States parties have to respect and ensure them to “each child within their jurisdiction”. 
Conversely, a differentiation is made for the measures of implementation of the vested rights under 
Article 4, which provides an obligation to undertake legislative, administrative or other measures 
realising ESC rights to the maximum extent of States parties’ available resources “and, where 
demanded, within the framework of international cooperation”.  
The extraterritorial scope of ensuing obligations has been slightly explored as such within the 
activities undertaken by its treaty-based body. Nonetheless, as stressed in Chapter 3, the application 
of the CRC in its entirety during both peacetime and war has been reiterated by its treaty-based 
monitoring body. 
5. Looking at treaties on ESC rights through a threefold lens of 
extraterritorial application in conflict-affected situations  
The textual vacuum and ambiguity of several treaties guaranteeing ESC rights concerning their 
general scope of application makes difficult an unconditional support for their extraterritorial 
application within conflict-affected situations. However, when a State party is engaged in the 
conduct of hostilities as well as when it is an occupying power or when it acts in post-conflict 
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1681 See General Recommendation No. 30, ibid. para. 12 (c). 





situations, no a priori reasons make its human rights obligations limited to its sovereign territory. 
Instead, it is reasonable to contend that a comprehensive legal assessment of State conduct in such 
scenarios entails exploring to what extent the realisation of ESC rights under relevant treaties to which the 
concerned State is party has extraterritorial dimensions. As far as the protection of civilians is concerned, this 
would imply to explore State compliance with corresponding binding obligations and State 
responsibility for violations of ESC rights albeit when the controversial conduct in question 
occurred beyond national borders.1683 
The legal foundations of extraterritoriality under treaties safeguarding ESC rights will be 
discussed according to a principal question: on the basis of what criteria and to what extent may the 
obligations stemming from such treaties apply to foreign territories as well as to civilians (non-
nationals) placed therein as affected by situations of armed conflict and periods of military 
occupation which involve non territorial States parties to such treaties? 
Three aspects have primary importance for the purpose of assessing the potential legal basis for 
extending such obligations beyond the territorial State. They concern the concept of jurisdiction, the 
notion of international cooperation, and the application of economic sanctions or equivalent measures. The 
following inquiry aims at shedding light on their distinct and specific - though controversial - 
relevance for the protection of civilians’ ESC rights in contemporary situations of armed conflict as 
well as belligerent occupation. 
5.1. The concept of jurisdiction: which role and content for the extraterritorial 
application of treaties on ESC rights? 
The relevance of the notion of jurisdiction in defining the scope of State obligations stemming from 
treaties such as the ICESCR, CEDAW and ICERD may be critical given the lack of a provision 
specifying their general scope of application. Nonetheless, it is worth taking into account the distinct 
function of “jurisdiction” under international human rights law. Its ordinary function under 
international law is concerned with State powers to regulate and enforce rules, and concerns the 
legitimacy of State acts, it is about the allocation of competencies between States. Conversely, in 
international human rights law “jurisdiction” generally plays the special function of addressing the 
                                                
1683 It is worth noting that, according to the 2000 Maastricht Guideline No. 16, “the State responsible must establish 
mechanisms to correct such violations, including monitoring investigation, prosecution, and remedies for victims”, see Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Twenty-fourth session, 2000), E/C.12/2000/13. As underlined in related 
commentary, violations of ESC rights may be committed by individuals, organizations, institutions and other entities in 
a State without the direct and active participation of the State; however the same commentators explicitly affirm “the 
duty of the State to set up procedures, structure and other modes by which victims of violations of ESC rights can get redress and remedies”, see 
Dankwa V., Flinterman C. and Leckie S., “Commentary to the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, 





relationship between an individual as the beneficiary of a human right and a State as the 
corresponding duty bearer. In this regard, this concept relates to the issue of whether a State (which 
was or not entitled to exercise jurisdiction under international law) is to be held accountable for a human 
rights violation resulting from a certain conduct.1684 
In dealing with the application of treaties on ESC rights in contexts of armed conflict and 
belligerent occupation, this concept of jurisdiction may be revised in view of a number of issues, 
which will be further articulated in the next section. 
In particular, invoking the primarily territorial nature of State jurisdiction under public 
international law seems not in line with the connotation of the term “jurisdiction” under human 
rights treaties.1685 Accordingly, other “special tests” for jurisdiction warrant consideration for the 
purpose of triggering the extraterritorial application of treaties on ESC rights in war-torn scenarios. 
This mainly implies to explore the adequacy of the “effective control” criterion in relation to ESC rights 
(together with the set of standards indicating such control). In this regard, in cases of military 
occupation the authority exercised by an occupying power constitutes one of the legal bases for the 
recognition and discharge of obligations on ESC rights of persons within the occupied territory.1686 
Then, “less demanding” tests for jurisdiction may be considered, and the more nuanced notion of “actual 
control over factual circumstances” may be explored (when it affects civilians by resulting in violations of 
their ESC rights).  
Moreover, some implications for conflict-affected situations may derive from reflecting on the 
distinction between the concept of jurisdiction as State power to act under a human rights treaty and the 
notion of jurisdiction as competence of an international court or a treaty-body to deal with alleged human rights 
violations. In particular, a relevant issue arises as how the lack of jurisdiction of a certain monitoring 
body can lead to (or at least influence) de facto impunity for human rights violations allegedly 
committed by a State party to the relevant treaty.1687 The fact that a judicial or quasi-judicial body 
does not have jurisdictional competence to hear a certain case does not automatically mean that the 
State in question acted outside its jurisdictional power under the treaty concerned; this represents a 
challenge to the accountability aspect of extraterritoriality, and it also raises the question of 
                                                
1684 See M. Milanovic, “From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights 
Treaties”, 8(3) HRLR, 2008, pp. 441-488. 
1685 This aspect will be articulated in next section 5.1.1. 
1686 International humanitarian law does not employ the term “jurisdiction” as the relevant criteria to determine whether 
persons are entitled to protection under its rules; as already highlighted in previous Chapter 1, in view of Article 4 
GCIV it is the link with the actual existence of an armed conflict or a situation of occupation that places certain obligations on the 
belligerent State or the occupying power towards individuals situated outside its own sovereign territory. 
1687 On this issue, see L. McGregor, “Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty”, 18 





international institutions having sufficient jurisdiction to hear relevant cases.  
Further implications for conflict-related settings may derive from considering the relationship 
between State jurisdiction under human rights treaties and State responsibility under public international law. 
When a State exercises such a jurisdiction it can act lawfully or unlawfully.1688  The law of State 
responsibility as codified in the ILC Draft Articles of 2001 echoes an interstate structure of public 
international law: this responsibility is generally triggered when a State has breached an 
international obligation by committing an internationally wrongful act and the injured State invokes 
the principles of State responsibility to address internationally such conduct. These Articles attribute 
conduct to a State without resting on the concept of jurisdiction, but Articles 4-19 deal with the conduct or 
relationships that trigger its responsibility; thus, they may represent interpretative tools for the 
application of human rights treaties, providing external guidance for courts and treaty bodies in 
applying rules on admissibility to ascertain human rights accountability.1689 In particular, the law of 
State responsibility may become valuable to address whether an individual was under the 
jurisdiction of a State party for the purpose of a human rights treaty not containing that term, or 
whether a certain conduct (which adversely affected the enjoyment of civilians’ ESC rights) was 
within the scope of the obligations flowing from such treaty.  
Inasmuch as State responsibility resulting from controversial conduct beyond national borders 
remains difficult to be triggered, an additional concept of “diffuse” and “shared” responsibility for 
individuals or groups’ human rights violations has been debated, framing it as “division of 
responsibility” between the domestic State and other States or among external States, and using the 
traditional tripartition of obligations as analytical tool. 
5.1.1. State jurisdiction: a revised traditional basis for extraterritorial obligations on 
ESC rights  
“Jurisdiction” is generally conceived as a prerequisite for triggering the applicability of States’ 
obligations - and, eventually, responsibility - under human rights treaties. In the context of the 
                                                
1688 For the impact of human rights law on the law of State responsibility, see R. McCordquodale, “Impact on State 
Responsibility”, in Kamminga and Scheinin (eds.), The impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law, Oxford, 
2009, pp. 235-254. 
1689 On this aspect, see M. Scheinin, “Characteristic of Human Rights Norms”, in C. Krause and M. Scheinin (eds.), 
International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook2, Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights 2012, pp. 26-27. 
His illustrative example is the HRC’s Concluding Observations on Israel in 2003, in which the Committee applied the 
principles of State responsibility in addressing the scope of Israel’s obligations concerning persons in the occupied 
Palestinian territories, see HRC, Concluding Observations: Israel, 21 August 2003, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR. See also 
Scheinin, “Just Another Word? Jurisdiction in the Roadmaps of State Responsibility”, in Langford, Vandenhole, 
Scheinin, van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 





present research, the treaties guaranteeing ESC rights without a restrictive reference to both 
territory and jurisdiction bring forth the following two questions: (i) what the omission of a jurisdiction 
clause means and implies in conflict-affected situations; (ii) whether the concept of jurisdiction has any role to play in 
covering States’ conduct that have ESC rights implications in such scenarios, in a way that the protection 
granted to affected civilians would be not limited to a State party’s own national territory, but it 
would extend whenever the State in question exercises its power. 
It is worth highlighting that no definition of “jurisdiction” is given in the human rights treaties 
that use this concept. 1690 Under general international law jurisdiction may be presumptively 
territorial,1691  but the jurisprudence under international human rights law has acknowledged 
exceptions eroding this presumption. Significant case law and other authoritative statements have 
interpreted jurisdiction as a personal or spatial connection between the State and the individual who is affected 
by its acts or the territory in which its acts took place (as detailed in section 5.1.b.i). It is actually in 
relation to human rights treaties on civil and political rights that extraterritorial jurisdiction has 
been identified with State agents’ authority over persons (both natural and legal) outside its own territory 
or State control over foreign territory.1692 These “jurisdictional tests” have not followed the ordinary 
jurisdictional rules of public international law, being more concerned with “functional” characteristics 
of sovereignty rather than with “formalistic” notions of sovereignty. 1693  As anticipated above, 
“jurisdiction” has served the purpose of addressing the relationship between individuals as the beneficiaries of 
the rights enshrined in such treaties and a signatory State as the corresponding duty-bearer.1694 
                                                
1690 However, jurisdictional clauses in human rights treaties ‘support’ the idea that rights and obligations are territorially 
limited, see T. Meron, “Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties”, 89 AJIL, 1995, p. 78. 
1691 Permanent Court of International Justice, The Case of S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 7 September 1927, Series A, 
No. 10 (1927).  
1692 For several references on the personal as well as spatial connections, see R. Wilde, “Triggering State Obligations 
Extraterritorially: the Spatial test in Certain Human Rights Treaties”, in R. Arnold and N. Quenivet, International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger In International Law, 2008, at 137-139 (particularly notes 8 
and 9). 
1693 This has been properly elucidated in legal scholarship. In public international law the concept of jurisdiction corresponds to 
the State’s power to regulate or enforce rules. These powers primarily pertain to acts occurring within State’s sovereign 
territory, but extraterritorial jurisdiction is allowed where a strong connection to the State exists. In this regard, four 
recognised bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction include active personality/nationality, passive personality, the protective principle, 
and universality, as they are justified by some connection to the State’s nationals or they involve vital interests of the State. 
As Marko Milanović highlights, these bases reflect the functional purpose of jurisdiction in public international law, that is the 
regulation of relations among States by distinguishing between permissible and impermissible exercises of authority 
when confronted with an instance of direct or indirect intervention by one State into another, see M. Milanović, “From 
Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties”, 8 HRLR, 2008, pp. 
7-17.  
1694 Human rights treaties apply to States’ conduct performed outside their entitlements to exercise jurisdiction under 
international law: in this regard, the term “jurisdiction” in such treaties should not be “confused” with the bounds set up 
under international law on States’ ability to exercise prescriptive/legislative and enforcement jurisdiction. See M. 
Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles and Policy, Oxford, 2011, pp. 30-34, 39-41. See 





Conversely, States’ entitlement to exercise jurisdiction under public international law (over a certain 
situation via regulatory, adjudicatory and enforcement means) remains relevant in determining 
whether they are allowed to extend their authority over an individual or a territory through the 
regulation of conduct outside their sovereign territories so as to contribute to human rights 
protection.1695 
In focusing on treaties on ESC rights typically the realisation of these rights occurs on the State’s 
sovereign territory, thus it essentially has a territorial scope. However, this does not make it easier to 
ignore that the outbreak of an armed conflict or the beginning of a period of belligerent occupation 
are likely to imply acts or omissions - by third States (either undertaken wholly beyond national 
borders or resulting from decisions or policies taken on national territories) or even by other entities 
- which impinge on the territories and civilian individuals or groups affected by such scenarios bycausing the denial or 
lack of access to ESC rights, and which would be qualified as a violation of the concerned treaty had it 
been undertaken on their sovereign territories. In this regard, it is argued that the concept of 
jurisdiction may partly shape the legal discourse as to the obligations flowing from such treaties and 
arising for States parties other than the territorial one within conflict-related contexts provided that 
the following points are taken into due account. 
As observed above, the protection granted by international human rights law to individuals vis-
à-vis States is not entirely in line with the traditional approach of invoking the primarily territorial 
nature of jurisdiction under public international law. Especially in conflict-affected scenarios, the 
risks of focusing exclusively on territorial jurisdiction under treaties on ESC rights are at least twofold: 
(1) removing the ground of State responsibility for decisions or acts taken outside a State’s own 
territory but leading to violations of ESC rights; and (2) making international accountability 
structures unable to operate, so as to lead to a de facto impunity of the States involved in human 
rights violations.1696  
Conversely, interpreting the concept of jurisdiction as not entirely connected to the State’s 
sovereign territory, it may relate it to the degree of authority, control, or influence of a State over the factual 
circumstances affecting the access and enjoyment of ESC rights. This “less demanding” interpretation 
consents to address State jurisdiction on the basis of the actual power a State exercises (which would result from 
                                                                                                                                                            
UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (1997), para. 13, holding that: “When an external party takes upon itself even partial responsibility for 
the situation within a country (whether under Chapter VII of the chapter or otherwise), it also unavoidably assumes a responsibility to do all 
within its power to protect the economic, social, and cultural rights of the affected population”. 
1695 See also Maastricht Principle 10. 
1696 Pertinent here is the case of the NATO bombing of the television tower in Belgrade, in which the European Court 
found that this took place outside the territory (and jurisdiction) of the European members of NATO and affirmed not 





the decisions or acts taken, alongside their contents and consequences) over situations that impaired the 
position of civilians as beneficiaries of ESC rights and that resulted in related violations. Therefore, this 
interpretation offers the potential of covering various controversial conduct in contexts of armed 
conflict and belligerent occupation. 
In focusing on distinctive tests denoting the subsistence of State jurisdiction for triggering the 
extraterritorial application of treaties on ESC rights in conflict-torn situations, a basic issue arises: 
whether a State party owes obligations exclusively towards individuals or groups who are within its 
own sovereign territory or, conversely, also towards civilians located outside its national borders but 
actually subject to “de facto jurisdiction” of that State, and if so, under which conditions this may be 
defined.  
Notably, a progressive understanding of the notion of jurisdiction in the context of the obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil ESC rights has been articulated in Principle 9 of the 2011 Maastricht Principles, as 
examined in section 3. Precisely, the “jurisdictional scope” of State obligations on ESC rights is 
enunciated as covering the following situations: (a) State’s exercise of authority or effective control, 
whether or not in line with international law; (b) State’s acts or omissions bringing about “foreseeable 
effects on the enjoyment of ESC rights”, whether outside or within its territory; (c) separate or joint actions 
of a State (via its executive, legislative or judicial branches) which lead it to “exercise decisive influence” 
or “take measures” to realise ESC rights extraterritorially, in line with international law. Such tripartite 
articulation contributes to outline significant “exceptions” eroding the basic notion of jurisdiction as 
presumptively territorial, according to certain developments emerged in international law. It clearly 
broadens the connections under which a State may be deemed to act within its jurisdiction. 
In the next sections these three circumstances will be explored in relation to situations of armed 
conflict and periods of military occupation, taking into due account relevant interpretations 
articulated by human rights treaty bodies as well as other international judicial or non-judicial 
bodies in accordance with their several functions.  
It is argued that framing under such articulation the “jurisdictional scope” of State obligations 
ensuing from ESC rights within conflict-related settings may favour a better explanation of several 
factual connections basing the relationship between the affected civilians as beneficiaries of such rights 
and the non-territorial States as corresponding duty-bearers acting in such settings. In fact, the 
jurisdictional doctrine of effective control (as advanced in the jurisprudence on civil and political 
rights) may play a role for extending the obligations relating to ESC rights beyond the sovereign 





power’s obligations to respect, protect and fulfil such rights within the occupied territory relies on its 
authority therein. However, such doctrine may be too restrictive, and other “less demanding” factual 
connections may prove equally relevant for disputing serious impairments of civilians’ ESC rights as 
taking place in conflict-affected scenarios. 
5.1.2. Preliminary remarks on the scope of the ICESCR 
The major treaty guaranteeing ESC rights deserves some preliminary considerations on the 
potential extensive interpretation of its scope of application despite the different wording of other 
human rights treaties having explicit jurisdictional clauses.  
Article 2 does not use the two notions of territory and jurisdiction to emphasise a territorial focus 
of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, implicit restrictions of the ICESCR scope have been interpreted as 
flowing from the territorial nature of the rights concerned.1697 Considering its negotiating history, while both 
draft Covenants approved by the Commission on Human Rights in 1954 included identical 
provisions specifying their application to all the territories of a State1698, during the General 
Assembly’s review in 1966 some amendments by the Soviet-bloc States called for deleting the 
territorial clauses: these were deemed “unnecessary and offering nothing to the colonial people”, being the 
States’ obligation to apply the provisions to both metropolitan and non-metropolitan territories a 
general principle of international law; thus, taking those clauses “would be harmful, for it would justify the 
perpetuation of the colonial system”.1699 The final rejection of the territorial clauses followed the UN legal 
counsel’s endorsement that the “nature of the treaty and the intention of the negotiating States had to be taken 
into account … in the absence of a territorial clause, a State on becoming a party to the Covenant would be bound in 
principle to apply the provisions of the Covenant to all its territories”.1700 
Even though the ICESCR does not delimit criteria for its scope of application, the explicit reference 
in several provisions to international dimensions of realisation of ESC rights seems to corroborate that the 
drafters intended a certain extraterritorial scope of the obligations flowing from this treaty.1701 This 
                                                
1697 See M. Dennis, “Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military 
Occupation”, 99 AJIL, 2005, 119, pp. 127-128. 
1698 See Comm. Human Rights, Report on the Tenth Session, UN ESCOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 7, para. 243, Annex I, 
Arts. 28 of the ICESCR and 53 of the ICCPR, providing: “The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to or be applicable 
equally to a signatory metropolitan State and to all the territories, be they Non-Self Governing, Trust, or Colonial Territories, which are being 
administered or governed by such metropolitan State”. 
1699 Statement of the representative of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, A/C.3/SR.1411, (1966), para. 4. 
1700 Statement of UN legal counsel Stavropoulos, A/C.3/SR.1411, (1966), paras. 36 and 38. See generally E. Schwelb, 
“Some Aspects of the International Covenants on Human Rights of December 1962, in Eide, Asbjorn and Schou, 
August (eds.), International Protection of Human Rights, 1968, pp. 112-113. 
1701 In favour of such an interpretation, see M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – A 





finds support in Article 2(1) containing the obligation to take steps “through international cooperation”, in 
Article 11(2) on the right to an adequate standard of living, in Article 15(4) on international co-
operation in the scientific and cultural fields, in Article 22 on the role of the specialised agencies, in 
Article 23 on international action to achieve the rights in the Covenant, and also in the Preamble, 
which refers to the “obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and freedom”.  
As to the drafters’ intent, legal scholarship has noticed how there was “no need to limit explicitly the 
protection of ESC rights to those people resident in the territory of a State Party only”.1702 Indeed, it is the same 
terminology to indicate that States parties recognise “the rights of everyone”, and, in any case, the 
aforementioned substantive provisions of the ICESCR appear to broaden the range of acts or 
omissions by States, other than the territorial one, which might be considered in breach of them. 
Furthermore, an extensive interpretation of the Covenant’s scope is undertaken in another 
noteworthy source of guidance on its implementation, namely the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which contain one more explicit reference to 
jurisdiction as a basis for the Covenant’s application beyond the sovereign territory of State parties. 
In addressing the aspect of assigning State responsibility for violations of the treaty, Guideline 
no. 16 emphasises that these violations are “in principle imputable to the State within whose jurisdiction they 
occur”, specifying that, “as a consequence, the State responsible must establish mechanisms to correct such 
violations, including monitoring investigation, prosecution, and remedies for victims”. The commentary to this 
guideline does not focus on the notion of jurisdiction and whether it is separated from - and not 
confined by - territory, but it highlights “the duty of the State to set up procedures, structure and other modes by 
which victims of violations of ESC rights can get redress and remedies”, even if the violations concerned may 
be committed by individuals, organizations, institutions and other entities in a State without its 
direct and active participation.1703  
Conversely, Guideline no. 17 enunciates that under situations of colonialism, further forms of 
alien domination and military occupation, the denials of ESC rights may be imputable to the 
                                                                                                                                                            
international cooperation instead of allowing the enjoyment of rights to be put off, (the reference to international cooperation) filled the gap 
between what States could in fact do and the steps the would have to take to meet their obligations under the Covenant”, 21 May 1951, 
E/CN.4/SR.216, at 6. 
1702 In favour of this reading, see F. Coomans, “The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in the Work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 
HRLR, 2011, pp. 7-8. 
1703 See T.C. Van Boven, C. Flinterman and I. Westendorp (eds.), Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, SIM Special No. 20, Utrecht, The Netherlands, 26 January 1997. These guidelines were published as an 
official UN Document, (Twenty-fourth session, 2000), E/C.12/2000/13. See V. Dankwa, C. Flinterman, S. Leckie, 






conduct of the State exercising effective control over the territory concerned, specifing as well the 
responsibility of the dominating or occupying power for violations of ESC rights, and indicating that “there are also 
circumstances in which States acting in concert violate economic, social and cultural rights”. According to the 
related commentary, the duty to establish mechanisms for dealing with such violations “must be borne 
by the foreign authority which is in effective control of the State where they occur”.1704 
5.1.2.a. The “exclusive” use of the term jurisdiction in the OP-ICESCR 
As observed above, contrary to the actual text of the ICESCR, its Optional Protocol uses the term 
“jurisdiction” in two provisions: in Article 2 to determine who has the right to present a 
communication; in Article 13 to oblige a State party to take measures ensuring that “individuals under 
its jurisdiction” are not ill-treated or intimidated as a result of submitting a communication to the 
Committee pursuant to the Protocol.1705 Such a use is in line with the wording of other existing 
international complaints procedures,1706 and it is an aspect that received less consideration than 
other issues thornily negotiated within the text of the Optional Protocol.1707  
In theory, the textual reference in Article 2 to “individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction 
of a State Party” makes it difficult to present communications against States parties when they violate 
ESC rights outside their national borders. No general presumption exists in support of States’ 
jurisdiction beyond sovereign territories. Thus, under the OP-ICESCR petitioners bear the burden 
of proof to demonstrate that an extraterritorial violation of the Covenant occurred under the 
jurisdiction of the State party concerned. 
Conversely, in practice, extraterritorial application under this Protocol cannot be precluded. 
The Committee could choose to accept communications from individuals alleging violations of their 
ESC rights under the Covenant as occurred outside the territory of the State party whose 
responsibility is asserted. In this regard, in Article 2 OP-ICESCR the significance of the notion of 
jurisdiction as separated from - and not confined by - State sovereign territory may be linked to the 
                                                
1704 See Maastricht Guidelines, ibid. See also V. Dankwa, C. Flinterman, S. Leckie, ibid., p. 724. 
1705 For a comment, see I. Biglino and C. Golay, “The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights”, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, July 2013; C. 
Courtis and M. Sepulveda, “Are Extra-Territorial Obligations Reviewable under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR”, 27 (1) Nordisk Tidsskrift for Mennekerettigheter, 2009. 
1706 See Article 1(2) OP-ICCPR; Article 2 OP-CEDAW; Article 14(1) CERD. On the opportunity to incorporate a 
“jurisdictional limitation clause”, see Inter-American Institute of Human Rights and International Commission of 
Jurists, Commentary on the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Costa 
Rica/Geneva: Inter-American Institute for Human Rights/Sida, 2010, pp. 51-52. 
1707 For a comment of its negotiations, see M. Langford, “Closing the Gap? - An Introduction to the Optional Protocol 






specific nature of this treaty: the “exclusive” use of the term jurisdiction appears to emphasise the 
requirement that the victim was under a factual connection with the State party which she/he claims has 
violated or is violating her/his rights set forth in the Covenant. In other words, jurisdiction under 
the Optional Protocol may be addressed on the basis of the actual control/authority exercised by 
that State over certain factual circumstances, which impinged on the position of the beneficiaries of 
ESC rights and resulted in their violations. From this perspective, individual communications might 
call the attention of the Committee to States’ conduct having drastic implications for the ESC rights 
of civilians affected by conflict-related situations. However, no case law has contributed to clarify 
this point yet, being as the Protocol has been in force only as of 5 May 2013. 
Even though the potential of claiming extraterritorial violations of the ICESCR through the 
individual communications procedure of the OP-ICESCR remains unpromising, it is worth just 
mentioning that the aforementioned inter-State communications procedure as well as the inquiry 
procedure could allow for addressing issues related to extraterritorial violations of ESC rights of 
individuals affected by a State party’s conduct beyond its national borders. In particular, the inquiry 
procedure might enable the Committee to address grave or systematic violations of ESC rigths of 
civilians. This option seems plausible even in view that the requirements for submitting information 
to request an inquiry are less rigorous (inter alia, it is not required to indicate identifiable victims, to 
present a formal communication, to exhaust domestic remedies1708) and no reference to territorial 
or jurisdictional limitations is made among the requirements for initiating this procedure. 
Of note is that certain positions undertaken by the treaty-based body of the ICESCR, the 
International Court of Justice1709 and other supervisory mechanisms1710 in the exercise of their 
functions have contributed to orient the debate in favour of a certain extraterritorial scope of the 
Covenant by invoking the factor of State jurisdiction as a basis for its application to a State party’s conduct outside 
its sovereign territory.1711 These positions are detailed in the next three sub-sections. 
                                                
1708 The OP-ICESCR contains all of the admissibility requirements of its ICCPR, and it adds two further stipulations. 
Firstly, under Article 2(a) cases must be “submitted within one year after the exhaustion of domestic remedies, except in cases where the 
author can demonstrate that it had not been possible to submit the communication within that time limit”. Secondly, under Article 4 the 
CESCR “may, if necessary, decline to consider a communication where it does not reveal that the author has suffered a clear disadvantage, 
unless the Committee considers that the communication raises a serious issue of general importance”. 
1709 See ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 
2004, paras. 112 and 134, where the Court found that the Palestinian territories have been subject to Israel’s territorial 
jurisdiction as an occupying power and on this basis the latter is bound by the ICESCR in the OPT. 
1710 These include UN individual experts monitoring human rights situations in specific countries or dealing with 
specific issues of concern. 
1711 For a comment on the practice, see M. Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalizing World: Extraterritorial 





5.1.2.b. The practice of the Committee on economic, social and cultural rights 
The CESCR has invoked the standard of jurisdiction in several of its General Comments, indicating 
the need that State parties “monitor the actual situation with respect to each of the rights on a regular basis” and 
so be “aware of the extent to which the various rights are, or are not, being enjoyed by all individuals within its 
territory or under its jurisdiction”.1712  
Furthermore, as detailed in the following sections, the jurisprudence in its concluding 
observations has implicitly developed the position whereby a State party has jurisdiction outside its own 
territory, stating that the Covenant applies to all areas over which a State party maintains functional, 
personal, or geographical jurisdiction, including “dependent territories”1713 and territories where the State 
has a de facto control1714. According to the Committee, a State party to the ICESCR may also have a 
certain jurisdiction over nationals or ordinarily resident of another Contracting Party when the 
negative implementation of a treaty obligation results in violations within its own territory.1715  
5.1.2.c. The approach of the International Court of Justice 
The sole pronouncement so far explicitly referring to the extraterritorial applicability of the 
ICESCR is represented by its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of Construction of the Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. As already observed, one of the issues to be determined by the Court 
was whether the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the CRC were applicable only on States parties’ 
territories or, instead, also beyond such territories and, if so, in what circumstances. It is worthy just 
                                                
1712 CESCR, General Comment No. 1: Reporting by States Parties, UN Doc. E/1989/22, Annex III, para. 3. See also General 
Comment No. 4: The right to adequate housing, E/1992/23, para. 13; CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food, 
UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/11, para. 14 (“Every State is obliged to ensure for everyone under its jurisdiction access to the minimum 
essential food which is sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure their freedom from hunger”); CESCR, General Comment No. 13: 
The right to education, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10, para. 6(a)-(b); CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest 
attainable standard of health, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para. 12(b), 51; CESCR, General Comment No.15: The right to water, 
E/C.12/2002/11, paras. 12(c), 31, 44(b), 53; CESCR, General Comment No. 18: The right to work (2005), UN Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/18, para. 12(b), 35; CESCR, General Comment No. 8: The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for 
economic, social and cultural rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8, para. 10; CESCR, General Comment No. 9: The domestic 
application of the Covenant, UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/24, para. 9.  
1713 CESCR, Concluding Observations: the Netherlands, UN Doc. E/1999/22, para. 194, urging “the State party to ensure that it 
complies fully with its obligations under the Covenant as they apply to Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles”. Its concerned was expressed 
in relation to the State party’s statement that “the Government of the Netherlands is not responsible for the implementation of economic, 
social and cultural rights in Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles” since they were deemed “equal parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the Government of the Netherlands contributes every year 1.5 per cent of GNP” to them.  
1714 E.g., CESCR, Concluding Observations on Israel, UN Doc. E/1999/22, para. 232, reading: “The Committee takes note of the 
statement by State party’s representatives that with respect to the Covenant’s applicability in the occupied territories, Israel accepts direct 
responsibility in some areas covered by the Covenant, indirect responsibility in other areas and overall significant legal responsibility across the 
board. This conforms to the Committee’s view that the Covenant applies to all areas where Israel maintains geographical, functional or 
personal jurisdiction”. 
1715 CESCR, Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka, E/1999/22, para. 77, in which it noted with concern “the plight of 
hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankan women working abroad as domestic helpers, many of them underpaid and treated as virtual slaves”, 
regretting “that the Government has not made a serious effort to assess the negative impact of this phenomenon on children who are left in 





mentioning that the Court found the ICCPR as applicable to a State party’s sovereign territories 
and “in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory”,1716 while it 
concluded that the CRC is applicable within the occupied Palestinian territories.1717  
As for the ICESCR, the absence of provisions specifying its scope of application was explained 
in the view that it establishes rights that are by their nature “essentially territorial”. Although it did not 
affirm that the treaty obligations are exclusively territorial, the Court cautiously acknowledged “it is 
not to be excluded” that this Covenant “applies both to territories over which a State party has sovereignty and to 
those over which that State exercises territorial jurisdiction”.1718 This finding has some implications for those 
asserting rights’ against acts carried out by a State exercising jurisdiction beyond its sovereign 
territory: apparently the Court delineated carefully the situations in which this Covenant would 
apply extraterritorially, since it required territorial jurisdiction (instead of a simple reference to 
jurisdiction), so entailing control over territory and not just over persons.  
Then, the Court referred to Article 14 of the Covenant, which obliges each party “to adopt a plan 
of action for the progressive implementation of compulsory primary education” in its metropolitan territory or 
other territories under its jurisdiction.1719 Here it seems clear the Court’s presumption that the 
implementation of the ICESCR entails the exercise of “quasi-sovereign” powers by the State (e.g. to set 
up a school system, to build health care centres, or to design social housing programmes). This 
evidences the complexity of imposing extraterritorial obligations in the area of ESC rights as far as 
                                                
1716 Although General Comment No. 31 was adopted by the Human Rights Committee before this advisory opinion, the 
ICJ did not cite it expressly. The Court referred to the Committee’s position and acknowledged that the ICCPR is 
“applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory” (para. 111), but it did not employ 
the Committee’s wider reference to the authorities’ conduct “that affect […] the enjoyment of rights” and it used a narrower 
and more specific formulation (“acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction”), without providing indication of such an 
exercise. This standard was deemed met in the case of occupation, but the Committee’s wider interpretation was not 
rejected by the ICJ, which referred to Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (No. 52/1979, 29 July 1981) and particularly to the arrests 
as exercises of jurisdiction (para. 109). Significantly Article 2(1) was deemed to cover both individuals within the 
sovereign territory and individuals subject to State’s jurisdiction but outside such territory. 
1717 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, para. 113. Article 2 
CRC mentions only the jurisdiction aspect, providing that “States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the … 
Convention to each child within their jurisdiction …”; the Court basically noted Article 2 and acknowledged that the “Convention 
is therefore applicable within the Occupied Palestinian Territory”. However, it is not clear what standard was applied by the Court 
in this finding, since no other analysis was made in relation to the CRC; in light of the similarity between Article 2 CRC 
and Article 2 ICCPR, it may be deduced that the Court applied the same standard to both; nonetheless, it should be 
noted that the CRC contains social and economic rights as well as political and civil rights. 
1718 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, 
para.112. The Court cited and approved the finding of the CESCR that the “State party’s obligations under the Covenant apply 
to all territories and populations under its effective control”. While this may be interpreted to apply to effective control over either 
territories or populations, it is difficult to conceive of effective control of a population, as opposed to certain individuals, 
without territorial control.   
1719 For a critical position on this point, see M. Dennis, op. cit., at 128 (note 71), noting that the negotiating history of 
Article 14 shows that the phrase “metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction" was included to guarantee that 
parties would implement the right to primary education in ‘dependent territories’ over which they exercised sovereignty, 





the dominant mind-set conceives them as imposing on the State positive duties (while civil and 
political rights primarily would impose negative duties). Without examining the negotiating history 
of the Covenant, the Court concisely interpreted the exercise of territorial jurisdiction and the 
powers available to the occupying State as the basis for founding the ICESCR applicable within the 
West Bank and Gaza.  
The subsequent reasoning in the same paragraph of the advisory opinion concerned Israel’s 
position and its rejection by the CESCR, whose jurisprudence was explicitly endorsed by the Court. 
Finally, after having considered that “the territories occupied by Israel have for over 37 years been subject to its 
territorial jurisdiction as the occupying power”, the Court concluded that Israel was bound by the 
Covenant’s provisions and was also “under an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in 
those fields where competence has been transferred to Palestinian authorities”.1720 
In any case, it appears that the International Court of Justice’s view on ESC rights supports 
what has become more and more acknowledged in the following years, namely the idea that the long 
term of occupation impacts the level of protection the occupying power is required to provide for the individuals located 
beyond its national borders but subject to its territorial jurisdiction. In this respect, the temporal factor of the 
duration of belligerent occupation may be taken into account to explain the assessment undertaken 
by the same Court for the Ugandan occupation of Congolese territories, which did not last for an 
extremely long period of time, given that it started in August 1998, with troops advancement until 
July 1999 and their gradual withdrawal from June 2000, which was completed in June 2003.  
In the Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo the International Court of Justice 
confined itself to an appraisal of civil and political rights and the issue of child soldiers, 
notwithstanding the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as Uganda were States parties to the 
ICESCR and in spite of the fact that the DRC invoked this Covenant as pertinent in the case before 
it.1721 However, in considering which principles and rules of international humanitarian law and 
human rights were pertinent in the contentious case, the Court openly recalled and emphasised in 
broader terms that in its advisory opinion on the wall it had “concluded that international human rights 
instruments are applicable ‘in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory’, 
particularly in occupied territories”.1722 At least two important suggestions may stem from such wording. 
                                                
1720 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, op. cit., para. 112. 
1721 See Mémoire de la Republique Démocratique du Congo, at 147-148, para. 3.58. The Democratic Republic of the Congo 
acceded to the Covenant on November 1976 and Uganda on 21 January 1987; see Traités multilatéraux déposés auprès du 
Secrétaire général, Etat au 31 décembre 1996, ST/LEG/SER.E/15, New York, Nations Unies, 1997, pp. 117-118. 
1722 ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, 
para. 216. The Court considered “whether or not Uganda was an occupying power in the parts of the Congolese territory where its troops 





Firstly, it is in favour of a unique standard for finding applicable every human rights treaty, 
although very little guidance is given in this judgement on what integrate “acts done by a State in the 
exercise of its jurisdiction”. Secondly, it entails the application of such treaties to a State’s conduct even 
when its control does not make the grade exercised by an occupying power (i.e. the application of 
such treaties during occupation is but one example of possible relevant situations).1723 Besides, 
exactly because the Court’s appeal to international human rights law was not inspired by 
extraordinary circumstances - as those concerning the Israeli prolonged occupation have appeared 
to be1724 - the judgment in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda represents a noteworthy case 
corroborating the idea that the exercise of State jurisdiction abroad triggers the extraterritorial application of core 
international human rights treaties, and this notwithstanding the observation made in legal scholarship 
that “the general principle that human rights law can apply to military occupation is now widely, but by no means 
universally, accepted”.1725   
5.1.2.d. The position within the UN Special Procedures mechanisms 
The extraterritorial scope of the ICESCR have been considered by some UN independent experts 
in the exercise of their thematic or country mandates to examine, monitor, advise, and publicly 
report on human rights issues through activities undertaken by special procedures. For instance, the 
Covenant’s extraterritorial applicability has been dealt, directly or indirectly, by various Special 
Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, as examined in 
section 5.1.3.a.iii. 
5.1.3. A progressive interpretation of the scope of State obligations relating to ESC 
rights  
As briefly mentioned above, in focusing on the different de facto circumstances potentially denoting the 
                                                                                                                                                            
outside occupied territory. Uganda was found in violation of a number of treaties, including the ICCPR, the CRC and 
its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, and the ACHPR, in addition to a number of 
IHL instruments, see ibid., para. 217. The Court concluded that “Uganda is internationally responsible for violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law committed by the UPDF and by its members in the territory of the DRC 
and for failing to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri in respect of violations of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law in the occupied territory” (para. 220). 
1723 On these implications, see J. Cerone, “Out of Bounds: Considering the reach of international human rights”, 
CHRGJ Working Paper No. 5, 2006, pp. 7-8. 
1724 On this view, see M. Dennis, “Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict 
and Military Occupation”, 99 AJIL, 2005, 119, p. 122, underling that “the ICJ’s conclusion…appears to have been based upon 
the unusual circumstances of Israel’s prolonged occupation. It therefore remains unclear whether the opinion should be read as generally 
endorsing the view that the obligations assumed by States under international human rights instruments apply extraterritorially during situations 
of armed conflict and military occupation”. 
1725 See A. Roberts, “Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights”, 100 AJIL, 





subsistence of State jurisdiction for the purpose of triggering the extraterritorial application of 
treaties on ESC rights in conflict-afflicted scenarios, the present research takes into account the 
progressive understanding of the notion of jurisdiction as recently articulated within the large debate 
developed among scholars, human rights experts and organizations in the field of ESC rights. 
Indeed, this has contributed to outline significant “exceptions” eroding the basic notion of 
jurisdiction as presumptively territorial while broadening the connections under which a State may be 
deemed to act within its jurisdiction.  
More precisely, the “jurisdictional scope” of State obligations relating to ESC rights has been 
deemed as potentially extending extraterritorially in one the following situations: (1) effective 
control/authority over individuals or foreign territorial areas, (2) foreseeability as to the effects on 
the enjoyment of ESC rights, and (3) decisive influence or measures to realise the rights in 
question.1726 The following three sections attempt to deal with these circumstances from the 
perspective of contemporary situations of armed conflict and periods of military occupation.  
5.1.3.1. Effective control and authority over people or foreign territories  
The exercise by a State of effective control and authority over individuals or foreign territorial areas - whether or 
not in compliance with international law - may be deemed the most basic factual circumstance for 
triggering the extraterritorial applicability of treaties on ESC rights in conflict-related scenarios and, 
consequently, the existence of corresponding human rights obligations upon the State concerned 
beyond its sovereign territory. 
Although the potential of such a basis (borrowed from the civil and political rights jurisprudence) 
is significant, a primary question is its adequacy for the ESC rights of civilians affected by conflict-related 
settings. This requires we reflect on several aspects such as: what set of standards may indicate a 
situation of “effective control” exercised by a State regarding ESC rights affected by such settings; 
whether the degree of State control weights the extent of extraterritorial obligations relating to the 
ESC rights of civilians; whether recent cases of military occupation require clarifications about the 
jurisdictional capacity of the occupying power from the perspective of safeguarding ESC rights.  
Before discussing such potentialities, it seems worth focusing briefly on the doctrine of effective 
control as has progressively emerged from the jurisprudence advanced in the field of civil and 
political rights by judicial or quasi-judicial supervisory bodies. 
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5.1.3.1.a. The doctrine of effective control as developed in international 
jurisprudence  
While the jurisdiction clauses contained in some universal and regional human rights treaties (i.e. the 
ICCPR, the CERD, the CAT, the CRC, the ECHR and the ACHR1727) was traditionally perceived 
as a geographical limitation that might be interpreted as granting States’ impunity when their 
conduct takes place outside their national territory, such a narrow interpretation has been 
challenged by a growing body of international jurisprudence taking jurisdiction as related to the power 
a State exercises over persons (both natural and legal) affected by States’ conduct or over territory in which States’ 
conduct took place.1728 
Notably, the importance of extraterritoriality for human rights treaties has been clearly 
underlined after Bankovic and others v. Belgium and 16 other NATO States, in which the European Court 
denied the applicability of the ECHR to the victims of a NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia 
in 1999. That decision was based on the rationale that jurisdiction within the meaning of the 
Convention is an essentially territorial concept and its extraterritorial exercise is strictly 
exceptional. 1729  Conversely, the “gradual approach to jurisdiction” has been put forward by the 
applicants of that case and then by several scholars, arguing that the obligation under Article 1 
ECHR to secure the Convention’s rights to a given person applies proportionately to the control in fact 
exercise over that person: States would be obliged to secure those rights that were within their control, 
                                                
1727 Four human rights treaties (ICCPR, CERD, CAT and CRC) use “jurisdiction” to describe their scope of application: 
“[e]ach State party…undertakes to respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in 
the present Covenant” (Art. 2 (1) ICCPR); “States Parties… undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all [racist practices] in territories 
under their jurisdiction” (Art. 3 CERD); “Each State Party shall take effective measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its 
jurisdiction” (Art. 2 (1) CAT); “States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their 
jurisdiction” (Art. 2(1) CRC). However, two of these treaties use that term in connection with “territory” by determining 
that States parties’ obligations encompass “territories under their jurisdiction” (Art. 3 CERD and Art. 2(1) CAT), thus 
implying that the exercise of jurisdiction over a territory by a State party (and not the formal existence of sovereignty or 
lack thereof) represents the crucial test defining the scope of application of such treaties.  
1728 See HRC, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 29 March 2004, para. 10, in which the Committee took the view that each State party 
“must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if not 
situated within the territory of that State party”. See Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 
by States parties, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2, 24 January 2008, para. 16, in which the Committee took the view that “any 
territory” includes every area in which a State party exercises “de iure or de facto”, “in whole or in part”, “directly or 
indirectly”, effective control in line with international law. See ICJ, Provisional measures in the case of Georgia v. Russian 
Federation, 15 October 2008, No. 35/2008, para. 109, in which the Court confirmed that “(t)here is no restriction of a general 
nature in CERD relating to its territorial application […] (t)he Court consequently finds that the provisions of CERD generally appear to 
apply, like other provisions of instruments of that nature, to the actions of a State party when it acts beyond its territory”. 
1729 ECtHR, Bankovic and others v. Belgium and 16 other NATO States, Appl. No. 52207/99, Grand Chamber, 12 December 
2001, 41 ILM (2002). According to the Court, at the relevant time the victims of the bombing of the Serbian television 
station RTS in Belgrade, who alleged extraterritorial violations of Article 2 (right to life), Article 10 (freedom of 
expression) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy), had not been under the respondent States’ jurisdiction (which 
were parties to the same Convention). Extraterritorial jurisdiction was understood as applicable when a State - via 





which could be extensive or limited and whose level could be determined in function of establishing 
the corresponding level of obligations by considering, inter alia, the ability of the State to influence the 
situation of the person under control and the ability of the State to prevent the violation of a certain right.1730 
Indeed, notwithstanding the more cautious approach traditionally taken by the European Court 
of Human Rights, another line of case law of human rights bodies has not limited jurisdiction to 
territorial boundaries and, instead, has explicitly used the “effective control” or “degree of control” test, 
based on power or authority, to determine whether a treaty should be applied extraterritorially.1731 
A lower threshold has been applied by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, and its 
case law indicates that the State’s exercise of “effective control” over persons whose rights have been 
violated 1732  may result from three forms of extraterritorial conduct (i.e. military occupation, 
detention, military control).1733 Furthermore, in the recent Al-Skeini1734 and Al-Jedda1735 the European 
                                                
1730 See R. Lawson, “Moving from Bankovic: The gradually expanding reach of the European Convention of Human 
Rights”, in The Rule of Law in Peace Operations, Recueils de la Société Internationale de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre, Vol. 
17, pp. 473-487. H. Nannum, “Remarks”, in Cerna et al., “Bombing For Peace: Collateral Damage and Human 
Rights”, Proceedings of the 96th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 13-16 March 2002, Vol. 96, pp. 95-
108. 
1731 See ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, Appl. No. 15318/94, Judgment of 18 December 1996, para. 52 (“the concept of 
jurisdiction … is not restricted to the national territory of the Contracting States … (T)he responsibility of a Contracting Party could also arise 
when … it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory”). See ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, 
Judgment of 10 May 2001, para. 71 (holding Turkey liable for acts of a local administration that endured due to its 
military support). See ECtHR, Ocalan v. Turkey, Appl. No. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 March 2003; ECtHR, Issa and 
Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 31821/96, Judgment 16 November 2004; ECtHR, Ilasu v. Moldova and Russia, Appl. No. 
48787/99, Judgment of 8 July 2004. 
1732 See IACommHR, Coard et al. v. United States, Report No. 109/99, Case 10.951, 1999, para. 37; IACommHR, 
Alejandre v. Cuba, Report No. 86/99, Case 11.589, 29 September 1999. 
1733 See C.M. Cerna, “Out of Bounds: The Approach of the Inter-American System for the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights to the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Law”, CHRGJ Working Paper No. 6, 2006, p. 5. 
1734 Al-Skeini concerned the killing of six Iraqi civilians by British soldiers in Southern Iraq, including the brutal death of 
Baha Mousa during his detention at a UK army base. Their relatives asked for an independent investigation, which was 
denied, so they brought various applications for judicial review. In 2007, the House of Lords held that the Human 
Rights Act 1998 did not apply to the soldiers’ actions save those on the army base. The UK Court of Appeal recognised 
the possible application of the European Convention to the occupying powers in Iraq, see UK Court of Appeal, the 
Queen (on the application of Mazin Mumaa Galteth Al-Skeini and Others) v. The Secretary of State for Defence, Case No. 
C1/2005/0461, C1/20050461B, 21 December 2005, E.W.C.A. Civ. 1609 (2005). Specifically, according to the House 
of Lords, only Baha Mousa was held to be within the jurisdiction of the UK: since he was killed while in custody in a 
British detention facility in Iraq, the judges considered him to be within the State’s jurisdiction “essentially by analogy with 
the extraterritorial exception made for embassies” (see Lord Brown at para. 132). Conversely, the other five applicants were 
killed by British troops on patrol in UK-occupied Basra and the judges dismissed their case by denying jurisdiction and, 
consequently, the extraterritorial application of the Convention. The five applicants who lost the case took it to 
Strasburg. An unanimous Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held, firstly, that the UK had jurisdiction under Article 1 
ECHR in respect of civilians killed during British occupation in South East Iraq and, secondly, that the UK had 
violated the procedural duties under the right to life (i.e. it had a duty to conduct an independent and effective 
investigation into the deaths of all the civilians killed by British soldiers, whether or not they were within the confines of a UK 
military base, in compliance with Article 2 ECHR). Its decision was based on the fact that the UK had assumed 
responsibility for the maintenance of security in Southern Iraq and was exercising “control and authority” over Iraqi 
civilians. See ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingom, Appl. No. 55721/07, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 7 July 





Court on Human Rights still retained the basic Bankovic position that the recognition of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is exceptional and requires justification on the basis of general 
international law,1736 but in these two judgments the Grand Chamber significantly held that the 
ECHR may apply to (certain) military operations performed abroad. It found the UK 
Government’s human rights obligations under the European Convention as exceptionally extended 
to situations in which British officials exercised, in fact, “control and authority” over foreign nationals 
abroad. Of note, the Court indicated that the State authorities’ acts performed abroad or producing effects 
beyond their own territories may constitute an exercise of jurisdiction under Article 1.1737 To the Court, 
however, whether or not all treaty obligations become effective depends on the circumstances: “the 
State is under an obligation […] to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms […] that are relevant to the 
situation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the convention rights can be “divided and tailored””. Notably, 
regarding the indicators determining the existence of effective control over an area, the Court 
referred to “the strength of the State’s military presence in the area”1738 concerned, adding the relevance of 
“the extent to which (State’s) military, economic and political support for the local subordinate administration provides 
it with influence and control over the region”.1739 
Therefore, apparently human rights judicial and quasi-judicial bodies as well as the 
International Court of Justice tend to agree on the basic position that a State owe human rights 
obligations in any situation over which it exercises effective control (e.g. over an occupied territory), whether or not such 
situation is found in its sovereign territory. In other words, as far as a State exercises through its agents 
effective control over foreign territory the human rights treaties to which it is a party apply to the 
conduct it undertakes in such territory.1740 Nonetheless, even though a State may be required to 
ensure the whole range of human rights when it exercises effective control over territory or people, 
                                                                                                                                                            
1735 Al-Jedda concerned the indefinite detention without charge of a dual British/Iraqi citizen in a Basra facility run by 
British forces. In 2007, the House of Lords held that the detention was lawful because the UK Government had been 
authorised to act by UN Security Council Res. 1546. However, the Grand Chamber held that the Security Council 
Resolution did not displace the Government’s obligations to protect the right to liberty under Article 5 ECHR. See 
ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27021/08, Judgment, 7 July 2011. 
1736 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment, 7 July 2011, paras. 135-137.  
1737 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom, ibid., paras.131-133. 
1738 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom, ibid., para.139, citing Loizidou (merits) at 16 and 56. 
1739 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom, ibid., para.139, citing Ilascu at 388-394.  
1740 This interpretation has found certain support by political bodies such as the UN Security Council and the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In particular, see SC Res. 1546 (2004), S/RES/1546, 8 June 2004, 
which was adopted in anticipation of the transfer of the authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi 
interim government, and whose wording does not reveal any departure from the applicable international humanitarian 
law (whose relevance it explicitly affirmed) nor from human rights law since it does not include any indication to that 
effect. See also Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Resolution 1386 (June 2004), The Council of Europe’s 






it is the extent of such control that may vary and so will the scope of its obligations under the relevant 
treaties.  
In this regard Maastricht Principle No. 18, which deals specifically with a State carrying out 
belligerent occupation or otherwise exercising effective control over a territory beyond its national 
soil, enunciates that this situation involves extraterritorial obligations on the ESC rights of 
individuals within that territory, whereby the State assumes specific responsibilities for its 
extraterritorial conduct.  
A notable clarification undertaken in legal scholarship has favoured the notion of jurisdiction as 
related to the exercise of authority and control, supporting a proportionate approach: “the law of 
jurisdiction is about entitlements to act, the law of State responsibility is about obligations incurred when a State does 
act” .1741 A State is allowed to act both within and outside its territory as long as its performances are 
in accordance with international law; when a State commits an internationally wrongful act or 
omission the notion of State responsibility determines the legal consequences of such conduct, even 
of an extraterritorial one.  
As already observed, a certain confusion as to what the “jurisdictional” limitation actually refers in 
human rights treaties has been extensively addressed by scholars, broadly claiming an 
incompatibility of the traditional territorial approach to jurisdiction with its function in the context 
and purpose of human rights treaties. Actually, a broad interpretation of the notion of jurisdiction has 
revealed to be crucial for such treaties: insofar as they bound States acting within a jurisdiction, the 
risk of considering the latter as related only to a geographic area is that States could have “extra-
jurisdictional activities” without State responsibility being triggered.1742  
5.1.3.1.b. The effective control criterion in cases of occupied territories 
Contemporary situations of occupation gain relevance in exploring the use of the effective control 
standard for triggering the extraterritorial applicability of treaties on ESC rights. As to the ICESCR, 
the exercise of effective control over foreign territory and over populations residing therein by a 
State party has constituted a decisive factor for its treaty-based monitoring body to acknowledge its 
extraterritorial application. However, the single case in which the CESCR has extensively discussed 
                                                
1741 See R. Higgins, Problem and process - International Law and How We Use It, Oxford: Carendon Press, 1994, at 146.  
1742 On this point, see also M. Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties, Intersentia, 2009, pp. 56 and 168; Coomans, “The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights”, HRLR, 2011, pp. 1-35; Skogly, “Extraterritoriality - Universal Human Rights without Universal 
Obligations?”, in S. Joseph and A. McBeth (eds.), Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law, Edward Elgar 





the reach of the ICESCR in such situations concerns Israel and the situation of the occupied 
Palestinian territories. This will be examined in the following sub-section. Conversely, other cases of 
present-day occupations involving States parties to the ICESCR have been overlooked by the 
CESCR. Regrettably this appears a relatively unbalanced and selective approach.  
5.1.3.1.b.i. Critical missing cases  
Prominent instances in which supervisory human rights bodies have mainly disregarded the 
question of the extraterritorial application of treaties guaranteeing ESC rights may total at least 
four. One may refer here to the belligerent occupation of parts of Iraq and Afghanistan by military 
forces of the United Kingdom, the effects of which on the enjoyment of ESC rights (e.g. the right to 
have access to basic services like water, electricity, the right to adequate housing, and the right to 
have access to health care facilities) were not considered during the 2009 examination of the UK 
State Report.1743  
Equally, the situation of ESC rights in the Northern part of Cyprus, occupied by Turkish armed 
forces since 1974, was not included in the list of issues for the consideration of the initial Turkish 
report on the Covenant’s implementation.1744  
Another relevant situation concerns Western Sahara. Morocco is a party to several UN human 
rights treaties (e.g. the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the CERD, the CAT, the CEDAW, CRC, and the 
Migrant Workers Convention) and it has made no relevant derogations. Conversely, it is not a party 
to the AfrCHPR. Contrary to their stance towards other occupying powers, the related treaty-based 
bodies have not clearly affirmed that these conventions apply in the Western Sahara, and their 
remarks have been mostly limited to concern about the lack of progress towards self-determination 
as required by Article 1 of both the ICCPR and ICESCR. While the treaty bodies under CAT, 
CERD, and CRC, did not explicitly refer to this point, apparently the other two Committees have 
assumed that the 1977 Covenants do apply.1745 
                                                
1743 A different approach has been undertaken by the Human Rights Committee during the discussion on the UK 
periodic ICCPR report in 2008, as it called upon the State party to “state clearly that the Covenant applies to all individuals 
which are subject to its jurisdiction or control”, see HRC, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6, 18 July 2008, para. 14. 
1744 See List of issues on Turkey, UN Doc. E/C.12//TUR/Q/1, 14 June 2010. The CESCR considered the initial report 
of Turkey on the implementation of the ICESCR (E/C.12/TUR/1) on 3 and 4 May 2011 (E/C.12/2011/SR.3-5). See 
CESCR, Concluding Observations: Turkey, UN Doc. E/C.12/TUR/CO/1, 12 July 2011. 
1745 In the comments to Morocco’s 4th Periodic Report, the Human Rights Committee remained “concerned about the very 
slow pace of the preparations toward a referendum in Western Sahara on the question of self-determination, and at the lack of information on 
the implementation of human rights in that region”, CCPR/C/79/Add113, 1 November 1999. In 2004, the Human Rights 
Committee remained still “concerned about the lack of progress on the question of the realisation of the right to self-determination for the 





In the context of the CESCR’s supervising Morocco as State party to the ICESCR, the general 
application of this Covenant to the occupied territories of Western Sahara has not been rejected by 
Morocco.1746 Several times the CESCR has expressed concern over the self-determination rights of 
the people living in these occupied territories, particularly about the negative consequences of the of 
Western Sahara policy of Morocco “for the enjoyment of the economic, social and cultural rights of the relevant 
population through population transfer”.1747 In regretting the lack of a “definite solution to the question of self-
determination”, the Committee has encouraged Morocco to resolve problems impeding the realisation 
of the referendum on this issue,1748 while the latter’s ambiguous response has been that “Morocco … 
continues to collaborate with the United Nations in the search for a settlement to the Sahara conflict that will ensure 
national sovereignty over the whole of Moroccan territory”.1749 In the most recent concluding observations, 
the Committee indicated among the principal subject of concern “the fact that no clear solution has yet 
been found to the question of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara”, remarking “reports of the 
straitened circumstances endured by people displaced by the conflict in Western Sahara, particularly women and 
children, who apparently suffer multiple violations of their rights under the Covenant”.1750 
Notably, the 2006 OHCHR report highlighted that “the respect of all human rights of the people of 
Western Sahara must be seen in tandem with this right and a lack of its realisation will inevitably impact on the 
enjoyment of all other rights guaranteed in the seven core international human rights treaties in force.”  
In 2008 Morocco was subject to the Universal Periodic Review. The comments of the Human 
Rights Committee and other relevant comments by UN Special Rapporteurs were noted in the 
compilation of information for the Council that was prepared by the OHCHR. However, the 
Human Rights Council made little reference to the situation in Western Sahara in the UPR process, 
and only Amnesty International expressed real concern. 
5.1.3.1.b.ii. The Israeli/Palestinian case 
The complex Israeli-Palestinian situation represents a noteworthy case for reflecting on the effective 
control criterion. The practice of several human rights monitoring bodies offer the chance to 
                                                                                                                                                            
recognised by the Covenant”, see HRC, Concluding Observations: Morocco, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/82/MAR, 1 December 2004, 
para. 8. 
1746 The Morocco-controlled parts of Western Sahara include several provinces treated as integral parts of the kingdom. 
The Polisario Front is based at the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria, which it controls; it also controls the part of 
Western Sahara to the east of the Berm. 
1747 CERSC, Concluding Observations: Morocco, UN Doc. E/C.12/1994/5, 30 May 1994, para. 10. 
1748 CERSC, Concluding Observations: Morocco, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.55, 1 December 2000. 
1749 Third Periodic Report of Morocco under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum, UN Doc. E/1994/104/Add.29, 17 
January 2005, para. 20. 





examine its adequacy for clarifying the scope of “jurisdictional capacity” and responsibility of an 
occupying power to safeguard the ESC rights of those who live in occupied territories. Specifically, 
it raises a twofold question: (i) what set of standards may indicate the exercise of “effective control” 
by a State over a situation impacting ESC rights;1751 (ii) how the extent of control exercised by a 
State determines the scope of its extraterritorial obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the ESC 
rights of the civilian population. 
 
The CESCR’s use of the criterion of “effective control” 
The relevant position of the CESCR mostly relies on the three rounds of its concluding observations 
in respect of Israeli reports. The basic question dealt at length by the Committee has concerned 
whether Israel, as the occupying power, has to comply with its obligations under the Covenant with 
respect to the occupied Palestinian territories and so whether it has to observe the ESC rights of the 
Palestinians who live therein.1752 
Since Israel’s first report, the Committee has expressed the position whereby “the State party’s 
obligations under the Covenant apply to all territories and populations under its effective control”, addressing “that 
even in a situation of armed conflict fundamental human rights must be respected, and that basic economic, social and 
cultural rights, as part of the minimum standards of human rights, are guaranteed under customary international law 
and are also prescribed by international humanitarian law”, noting with concern how the statistics included 
in Israel’s written and oral reports referred only to the enjoyment of Israeli settlers’ rights in the 
OPT,1753 but failed to submit information on the living conditions of Palestinian people residing in 
the same jurisdictional areas.1754   
Importantly, one of the State measures openly condemned by the Committee regarded the 
general closures between Israel and the occupied territories and the restrictions on freedom of 
movement within such territories, which led to the cutting off from land resources. In its words, they 
resulted in widespread violations of Palestinians’ ESC rights, particularly those afforded in Article 
1(2), with a severe impact on the right to health care, access to workplace, livelihood and income. 
Closures were also criticised for aggravating poverty and the lack of food, and generating a 
                                                
1751 A number of criteria indicating a situation of “effective control” are generally identified in the following: the 
influence of the State, the position of the State to support or not, the input of a State to policy failures, the issue which 
States profit from certain policy instruments. 
1752 For an examination of the various theories of applicability of human rights to belligerent occupation, see the report 
by Al-Haq, “The Applicability of Human Rights Law to Occupied Territories: The Case of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories” Ramallah: Al-Haq, 2003. See also M. Dennis, “Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in 
Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation”, 99 AJIL, 2005, p. 119.  
1753 See Initial Report submitted by Israel under Articles 16 and 17 ICESCR, 28 November 1997, E/1990/5/Add.39.  





separation of families. 1755  Other concerns included strict permanent residency laws in East 
Jerusalem, increasing exclusion faced there from the enjoyment of ESC rights, land confiscation, 
home demolitions, restrictions on family reunification and residency rights, and policies leading to a 
sub-standard of living. 1756  The policy of expanding and facilitating the expansion of illegal 
settlements in the West Bank was also critically addressed in light of the obligations flowing from 
Article 11.1757  
In the additional information on the realisation of ESC rights, which the Government submitted 
upon the Committee’s request, Israel emphasised to having “consistently maintained that the Covenant does 
not apply to areas that are not subject to its sovereign territory and jurisdiction”.1758 International humanitarian 
law was considered as the only applicable to the OPT; in its view, powers and responsibilities in all 
civil spheres were transferred to the Palestinian Council, including those ones relating to the 
realisation of ESC rights, and in these areas Israel could not be “internationally responsible for ensuring the 
rights under the ICESCR”.1759 It was nevertheless admitted that some powers and responsibilities 
“continue to be exercised by Israel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip” under the agreements reached with the 
Palestinians.1760 However, its argument that the law of armed conflict supersedes the applicability of 
human rights treaties was rejected by the Committee, which addressed that the occupying power 
must respect fundamental rights even during a situation of armed conflict.1761  
The information on the implementation of the rights concerned in respect of people other than 
Israeli settlers living in the West Bank and Gaza were not submitted even in the second periodic 
review report.1762 Several reasons were restated by the Israeli delegation present in the oral 
examination to justify this omission. Firstly, the ICESCR was deemed to relate to fields for which 
powers and responsibilities had been transferred from Israel to the Palestinian Authority in 1994, so 
considering the latter as “responsible for nearly all governmental aspects of Palestinian life, including 
administration, law enforcement, tax collection, education, welfare, health, internal security and public order, as well 
as the judicial, legislative and executive spheres”. Secondly, in affirming that the law of armed conflict 
applied in situations where generally recognised human rights norms could not be applied owing to 
                                                
1755 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.27 (4 December 1998), paras. 17-18-19. 
1756 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.27, 4 December 1998, paras. 20-22. 
1757 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.27, 4 December 1998, paras. 24. 
1758 Israel, Additional information submitted by State Parities to the Covenant following the consideration of their reports by the Committee on 
Economic and Social and Cultural Rights, 14 May 2001, E/1989/5/Add.14, para. 2. 
1759 Ibid., para. 3. 
1760 Ibid., para. 5. 
1761 CESCR, Concluding Observations on the additional information submitted by Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.69, 31 August 
2001, para. 12. 





the fact that the normal government-citizen relationship did not prevail, Israel viewed the ICESCR 
as a specific, territorially-bound treaty that does not apply to areas outside the national territory of a 
State Party. Thirdly, Israel did not exercise effective control over those territories during the period 
in which the report had been drawn up (1998 to 2000).1763  
Conversely, the Committee’s position confirmed that “the State party’s obligations under the Covenant 
apply to all territories under its effective control”, repeating that even in case of armed conflict fundamental 
rights must be respected and that basic ESC rights, “as part of a minimum standard of human rights, are 
guaranteed under customary international law and are also prescribed by international humanitarian law”, but 
noting that “the applicability of rules of humanitarian law does not by itself impede the application of the Covenant 
or the accountability of the State under article 2 (1) for the actions of its authorities”.1764 Accordingly, Israel was 
called upon to give full effect to its obligations under the ICESCR in the occupied territories, 
including, as a matter of priority, to undertake to ensure safe passage at checkpoints for Palestinian 
medical staff and people seeking medical treatment, unhampered flow of medical food-stuffs and 
supplies, free movement to places of employment, free access to land and water resources, and safe 
conduct of students and teachers to and from schools. Furthermore, the Committee insisted on that 
any security measure cannot disproportionately limit or impede the enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the Covenant 
(particularly, access to land and water resources by Palestinians), emphasising the necessity to 
provide adequate restitution and compensation to those who incurred damage to, and loss of, property and 
lands as a result of such measures. Therefore, Israel was strongly urged to take “immediate steps to 
ensure equitable access to and distribution of water to all populations living in the Occupied Territories”, including 
the full and equal participation of all parties in the process of water management, extraction and 
distribution. Then, in addressing the need “to cease the practices of facilitating the building of Israeli 
settlements, expropriating land, water and resources, demolishing houses and carrying out arbitrary evictions”, the 
Committee urged Israel “to take immediate steps to respect and implement the right to an adequate standard of 
                                                
1763 Summary Records of the 18th Meeting, CESC, Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/2003/SR.18, 4 June 2003, paras 22-4. On the 
applicability issue, Israel referred to the fact that “various States parties had voluntarily made declarations reserving the right to extend 
the applicability of the Covenant to any territory for whose international relations they were responsible, such as non-self-governing or 
trusteeship territories, but Israel had made no such declaration in respect of the territories administered by the Palestinian Authority”. 
1764 See CESCR, Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90, 23 May 2003, 
para. 31. It is remarkable that several human rights treaty bodies have consistently held Israel responsible in respect of 
the OPT under the respective treaties, and have reaffirmed not only the extraterritorial applicability of the latter but 
also rejected Israel’s argument that the law of armed conflict would supersede their applicability. See HRC, Concluding 
Observations: Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/1Add.90 (2003), para.15; CERD, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. 
CERD/C/ISR/CO/13 (2007), para. 32; CRC, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.195 (2002); 
CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Israel, A/60/38 (2005), paras. 243-244; Committee against Torture, Conclusions and 
recommendations: Israel, A/57/44 (2002), paras. 5-7. In the same regard, see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Mission to Israel, including visit to the 





living, including housing, of the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and the Palestinian Arabs in cities with mixed 
populations”.1765 
Before focusing on the monitoring function carried out on the third periodic report, it is worth 
underscoring a pertinent critique that has emerged in legal scholarship on the Committee’s 
approach. In its concluding observations no explanations were given as to what the criterion of “exercise 
of effective control” exactly means.1766 Although it reiterated that under military occupation the occupier 
exercises such a control, no explanations as to what type of obligations Israel has in the territories over which it 
exercises effective control were elucidated. This aspect seems crucially relevant: undertaking a detailed and 
in-depth legal analysis of the different treaty obligations upon a State party to the ICESCR when it 
occupies a foreign territory would have been useful so as to corroborate an explicit and coherent 
position in favour of the existence of extraterritorial binding duties.  
Some developments in this regard are noticeable in the most recent concluding observations 
examining the implementation of the ICESCR. While addressing the serious concerns on security, 
the Committee reminded the State party of its obligation to report and to fully guarantee and 
implement the Covenant rights “for all persons in all territories under its effective control”. Indeed, it 
regretted the absence of information on the enjoyment of ESC rights in the occupied territories in 
the third periodic report as well as in the replies to the list of issues, urging Israel to provide such 
information in the next report.1767 The principal subjects of concerns and recommendations of the 
Committee, as based on available information,1768 included significant references to the situation of 
such territories and evidence substantial efforts to elaborate the range of obligations on the occupant 
in relation to the ESC rights of local inhabitants. 
                                                
1765 CESCR, Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90, 23 May 2003, paras. 
35, 40, 41, 42. 
1766 See F. Coomans, “The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, HRLR, 2011, p. 15, 
questioning whether it is only obligations to respect (meaning obligations not to interfere in the free enjoyment of rights 
and freedoms of the Palestinian people) or wheter it includes also more positive obligations (i.e. to protect and to fulfil). 
The Committee considered mainly duties to respect, but positive duties may be included (i.e. the obligation to ensure 
impartial access to, and distribution of, to all those who live in the occupied territories). 
1767 See CESCR, Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/ISR/CO.3, 16 December 
2011, paras. 3 and 8. The Israeli report dates from November 2008. The Committee reminded the State party of the 
advisory opinion of 9 July 2004 and particularly of the ICJ’s statement that Israel is bound by the Covenant with regard 
to the OPT and is also under “an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where competence has 
been transferred to Palestinian authorities” (para. 112 of the advisory opinion on the wall). Notwithstanding the adoption of 
certain Governmental measures to lessen movement restrictions for Palestinians in the West Bank, certain impediments 
were reported: “there were indications that settler violence was developing beyond sporadic incidents into organized efforts to destroy 
Palestinian livelihood and culture (e.g. through the desecration of mosques and the uprooting of olive trees)”, see OHCHR, “OHCHR in 
the field: Middle East and North Africa (OHCHR-OPT)”, Report 2010, pp. 211-212. 
1768 Several international, Palestinian and Israeli human rights organizations provided additional information to 





Firstly, the Committee focused on serious obstacles to the enjoyment of the right to work.1769 Israel 
was urged to ensure that Palestinians enjoy “unimpeded access to their agricultural lands in all their 
territories”, to “demarcate the buffer zone to the extent strictly necessary to address its security concerns”, and to 
effectively inform the civilian population in the Gaza Strip of the extent of its applicable regime. 
Thus, the necessity of conducting investigations of the killings and injuries of workers in the buffer 
zone alongside providing victims with an adequate remedy was highlighted in the report. 
Furthermore, Israel was asked “to recognise and respect the right of the Palestinian people to the marine resources, 
including the right to fish in the territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of the Gaza Strip”. Conversely, as to 
those living in the occupied territories and working in Israel, the Committee expressed concern as 
they are not permitted to be members of the General Federation of Laborers in Israel, “which has 
been assigned by law with the responsibility to protect Palestinian workers’ rights in Israel and retains half of the union 
fees collected from those workers” in accordance to Article 8 of the Covenant.1770 
The revocation of residency permits of those living in East Jerusalem were also openly addressed for 
resulting in the loss, inter alia, of their right to social security, including access to social services. An 
end to this revocation was called by the Committee, urging Israel not to impede the enjoyment of 
their right to access to social security as well as ensuring this right on a non-discriminatory basis, 
particularly for marginalised and disadvantaged groups and individuals.1771 
Additionally, insufficient efforts in the creation of educational programmes and services on sexual and 
reproductive health aimed at the most vulnerable segments, such as women and young people from the 
occupied territories and the Arab-Israeli population group were addressed. Measures for allowing 
the Palestinian Authority’s functions and powers under the 1995 Interim Agreement, including the 
transfer of tax revenues to it, were recommended too. In view of the expanded privatization of 
social services, affecting the right to an adequate standard of living under Article 11, emphasis was 
put on the high rate of poverty among the Arab-Israeli population as well as in the occupied 
territories. Thus, the Committee recommended the establishment of “a comprehensive policy to address 
the problem of poverty and social exclusion, accompanied by adequate budget allocations and a scaling down of the 
                                                
1769 CESCR, Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/ISR/CO.3, 16 December 2011, 
para. 12. Specifically, the Committee expressed concern about serious obstacles to the enjoyment of the right to work of: 
(a) Palestinians in the West Bank whose agricultural land has been rendered inaccessible or difficult to reach by the 
construction of the wall and the limited allocation of permits and opening times of the wall gates; (b) Palestinian farmers 
in the Gaza Strip whose agricultural land lies in or near the buffer zone; and (c) Palestinian fishermen in Gaza (Article 
6). 
1770 CESCR, Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/ISR/CO.3, 16 December 2011, 
para. 16, recommending Israel to take steps to allow that all those living in the OPT and working in Israel can join the 
General Federation of Laborers in Israel. 





privatization of social services”. In this regard, Israel was also recommended “to ensure timely and unfettered 
access by the humanitarian organizations operating in the Occupied Palestinian Territory to the Palestinian population, 
including in all areas affected by the wall and its associated regime”, also in view of the Committee’s 
Statement on Poverty and the ICESCR.1772 
Great concern was expressed as regards the practices of house demolitions and forced evictions in the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem by Israeli authorities, military personnel and settlers, in breach of the 
State obligation to respect the right to an adequate standard of living. Israel was recommended “to 
stop forthwith home demolitions as reprisals”.  With respect to the evictions in Area C of the West Bank, it 
was specifically urged to conform to its “duty (a) to explore all possible alternatives prior to evictions; (b) to 
consult with the affected persons; and (c) to provide effective remedies to those affected by forced evictions carried out by 
the State party’s military”.1773 It was also recommended to officially regulate the unrecognised villages, 
stop the demolition of buildings therein, and ensure the enjoyment of the right to adequate 
housing.1774  
The growing food insecurity and hunger among marginalised and disadvantaged individuals 
and groups, including the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish families and the Palestinians living in the 
occupied territories, was another matter of concern of the Committee, which recommended Israel 
to intensify its efforts to address it without discrimination.1775 
The lack of access to safe and sufficient drinking water and adequate sanitation was specifically 
addressed by the Committee alongside “the continuing destruction of the water infrastructure in Gaza and the 
West Bank, including in the Jordan Valley, under military and settler operations since 1967”.1776 This was 
deemed to violate their right to water under Article 11. Thus, Israel was urged to take measures “to 
ensure the availability of sufficient and safe drinking water and adequate sanitation … including through the 
facilitation of the entry of necessary materials to rebuild the water and sanitation systems in Gaza”. Additionally, it 
was urged to take steps “to facilitate the restoration of the water infrastructure of the West Bank including in the 
Jordan Valley, affected by the destruction of the local civilians’ wells, roof water tanks, and other water and irrigation 
                                                
1772 Ibid., paras. 19, 23, 24. See also UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/10. 
1773 Ibid., para. 26. The Committee also advised that, to comply with its legal obligations, Israel would have to: ensure 
that “the development of special outline plans and closed military zones are preceded by consultations with affected Palestinian communities”; 
review and reform “its housing policy and the issuance of construction permits in East Jerusalem, in order to prevent demolitions and forced 
evictions and ensure the legality of construction in those areas”; intensify efforts “to prevent attacks by settlers against Palestinians and 
Palestinian property in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem”, investigating and prosecuting criminal acts perpetrated by 
settlers. 
1774 CESCR, Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/ISR/CO.3, 16 December 2011, 
para. 27. It referred to the Plan for the Regularization of Bedouin Housing and for the Economic Development of the 
Bedouin Population in the Negev adopted in September 2011, expressing concerned for its land planning scheme to be 
operated in a short and limited period of time. 
1775 Ibid., para. 28. 





facilities under military and settler operations since 1967”. In this regard, attention was drawn to General 
Comment No.15 on the right to water.  
As to the right to health, various obligations were articulated under Article 12.1777 Recognising a 
concrete connection between the rights to housing and health, the Committee remarked how the 
National Health Insurance Law excludes vulnerable persons who do not have a permanent 
residency permit. Thus, an extended coverage under this law was recommended so as to guarantee 
universal access to affordable primary health care for Palestinians under “temporary” permits, migrant 
workers and refugees. Conversely, Israel was recommended to take measures allowing the 
Palestinian Authority’s functions and powers under the 1995 Interim Agreement. Nonetheless, it 
was also urged to guarantee “unrestricted access to health facilities, goods and services” particularly for 
Palestinians living in the areas between the wall and the Green Line (i.e. seam zones) as well as in 
Gaza. Disciplinary action was recommended “against checkpoint officials who are found responsible for 
unattended roadside births, miscarriages, and maternal deaths resulting from delays at checkpoints, as well as 
maltreatment of Palestinian ambulance drivers”; in this respect, serious measures were advocated “to ensure 
Palestinian women’s unrestricted access to adequate prenatal, natal and post-natal medical care”. Finally, Israel 
was urged to take “measures to ensure the availability and accessibility of psychological trauma care for people 
living in Gaza, in particular children”. 
As to the right to education under Article 13 and 14, measures to address the serious shortage of 
classrooms in schools for Arab Israeli children as well as in the OPT were recommended to the 
State party, which was additionally urged “to ensure that children living in East Jerusalem are able to be 
absorbed in the regular education system through the establishment of adequate infrastructures, and until such time to 
provide financial coverage for alternative educational frameworks as an interim solution, in line with the decision of the 
High Court of Justice of 6 February 2011”.1778 Conversely, measures allowing the Palestinian Authority’s 
functions and powers under the 1995 Interim Agreement were recommended in order to guarantee 
the right to education for children living in the OPT. Nevertheless, the State party was urged “to 
address violations of the right to education, including those stemming from restriction on movement, incidents of 
harassment and attacks by the Israeli military and settlers on school children and educational facilities, as well as non-
attendance caused by a lack of registration”.1779 
In relation to the measures adopted by Israeli authorities to restrict freedom of movement of 
both people and goods in the OPT, the Committee specifically urged the State party to ensure to 
                                                
1777 Ibid., paras. 31-32. 
1778 Ibid., para. 33. 
1779 Ibid., para 35, in which it was also addressed the concern that in East Jerusalem there are around 10,000 





Palestinians living therein the possibility to “exercise their right to take part in cultural and religious life, 
without restrictions other than those that are strictly proportionate to security considerations and are non-discriminatory 
in their application, in accordance with international humanitarian law”. The protection of holy sites in the 
OPT was also recommended against demolition and desecration in accordance with the Protection 
of Holy Places Law 5727-1967.1780 
The obligation to respect the right to culture under Article 15 was addressed in relation to the 
measures relocating Bedouin Arab in new settlements, by recommending the State party to “fully 
respect the rights of the Arab-Bedouin people to their traditional and ancestral lands”.1781 
Overall, it seems that the Concluding Observations in the third periodic review of Israel as party 
to the ICESCR offer a more detailed elaboration of its duty to respect alongside positive duties to 
protect ESC rights as a result of its exercise of effective control over the occupied territories in 
question. In doing so, the Committee also updated the record of breaches of legal guarantees 
relating to work, social security, housing, education, healthcare, food, and culture according to a 
line of reasoning that confirms a constant link between and among the various categories of human 
rights.  
 
The Committee on Racial Discrimination’s reference to the criterion of effective 
control 
During its monitoring activities in respect of Israel, the Committee on Racial Discrimination has 
reiterated the applicability of the Convention to “all territories under the State party’s effective control”,1782 a 
position that already previously emerged.1783 Despite the Israeli delegation’s subsequent willingness 
to discuss issues regarding the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, even its most recent reports did not 
contain any information concerning the population living in these territories.1784 In re-expressing its 
                                                
1780 Ibid., para. 36. 
1781 Ibid., para. 37. 
1782 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Israel, UN Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, 
14 June 2007, para. 32. 
1783 In connections with the consideration of the tenth and thirteenth periodic reports of Israel, the Committee’s 
Rapporteur requested information on “the number of investigations of complaints of misconduct of the Israeli Defence Force in the 
Occupied Territories as well as the resulting number of indictments, prosecutions, and convictions”, see CERD, 69th sess., 31 July-18 
August 2006, UN Doc. CERD/C/471/Add.2, para. 13. Further, the Rapporteur requested for information on “how the 
reported application in the Occupied Palestinian Territories of different set of legislation and rules to Palestinians and Israelis who have 
committed offences complies with the principle of non-discrimination”, and on “violence, intimidation and destruction of property of 
Palestinians by Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories” (ibid., para. 14). Then, information was requested on 
measures adopted by the State Party in relation to the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the wall (op. cit., para. 15), and on non-
discrimination and applicability of different rules to Palestinians and Israelis in the OPT concerning freedom of 
movement, land allocation, access to housing, food, and medical services (op. cit., para. 16). 
1784  Israel submitted these in one document (CERD/C/ISR/14-16), at its 2131th and 2132th meetings 





serious concern at the State party’s position to the effect that the CERD does not apply to all the 
territories under its effective control, the Committee reiterated that such a position is not consistent 
with the letter and spirit of the Convention as well as with international law, as affirmed also by the 
International Court of Justice and by other international bodies. Thus, again, Israel was urged “to 
ensure that all civilians under its effective control enjoy full rights under the Convention without discrimination based on 
ethnicity, citizenship, or national origin”.1785  
As far as the situation of the occupied Palestinian territories (including East Jerusalem and the 
occupied Syrian Golan) is specifically concerned, the Committee referred to some violations of the 
CERD that specifically relate to certain ESC rights.   
In addressing that the Israeli planning and zoning policy in the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem, seriously breached a range of fundamental rights under the Convention1786 , the 
Committee urged Israel to review the whole policy so as to ensure Palestinian and Bedouin rights to 
property, access to land, access to housing and access to natural resources (especially water 
resources), recommending the implementation of such policy in consultation with the populations 
directly affected by these measures (para. 25).  
In expressing concern for the “dramatic and disproportionate impact of the Israel Defense Forces’ blockade 
and military operations on Palestinians’ right to housing and basic services in the Gaza Strip”, the Committee 
urged the State party to rescind its blockade policy and urgently “allow all construction materials 
necessary for rebuilding homes and civilian infrastructures into the Gaza Strip so as to ensure respect for Palestinians’ 
right to housing, education, health, water and sanitation in compliance with the Convention” (para. 26). 
In expressing concern for “the vulnerable situation of Syrian residents of the Occupied Syrian Golan and their 
unequal access to land, housing and basic services”, the Committee observed that the State party should 
guarantee “equal access for all residents of Israeli-controlled territories to fundamental rights such as the right to 
land, housing, movement, marriage and choice of spouse”, also urging it to satisfactorily solve “the issue of family 
separation that particularly affects Syrian residents of the Occupied Syrian Golan” (para. 29). 
 
                                                
1785 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Israel, UN Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-
16, 9 March 2012, para.10; as to the territories under its effective control, it refers to the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Occupied Syrian Golan.  
1786 The Committee articulates the State party’s discriminatory planning policy by referring to the fact that the granting 
of construction permits to Palestinian and Bedouin communities is rare and demolitions mostly target property owned 
by Palestinians and Bedouins. Moreover, concern is expressed on the adverse tendency of preferential treatment for the 
expansion of Israeli settlements, “through the use of ‘state land’ allocated for settlements, the provision of infrastructure such as roads and  
systems, high approval rates for planning permits and the establishment of Special Planning Committees consisting of settlers for consultative 
decision-making processes”. Additionally, the “State party’s policy of ‘demographic balance’, which has been a stated aim of official 






The Committee on the Rights of the Child 
Its Concluding Observations on Israel’s periodic reports are noteworthy. The State party’s 
persistent refusal to provide information and data and to respond to the Committee’s written 
questions on children living in the OTP (including East Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan 
Heights) was considered by the Committee as greatly affecting the adequacy of the reporting 
process and its accountability for the implementation of the CRC, in respect of which it was urged 
to abide by its obligations to ensure the full application of this treaty also in those territories.1787  
The Committee reiterated that the provisions of the Convention and Optional Protocols apply 
in favour of the children living therein, notably for conduct by the State party’s authorities or agents 
which impact the enjoyment of the rights concerned.1788 
 
The UN Special Rapporteurs’ approach to the issue of “effective control” 
Another attempt to approach the concept of jurisdiction through the criterion of “effective control” in 
relation to the Israeli-Palestinian situation has emerged in the monitoring activities of some UN 
Charter-based mechanisms. Several of their reports provide various examples as to what might 
potentially be regarded as ‘violations of ESC rights’ therein, including: the closures causing limited 
ability to access to both health and education services; the wall and occupation deteriorating the 
quality of education; the destructions of infrastructures resulting in severe difficulties in the access to 
safe clean water; house demolitions causing a considerable scarcity of shelters; the loss of property 
caused by house demolitions, land requisitions and the levelling of land; poverty and growing 
unemployment resulting from the closures and the wall. 1789  
                                                
1787 See Concluding Observations on the second to fourth periodic reports of Israel, UN Doc. CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4, 4 July 2013, 
para. 3; see especially para. 53 on the deterioration of basic health; para. 59 on the increasing poverty among 
Palestinian children, the serious violations of their right to an adequate standard of living of Palestinian and Bedouin 
families resulting from the occupation, land confiscation, critical  shortage, large-scale demolition of Palestinian houses, 
chronic malnutrition; paras. 61-68 on education. See also Concluding Observations on the initial report by Israel, 2 October 
2002, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.195, para. 2; see particulalry para. 44 and paras. 52-53, on the deterioration of health 
and health services of children in the OPT and the prevalence of malnutrition, in addition to the grave deterioration of 
access to education of children therein because of measures of restrictions on mobility. 
1788 See “Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict”, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ISR/CO/1, 
29 January 2010, para. 4. 
1789 On the impacts of closures on the rights to education, see Report on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories 
occupied since 1967, submitted by Mr. Giorgio Giacomelli, Special Rapporteur, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 
1993/2 A, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/25, 15 March 2000, paras. 47-49. On house demolitions, see Report of the Special 
Rapporteur John Dugard) on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territories occupied since 1967 to the Human Rights Council, 
A/61/470, 27 September 2006, paras. 55-56. On the humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian territories resulting from the 
occupation and the construction of the wall, see Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John 
Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, A/60/271, 18 August 2005, paras. 46-49; 





Remarkably, in a number of reports released by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, the concept of jurisdiction is interpreted by 
exploring the criterion of effective control of the territory of Gaza and focusing on the factual circumstance of 
the impact on the lives of the population located therein (rather than relying on the military presence on the 
ground of the occupying power’s army).  
Indeed, in August 2005 Israel withdrew its settlers and armed forces from Gaza, and according 
to its Government such a withdrawal ended the related occupation. However, on the basis that 
“Palestine constitutes a single self-determination unit, comprising the West Bank and Gaza” under the Oslo 
Agreements, the withdrawal was viewed as not ending the situation of occupation.1790 In particular, 
although the absence of a military occupying power in Gaza removed many of the features of 
occupation, several reasons were highlighted by the Special Rapporteur. One of his main points is 
that “technological advances since 1949 have changed the whole nature of control” and “it is no longer necessary for 
a foreign military power to maintain a permanent physical presence in a territory to exercise control”. In this regard, 
Israel was deemed to retain “effective control of Gaza” even before its forces re-entered therein in 2006; 
such a control was exercised over its airspace, sea space and territorial waters (fishing has been 
allowed only within 10 nautical miles of the coastline) and external borders; its effectiveness relied 
on certain actions of the Israel Defence Forces, such as “sonic booms caused by (Israeli) over-flying 
aircraft”, “regular shelling of homes and fields along the border” and “targeted assassinations of militants”.1791 
Additional factual circumstances confirming the maintenance of control were related to the Israeli 
administration of the Gaza population’s civil register, the provision of identity documents to Gazans 
(a precondition for control and movement in and out of that territory), the unilateral administration 
of entry visas and work permits for thousands of Palestinian non-ID holders in the occupied 
                                                                                                                                                            
Territories occupied since 1967, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/29, 17 January 2006, paras. 47-50; Report of the Special Rapporteur of 
the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territories occupied since 1967, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/4/17, 29 January 2007, paras. 14-20. On Israeli actions against Gaza and their consequences 
concerning ESC rights, see Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of 
human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, UN Doc. A/HRC/7/17, 21 January 2008, paras. 15-24. 
1790 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian 
territories occupied since 1967, A/60/271, 18 August 2005, para. 8 reading: “it would be incomprehensible if a statement proclaiming 
the end of occupation for Gaza were made without addressing the continued occupation of the West Bank”; Report of the Special Rapporteur of 
the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territories occupied since 1967, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/29, 17 January 2006, para. 8 concluding: “To suggest that Gaza should enjoy a status different from that of 
the West Bank would violate the territorial integrity of Palestine and the substantive law of self-determination”. 
1791 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territories occupied since 1967 to the Human Rights 
Council, A/61/470, 27 September 2006, paras. 7-8, adding that “(t)he actions of IDF in respect of Gaza have clearly demonstrated 
that modern technology allows an occupying Power to effectively control a territory even without a military presence” (para. 7) and that 
“(t)he question whether Gaza remains an occupied territory is now of academic interest only. In the course of the cynically named “Operation 
Summer Rains” that commenced on 25 June, the IDF has not only asserted its control in Gaza by means of heavy shelling, but has also done 
so by means of a military presence” (para. 8). See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian 





territories and for foreign visitors.1792 Three relevant facts additionally addressed by the same 
Special Rapporteur included the following: the holding of hundreds of Gaza prisoners in spite of 
their release “at the close of occupation” as provided for in Article 77 GCIV; the military control over a 
buffer zone ranging between 150 and 300 metres within Gaza along its eastern and northern 
borders from which Palestinians were excluded; the possibility for Israel to cut off electricity supplies 
to Gaza. Thus, the Special Rapporteur approached the issue of control by focusing on the actual facts 
as regards its impact on the lives of the population living in the territories concerned.  
The prior Special Rapporteur, who monitored the situation in the occupied territories when the 
Israeli military presence was less concentrated, relied on three aspects to affirm the application of 
human rights treaty obligations therein.1793 Firstly, Israel’s sharing of the “personal”, “functional” and 
“geographical” elements of jurisdiction with the Palestinian Authority in a patchwork of areas (“A”, 
“B”, “C”) as defined by the Oslo Agreement, with the exception of Jerusalem. Secondly, Israel’s 
constant exercise of control in such areas over the movement of people and goods between and 
among jurisdictional areas and the external borders. Thirdly, Israel’s claimed right to enter all areas 
for purposes of security as a matter of agreement with the Palestinian representatives.1794  
As regards the present Special Rapporteur’s reports, the issue of control is implicitly or explicitly 
referred to. In the last one, the extraterritorial application of human rights is addressed by 
emphasising the relevant endorsement of other various forums.1795 
Equally, the independent international fact-finding mission recently established to investigate 
                                                
1792 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human 
rights in the Palestinian Territories occupied since 1967, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/29, 17 January 2006, para. 8, noting 
that “(w)hile it is true that the Rafah crossing is now open to Palestinian ID cardholders, Israel reserves the right to complain about who 
crosses at Gaza and has already done so (the crossing is administered by the Palestinian Authority and Egypt, but supervised by European 
Union inspectors and followed by Israeli officials on TV monitor screens). Karni crossing was largely dysfunctional at the time of writing and 
allowed passage of only 35 to 40 trucks compared with the 150 trucks promised by the 15 November agreement. This is a serious problem for 
greenhouse agricultural products harvested in December/January and exported to Israel and the West Bank. The passage of persons between 
Gaza and the West Bank by bus convoys, scheduled to start on 15 December, has been stopped by Israel, as a result of a suicide bombing in 
Netanya and Israel’s dissatisfaction with the Rafah crossing”. 
1793 See Report on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, submitted by Mr. Giorgio Giacomelli, 
Special Rapporteur, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/2 A, “Question of the violation of human rights in 
the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine”, 15 March 2000, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/25, para. 6, which 
emphasises the treaty bodies’ view that “the responsibility and obligation to observe human rights, especially upon a ratifying State, 
encompasses the State jurisdiction even when such jurisdiction exceeds the State’s entitled territory, whether such territories are occupied, 
administered or overseen in any other form”. 
1794 Ibid., paras. 7-8. 
1795  See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Richard Falk, 
submitted in accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, “Situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories 
occupied since 1967”, UN Doc. A/68/376, 10 September 2013, para. 18, in which he mentioned, as examples: the ICJ 
Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, paras. 109-113; the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 31 on The Nature of 
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, paras. 15, 18; and 
the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (the Turkel Commission), “Israel’s mechanisms 
for examining and investigating complaints and claims of violations of the laws of armed conflict according to international law”, February 





the implications of the settlements on the rights of Palestinian people throughout the occupied 
territories confirmed that Israel was bound to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the full range of 
human rights “of all persons within its jurisdiction” being a State party to the ICCPR, ICESCR, the 
CAT, the CEDAW, the CRC (plus its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed 
conflict) and the CERD, and, furthermore, as a result of relevant human rights rules that are a part 
of customary international law. Emphasis was then placed on the basic view that “the rights protected by 
human rights treaties must be available to all individuals in the territory of or subject to the jurisdiction of Israel, except 
where the State has lawfully derogated from them”.1796 
5.1.3.2. Foreseeability as to the effects on the enjoyment of ESC rights 
States’ conduct may affect the access and enjoyment of ESC rights outside their sovereign territories 
without exercising an effective factual control over a situation or an individual. In this regard an 
emerging argument for the extraterritoriality issue is that the obligations flowing from relevant 
treaties may be triggered when the State’s authorities “know or should have known” that its conduct will produce 
significant human rights consequences within a foreign territory.1797  
In conflict-related settings this perspective would entail inquiring as to the potential of holding a 
foreign State liable for the foreseeable consequences which result from its acts or omissions and which nullify or 
impair the enjoyment of ESC rights of civilians even in the absence of its effective control or authority. The 
required protection of civilians would derive from the State’s power/capability to positively 
influence their human rights situation. In any case, the condition of foreseeability as to the 
impingement of civilians’ ESC rights by the State’s conduct in another territory would entail 
exclusion of its responsibility insofar as the proximity of its conduct with such human rights impacts 
is not found or they are only remotely connected. In other words, the relationship of the State with a 
particular set of circumstances would be of such a special nature that would end up being decisive in 
enlivening its positive obligations. 
It is worth briefly considering that some regional judicial human rights bodies have already 
confirmed this view. According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights “a State party 
to the American Convention may be responsible under certain circumstances for the acts and omissions of its agents 
                                                
1796 See Report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East 
Jerusalem, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/63, 7 February 2013, paras. 11-12. 
1797 Under Maastricht Principle 9 (b), “a State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural rights in any of 
the following: … b) situations over which state acts or omissions bring about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and 





which produce effects or are undertaken outside that State’s own territory”.1798 Similarly, in delineating the scope 
of States parties’ obligations under Article 1 ECHR, the European Court affirmed that jurisdiction 
“may extend to acts of its authorities, which produce effects outside its own territory” and some potential 
situations were identified in this regard, as detailed above.1799 Furthermore, according to the same 
Court, “State’s responsibility may […] be engaged on account of acts which have sufficiently proximate repercussions 
on rights guaranteed by the Convention, even if those repercussions occur outside its jurisdiction”.1800  
A further relevant statement comes from the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, 
which have recognised a State party’s responsibility for extraterritorial breaches of the ICCPR “if it 
is a link in the causal chain that would make possible violations in another jurisdiction”, so noting that “the risk of 
an extraterritorial violation must be a necessary and foreseeable consequence and must be judged on the knowledge the 
State party had at the time”.1801 
5.1.3.3. Decisive influence or measures to realise ESC rights  
In situations in which a State undertakes policies and measures directly supporting the access, 
enjoyment and progressive realisation of ESC rights beyond its sovereign territory, the question as 
whether or not that State is required to do so in accordance with international law is controversial. As far as the 
protection of civilians is specifically concerned, this issue may prove particularly relevant for 
evaluating multilateral contexts of reconstruction and development assistance in conflict-related 
contexts. Matters relating to environmental protection, investment, bilateral and multilateral trade 
may also have certain relevance in such contexts. 
Legal scholarship has enunciated the content and implications of a possible obligation in this 
regard. States would be duty-bound to conform (universally) to ESC rights and to contribute to their 
fulfilment even outside national territories; such a requirement would take the form of interstate 
cooperation as well as other concrete, deliberate and targeted measures supporting their enjoyment by 
individuals overseas, but respecting the sovereignty of the territorially competent State, and without 
                                                
1798 IACommHR, Saldano v. Argentina, Report No. 38/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev., 11 March 1999, para 17. 
1799 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment, 7 July 2011, para. 133. 
1800 ECtHR, Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Appl. No. 48787/99, Judgment, 8 July 2004, para. 317. 
1801 See HRC, Mohammad Munaf v. Romania, Communication No. 1539/2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006, 
21 August 2009, para. 14.2 (“The main issue to be considered by the Committee is whether, by allowing the author to leave the premises of 
the Romanian Embassy in Baghdad, it exercised jurisdiction over him in a way that exposed him to a real risk of becoming a victim of 
violations of his rights under articles 6, 7, 9, 10, paragraph 1 and 14 of the Covenant, which it could reasonably have anticipated. The 
Committee recalls its jurisprudence that a State party may be responsible for extraterritorial violations of the Covenant, if it is a link in the 
causal chain that would make possible violations in another jurisdiction. Thus, the risk of an extraterritorial violation must be a necessary and 
foreseeable consequence and must be judged on the knowledge the State party had at the time: in this case at the time of the author's departure 





restricting the scope of the obligation upon each State to meet its duties towards the individuals 
present on its own territory.1802  
According to this line of reasoning, a duty to advance rules setting up “an international enabling 
environment” is specifically articulated; related tools include either the “elaboration, interpretation, 
application and regular review of multilateral and bilateral agreements as well as international standards”, or State 
policies and measures regarding its own foreign relations, even within international organizations, 
and its domestic situation (Maastricht Principle 29). Similarly, a procedural duty for cooperating 
effectively in the fulfilment of ESC rights globally is identified; necessary coordination among States to 
devise a suitable international division of responsibilities is emphasised - although this would not 
exempt them from acting separately to meet their own positive duties on ESC rights 
extraterritorially (Maastricht Principle 30). A procedural component of the duty concerned is 
enunciated by providing a non-exhaustive list of capacities and resources (Maastricht Principle 31). 
Guiding principles and priorities during such cooperation are also detailed.1803  
Within the same scholarly debate, providing international assistance as well as seeking international 
assistance and cooperation are understood as two State duties for the satisfaction of ESC rights in the 
territory of other States: while the first one would be a component of international cooperation, the 
second one would place on the receiving State the explanatory burden of rejecting assistance, and 
the requesting State would retain the title to decline them (Maastricht Principles 33 and 34). 
Furthermore, the notion international cooperation is understood as requiring to desist from 
“nullifying or impairing human rights in other States” and to ensure “that non-State actors are prohibited from 
prejudicing the enjoyment of such rights” when the State is in a position to influence their conduct. 
In view of this comprehensive effort to articulate extraterritorial State duties, which would result 
from the requirements of international cooperation set forth in international law, the next sections 
aim to explore two relevant aspects: the role of international cooperation in relation to ESC rights 
within conflict-related settings as well as the role of sanctions in such settings. 
                                                
1802 Under Maastricht Principle 9 (c), “a State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural rights in any of 
the following: … c) situations in which the State, acting separately or jointly, whether through its executive, legislative or judicial branches, is 
in a position to exercise decisive influence or to take measures to realise economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially, in accordance with 
international law”. See also Maastricht Principles 28-35. 
1803 Maastricht Principle 32 reads: “In fulfilling economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially, States must: a) prioritize the 
realisation of the rights of disadvantaged, marginalised and vulnerable groups; b) prioritize core obligations to realise minimum essential levels 
of economic, social and cultural rights, and move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights; c) observe international human rights standards, including the right to self-determination and the right to participate in decision-
making, as well as the principles of non-discrimination and equality, including gender equality, transparency, and accountability; and d) avoid 
any retrogressive measures or else discharge their burden to demonstrate that such measures are duly justified by reference to the full range of 





5.2. The concept of “international cooperation”: which relevance for the 
extraterritorial application of treaties on ESC rights? 
International cooperation may be regarded as a general principle of international law, as detailed 
heretofore.1804 The growing significance of this concept deserves attention for the purpose of 
assessing the potential legal basis for extending the obligations stemming from treaties on ESC rights 
beyond the territorial State in conflict-related situations. Indeed, “international assistance and 
cooperation” is explicitly referred as one of the means to achieve the rights set forth in the ICESCR (e.g. 
Article 2(1), Article 11(1), Articles 22 and 23) and in the CRC (e.g. Article 4, Article 23(4), Article 
24(4), Article 28(3)), which specifically prescribe States’ actions that by their very nature are 
supposed to produce effects beyond national borders. This concept is also contained in other 
specialized human rights treaties such as the ICRPD (e.g. Article 32), CAT (e.g. Article 9(1)), 
ICPPED (e.g. Article 15).  
Accordingly, in conflict-related situations in which civilians’ ESC rights (as entitled to both 
individuals and groups) may be substantially impacted by actions or omissions made by States other 
than their own, a supplementary question may arise: whether and to what extent States are required 
to enhance the realisation of such rights on the basis of the international cooperation as referred in 
several international and regional instruments, which would entail duties to take separate or joint actions 
through international cooperation in other States.  
In particular, the relevance of this concept may be explored in connection to the emerging 
normative content of the obligations flowing from treaties on ESC rights as applied in conflict-
related settings. Affected civilians may be taken as the beneficiaries of the rights satisfied by means 
of international cooperation. The legal implications of its relevance as an additional lens to read 
extraterritorial dimensions of such treaties may be examined in areas such as financial assistance, 
technical and social assistance, or the multilateral contexts of reconstruction and development 
cooperation in post-conflict situations. In this regard, a basic question would concern the emerging 
patterns of State practice in the area of international cooperation and assistance in the process of 
                                                
1804 See Articles 1(3), 55, and 56 UN Charter; Articles 22 and 28 UDHR; paragraph 2 of the Proclamation of Teheran, Final 
Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, A/CONF. 32/41, at 3. For key 
documents that address international cooperation and elaborate on related issues, see Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970; Charter of Economic, Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 
3281 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, adopted as one tool for pursuing the New International Economic Order; 
Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res. 41/128, 4 December 1986; Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, A/CONF.157/23, 25 June 1993; UN Millennium Declaration, GA Res. 55/2, 8 September 2000. For a 
detailed analysis of such documents, see S. Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International 
Cooperation, Intersentia, 2006, pp. 17-18; H.J. Steiner, P. Alston, R. Goodman, op. cit., 2008, pp. 1442-1461; M. Gondek, 





implementing civilians’ ESC rights. 
5.2.1. “International cooperation”: an emerging basis for extraterritorial 
obligations on ESC rights 
In considering the emergence of international cooperation as a further notion for the purpose of 
assessing the potential legal basis to extend the obligations flowing from treaties on ESC rights 
beyond the territorial State, the next sections primarily address its status as a general principle of 
international law as well as its reference in human rights treaties. Additionally, some remarks are 
briefly highlighted in relation to customary international law. 
5.2.1.1. International cooperation as a general principle of international law  
The UN Charter embodies the notion of international cooperation in various provisions. Under 
Article 1(3) one of the purposes of this international organization is “to achieve international cooperation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language 
or religion”. A further two key provisions are contained in chapter IX entitled ‘International 
Economic and Social Cooperation’; under Article 56, “all Members pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in cooperation with the Organization...” to achieve purposes indicated in Article 55, 
including “... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” and “higher standards of living”.1805  
Conversely, the UDHR - which is understood as an “authoritative interpretation” of the 
aforementioned provisions 1806  and as declaring “general principles of law as a source of 
international law”1807 - lays down some relevant elements. Article 22 entitles everyone to the 
realisation, “... through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and 
                                                
1805 UN Charter, signed on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945. See R. Wolfrum, “Article 55 (a) 
and (b)”, in B. Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nation. A Commentary2, 2002, at 897-917; E. Riedel, “Article 55 
(c)”, in B. Simma, ibid., at 918-941; R. Wolfrum, “Article 56”, in B. Simma, ibid., pp. 941-944. 
1806 See ICJ, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran) (Merits), 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports 
1980, 3, 42. See T. Buergenthal, “International Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments and Prospects”, 
63 Washington Law Review, 1988, 1, 5-6, 8-9; B. Simma and P. Alston, “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles”, 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law, 1988-9, pp. 100-102; H. Hannum, “The 
Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law”, 25 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 1995-1996, pp. 351-352; O. De Schutter, “The Status of Human Rights in 
International Law”, in C. Krause and M. Scheinin (eds.), International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook, op. cit., p. 39, 
41. 
1807 See the Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 
1968, A/CONF. 32/41, at 3 (1968), para. 2, recognising that the UDHR’s “common understanding of the peoples of the world 
concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family” and its constituting “an obligation for all members of 





resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development 
of his personality”. Additionally, Article 28 proclaims the entitlement of everyone “to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms in this Declaration can be fully realised”, so evoking 
cooperation in setting up such an order.  
Notable reiterations of this view are contained in international declarations, in which States 
undertake to ensure consistency of their foreign policies with the realisation of human rights and 
accept certain extraterritorial duties to respect them. In this regard, the Declaration on the Right to 
Development affirms that States have to generate “national and international conditions” beneficial to 
realising the right in question, they have to cooperate for achieving this right, and they have to take 
steps “individually and collectively” to frame development policies focused on its fulfillment.1808 These 
commitments relate to all fundamental rights since the right to development under Article 1 DRD 
entitles “... every human person and all peoples to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and 
political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be realised”. A unanimous 
recognition by the Heads of States and Governments is also expressed in the Millennium 
Declaration: “… in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective 
responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level”.1809 Furthermore, 
the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action and the 2008 Doha 
Declaration on Financing for Development move towards similar directions.1810 It is reasonable to 
contend that all these pronouncements indicate a certain practice of States in the application of 
human rights treaties and contribute to a foundation as to a certain conformity concerning their 
interpretation.1811  
The relevance of the principle of international cooperation is also emphasised in the ILC Draft 
Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. According to Article 
4 (entitled “Cooperation”), “States concerned shall cooperate in good faith and, as necessary, seek the assistance of 
                                                
1808 See Articles 3 and 4 of the Declaration on the Right to Development of 4 December 1986 (GA Res. 41/128). 
Subsequent declarations (adopted unanimously) refer to the right to development: e.g., the UN Millennium Declaration 
of 8 September 2000 (GA Res. 55/2); the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 25 June 1993 
(A/CONF.157/23). See also M. E. Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of 
International Law, Oxford, 2007.   
1809 See UN Millennium Declaration, GA Res. 55/2, 8 September 2000, para. 2. 
1810  The Doha Declaration was adopted as outcome-document of the international conference to review the 
implementation of the Monterrey Consensus (29 November - 2 December 2008), A/CONF.212/L.1/Rev.1. The Accra 
Agenda for Action was agreed at the OECD’s Ministerial Conference (comprising over 100 countries), at the third high 
level forum on Aid Effectiveness (2-4 September 2008); its paragraph 13 (d) provides that “developing countries and donors 
will ensure that their respective development policies and programmes are designed and implemented in ways consistent with their agreed 
international commitments on gender equality, human rights, disability and environmental sustainability”. See A. Khalfan, 
“Development Cooperation and Extraterritorial Obligations”, in M. Langford and A. Russell (eds.), The Right to Water: 
Theory, Practice and Prospects, Cambridge, 2012. 





one or more competent international organizations in preventing significant transboundary harm or at any event in 
minimizing the risk thereof”.1812 
5.2.1.2. International cooperation as referred to in human rights treaties 
In acknowledging the importance of international cooperation, the CRPD requires States parties to 
“... undertake appropriate and effective measures in this regard ...”, listing explanatory measures to accomplish 
this commitment.1813 The CAT establishes a duty to cooperate for the full realisation of human 
rights, requiring Contracting Parties to afford each other “... the greatest measure of assistance in connection 
with criminal proceedings ...” relating to torture, and it requires “... the supply of all evidence at their disposal 
necessary for the proceedings”.1814 The ICPPED also contains a comparable commitment.1815  
As to the CRC, States parties are required to take measures to implement the ESC rights 
enshrined in this treaty “... to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the 
framework of international cooperation”.1816 In this respect, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
highlighted that “[w]hen States ratify the Convention, they take upon themselves obligations not only to implement it 
within their jurisdiction, but also to contribute, through international cooperation, to global implementation”.1817 
Furthermore, under its first two Optional Protocols States parties’ cooperation is required so as to 
prevent and punish those responsible for the involvement of children in armed conflict, the sale of 
children, child pornography and child prostitution. They are also required to assist victims and 
afford technical and financial assistance inasmuch as they are in a position to do so.1818  
 
A specific commitment to assist and cooperate in favour of the ESC rights enshrined in the 
ICESCR is contained in various provisions. Primarily, according to Article 2 (1), States parties 
undertake to “take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
                                                
1812 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of the fifty-third session, UN Doc. A/56/10, 21 August 
2001, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, p. 155. 
1813 Article 32 CRPD. 
1814 Article 9 (1) CAT. 
1815 According to Article 15 of ICPPED, “States Parties shall cooperate with each other and shall afford one another the greatest 
measure of mutual assistance with a view to assisting victims of enforced disappearance, and in searching for, locating and releasing 
disappeared persons and, in the event of death, in exhuming and identifying them and returning their remains”. 
1816 Article 4 CRC. Under Articles 24(4) and 28(3) States are required to “promote and encourage international cooperation” 
concerning the right to health and the right to education, with particular consideration of “the needs of developing countries”. 
See W. Vandenhole, “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the CRC: Is There a Legal Obligation to Cooperate 
Internationally for Development”, 17(1) International Journal of Children's Rights, 2009, 23-63.  
1817 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5: General Measures of Implementation for the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, Thirty-fourth session, 2003, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5, para. 5. 
1818 See Article 10 of the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography, A/54/49, vol. III (2000). See Article 7 of the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of 





technical”, to the maximum of their available resources, “with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realisation of the rights” recognised in this treaty. In this regard, the existence of a State obligation to 
engage in international cooperation under the Covenant has been acknowledged by the CESCR 
since its early attempt to examine the nature of the treaty obligations.1819 In addition, other notable 
elements concerning the context in which cooperation and assistance should be placed and how 
they should be interpreted stem from the Limburg Principles on implementation of the 
ICESCR.1820 
The notion of international cooperation is mentioned for the right to an adequate standard of 
living under article 11(1) ICESCR, which provides that “States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure 
the realisation of this right, recognising to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free 
consent”.  
Two relevant provisions relate to the context of the measures of implementation of this treaty. 
Under Article 22 ICESCR the Economic and Social Council may bring to the attention of other 
agencies and organs providing “technical assistance” every information arising out of States parties’ 
reports which “may assist such bodies in deciding, each within its field of competence, on the advisability of 
international measures likely to contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the present Covenant”. 
Further, Article 23 identifies various forms of international action for achieving ESC rights, 
including “such methods as the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of 
technical assistance and the holding of regional meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of consultation and 
study organized in conjunction with the Governments concerned”.  
All these provisions appear to reinforce the idea that the obligations ensuing from the ICESCR 
may have international (and consequently extraterritorial) dimensions. In this respect, the treaty’s 
silence on its scope of application may be understood as confirming its extent beyond both territory 
and jurisdiction. However, the binding nature of “international cooperation” as articulated in the 
ICESCR is contentious, since the drafting history of this treaty and subsequent States’ practice do 
not offer an ultimate solution. 
Significantly, some scholarly reviews of the drafting history of Article 2(1) have already 
highlighted the discussions taken in the 1950s and 1960s in the former Commission on Human 
Rights and in the General Assembly’s Third Committee in relation to the opportunity to include the 
                                                
1819 E.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 3:  The nature of States Parties’ obligations, Fifth session, 1993, E/1991/23, para. 14. 
For a detailed analysis on the manner in which the Committee has approached the issue of extraterritoriality, see 
Sepulveda M., “Obligations of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ in an Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 24 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2006, pp. 271-303. 





passage “international assistance and cooperation” in this provision.1821 Precisely, although the drafters 
deemed it necessary to fully realise the ESC rights in question, disagreement emerged on the 
possibility to claim it as a right, but no vote was taken in this regard; the nature of cooperation was 
specifically debated, questioning also whether the requirement of being “especially economic and 
technical” would have limited that notion.1822 Such competing views have remerged during recent 
negations of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR: while certain industrialized countries 
acknowledged a moral responsibility of international cooperation, this treaty was deemed not to 
impose legally binding obligations for ESC rights internationally.1823  
Nevertheless, States have not expressed unanimous interpretation. It is a fact that the travaux 
préparatoires1824 as well as textual elements of other provisions of the ICESCR offer some guidance on 
the meaning and scope of “international cooperation”: Article 11 (1) and (2) concerning the right to 
be free from hunger, Article 15 (4) in the field of science and culture, Article 22 on international 
measures for contributing to the effective implementation of the treaty, and Article 23 on other 
forms of international action such as technical assistance. 
Even though divergences persist about the extent of the engagement in international cooperation 
and its specific implications, States generally agree that the ICESCR sets out some extraterritorial 
duties, as certain international declarations adopted without a vote seem to indicate. Of note, in the 
General Assembly’s resolutions on the right to adequate food, the latter is understood to require “... 
the adoption of appropriate environmental and social policies, at both the national and international levels, oriented to 
the eradication of poverty and the fulfilment of human rights for all”; and it is provided that “... all States should 
make all efforts to ensure that their international policies of a political and economic nature, including international 
trade agreements, do not have a negative impact on the right to food in other countries”.1825 Another emblematic 
endorsement to cooperate internationally for advancing ESC rights is expressed in the Millennium 
Development Goal no. 8 on “developing a global partnerships for development”, which sets forth the targets 
                                                
1821 On documentation and reflections concerning these debates, see S.I. Skogly, “The obligation of international 
assistance and cooperation in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, in B. Morten (ed.), 
Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden, Kluwer Law International, 2003, pp. 403-420. See also P. Alston and 
G. Quinn, op. cit., pp. 188-9. 
1822 GA, Seventeenth Session, Third Committee 1204th meeting, Official Records, para. 49. On this point, see S.I. 
Skogly, “The obligation of international assistance and cooperation in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights”, in B. Morten (ed.), Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden, Kluwer Law International, 
2003, pp. 407-412. 
1823 See Report of the Open-ended Working Group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an optional 
protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its third session, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/47, paras. 78 and 82. 
1824 For a comment on the travaux préparatoires of the relevant provisions of the ICESCR and of the CRC, see M. 
Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalizing World: Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, pp. 299-304. 





to be met by developed countries and covers basic efforts in areas such as development aid, debt 
relief, affordable essential drugs, trade and foreign direct investment. All these reiterations on 
international cooperation seem to strengthen the legal commitment in this field. 
Notably, under the aforementioned human rights instruments, the concept of international 
cooperation clearly embraces, without being limited to, the notion of international assistance. A 
reference to “international assistance and cooperation” is contained only in the ICESCR. The CRC and 
the CRPD refer simply to “international cooperation”, being the latter viewed by their drafters as 
comprising the former. This is the case also for the Declaration on the Right to Development. 
5.2.1.3. International cooperation on the right to food and the right to health  
The potential of international cooperation and assistance as a specific area for implementing 
internationally recognised ESC rights has been addressed from the perspective of extraterritorial 
obligations by the Special Rapporteurs on the right to food and the right to health. 
Specifically, the importance of clarifying such obligations in relation to the right to food was 
primarily placed in the context of an increasingly integrated world economy.1826 Conversely, a 
framework for better interpreting a human rights approach to development cooperation and food-
aid has been suggested by the subsequent Special Rapportuer. Of remark is that three levels for the 
realisation of the right to food in this area are envisaged: the normative level (i.e. the obligation to provide 
cooperation), the level of implementation (with tools like national strategies and disciplined and context 
specific food aid), and the level of evaluation.1827  
Conversely, the Special Rapporteur on the right to the highest attainable standard of health has 
spelt out “the contours and content of the human rights responsibility of international assistance and cooperation in 
health”, upon which the realisation of this right is viewed as highly dependent.1828 In particular, the 
                                                
1826 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Mr. Jean Ziegler, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/47, 24 January 2005, 
paras. 39-40. The extraterritorial obligations flowing from ESC rights were deemed one of the issues challenging the 
“traditional territorial boundaries of human rights” and full compliance with the obligations under the right to food is deemed 
to impose States to respect, protect and support the fulfilment of the right to food of people living in other territories. 
The objective of the report is to show that States have responsibilities under international law towards people living in 
other countries through their own actions and through their decisions taken as members of international organizations 
(see para. 34). In the same vein, Ziegler addressed that it “cannot be argued that extraterritorial obligations towards these rights do 
not exist at all” and States have at least “responsibilities towards people living in other countries, both through their own actions and 
through international institutions”, see ibid., paras. 43-45. 
1827 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, UN Doc. A/HCR/10/5/Add.1, 17 February 
2009. 
1828 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health, Paul Hunt, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/28/Add.2, 5 March 2008, para. 17. See also earlier Reports by the same Special 
Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/51, 11 February 2005, paras. 62-66; UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/58, 13 February 
2003, para. 28 (“States have an obligation to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, towards the full 





State duty to dispose of its available resources through offering international assistance and cooperation is considered 
to be “supplementary” to the State obligation to realise the right to health within its own available 
resources. Then, substantive and procedural key features to be supported by such a duty are 
identified and include freedoms and entitlements, equality and non-discrimination, participation, 
monitoring, and accountability. Further, policy coherence across national and international 
policymaking processes is highlighted.1829 
5.2.1.4. Some remarks under customary international law  
It is worth briefly noting that States are required to bring to an end any breach of peremptory 
norms. This entails a duty to cooperate to cease any serious violations, a duty to abstain from acknowledging as 
legitimate every situation deriving from such violations, and a duty to abstain from giving assistance or 
aid to its maintainance.1830 As commonly emphasised, peremptory norms may relate to every 
fundamental right. Indeed, the prohibition against inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment or 
punishment, war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, enforced desappearence, slavery, and 
racial discrimination represent relevant instances. Moreover, customary international law requires 
States to collaborate in the investigation of relevant crimes against international law and in the 
prosecution of related perpetrators.  
5.3. Sanctions or equivalent measures as acts giving rise to the extraterritorial 
application of treaties on ESC rights 
The application of sanctions and analogous measures in the contexts of armed conflict and 
occupation acquires a specific significance regarding the issue of extraterritoriality, since it may 
imply certain failures to comply with international human rights law.1831 When States parties to 
human rights treaties participate in a regime of multilateral sanctions a basic potential conflict arises 
between the obligations incumbent on them under those treaties and the other international 
obligations existing upon the same States. A pertinent case here would concern a State has to 
impose sanctions to honour its obligation to comply with a certain sanctions regime set up by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; another instance concerns the sanctions 
                                                                                                                                                            
that no international agreement or policy adversely impacts upon the right to health, and that their representatives in international organizations 
take due account of the right to health, as well as the obligation of international assistance and cooperation, in all policy-making matters”). 
1829 UN Doc. A/HRC/4/28/Add.2, ibid., para. 30. 
1830 See Commentary to Article 41 of the ILC’s Draft Articles of 2001, op. cit.  
1831 For an analysis of the notion of sanctions in international law, see G. Abi-Saab, “The concept of sanctions in 
international law”, in V. Gowlland-Debbas (ed.), United Nations Sanctions and International Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law 





needed to comply with a State’s obligation to bring to an end breaches of peremptory international 
norms.  
The great potential of a sanctions regime to produce negative effects upon the enjoyment of 
human rights of the population living within the target State is widely acknowledged, although the 
related issue of responsibility remains a matter of dispute.1832 Initially, scholars dealing with the 
legality of sanctions and their consequential impacts on human rights have extensively focused on 
the question as to the limits upon the Security Council regarding sanctions.1833 In this regard, the 
right to implement them has not been understood as boundless, especially in view of the limitations 
stemming from the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, 
and certain resolutions of the General Assembly, though of non-binding character.1834 Conversely, a 
distinct issue subsequently addressed by scholars has specifically concerned the human rights 
obligations applicable to States (both as members of the Security Council and as individual States 
implementing the sanctions) and the implications of such obligations.1835  
As evident in the Maastricht Principles (particularly principles 19-22), this issue has been 
elaborated for the general obligation to respect ESC rights. In addition to refraining from adopting a 
wide range of measures that nullify or impair the enjoyment of ESC rights, States are required to 
fully respect human rights obligations in the distinct phases (“design, implementation and termination”) of 
any sanctions regime undertaken to comply with other international legal obligations. In any case, 
the provision and transfer of services and goods indispensable to meet core obligations are regarded as 
unconditionally excluded from any permissible content of economic sanctions. 
For the purposes of the present research, a primary consideration remains that, despite the 
                                                
1832 E.g., “Report of the Second Panel established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 
January 1999 (S/1999/100), concerning the  current humanitarian situation in Iraq”, Annex II of S/1999/356, 30 
March 1999. 
1833 See W.M. Reisman and D.L. Stevick, “The applicability of international law standards to United Nations economic 
sanctions programmes”, 9 EJIL, 1998, pp. 86-141; E. de Wet, “Human Rights limitations to economic enforcement 
measures under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter and the Iraqi Sanctions Regime”, 14 Leiden JIL, 2001, pp. 
277-300. 
1834 See Working paper prepared by Prof. Marc Bossuyt, “The adverse consequences of economic sanctions on the enjoyment 
of human rights”, Commission on Human Rights, Sud-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, 21 June 2000, paras. 19-17; a six-prong test was developed by the author in 
order to assess sanctions: 1. They have been imposed for valid reasons; 2. They have to target proper parties (not the 
civilian population uninvolved in the threat to international peace and security); 3. They must target proper goods or 
objects (without interfering with the flow of humanitarian goods necessary to ensure basic subsistence rights of the 
civilian population); 4. They have to be reasonably time-limited; 5. The have to be effective (capable to attain the 
chosen result); 6. They have to be free from protest arising from violations of the “principles of humanity and the dictates of the 
public conscience”. See also M. Craven, “Humanitarianism and the quest for smarter sanctions”, 13 EJIL, 2002, 43-61, in 
particular at 51-53 three possible approaches to the question of legal limits to the activity of the Security Council are 
provided by the author. 





possibility to qualify sanctions by humanitarian exemptions (whereby certain products are excluded 
for humanitarian reasons),1836 a wide range of measures such as embargoes, military blockades, 
threats or pressures, prohibitions on trade with another State, and removal of trade preferential 
schemes, may have direct effects on the enjoyment of ESC rights by civilians. Accordingly, within 
conflict-related situations a basic question arises as to whether and to what extent the international 
community has started to regard sanctions as acts giving rise to the extraterritorial application of treaties on ESC rights 
in light of their well-documented and inevitable deleterious impacts upon civilians’ lives in the target 
State.  
In this regard, the position of States participating in sanctions regimes may be examined in view 
of the emerging normative elaboration of the issue of sanctions and equivalent measures concerning the 
general duty to respect ESC rights. In particular, Maastricht Principle 22 gains relevance according to the 
following remarks.  
Firstly, this principle enunciates the States’ duty to refrain from “adopting measures, such as 
embargoes or other economic sanctions, which would result in nullifying or impairing the enjoyment” of ESC rights. 
This has to be read in view of Article 50 (1) of the ILC’s Draft Articles of 2001 which identifies four 
categories of substantial obligations that, “by reason of their character”, cannot be impaired by 
countermeasures imposed by individual States or groups of States in reaction to an internationally 
wrongful act by another State: “the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the UN 
Charter”;1837 “obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights”1838; “obligations of a humanitarian 
character prohibiting reprisals”1839; and “other obligations under peremptory norms of general international law”. 
Furthermore, States may agree to exclude other rules of international law from the possibility to be 
the subject of countermeasures, under the lex specialis provision in Article 55 (as underlined in the 
                                                
1836 For an overview of the humanitarian exemptions to the Iraqi sanctions regime, see E. De Wet, “Human Rights 
limitations to economic enforcement measures under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter and the Iraqi Sanctions 
Regime”, 14 Leiden JIL, 2001, pp. 281-284. See SC Res. 661(1990), S/RES/661, para. 4; Security Council Res. 
666(1991), S/RES/666, paras. 1, 3-5. Another instance of a broad humanitarian exception is established by SC Res. 
986(1995) related to the oil-for-food programme. See the Working paper prepared by Marc Bossuyt, “The adverse 
consequences of economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights”, 21 June 2000, para. 53, putting in question the 
efficacy of the exemptions. 
1837 As highlighted in the Commentary to Article 50, “it excludes forcible measures from the ambit of permissible countermeasures”; 
this prohibition is elucidated in the General Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in which it 
was stated that “States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force” (see GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, first 
principle). 
1838 As highlighted in the Commentary to Article 50, the Institut de droit international has declared in its Resolution 1934 
that, in adopting countermeasures, a State must “abstain from any harsh measure which would be contrary to the laws of humanity 
or the demands of the public conscience” (see Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international, vol. 38 (1934), p. 710). 
1839 As highlighted in the Commentary to Article 50, it is modelled on Article 60 (5) VCLT and it also echoes the 





same commentary to Article 50). 
As regards the case in which sanctions are taken to meet other international legal obligations, 
Principle 22 calls for States’ full respect of human rights obligations in each of the distinct stages of any sanctions 
regime. Nonetheless, a position is not taken regarding the legitimacy of the imposition of sanctions 
impairing ESC rights while having the objective of ensuring compliance by the target State with its 
own international legal obligations. On this point, some notable considerations are offered by the 
CESCR, which has examined the consequence of economic sanctions on civilian populations by 
dealing with both countermeasures by States as well as the effect of measures adopted by 
international organizations. In particular, besides stressing that “whatever the circumstances, such sanctions 
should always take full account of the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights”, the emphasis has been put on the crucial distinction “between the basic objective of applying 
political and economic pressure upon the governing elite of a country to persuade them to conform to international law, 
and the collateral infliction of suffering upon the most vulnerable groups within the targeted country”.1840 
As regards the design stage, Principle 22 is in line with what the CESCR has already 
emphasised. 1841  In designing a sanctions regime that results proportionate to fulfill other 
international obligations, two relevant dimensions of the necessary effort to minimise to the greatest 
extent possible its negative impacts on human rights may be highlighted. One derives from the right 
to self-determination as enshrined in common Article 1(2) ICESCR and ICCPR (“In no case may a 
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence”). Another one derives from Article 4 ICESCR, which 
requires the compatibility of any limitation “with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society”. 
As to the implementation stage, again, the reference in Principle 22 is in line with the view 
expressed by the CESCR, according to which effective monitoring is to be undertaken during the 
period in force of the sanctions, and, moreover, the entity enforcing sanctions has “an obligation ‘to 
take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical’ in 
order to respond to any disproportionate suffering experienced by vulnerable groups within the targeted country”.1842 
Even the termination stage of a sanction regime is deemed to be determined as taking into 
account human rights obligations, thus avoiding that the impact on ESC rights prevails over the 
objectives being sought. 
                                                
1840 See CESCR, General Comment No. 8: The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural 
rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (1997), paras. 1 and 4. 
1841 See CESCR, General Comment No. 8, ibid., para. 12, emphasising that “must be taken fully into account when designing an 
appropriate sanctions regime”. 





Finally, Principle 22 lays down an absolute limit on sanctions by requiring States to desist from 
imposing embargoes and equivalent measures on services and goods fundamental to honour core obligations. 
The same view has been endorsed by the CESCR for measures that impede the provision of health 
care, water and food, along with services and goods indispensable for ensuring the corresponding 
rights; in this regard, the denial of access to such rights is deemed absolutely forbidden as a tool of 
economic and political pressure.1843 It is reasonable to contend that other ESC rights, such as the 
right to education, entail the same duties. 
 
 
                                                
1843 See CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food, op. cit., para. 37; General Comment No. 14: The right to the 





CHAPTER VI: TESTING CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR BREACHES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW HAVING DIRECT OR INDIRECT RELEVANCE 
FOR CIVILIANS’ ESC RIGHTS  
1. Introduction 
The issue of liability of multinational business corporations engaging in activities carried out in 
conflict-affected or high-risk areas assumes central importance in relation to breaches of 
international law that may inhibit the effective exercise of, or adequate access to, ESC rights of 
civilians (especially in relation to their basic necessities of life). The nature of controversial activities 
may vary, including, inter alia, extractives industry, infrastructural projects, development projects, or 
simply financial investments. The range of ESC rights enshrined in international human rights and 
humanitarian law that may be seriously affected through such business activities relate to the 
following: adequate standards of living, including the right to food with particular regard for two of its 
components (individual and collective access to natural resources as a mean of food procurement 
and food adequacy), the right to the highest attainable standard of health with special regard to 
access to healthcare and medicines, the right to water and sanitation with special regard to the need 
to ensure safety, equality, and non-discrimination in access to it, the right to a clean and healthy 
environment; social and economic development; human security; decent work conditions; adequate housing (with 
particular regards for the question of evictions).  
The modes of participation under which the activities concerned may raise questions of 
corporate liability for breaches of international law may vary. Besides business misconducts 
potentially amounting to the direct commission of such a breach, critical ways of indirect 
involvement include the following: the provision of services, technology, goods, or other resources to 
State organs or authorities that supposedly use them in the commission of the breach;1844 the supply 
of chains, logistical and material support, or even financial assistance, that apparently enables or 
                                                
1844 A test case that will be examined concerns the Dutch National Public Prosecutor’s Office dismissal (14 May 2013) of 
the case against Lima Holdings (the Dutch parent) for Riwal’s alleged involvement in the commission of alleged Israeli 
war crimes due to its supply of equipment used for the construction of the wall in several locations of the occupied 





facilitates or incentivizes or exacerbates a third-party unlawful conduct1845; the corporation’s 
investment in projects or participation in joint ventures having key connections with repressive 
regimes known as front-line offenders.1846 
All these ways of involvement primarily relate to developed theories of corporate complicity in 
the wrongful act perpetrated by others. In this regard, it is worth noting that in national jurisdictions 
several factors typically play a role in the determination of corporate civil or criminal liability, 
notwithstanding they are applied differently: what the company and its executive directors knew at 
the relevant time; what they intended to occur; what level of involvement/contribution was provided by 
the company when the relevant violation was committed by a third party; the extent to which 
corporate activities caused the violation concerned.  
Conversely, international criminal law jurisprudence has recognised and defined the concept of 
complicity under the standard of aiding and abetting international crimes: the actus reus is met by any act or 
omission comprising “practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support” to the principal offender of the 
crime, which has a “substantial effect” on the commission of that crime; the mens rea requires the 
knowledge that one’s acts would contribute to the commission of that crime. 1847  Recent 
jurisprudence on this subject has provided a higher standard (for a defendant to be liable the 
prosecution had to establish that the defendant’s assistance was “specifically directed” towards the 
specific crime1848), which, however, has been confirmed in other judgments.1849  
                                                
1845 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 395 F.3d 932, Judgment of 18 September 2002. 
See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 f. Supp. 2d 289, US District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, 19 March 2003. See Canadian Association Against Impunity (CAAI) v. Anvil Mining Ltd., File No. 500-09-021701-115, 
Court of Appeal, Province of Quebec, Judgment of 24 January 2012. See United States Supreme Court decision, Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S., 17 April 2013. 
1846 See Khulumani et al. v. Barclays National Bank Ltd, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 02-md-
1499. In 2002 South African nationals sued twenty banks and corporations in the US courts alleging that their 
investments and participation in crucial industries was influential in encouraging gross human rights abuses (e.g. 
extrajudicial killings, torture, rape) against black South Africans and therefore the defendants were complicit in such 
wrongs.  
1847 See British Military Court, Hamburg, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, 1-8 March 1946, reprinted in Law Reports of 
Trials of War Criminals, Vol. 1, London, 1947, p. 93; Bruno Emil Tesch was the owner of the company that supplied 
Zyklon B poisonous gas to the SS for use it in the extermination camps and he was convicted of complicity in war 
crimes and sentenced to death for knowingly supplying Zyklon B: the Court found that he continued to supply ever-
larger quantities of such widely-used insecticide even after he realised that it was being used to kill people. See US 
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, The United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al., Judgment of 30 July 1948. Officials in the 
I.G. Farben company were convicted of complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity for their role in the 
construction of extermination camps. See US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, The United States of America v. Friedrich Flick 
et al., Judgment of 22 December 1947. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundzija (IT-95-17/1-T), Trial Chamber, 10 December 
1998, paras. 232-235, 243-245. 
1848 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić (IT-04-81-A), Appeals Chamber, 28 February 2013, paras. 33-44. See the 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišic and Franco Simatovic, Trial Chamber (IT-03-69).The specific direction requirement led to 
the aquittals in these two cases.  
1849 See Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-A (10766-11114), Appeals Chamber, 26 






The present chapter is intended to examine a number of legal cases brought before national as 
well as international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies, in which business enterprises have been 
litigated or prosecuted in relation to allegations of involvement in serious breaches of international law that 
directly or indirectly inhibit the exercise of, or adequate access to, ESC rights.  
At the national level, such jurisprudence appears to evidence a certain disinclination by 
domestic courts and prosecutors to proceed with litigation in cases where a corporation is claimed to 
have contributed to serious breaches of international law by foreign States abroad. In particular, 
their uncertainty about whether business enterprises are bound by international human rights and 
humanitarian norms is affirmed when indirect connection exists to the assumed violations. Further, 
courts and prosecutors’ cautiousness to sit in judgment that end up touching the activities and 
policies of foreign States or to become embroiled in complex disputes that could have far-reaching 
political and policy consequences is clear. Moreover, a certain hesitation to open domestic courts to 
litigations related to corporate conducts with tenuous connections to their jurisdiction is palpable; 
forum shopping or the circumvention of sovereign immunity laws are not encouraged from such 
jurisprudence over alleging corporate complicity in breaches of international law by foreign States, 
which rather favours reliance upon non-justiciability doctrines and other non-merits grounds.  
However, the relevance of these cases under the present research inquiring the evolving legal 
framework for the protection of civilians’ ESC rights in international law seems basic.  
Specifically, the Jerusalem light rail case and the Bil’in Village case, concerning corporate civil 
liability before French and Canadian courts, will be emblematic for reflecting about the increasingly 
debated issue of liability risks for multinational enterprises playing a major role in funding, facilitating, and abetting 
serious breaches of international law in the context of the legal ramifications of the settlements policy in the West 
Bank (where a vast majority of them are placed).1850 Indeed, a number of activities undertaken in 
those settlements have been identified as raising human rights violations concerns1851. They include, 
inter alia, the following: “the supply of equipment and materials facilitating the construction and the expansion of 
                                                                                                                                                            
form of responsibility, confirming that knowledge was the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting. See ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Nikola Šainovic et al., Appeal Judgment, 23 January 2014, in which it concluded that “specific direction” is not an element 
of aiding and abetting liability under customary international law or the Statute. 
1850 See Report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East 
Jerusalem, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/63, 7 February 2013, paras. 96-99, which address that “business enterprises have, directly 
and indirectly, enabled, facilitated and profited from the construction and growth of the settlements”. 
1851 Two debated cases of legal action in Israel concern the Israeli corporations’ decision to fully or partially withdraw 
from contracts related to the supply of fuel or financial services whose lack may amount, under specific circumstances, 
to violations of human rights of the affected population. See D. Weiss and R. Shamir, “Corporate Accountability to 





settlements and the wall, and associated infrastructures”; “the supply of equipment for the demolition of housing and 
property, the destruction of agricultural farms, greenhouses, olives groves and crops”; “the provision of services and 
utilities supporting the maintenance and existence of settlements, including transport”; “banking and financial 
operations helping to develop, expand or maintain settlements and their activities, including loans for housing and the 
development of businesses”; “the use of natural resources, in particular water and land, for business purposes”; 
“pollution, and the dumping of waste in or its transfer to Palestinian villages”; “captivity of the Palestinian financial 
and economic markets, as well as practices that disadvantage Palestinian enterprises, including through restrictions on 
movement, administrative and legal constraints”; “the use of benefits and reinvestments of enterprises owned totally or 
partially by settlers for developing, expanding and maintaining the settlements”.1852 In the same vein, other two 
examples consist of “banking institutions involved in financial transactions, such as loans to construct or purchase 
Israeli settlements” (e.g. the Dexia Group, a European banking group), and “real estate companies that 
advertise and sell properties in settlements” (e.g. Re/Max International, a company based in the United 
States of America).1853 
Conversely, among the few advanced domestic instances of investigation and/or prosecution for 
establishing corporate criminal complicity in international crimes, a recent prosecutorial decision 
for criminal complaints filed in the Netherlands against the Dutch company Riwal Group/Lima 
Holding will be examined. It will illustrate the dilemmas that public prosecutors are likely to face in 
such cases. A basic problem relates to the margin for exercising prosecutorial discretion to investigate and 
prosecute allegations of crimes of particular seriousness in the face of external pressure (mainly economic, political, 
diplomatic pressure), weak internal resources to continuing investigations of big proportions, and strong public 
interest in prosecution. Another dilemma relates to the practical difficulties to carry out effective 
investigations and prosecutions of serious crimes committed in third countries and with the 
involvement of transnational entities. 
Another relevant criminal complaint is the one issued to the State Prosecutor in Frankfurt 
against two nationals senior employees of the engineering office of the German corporation 
Lahmeyer International for conducts undertaken overseas, namely for the alleged reckless 
management of a large infrastructure project and the related intensification of controversial conduct 
taken by the Sudanese Government in this regard. Although still at an early stage, this case will offer 
                                                
1852 UN Doc. A/HRC/22/63, op. cit., para. 96. Paragraph 97 elaborates on the issue of business enterprises’ activities in 
the settlements and the contribution to their maintenance, consolidation and development, stressing that “industrial parks 
in settlements, such as Barkan and Mishor Edomim, offer numerous incentives, including tax breaks, low rents and low labour costs”. It is 
also underlined that “a number of banks provide mortgage loans for home buyers and special loans for building projects in settlements. They 
also provide financial services to businesses in settlements and, in some cases, are physically present there”. 
1853 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, UN Doc. 





the chance to reflect about the normative content of the extraterritorial dimension of the State duty to protect ESC 
rights. As is noticed in Chapter 5, this has been articulated as a duty to regulate the conduct of non-
State actors, to exercise influence on such conduct, and to take action separately and jointly through 
international cooperation. However, as is already underlined, the crystallization of the 
extraterritorial dimension of such duty in the current stage of international law is still controversial. 
Emblematically, the Lahmeyer case will evidence the importance of “the function of regulation” 
exercisable by the State through several means (e.g. investigative and adjudicatory measures) when it 
is in a position to do so according to certain “bases for protection”, in compliance with international 
law, in order to guarantee that non-state actors’ activities do not impair or nullify ESC rights.  
Some of these lawsuits acquire weight particularly for their attempt to attribute legal 
responsibility to members of a corporate group operating in conflict-affected areas in connection 
with allegations of damage caused abroad by a foreign subsidiary (mainly as accomplice to unlawful 
conducts of States), including violations of ESC rights. This appears to be part of a more 
comprehensive trend of foreign plaintiffs turning to overseas courts for seeking redress against 
multinational corporations for international law violations committed abroad.  
The significance of focusing on such litigations on corporate liability is linked, inter alia, to the 
fact that in conflict-related scenarios judicial recourse may constitute an indispensable part of 
accessing remedy or alternative sources of effective remedy are unavailable. In such scenarios 
claimants who suffer a denial of justice in the territorial (host) State and cannot access the courts of 
the home State (irrespective of the merits of the claim) end up substantiating a serious legal obstacle. 
In this vein, any legal, practical, or procedural barriers preventing judicial mechanisms to function 
effectively raises a question of compatibility with the State duty to protect against business-related human rights 
abuses which occurred within its sovereign territory and/or under its jurisdiction, or which felt within the ambit of 
State responsibility under the principles of public international law (i.e. the unlawful act in question is 
attributable to a State and constitutes a violation of an international legal obligation). 
As is identified by the International Law Commission, at least in four situations businesses’ 
actions can be attributed to a State1854 and so raise the risk of being a co-defendant in those cases 
where it has renounced to its sovereign immunity.1855 Primarily, a State may incur international 
responsibility for the acts of a company that exercised governmental activity and was empowered to 
do so (Art. 5 of the Draft Articles). Besides, a State would be responsible for the acts of a company 
                                                
1854 See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of the fifty-third session, UN Doc. A/56/10, 21 
August 2001, Article 6. 
1855 In cases where the State concerned is the forum State, immunity will not apply because that State will be not immune 





that was under the control or direction of, or acted under the instructions of, the State in having the 
conduct that allegedly resulted in the relevant breach.1856 Thirdly, a State would be responsible for 
the company’s activities adopted or acknowledged by that State as its own (Art. 11 of the Draft 
Articles). Finally, State responsibility may arise as accomplice in the company’s actions or as result 
of its failure to exercise due diligence to prevent the effects of those actions.1857 
Another relevant dimension of the case law examined in the present chapter is that the 
corporations concerned operate from within the jurisdiction of the European Union. Indeed, 
various claims against business enterprises have been brought across several European countries. 
This leads to question whether and to what extent the European Union and its Member States do 
ensure that the international legal order is not disregarded in light of controversial activities 
undertaken by multinational companies which end up undermining, or acting in blatant 
contradiction of, the EU’s legal commitments to its proclaimed foreign policy and to the rule of law. 
2. Civil litigation in national legal orders 
2.1 The Jerusalem Light Rail case 
In a decision taken on 22 March 2013 the Versailles Court of Appeal dismissed the case against two 
French multinational companies (Alstom/Alstom Transport and Connex/Veolia Transport),1858 
which was originally filed by the AFPS (l’Association France Palestine Solidarité)1859 and by the OLP 
                                                
1856 See J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text, and Commentaries, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 74, 91-121. 
1857 See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of the fifty-third session, UN Doc. A/56/10, 21 
August 2001, 81 (“A receiving State is not responsible, as such, for the acts of private individuals in seizing an embassy, but it will be 
responsible if it fails to take all the necessary steps to protect the embassy from seizure or to regain control over it”). See ICJ, Case Concerning 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), ICJ Reports 1980, 3, paras. 2, 8 (a), 63, 
68-71. 
1858 They are involved in vast projects in several countries, mostly focusing on transportation, water and sanitation. 
1859 In parallel to the mentioned proceedings, on 1 March 2007 the AFPS filed a claim against the French Minister for 
Foreign and European Affairs for the payment of a one euro indemnity to compensate counts of harm resulting from 
the support provided to the French undertakings’ involvement in the operating of said tramway. As this claim was 
implicitly rejected, the AFPS petitioned the Amministrative Court of Paris to order the French State to pay it this 
indemnity (see Amministrative Court of Paris, Association France-Palestine Solidarité v. Republic of France, No. 1004813/6-1, decision 
of 28 October 2011). In this regard, the AFPS objected to France having allowed French undertakings to participate in an 
international call for tenders for the construction and operation of a tramway to serve the territory of Jerusalem and 
part of the West Bank and having welcomed the conclusion of this contract. Further, the AFPS objected to the French 
State having breached its commitment, as affirmed in Article 1 GCIV to “ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances”. In this vein, the AFPS alleged that the French State triggered its liability in breaching its obligation to take 
any positive action to prevent the signature of the litigious contracts and in actively encouraging their conclusion. The 
AFPS petitioned the French Conseil d’Etat to annul the decision of Administrative Court of Paris, but it dismissed it (see 





(l’Organisation de Libération de la Palestine, which voluntary become co-plaintiff later that year)1860 at the 
Tribunal de Grande Instance of Nanterre (France) in February 2007.1861 
These French companies participated, through a series of engineering and construction 
contracts, in an Israeli law corporation called Citypass (that consisted of the two French law 
companies1862 and four Israeli law companies) which had won the thirty-year public service 
concession contract by the Israeli Government in July 2005 for the financing, design, construction, 
operation, and maintenance of a light rail project in Jerusalem; since July 2011 this public tramway 
service has become active between West Jerusalem (inside Israel’s internationally recognised 
borders) and East Jerusalem (inside the Palestinian territory of the West Bank) where several Israeli 
settlements are located. The AFPS and OLP sought an injunction to annul all these contracts for 
unlawful cause (as contrary to public policy) pursuant to Articles 6, 1131, and 1133 of the French 
Civil Code.1863 As will be detailed hereafter, this ended up in an appeal to determine whether the 
international responsibility of those French companies occurred as a condition of their corporate 
liability. 
Without entering into the details of overlaid procedures, particularly as to the admissibility of 
the main action, it is noteworthy to focus on the merits. According to the plaintiffs, the tramway 
project represented a way for ensuring the long-term persistence of Israeli settlements and the 
integration of the city of Jerusalem in the State of Israel, involving the destruction of dwellings and 
infrastructures located on its route, the confiscation of archaeological relics and damage to 
archaeological sites (Palestinian cultural property), and expropriations of Palestinians’ movable and 
                                                
1860 In October 2007, the corporate defendants moved to dismiss the case and questioned the admissibility of AFPS’ 
requests to invalidate the contract, arguing that it was outside the scope of French jurisdiction. In April 2009, without 
reaching the merits of the case, the Nanterre Tribunal de Grande Instance ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, but 
that the PLO could not be accepted as a co-plaintiff. The Tribunal underlined that the defendants were not in a 
position to plead immunity, since corporate entities are not included as subjects of sovereign immunity. Alstom and its 
subsidiary Alstom Transport appealed the decision of the Tribunal de Grande Instance in November 2009. Veolia did not 
contest the ruling; it sold its shares in the City Pass Consortium to Dan Bus Company in September 2009. In December 
2009, the Appeals Court upheld the rulings of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, emphasising that it had jurisdiction to hear 
the case. In February 2010 this decision was appealed by Alstom (particularly opposing the jurisdiction of the French 
courts) before the Cour de Cassation, which rejected the appeal in February 2011. 
1861 See Tribunal De Grande Instance De Nanterre, Sème Chambre, Association France Palestine Solidarité “AFPS” et 
Organisation de Libération de la Palestine “OLP” c. Societé Alstom Transport SA, Societé Alstom SA and SA Veolia Transport, R.G. n. 
10/02629, Judgment of 30 May 2011. 
1862 Alstom and CGEA Connex, the latter operating since 2005 under the name Veolia Transport, were respectively 
owners of 20% and 5% of the shares of CityPass, CityPass had entered into an engineering contract for the supply and 
construction of the tramway with Alstom Transport and Citadis Israel Ltd. (indirect subsidiary of Alstom) as well as a 
further contract for the management and operation of the service with Connex Jerusalem Ltd. (indirect subsidiary of 
Veolia). 
1863 See Cour d’Appel de Versailles, 3ème Chamber, Association France Palestine Solidarité “AFPS” et Organisation de Libération 
de la Palestine “OLP” v. Societé Alstom Transsport SA, Societé Alstom SA and SA Veolia Transport, R.G. n. 11/05331, Judgment of 





immovable property. In objecting that this project was a major factor in the expansion of the 
colonization of East Jerusalem and the change of the city’s legal status, the plaintiffs claimed it 
contributed to the policy of annexing territories de facto, in breach of international law. In this vein, 
the defendant companies’ involvement into this project was disputed by invoking the violation of 
several provisions of international humanitarian law, as detailed hereafter.  
Then, a basic argument was that the illicit object and purpose (“la cause du contrat” in French) of 
the public service concession contract (provided that the protraction of unlawful Israeli occupation 
in the West Bank allegedly represented the actual reason of this project) affected also the subsequent 
contracts that the two French companies had as shareholders in Citypass and that should be 
declared void as against public policy (“ordre public” in French).1864 It was argued that the defendant 
corporations were liable under French civil law for having participated in contracts whose “cause” 
violated international law as well as for not having complied with their commitments under the 
Global Compact and their own corporate codes of ethics. 
In its decision of 30 May 2011, the Nanterre Tribunal de Grande Instance rejected those claims but 
ruled only on preliminary legal issues. To the Tribunal, the invoked conventional international 
humanitarian law did not create direct obligations on private companies; further, neither the 
international public order or jus cogens, nor customary international law could overcome the absence 
of such a direct effect. In any event, for the Tribunal, assuming that the conclusion by Israel of the 
public service concession contract constituted a violation of its commitments under those 
international treaties, this violation would have not deprived the contract of its “cause”, since the 
latter was subject to Israeli law (and not the French Civil Code). Furthermore, even the companies’ 
responsibility for breaching international codes of conduct and authoritative guidance applicable to 
multinational corporations was not demonstrated according to the Tribunal (besides ruling that “ni 
que la construction du tramway aurait constitué une violation des droits de l’Homme ou du droit humanitaire au sens 
large”). Consequently, in the absence of any proved misconduct, the examination of the existence of 
injury and causation was deemed as unnecessary. 
The subsequent judgment of 22 March 2013 by the Versailles Court of Appeal confirmed the 
Tribunal’s reasoning. Despite establishing that the OLP had standing to proceed with the lawsuit, 
the Court ruled its inadmissibility. It found that the international treaties in question created 
obligations between States and they could not be used to hold two private companies 
liable. Furthermore, in its opinion, the purely voluntary character of UN Global Compact as well as 
                                                





the non-binding commitments made by multinational enterprises in their codes of conduct could 
not create “d’obligations of engagements ni au bénéfice de tiers pouvant solliciter en le respect”.1865 The Court 
ordered the AFPS and OLP, as losing parties (art. 700 Code de procédure civile), to pay € 30,000 to each 
of the three companies to cover the expenses incurred in their defence.1866 Thus, the execution by 
Veolia and Alstom of the contented contracts for the construction and operation of the Jerusalem 
light rail could not breach international law or any other commitments under their own voluntary 
codes of ethics. The Court absolved the companies of any responsibility for potential involvement in 
internationally unlawful acts and maintained the contracts’ validity under French law.  
The following sub-sections will examine the basis of actions brought against the two French 
companies and the validity of the reasoning given by the Versailles Court to reject them, which 
seems confused, imprecise and approximate, without analysing all the grounds of the appeal 
judgment.  
2.1.1 The legal basis for actions against the two French companies 
The AFPS and OLP based their actions primarily on the violations of international humanitarian 
law applicable to occupation. They firstly claimed that the establishment and operation of the 
tramway have assisted in the violation of Article 49(6) GCIV, which prohibits the occupier from 
deporting or transferring part of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies; the appeal 
judgment does not detail the appellants’ argument on this point, namely that the construction of the 
tramway - by facilitating the transport of Israelis living in East Jerusalem and adjacent settlements 
(built in an area on which Israel’s sovereignty is not recognised by the international community) and 
by connecting the settlements of French Hill, Pisgat Zeev and Neve Yaakov in East Jerusalem with 
the centre in West Jerusalem - has contributed to the illegal maintenance of the occupier’s 
population therein, so legitimising the recognition of these settlements. 
According to the appellants, the construction of the tramline has also resulted in destructions, 
almost suppressing road n. 60 which was vital for transporting persons and goods, and the removal 
of this road and paths that needed expropriations was in violation of several provisions of 
international humanitarian law: Article 53 GCIV, which prohibits the occupier to destroy “real or 
personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, 
                                                
1865 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 28-29. However, it seems that, in dismissing the relevance of the companies’ 
obligations under their own voluntary codes, as well as the UN Global Compact, the Court undertook a position that 
remarkably backtracks on the valuable international developments regarding the concept of responsibility of 
multinational companies under international law.  





or to social organizations and cooperative organizations … except where such destruction is rendered absolutely 
necessary by military operations”; Article 23(g) HRs, which prohibits “to destroy or seize the enemy’s property 
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”; Article 46 HRs, which 
prohibits the confiscation of private property. 
Moreover, the appellants invoked the violation of some provisions prohibiting to attack cultural 
property, as set out in Article 4 of the 1954 Hague Convention,1867 Article 27 HRs,1868 Article 5 of 
the 1907 Hague Convention IX,1869 and Article 53 API.1870 Although this is not specified in the 
judgment, the AFPS and PLO claimed that the tramway affected cultural property and 
archaeological sites: during the contented construction the ancient ruins of a Judeo-Roman 
settlement site were discovered in the area of Shuafat (an active neighbourhood of some 35,000 
Palestinian residents, which links the old Jerusalem-Ramallah road about three miles north of the 
Old City); they were described as revealing “a sophisticated community impeccably planned by the Roman 
authorities, with orderly rows of houses and two fine public bathhouses to the north”.1871 It is worth noting that 
this is not illegal if the archaeological research takes place with the consent of the party occupied 
and if the occupier provides the protection of the site; but in this case the Palestinian Authority has 
not allowed this type of research. 
In the appeal judgment no reference is made to further relevant aspects invoked by the 
appellants. There is no mention of the evoked Security Council resolutions1872 that call for the 
withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied Palestinian territory, while the tramline may 
                                                
1867 Under Article 4(1), “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as 
within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the 
appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by 
refraining from any act of hostility, directed against such property”. Under Article 4(3), “The High Contracting Parties further undertake to 
prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, 
cultural property. They shall refrain from requisitioning movable cultural property situated in the territory of another High Contracting Party”. 
1868 Under Article 27 HRs, “in sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated 
to religion, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals .., provided that they are not being used at the time for military 
purposes”. 
1869 Under Article 5 HC IX, “In bombardments by naval forces all the necessary measures must be taken by the commander to spare as 
far as possible sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic, scientific, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the 
sick or wounded are collected, on the understanding that they are not used at the same time for military purposes.  
It is the duty of the inhabitants to indicate such monuments, edifices, or places by visible signs, which shall consist of large, stiff rectangular 
panels divided diagonally into two coloured triangular portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion white”. 
1870 Under Article 53 AP I, “Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, and of other relevant international instruments, it is prohibited: (a) to commit any acts of hostility 
directed against the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; (b) to 
use such objects in support of the military effort; (c) to make such objects the object of reprisals”. 
1871 See Isabel Kershner, “Under a Divided City, Evidence of a Once United One”, New York Times, 5 June 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/05/world/middleeast/05jerusalem.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0  
1872 See S/RES/242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, para. 1 (i). This resolution has been repeated many times since 1967: 
e.g., S/RES/258 (1968), S /RES/338 (1973), S/RES/344 (1973), S/RES/1322 (2000), S/RES/1397 (2002), 
S/RES/1402 (2002), S/RES/1405 (2002), S/RES/1435 (2002), S/RES/1515 (2003), S/RES/1544 (2004), 





reinforce the maintenance of the situation against such resolutions. In the same vein, the Versailles 
judges do not refer to the criminal nature of the establishment of those settlements in view of Article 
49(6) GCIV as combined with Article 147 GCIV that criminalises the “illegal transfer”. Further, the 
establishment of a settlement by the occupier in the occupied territory is explicitly recognised as a 
war crime under Article 85(4)(a) API, Article 8(2)(b)(viii) ICC Statute, and Article 20(c)(i) of the draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind as prepared by the International Law 
Commission in 1996. Nonetheless, it is not clear that the invocation of all these texts would have 
changed the outcome of the appeal judgment, because the Court’s reasoning reveals a critical 
misunderstanding of international law, as will be detailed hereafter. 
Additional international statements and reports were invoked in support of the unlawfulness of 
the construction of the tramway, such as the reports by the Heads of Mission of the European 
Union1873 and a resolution by the Human Rights Council,1874 but they were simply mentioned in 
the appeal judgment and considered as not directly related to such construction,1875 although they 
explicitly refer to this project. 
Conversely, the defendant French companies denied the commission of a fault by arguing their 
proper execution of the contracts signed with the Citypass and which retained legal autonomy. To 
them, the invoked IHL norms were not enforceable and the use of custom or jus cogens (as 
determined by an international public order) did not make those norms applicable against them.  
2.1.2. The reasoning of the Versailles Court of Appeal 
2.1.2.a. ..on the locus standi of the appellants 
According to the Court, the AFPS’s object did not allow this Association to sue the two companies 
                                                
1873 See “EU Heads of Mission Jerusalem Report 2010”, 16 January 2011, Annex 1 on East Jerusalem, paras. 48-50, in which 
it is deemed among the infrastructure projects that “contribute to the Israeli control over occupied East Jerusalem”. See “EU Heads 
of Mission Jerusalem Report 2011”, January 2012, Annex 1 on East Jerusalem, para. 58, in which it is further specified that 
“the first line of this tramway passes though the Palestinian neighborhood of Shu’afat and touches the southern border of Beit Hanina”, and 
that the line was about 14 kilometers along with 23 stops but that extensions were planned for both ends of the route. 
See “EU Heads of Mission Jerusalem Report 2012”, January 2013, Annex 1 on East Jerusalem, para. 54, in which it was 
included among the projects that “strengthen the Israeli control over East Jerusalem”, noting that “on 4 July 2012 the Local 
Planning Committee approved a plan extending to Jerusalem’s southern neighborhoods (Ein Kerem), a third section between the northern 
settlements of Piscaal Zeev and Neveh Ya’acov being also contemplated”, and stressing that “if it was implemented, this third session would 
significantly increase this light rail’s contribution to the ‘unification’ of Jerusalem”. 
1874 See Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council, “Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan”, 14 April 2010, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/13/7, para. 5(g), 
in which the Council expressed its grave concern at “(T)he Israeli decision to establish and operate a tramway between West 
Jerusalem and the Israeli settlement of Pisgat Zeev, which is in clear violation of international law and relevant United Nations resolutions”. 
The resolution was passed 44 to 1, with Ireland and all the EU members of the Council voting in favour. 
1875 See Cour d’Appel de Versailles, 3ème Chamber, Association France Palestine Solidarité “AFPS” and Organisation de 
Libération de la Palestine “OLP” v. Societé Alstom Transport SA, Societé Alstom SA and SA Veolia Transport, R.G. n. 11/05331, 





to annul the challenged contracts in view that, under Art. 2-1 of its Statute, its object is “développer 
l’amitié et la solidarité entre le peuple français et le peuple palestinien et d’œuvrer pour l’établissement d’une paix juste 
et durable au Proche-Orient fondée sur la reconnaissance des droits nationaux du peuple palestinien, sur la base du 
droit international”. In particular, in seeking to annul contracts to which it is third, the AFPS does not 
pursue its own members’ collective interest, which is distinct from the public interest of Palestinians 
for whose defence it has no statutory authority. 1876  However, this may be a very narrow 
interpretation of the Statute: inasmuch as the AFPS has been established to “work for the establishment 
of peace [...] based on the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people on the basis of international law”, 
its lawsuit may be a “way of working” for such recognition, so it may fill its social object. 
Conversely, the Court acknowledged the locus standi of the OLP. In noting the difficulty 
expressed by Alstom to know which of the OLP and the Palestinian Authority are the Palestinians, 
the Court found no elements in contradiction with the OLP’s ius standi (as a subject of law), which 
had interest in acting since the time it intervened voluntarily, the contracts for the disputed tramway 
were signed and the construction begun.1877 In this regard, on the basis of Article 32 of the French 
Code of Civil Procedure (whereby “est irrecevable toute prétention émise par ou contre une personne dépourvue du 
droit d’agir”), Alstom Transport and Veolia Transport alleged that the plaintiffs were misdirected by 
suing them, because the “only serious defendants” were Israel and Citypass. The Court rejected this 
argument because the French companies had signed the contracts whose unlawful nature had been 
claimed by the OLP.1878 
2.1.2.b. ..on the basis of the action brought by the OLP 
While declaring the AFPS’s action as inadmissible, the Court of Appeal considered the request of 
the OLP, whose action against the defendants required proof of fault and injury directly related to 
the fault.1879 The two sources of the companies’ alleged misconduct included (I) the participation to 
contracts whose object or purpose (“la cause”) violate norms of international law and (II) the non-
                                                
1876 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, ibid., at 17, in which the Court stated that “en poursuivant l’annulation ou l’interdiction des 
contrats internationaux auquel elle est tiers, l’association [ne] justifie [pas] de la défense d’un intérêt collectif propre à ses membres, distinct de 
l’intérêt général des Palestiniens pour la défense desquels elle n’a pas d’autorisation législative”. 
1877 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 14. 
1878 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 18. 
1879 The Court summarised as follows the basis of action of the PLO: “Elle soutient que la construction du métro léger ou tramway 
qui traverse la ville de Jérusalem est illicite en ce qu’elle correspond à la violation de normes internationales notamment par son tracé qui en 
donne accès aux colons israéliens et les conséquences de sa construction en résultant pour le peuple palestinien. Elle considère que les contrats 
signés à cette occasion qui violent ainsi l’ordre public sont en conséquence également illicites et que les sociétés ont commis une faute d’une part, 
pour avoir participé à des contrats dont la cause viole des normes de droit international et d’autre part, pour ne pas avoir en même temps 
respecté les engagements pris par leur adhésion au Pacte Mondial et dans leurs codes d’éthiques. Elle sollicite que leur responsabilité soit 





compliance with their ethical commitments under the Global Compact and their own ethical codes.  
The Court’s reasoning deserves attention in relation to its rejection of the appellant’s arguments 
based on international law. It seems that the comprehensive evaluation of the “motif determinant ayant 
poussé le débiteur à s’engager” (as the Court defined the contractual claim under French law1880) was 
circumvented in its judgment, with a focus on the peculiar “nature” of the parties involved in order 
to rule in favour of the non-applicability of international law to multinational corporations. In this 
vein, despite its explicit admission to refrain from evaluating the conduct of Israel (which was not a 
party of this suit), the Court seems to validate the light rail project with a not entirely appropriate 
reasoning in view of relevant documents invoked by the appellant and, more generally, in view of 
international law.  
 
I. The companies’ participation to contracts whose “cause” violates international law. The Versailles judges 
examined the participation of Alstom, Alstom and Veolia Transport to the contracts at issue by 
evaluating the alleged unlawfulness of their “cause” (A) because of Israel’s violation of its obligations 
under the international law of occupation as well as (B) because of the companies’ violation of 
international humanitarian law.  
 
I.A. The unlawfulness of the “cause” due to State violation of the law of occupation. The Court of Appeal 
primarily referred to the OLP’s argument that the unlawfulness of the construction was connected 
to the illegal occupation, which would have altered all acts taken and signed by Israel during the 
implementation of the light rail project: such construction would have been implicitly directed to 
consolidate a “colonization juive illegale”.1881 In particular, the appellant argued that the French 
companies, which not signed the public service concession contract, were directly affected by its 
implementation due to the technical and financial guarantees provided in their capacity as 
shareholders in Citypass as well as due to the direct aid resulting from the construction and 
operation contracts. In connecting the illegality of all these contracts to Israel’s violation of its 
obligations under the international law of occupation, the appellant invoked several international 
humanitarian law instruments.  
In respect to this specific claim, the Court ruled that on the basis of Article 43 HRs “la puissance 
occupante pouvait et même devait rétablir une activité publique normale du pays occupé” though administrative 
measures concerning “toutes les activités généralement exercées par les autorités étatiques (vie sociale, économique et 
                                                
1880 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 21. 





commerciale)”; and that, as such, the occupier could build a lighthouse or a hospital. In referring to a 
subway construction in occupied Italy to underline that the building of a public transportation 
infrastructure was recognised as part of the occupier’s administration, the Court concluded that “la 
construction d’un tramway par l’Etat d’Israël n’était pas prohibée”.1882  
Nonetheless, the Court’s interpretation of Article 43 HRs seems to overlook that the occupier’s 
exercise of governmental activities in the occupied territory is legitimate as long as it is consistent 
with international law, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. In the same vein, while 
the Court considered the tramway among the measures authorized by Article 43 HRs, the disputed 
project had been deemed as one of the activities likely contributing to the consolidation of 
settlements in violation of international law at different times and by several organs of the United 
Nations and the European Union. Indeed, the Court disregarded several positions expressed within 
these international organizations about the settlements and the other practices undertaken or 
arranged therein in breach of international law.1883  
At any rate, in underlining that the invoked IHL treaties were signed between States, the 
                                                
1882 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 20-21. 
1883 Inter alia, at the UN level, see SC Res. 452 (1979) of 20 July 1979 and SC Res. 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980; ICJ Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 120 (Article 
49(6) “prohibits not only deportations or forced transfers of population such as those carried out during the Second World War, but also any 
measures taken by an occupying Power in order to organise or encourage transfers of parts of its own population into the ciccupied territory”); 
Human Rights Council, UN Doc. HRC/RES/13/7, 14 April 2010; Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission to 
Investigate the Implications of the Israeli Settlements on the Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the Palestinian People 
Throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/63, 7 February 2013, para. 16 
(in para. 4 “Israeli settlements” were deemed to encompass all physical and non-physical structures and processes that constitute, 
enable and support the establishment, expansion and maintenance of Israeli residential communities beyond the 1949 Green Line in the 
OPT”, and in para. 20 measures such as “supporting settlements through public services delivery and development projects” were 
included). At EU level, see the “EU Heads of Mission Jerusalem Report for 2012”, para. 3, 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/eu-consuls-recommend-imposing-sanctions-on-israeli-
settlements.premium-1.506043: two of its ten recommendations directly relate to the economic activities of European 
companies that profit from settlements; in addition to the standard practice of excluding settlement products from the 
free trade agreement between the EU and Israel, the report recommends “guarantee[ing] the consumers’ right to an informed 
choice”, asking the European Commission to provide guidelines on labeling of settlement products, moreover, the report 
recommends that EU governments “[p]revent, discourage and raise awareness about problematic implications of financial transactions, 
including foreign direct investment, from within the EU in support of settlement activities, infrastructure and services”; this is followed by 
another recommendation that the EU informs businesses of the “financial and legal risks involved in purchasing property or 
providing services in settlements”. See also European Parliament resolution on the EU policy on the West Bank, including 
East Jerusalem, 2012/2694(RSP), 5 July 2012, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-0298&language=EN; Council of 
the European Union, 3209th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting Conclusions, 10 December 2012, at 7, para. 3, available 
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134152.pdf; “Guidelines on the 
Eligibility of Israeli Entities and their Activities in the Territories Occupied by Israel since June 1967 for Grants, Prizes and Financial 
Instruments Funded by the EU from 2014 onwards”, 2013/C 205/05, adopted on 17 July 2013 by the Council of the 
European Union, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:205:0009:0011:EN:PDF. Even France supported the same 
view repeatedly, opposing the creation of settlements, see “Declaration by the Permanent Representative of France to the United 
Nations on the situation in the Middle East”, at the Security Council, 23 January 2013, and the press on Israeli settlements to 






Versailles Court held that the ensuing obligations or prohibitions are addressed to States, 
consequently they apply to Israel in its capacity as occupying power and could have a bearing on 
the public service concession contract signed with Citypass. For the Court, however, Alstom and 
Veolia were parties only to the construction and operation contracts with Citypass, which retained 
legal autonomy from the concession contract (although all of them had in common to allow the 
creation of the tramway) and were not “contaminated” by any alleged illicit “cause” of that contract. 
On this point the Court detailed that under French law the legality of the “cause” of a contract could 
not be founded on “seule appréciation par un tiers d’une politique ou social situation”: in an objective sense, 
each party’s “cause” would be the execution of the other party’s contractual obligations; conversely, 
under a subjective approach, which allows to better assess the conformity of the “cause” to public 
order, the latter would be the decisive reason that pushed the debtor to commit. In this vein, for the 
Versailles Court, the “motif politique” (presented by the OLP as the “cause” of Israel’s engagement 
with Citypass) could not be transferred, as effect of a “contamination”, to distinct contracts between 
business companies.1884 Being Alstom, Alstom and Veolia Transport third parties to the general 
concession contract, on the one side, they could not respond for violations of international standards 
establishing obligations only on the occupier, and their responsibility could be sought only in respect 
of contracts they signed with Citypass; on the other side, they could not respond for any alleged 
illegality of the concession contract.  
Prudently, the Versailles judges underlined that the State of Israel was not named as a party to 
the proceedings and that the illegality of the “cause” of the separate contracts signed by Alstom and 
                                                
1884 See Cour d’Appel de Versailles, ibid., at 21. However, the inappropriateness of that characterisation may rely on 
that this is not simply a political interpretation of the facts; it is worth considering that the impact on the Palestinians’ 
rights of the activities of multinational enterprises operating in the occupied territories have been subject to a specific 
monitoring over the last years by the United Nations (especially following the 2011 Guiding Principles) as well as by 
various non-governmental organizations. Indeed, it is also in light of this widespread criticism that some States have 
adopted measures to discourage the participation of multinational enterprises in economic activities in those settlements. 
In this regard, some instances are noteworthy: the decision taken in January 2014 by the Dutch pension fund PGGM to 
no longer invest in five Israeli banks (i.e. Bank Hapoalim, Bank Leumi, First International Bank of Israel, Israel Discount 
Bank and Mizrahi Tefahot Bank) because of their involvement in financing Israeli settlements in the occupied 
Palestinian territories, http://st.ilfattoquotidiano.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Statement-PGGM-exclusion-Israeli-
banks.pdf?adf349; the decision taken in December 2013 by the Dutch drinking water company Vitens, following 
consultations with the Dutch Foreign Ministry, to suspend its trade relations with Mekorot (the Israeli public water 
company) given the latter’s provision of infrastructure for water supplies in West Bank settlements and other related 
operations, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.562769; the decision of the Dutch 
company Royal Haskoning Dhv, following the directions of the Government of the Netherlands, to withdraw its 
participation in a co-construction project of a sewage treatment facility in East Jerusalem; the decision taken in August 
2010 by the Ministry of Finance Norway, revoked only in August 2013, to exclude the Israeli company Africa Israel 
Investments Ltd. and its subsidiary Danya Cebus Ltd. from its Government Pension Fund Global because it was 







Veolia could not be decided, without expressing any comment on the claimed “illicit” purpose 
behind Israel’s decision to build the light rail line. Thus, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument 
that the contracts between Alstom/Veolia and Citypass were void as against public policy. 
The Court’s reasoning to apply the autonomy criterion to the disputed contracts seems, 
however, a bit confusing. It dealt just with the relativity of the public service concession contract, 
without considering to discuss the fact that the “cause” allegedly was linking illegal settlements of 
East and West Jerusalem (a service that did not benefit the civilian population); and, in any case, the 
application of the legal autonomy criterion would have required a more comprehensive analysis. 
Indeed, even if the “causes” of the various contracts remain distinct, it is reasonable to contend that, 
in view of their nature (the public service concession contract between Israel and CityPass was 
materially realised through a “contractor” - Alstom - and an “operator” - Veolia), a special connection 
makes all of them as mutually conditioning. In this vein, if the cause of the public service concession 
contract was finally assessed as illegal, it is reasonable to assume that the invalidity of the agreement 
between Israel and Citypass could also affect the existence of the subsequent contracts with Alstom 
and Veolia. 
 
I.B. The unlawfulness of the “cause” owing to companies’ violation of IHL. As anticipated, the OLP 
claimed the unlawful “cause” of the contracts at issue even as a result of the French companies’ 
violation of IHL norms. The Court of Appeal considered the various ways this unlawfulness was 
invoked, namely (a) as non-compliance with certain provisions of IHL treaties and (b) by virtue of 
the customary nature acquired by the relevant norms or their imperative character.1885 
I.B. (a) While the OLP contended that the invoked IHL standards entitled it to exercise special 
rights (vertical effect) and were applicable to the defendant companies (horizontal effect), the latter 
argued that the provisions concerned do not create rights for individuals and do not apply to private 
companies as they are not recognised subjects of international law. The following lines will examine 
the Court’s reasoning on these points. 
I.B. (a)(1) As to the vertical effect of IHL conventional norms, the Versailles judges ruled that the 
invoked IHL norms could not create private cause of action in French courts. By expressing a 
traditional position in international law, the Court of Appeal confirmed the application of the 
conventions concerned only to State parties and rejected their direct applicability to private 
companies according to the following reasoning. After mentioning the higher legal authority of 
                                                





international treaties by virtue of Article 55 of the 1958 French Constitution (to the extent that they 
have been approved and do not need to be implemented), it stressed that the Geneva Conventions 
and the Hague Regulations came into force and are applicable under French law. For the Court, in 
the absence of a specific reference, in order to confer rights on individuals in the internal legal 
order, the relevant international norm must contain elements sufficiently precise to infer the 
drafters’ intention to produce such an effect and be expressive enough in appointing individuals as 
recipients. In this regard, the existence of a presumption of direct applicability of the invoked 
treaties could not be upheld because, although supported in some reports submitted to le Conseil 
d'Etat, “elle n’a pas été consacrée par les décisions subséquentes et ne peut pas davantage être retenue à l’occasion de la 
présente procedure”.1886 
As far as the vertical effect of the Fourth Geneva Convention is specifically concerned, the 
Court of Appeal referred (in an imprecise manner) to an opinion by the International Court of 
Justice according to which the travaux préparatoires of this treaty would only address obligations upon 
States without mentioning the right of individuals to rely on it. For the Versailles judges, the first 
articles of this Convention would also lead to such an interpretation (under Article 1 “the High 
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present at all times” and under Article 2 “the 
Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it ...”). In particular, the analysis of all the IHL 
provisions invoked by the OLP would not support the existence of a right granted to individuals: 
Articles 49 and 53 GCIV are addressed to the “occupying power” and impose obligations on States; 
Articles 23 and 46 HRs refers to “contracting powers”; Article 4 of the 1954 Hague Convention and 
Article 53 API cite the commitments of the Contracting Parties; thus they would create obligations 
upon States parties, excluding individuals as the recipients. As to Article 5 of the 1907 Hague 
Convention IX and Article 27 HRs, the Court confirmed the non-applicability for the same reasons 
expressed by the Nanterre Tribunal, namely that Jerusalem was not bombed.1887 
In considering the cases cited by the OLP in which the Cour de cassation recognised direct effect to 
international law norms,1888 the Versailles judges still stated that the individual is not addressed in 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, which, instead, would focus on groups such as “protected persons” or 
                                                
1886 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 22, in which the Court refers to the amicus curiae brief filed by le Centre de 
recherches et d’études sur les droits fondamentaux de l’Université de Paris Ouest-Nanterre la Défense (CREDOF) in the case CE, Ass., 11 
avril 2012, Gisti et FAPIL.  
1887 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 22. 
1888 The emblematic cases referred to international law texts providing the recipient (i.e. the child in Article 10 CRC of 
26 January 1990, and the employee in Articles 2 and 4 of the ILO Convention of 22 June 1982) or conferring rights 
against the State to individuals or groups in specific situations (“the litigant” or “the defendant” is entitled to a fair trial 





“the population”. The existence of individual subjective rights in the present case was not 
acknowledged even by rejecting the appellant’s full assimilation of the protection granted under 
international humanitarian law and the protection under human rights law: for the Court of 
Appeal, only some of the invoked IHL provisions embody the protection afforded by the latter and, 
as such, involve individuals (e.g. in relation to genocide, torture, slavery); besides, the rights claimed 
under the invoked IHL are not of the same nature (e.g. in relation to the transfer of population, the 
destruction of property).1889 
Moreover, according to the Versailles Court, the invoked conventional norms could not confer 
upon individuals (or the Palestinian people who the PLO indicated to represent) the right to rely 
directly on them before a court. 
However, the aforementioned passages of the appeal judgment on the vertical effect of IHL 
conventional norms call several remarks.  
Firstly, it is worth noting that only two of the ICJ’s advisory opinions refer to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (i.e. the 1996 Opinion on the legality of use of nuclear weapons and the 2004 Opinion 
on the construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory) and no one reveals that its 
travaux préparatoires “ne contenaient que des obligations à la charge des États et que la faculté pour les individus de 
s’en prévaloir n’était pas évoquée”.1890 At the most, in the advisory opinion on the wall the ICJ held that: 
“… the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention sought to guarantee the protection of civilians in time of war, 
regardless of the status of the occupied territories, as is shown by Article 47 of the Convention. That interpretation is 
confirmed by the Convention’s travaux prèparatoires. The Conference of Government Experts convened by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross [...] in the aftermath of the Second World War for the purpose of preparing 
the new Geneva Conventions recommended that these conventions be applicable to any armed conflict ‘whether [it] is or 
is not recognised as a state of war by the parties’ and ‘in cases of occupation of territories in the absence of any state of 
war’”.1891 It seems that this passage has nothing to do with what the Court of Appeal of Versailles 
stated. It is true that it relates to the States Parties’ obligations to the Fourth Geneva Convention 
and that “the ability for individuals to rely on is not mentioned” (as affirmed by the Court of Appeal), but 
this was not the purpose of the reproduced passage concerning the subject of this convention (i.e. the 
protection of civilians) and its scope (armed conflict) without questioning whether it confers upon 
individuals some rights and obligations. 
Secondly, the Court of Appeal’s assertion that the Fourth Geneva Convention entails only 
                                                
1889 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 23. 
1890 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 22. 
1891 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ 





obligations upon States is incorrect. Certain prohibitions (such as murder, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture of persons not or no longer participating in hostilities, under common Article 
3 GCs) are addressed to individuals, and common Articles 50, 51, 130, 147 GCs criminalise such 
conducts as taken by individuals (not by States), without distinguishing whether they are or not State 
organs.1892 Further, the Court’s incorrect assertion would also mean that common Article 3 GCs 
(which is applicable even to conflicts not of an international character) would not bind organised 
opposition groups acting as non-state belligerents; it would also mean that international criminal 
tribunals would be wrong in attributing serious violations of the four Geneva Conventions to the 
accused persons. In any case, prohibitions imposed upon a State create correlative rights for 
individuals. 
Thirdly, as to the Court’s statement that in the Fourth Geneva Convention “seules quelques 
dispositions” embody the protection afforded by human rights law and, as such, involve individuals, it 
is worth noting that this assertion contradicts the one examined just above: while its travaux 
préparatoires contain only obligations on States and the right of individuals to rely on is not 
mentioned, certain of its provisions have a direct effect like human rights instruments. 
As regards the Court’s contention that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not address the 
individual because it focuses on groups such as “protected persons” or “the population”, this point seems 
inconsistent with the aforementioned recognition of the direct effect of certain provisions; the 
reference to “protected persons” and “the people” in a collective form does not exclude the legal existence 
of individual components of these groups.  
Overall, the Court’s reasoning contains some contradictory and confused aspects, besides 
suffering from a serious lack of accuracy. 
 
I.B. (a)(2) As to the horizontal effect of IHL conventional norms (meaning that private companies are 
bound by the invoked norms, so implying a status as subjects of international law), the Versailles 
judges primarily ruled that the international legal personality of transnational corporations is 
recognised “de façon très limitée”: their international capacity is partly allowed under specific 
conventional instruments, basically of economic nature, in order to protect their business activities 
                                                
1892 The grave breaches specified in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (Art. 50, 51, 130, 147 respectively) include: 
“willful killing of a protected person”; “torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; willfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health of a protected person”; “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” (this provision is not included in Art. 130 GCIII). Other grave braches specified in 
Art. 147 GCIV include: “compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of the hostile Power”; “willfully depriving a protected person 
of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the Convention; unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected 





in foreign countries vis-à-vis States which may be in dispute with them (e.g. the 1965 Washington 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States), or concerning the responsibility for the environment (e.g. the 1969 Brussels International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1993 Lugano Convention on Civil 
Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment).1893 Conversely, the 
Versailles Court emphasised that the obligations under the IHL conventions (whose breach was 
claimed by the OLP) should be specifically formulated against corporations, while they are 
addressed only to States.1894 Its conclusion was that the defendants companies, which were nor 
signatories to those conventions or direct recipient of their ensuing obligations, are not subjects of 
international law; as far as they lack international legal personality, those norms cannot be opposed 
to them.1895  
It is worth noting a certain inconsistency of this articulation of the Court’s reasoning, also in 
view of the ICJ’s statement in the Reparation case, namely that “the subjects of law in any legal system are 
not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the 
community”.1896 In particular, the Versailles Court seems to overlook positive law. The view that 
Alstom of Veolia may not be recipients of obligations under the invoked treaties seems as incorrect 
as affirming that individuals are not recipients of conventions because they are not Contracting 
Parties. Even though natural or legal persons cannot create rules of public international law, the 
latter may confer upon them rights and obligations. As far as legal persons are specifically 
concerned, the possibility to be addresses of obligations under international law, and, as such, be 
subjects of international law, is emblematically confirmed in European Union competition law (e.g. 
Arts. 101-102 TFEU 1897 ) or in other international legal instruments that require States to 
                                                
1893 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 23. 
1894 The Court referred again to Articles 49(6) and 53 GCIV, and Article 4 of the Hague Convention of 1954. 
1895 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 23, holding that “Les sociétés intimées morales de droit privé qui ne sont pas signataires 
des conventions invoquées, ni destinataires des obligations qui les contiennent, ne sont pas, en conséquence, des sujets de droit international. 
Dépourvues de la personnalité internationale, elles ne peuvent se voir opposer les différentes normes dont se prévaut l’appelante”. 
1896 ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, ICJ Report 
1949, p. 174, at 179. On this point, see L. Van den Herik and J.L. Cernic, “Regulating Corporations under 
International Law: From Human Rights to International Criminal Law and Back Again”, 8 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 2010, at 725 ff.; M. Fasciglione, “Corporate Liability, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Future of the 
Alien Tort Claims Act: Some Remarks after Kiobel”, Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 2013, at 401 ff.; P. Acconci, “La 
rilevanza per le imprese multinazionali degli obblighi convenzionali in materia di diritti della persona umana”, Diritti 
Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 2011, at 299 ff. 
1897 See Arts. 101-102 TFEU (former Arts. 85-86 of the 1957 Rome Treaty establishing the EEC, which turned into 
Arts. 81-82 after the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty), which typifies as crimes the abuse of a dominant position and 





incorporate the criminal or civil liability of corporations in their legislation in certain areas.1898 
Although the practice is not unanimous, as evidenced by this case or in others such as Kiobel,1899 
some additional remarks are noteworthy. Primarily, some excerpts from the judgments by the 
United States Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, in two trials following the Second World War, did 
refer to IHL breaches perpetrated by the corporations themselves, although the latter had not been 
charged as those trials were conducted against the natural persons running them and the Tribunal 
did not have jurisdiction over legal persons. Specifically, in the I.G. Farben Trial acts of plunder and 
pillage were addressed as acts of the company1900 by the Tribunal, which admitted the possibility 
that a juristic person breaches the laws and customs of war.1901 Furthermore, in the Krupp Trial the 
Krupp firm was found capable to take part in a crime,1902 to commit acts of plunder1903 and the war 
                                                
1898 E.g., see the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, whose 
Article 1(2) provides that “The States Parties declare criminal organization, institutions and individuals committing the crime of 
apartheid”; the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal, which requires States parties to prohibit “all persons” (natural or legal) from transporting or disposing of 
hazardous waste unless authorized or allowed to do so; the 1999 UN International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism (Art. 5), the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(A/RES/55/25), which criminalises the participation in an organized criminal group, the laundering of proceeds of 
crime, corruption, and obstruction of justice (Arts. 5, 6, 8, 23), and the 2001 European Convention on Cybercrime (Art. 
12). 
1899 See Supreme Court of the United States, Kiobel et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al., No.10-1491, 17 April 2013. A 
general presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law was found for claims under the Alien Tort Statute (US 
federal common law), also recognising that the law on which a claimant relies has to “overcome” such presumption, 
possibly via a considerable connection to the U.S. territory or interests. According to the Court, the ATS did not 
provide a possibility for justice for twelve Nigerian citizens against Dutch and British oil companies (Royal Dutch 
Petroleum and its subsidiaries), alleging that (via the Nigerian subsidiary) the companies had aided and abetted international 
law norms violations of human rights as committed by Nigerian military in the 1990s on foreign soil (Nigeria). In particular, 
the Nigerian subsidiary allegedly supplied transportation to Nigerian forces; allegedly permitted the utilisation of their 
property as “a staging ground for attacks”; allegedly suppplied food for the soldiers concerned; and provided compensation 
to them. In dismissing the case, the judges of the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit unanimously agreed that 
the simple presence of a multinational corporation was not an evident connection to U.S.  
1900 See U.S. Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, The United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al., Judgment of 30 July 1948, in 
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Vol. VIII, United States Government Printing Office, 
Washington, 1950, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-VIII.pdf. In the judgment 
convicting twenty-three senior executives of the I.G. Farben Company, the Tribunal held: “With reference to the charges in 
the present indictment concerning Farben’s activities in Poland, Norway, Alsace-Loraine, and France we find that the proof establishes beyond 
a reasonable doubt that offences against property as defined in Control Council Law No. 10 were committed by Farben, and that these offences 
were connected with, and an inextricable part of the German policy for occupied countries [...]. In some instances, following confiscation by 
Reich authorities, Farben proceeded permanently to acquire substantial or controlling interests in property contrary to the wishes of the owners. 
[...] The action of Farben and its representatives, under these circumstances, cannot be differentiated from acts of plunder and pillage committed 
by officers, soldiers, or public officials of the German Reich. [...] Such action on the part of Farben constituted a violation of the Hague 
Regulations”, ibid., p. 1140. 
1901 Ibid., p. 1132-33, holding: “Where private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed to exploit the military occupancy by 
acquiring private property against the will and consent of the former owner, such action not being expressly justified by any applicable provision 
of the Hague Regulations, is in violation of international law. [...] Similarly, where a private individual or a juristic person becomes a party to 
unlawful confiscation of public or private property by planning and executing a well-defined design to acquire such property permanently, 
acquisition under such circumstances subsequent to the confiscation constitutes conduct in violation of the Hague Regulations”. 
1902 See U.S. Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, The United States of America v. Alfried Felix Alwyn von Bohlen und Halbach and 
Eleven Others, Judgment of 31 July 1948, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Vol. IX, United 





crime of pillage, besides using forced labour of prisoners of war, foreign workers and civilian 
concentration camp inmates to work in its armament factories in breach of Article 6 HRs. 
Conversely, other cases in which corporations’ rights have been recognised under international 
law do not reject the view that they may be subject to direct legal obligations. In the advisory 
opinion on the wall the International Court of Justice found that, “given that the construction of the wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory has, inter alia, entailed the requisition and destruction of homes, businesses and 
agricultural holdings, … Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal 
persons concerned”.1904 Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has 
not excluded “the possibility that a commercial company may be awarded pecuniary compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage” resulting from a violation of the ECHR,1905 and it has also admitted the possibility to invoke 
the rights secured “to everyone” within the jurisdiction of a State party.1906  
In view of the general acknowledgment of States’ power to create (through relationships with 
other actors of the international system) “derivatives” international actors, remarkably some authors 
have highlighted that States may be intended to confer a limited and functional international legal 
personality to multinational enterprises (often as investors, in view of treaties conferring investment 
rights on corporations which then become capable of asserting and enforcing them), without 
                                                                                                                                                            
criminals_Vol-IX.pdf, pp. 1351-1352. In the judgment convicting twelve executives of the German Krupp company, 
the Tribunal held: “the confiscation of the Austin plant based upon German inspired anti-Jewish laws and its subsequent detention by the 
Krupp firm constitute a violation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations”, ibid., p. 1353; “[...] it is conclusively shown that throughout 
German industry in general, and the firm of Krupp and its subsidiaries in particular, prisoners of war of several nations including French, 
Belgian, Dutch, Polish, Yugoslav, Russian, and Italian military internees were employed in armament production in violation of the laws and 
customs of war”, ibid., p. 1376. 
1903 Ibid., p. 1370, holding: “We conclude that it has been clearly established by credible evidence that from 1942 onward illegal acts of 
spoliation and plunder were committed by, and on behalf of, the Krupp firm in the Netherlands on a large scale, and that particularly, between 
about September 1944 and the spring of 1945 certain industries of the Netherlands were exploited and plundered for the German war effort, in 
the most ruthless way, without consideration of the local economy, and in consequence of a deliberate design and policy”. 
1904 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ 
Reports 2004, p. 198, para. 152. 
1905 ECHR, Grand Chamber, Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal, 6 April 2000, para. 35, in which the Court held: “In the light of 
its own case-law and that practice, the Court cannot therefore exclude the possibility that a commercial company may be awarded pecuniary 
compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The Court reiterates that the Convention must be interpreted and applied in such a way as to 
guarantee rights that are practical and effective. Accordingly, since the principal form of redress which the Court may order is pecuniary 
compensation, it must necessarily be empowered, if the right guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention is to be effective, to award pecuniary 
compensation for non-pecuniary damage to commercial companies, too”. 
1906 ECHR, Grand Chamber, Sté. Colas Est et al. v. France, 16 April 2002, para. 41, in which the Court held: “The Court 
reiterates that the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions (see, mutatis mutandis, 
Cossey v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 184, p. 14, § 35 in fine). As regards the rights secured to 
companies by the Convention, it should be pointed out that the Court has already recognised a company's right under Article 41 to 
compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Comingersoll v. Portugal 
[GC], no. 35382/97, §§ 33-35, ECHR 2000-IV). Building on its dynamic interpretation of the Convention, the Court considers that the 
time has come to hold that in certain circumstances the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention may be construed as including the right 





denying States’ typical role as subject of law.1907 Moreover, such international legal personality may 
be more developed in respect to other non-state actors in view of corporations’ influence of over 
global political and social realities. 
 
1.B. (b) As anticipated, the alleged unlawfulness of the “cause” of the contracts because of the 
companies’ violation of IHL norms was also invoked by virtue of (1) the customary nature acquired 
by these norms and even (2) their imperative character.  
1.B. (b)(1) According to the OLP the existence of a customary rule of international law on corporate 
liability for human rights violations would allow applying the IHL norms in question, and thus the 
obligations imposed on States, to private companies.1908 Conversely, the defendant companies’ 
denial of such a customary rule was argued in view of the necessary indication of States’ practice 
and opinio juris and the apparent exclusion of an implicit recognition of international legal 
personality to transnational corporations by such practice. 
The Versailles Court concluded for the absence of evidence of such a customary rule on account 
of three main considerations. First, the view that the interpretation of “organs of society” or “group” in 
the 1948 UDHR includes companies remains questionable. Second, as regards the role of courts in 
the application of corporate responsibility, the US cases cited by the OLP (i.e. Filarga/Pena Irala-
Sosa/Alvares Machain) were deemed as not relevant since they discussed the enactment of a 
domestic legislation (i.e. the Alien Tort Claims Act), or because some of them had “criminal” aspects 
(Saro WIWA/RoyalDutch) being the company prosecuted for complicity in the murder and torture 
of several opponents to the Nigerian military junta. Even the invoked decisions of French courts 
                                                
1907 See, e.g., J. Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility. Limitations and Opportunities in International Law, 
Cambridge, 2006, at 75 ff. On the gradual transformation of the role of multinational corporations in the international 
order, see Sacerdoti, “Le società e le imprese nel diritto internazionale: dalla dipendenza dallo Stato nazionale a diretti 
destinatari di obblighi e responsabilità internazionali”, Diritto del commercio internazionale, 2013, at 109 ff. On the will of 
States to determine what (and who) has legal significance at the international level, see C. Focarelli, International Law as a 
Social Construct, Oxford, 2012, at 223 ff. 
1908 The OLP relied on the position formulated by Prof. Chemillier Gendreau: under such customary rule of 
international law, “les règles fondamentales du droit international s’appliquent aux entreprises privées notamment aux multinationales qui 
doivent répondre devant les juridictions nationales et internationales de leur responsabilité pour violation de ces règles”. In this regard, 
several circumstances were addressed in support of this rule: the reference in the 1948 UDHR of “every organ of society” 
(preamble) and “group” (Article 30); the acknowledgment by the PCIJ (in the Advisory Opinion No. 15 on the Jurisdiction of the 
Courts of Danzig, 3 March 1928), that a treaty may confer subjective rights and obligations of individuals; the assimilation 
to jus cogens of many IHL norms by the ICTY; the increasingly frequent referral to national courts of individuals’ 
petitions against corporate responsibility for violations of international law (concerning human rights, labour law, 
environmental law, humanitarian law); the recognition in French courts of violations of the ECHR, the ICESCR and 
the ILO Convention; the work of international organizations (the ILO Declaration and the OECD Guiding Principles, 
the UN General Assembly’s Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, groups, and Organs of Society 
adopted on 9 December 1998); policy statements; NGOs measures; the acceptance by States of the principle of 
corporate responsibility for violation of international law; the doctrine’s opinion. See Court d’Appel de Versailles, op. 





were considered as no longer relevant, because they occurred in a criminal context or they were 
related to the application of the ECHR, without connection with the present circumstances and the 
invoked IHL conventions. Third, the signs in favour of corporate responsibility were deemed 
additional to a key element for the formation of a customary norm, namely a general practice of 
States consenting to recognise the legal value of such a norm as a principle to be applied. According 
to the Court, the various elements of soft law cited by the OLP did not allow to consider that the 
conditions for the existence of a customary rule establishing la “responsabilité générale des entreprises 
transnationales pour violation des Droits de l’Homme” were met; during the search for such a norm, the 
notions of humanitarian law and human rights (affect to the human person and her/his dignity) 
were assimilated. 
Thus, the international standards whose violation was invoked by the OLP were deemed as not 
enforceable against the French companies. 
 
1.B. (b)(2) Regarding the imperative character of the IHL norms invoked by the appellant (i.e. those 
related to the prohibition to transfer the occupying power’s population into the occupied territories, 
the prohibition to destroy and expropriate property therein, the obligation to respect cultural 
property of the occupied population, and the prohibition to confiscate), the OLP argued that they 
represent irreducible principles of jus cogens that “devait s’entendre comme un ordre public international qui 
s’impose à tous les sujets de droit international”, and such order is hierarchically superior to the French 
public law.1909  
Conversely, according to the defendant companies the notion of ius cogens is not recognised 
under France law, it could not be applied since it has not acquired customary value. They denied 
the effect attributed by the OLP to jus cogens as well as the reference to international public order 
that would include the invoked IHL norms. They refuted the existence of an international public 
order as a normative standard. For the defendants, even if those norms had customary value this 
would not be sufficient to enforce them in relation to private legal persons. 
In this regard, the Court of Appeal highlighted that the customary nature of several IHL norms 
has been confirmed in the advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons.1910 Nonetheless, for the Versailles judges, the extent of such acknowledgement must be 
                                                
1909 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 25 and 27. 
1910 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, at 257, para. 79, 
holding that: “C’est sans doute parce qu’un grand nombre de règles du droit humanitaire applicables dans les conflits armés sont si 
fondamentales pour le respect de la personne humaine et pour des considérations élémentaires d’humanité selon l’expression utilisée par la cour 





qualified as the ICJ’s wording does not allow to consider as custom all IHL norms: “il est déclaré que se 
trouvent concernées ‘un grand nombre de règles’, en outre il est pris en considération la protection assurée par la règle à 
savoir ‘le caractère fondamental pour la personne humaine’, ‘des considérations élémentaires d’humanité’ en lien avec la 
protection de la personne humaine et de sa dignité. En outre, la CIJ ne cite au titre des destinataires de l’obligation, que 
les Etats auxquels il est interdit d’écarter la norme par les clauses d’un traité de sorte que se pose le problème de leur 
applicabilité, aux sociétés françaises intimées”.1911 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal considered that the invoked notion of ius cogens remains 
variously interpreted. For some, it has effect exclusively under the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties that adopted it,1912 and so it prohibits States to adopt a conventional norm contrary to it. 
In noting that domestic law does not recognise the notion of jus cogens, even in this limited aspect, the 
Court of Appeal highlighted that France is not a party to the Vienna Convention and repeated a 
quote by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs which reflects an opposition to that notion.1913 It 
was then noted that under French law ius cogens has the same value of customary law, it does not 
meet the requirements of international law and it only serves to solve conflicts of international 
norms. Conversely, for others such as the appellant, jus cogens is a broader concept enforceable 
against the subjects of international law, and IHL norms having this nature could not be 
derogated.1914  
However, for the Versailles judges, even if it could be proven that the relevant IHL norms 
constitute ius cogens, they would only apply to States, without a direct binding effect to private 
companies, stressing that the concept of non-derogation or “non dérogeabilité” of a norm does not 
imply formal hierarchy of the norms in question. The appellant’s argument was then rejected by 
repeating that “les entreprises ne sont sujets de droit international qu’exceptionnellement” (i.e. in relation to the 
conventions they signed or to specific areas that apply to them, such as labor law or environmental 
law) “et en l’espèce, cette condition n’existe pas, les normes en cause appartenant au droit humanitaire”.1915  
For the Court of Appeal, the existence of a higher international public order qualified as “jus 
                                                                                                                                                            
bénéficié d’une large adhésion des Etats. Ces règles fondamentales s’imposent d’ailleurs à tous les Etats qu’ils aient ou non ratifié les 
instruments conventionnels qui les expriment parce qu’elles constituent des principes intransgressibles du droit international coutumier”. 
1911 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 26. 
1912 Article 53 VCLT. 
1913 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, op. cit., at 26. That quote emphasises several aspects: the composition of ius cogens is 
uncertain; the inaccuracies featuring jus cogens have not been reduced since 1969; the vagueness about the content of this 
concept remains despite the contributions of international jurisprudence; the mode of formation of a peremptory norm 
is unclear; imprecision characterises the effects of jus cogens because, despite the entry into force of the Convention, the 
risk has not gone that the pacta sunt servanda rule is ignored by an abusive invocation of jus cogens. See Chronique 
Charpentier, AFDI, 1993, at 1055. 
1914 The OLP quoted the recognition of such a notion by Professor Kolb, according to which “truffée de dispositions 
protectrices de la personne dans une situation de vulnérabilité prononcée, elle établit un standard minimum d’ordre public”.  





cogens” (including the humanitarian rules that were invoked and that should be applied) was not 
demonstrated. Therefore, the application of the Hague and Geneva Law in question against the 
French companies under the jurisdiction of national law in the name of an international public 
order resulting from jus cogens was rejected. The Court emphasised that those IHL provisions could 
not be imposed on domestic courts as rules relating to fundamental subjective human rights as 
contended by the appellant, because they correspond to rights of another nature, whose respect and 
protection relate to States, but which cannot be applied to private legal persons. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the OLP could not claim against Alstom and Veolia the 
violations of Articles 49 and 53 GCIV, Articles 23 and 46 HRs, and Article 4 of the 1954 Hague 
Convention nor the 1977 Protocol I, for the contracts signed with Citypass during the construction 
of the tramline or for having participated in the public service concession contract to which they 
were not parties: its request concerning the unlawfulness of these contracts could only be rejected. 
It is worth considering that, the unlawfulness of the contracts awarded by Alstom and Veolia 
could have been explained without relying on that notion of ius cogens contested by France, but, 
instead, by reiterating, firstly, the criminal nature of the establishment of the aforementioned 
settlements under international norms legally binding to France (i.e. Art. 49(6) GCIV combined with 
Art. 147 GCIV criminalise the “illegal transfer”; Art. 85(4)(a) API and Art. 8(2)(b)(viii) ICC Statute 
explicitly recognise it as a war crime), and, secondly, the absolute obligation upon Israel to put an 
end to the settlements policy under the Geneva Convention and Security Council’s resolutions 
demanding the withdrawal from the occupied territories (Arts. 25 and 103 UN Charter). 
 
Overall, the significance of the Veolia case is reflected in the multiplicity of means (i.e. 
campaigning, advocacy and litigation) employed to promote and bring about respect for 
international law by corporations.1916 Apparently the pressure originated from such measures 
induced Veolia to withdraw from the railway project in 2011.1917 Further loss of large contracts and 
reputational costs were then suffered by this company because of its involvement in activities 
undertaken in the Palestinian occupied territory.1918  
Of note, another exclusion for Veolia from public contracts with UK local councils, under UK 
and EU procurement law, was debated in 2012 due to its involvement in activities of “‘grave 
                                                
1916  See O. Barghouti, “Derailing Injustice: Palestinian Civil Resistance to the “Jerusalem Light Rail”, 
http://www.jerusalemquarterly.org/images/ArticlesPdf/38_Derailing_Injustice.pdf  
1917 See Ma’an New Agency, “France's Veolia pulls out of Jerusalem tram project”, 30 November 2010. 
1918 See A. Nieuwhof, “Veolia suffering ‘expensive’ damage due to Palestine campaigners’ publicity, says financial 





misconduct’ in the conduct of business under any reasonable interpretation”.1919 A legal briefing clarified that 
Veolia “operates as a single entity worldwide, providing transport, sewage treatment, landfill and waste collection 
services that benefit illegal Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the occupied West Bank”, and this conduct 
was criticised for directly assisting serious violations of international humanitarian law. 1920 
Conversely, Veolia has still served a landfill in the Jordan Valley area of the occupied West Bank 
(near the Israeli settlement of Masua) and run transportation services from settlements of the 
occupied territories to Israel. 
As regards the French Government’s position vis-à-vis its and the EU institutions, it is worth 
considering its proclaimed foreign policy and legal commitments to ensure respect for “human rights 
and fundamental freedoms” and the “rule of law” (international and internal), even set out in the 2009 
“EU Guidelines on the promotion of compliance with international humanitarian law” in third 
countries.1921 On the one hand, the Versailles Court’s conclusions may create legal and political 
dissonance for their apparent incompatibility with the condemnations by both French and EU 
institutions of the settlements issue and their institutional practice vis-à-vis such settlements in terms 
of EU-Israel relations.1922 On the other hand, in the Veolia case the theoretical basis for ascertaining 
corporate responsibility raises the open issue of international economic competitiveness in respect to 
other businesses in different national jurisdictions which do not prevent them contributing to similar 
violations of international law and do not held them accountable for such breaches, including under 
civil and criminal liabilities as well as exclusion from public tendering. 
 
                                                
1919  Under Article 23(4)(e) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2006, which was enacted to comply with the 
requirements of EU Directive 2004/18/EC (31 March 2004), a public body may exclude a bidder or reject a bid where 
it is found that the individual or organization concerned “has committed an act of grave misconduct” in his business or 
profession. See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2006/1/regulation/23/made; Directive 2004/18/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, Official Journal L 134, 30/04/2004 P. 0114 – 
0240, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0018:EN:HTML  
1920 For a detailed reasoning on this view, see “Excluding Veolia from public contracts” - A legal briefing note prepared by 
Hickman and Rose, Solicitors, at http://jfjfp.com/?page_id=30850. See “Canterbury Council meeting interrupted by 
Middle East Protest”, 13 February 2012, http://www.thisiskent.co.uk/Canterbury-council-meeting-interrupted-
Middle/story-15214437-detail/story.html#axzz2ehAThMVC  
1921 Updated European Union Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), OJ C 
303, 15 Decemebr 2009, p. 12-17, available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/human_rights_in_third_countries/ah0004_en.htm  
1922 See the EU-Israel Association Agreement, signed on 20 November 1995 and entered into force on 1 June 2000, 
Article 2 (“Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and 
democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement”). See also 
the Report by Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, “Eu-Israel Relations: Promoting and Ensuring Respect 
For International Law”, February 2012; it examines Israel’s integration into the EU Internal Market as well as the EU 
corrective measures in relation to the State practice of expanding the implementation of its cooperation instruments 





2.2. Bil’in Village case 
Bil’in is a Palestinian village located north of Jerusalem and west of Ramallah in the central West 
Bank, and its municipal lands touch the 1967 border with the State of Israel (i.e. the Green Line).  
2.2.1. The suits before Canadian courts and the controversial viability of civil claims 
for war crimes allegedly committed abroad 
In July 2008 the Village Council of Bil’in and the Head of the Village Council sued two Quebec-
registered corporations and their sole Director and Officer before the Superior Court in the District 
of Montreal, Québec.1923 The plaintiffs claimed that Green Park International Inc. and Green 
Mount International Inc., “on their own behalf and as de facto agents of the State of Israel”, had illegally 
constructed residential and other buildings on Bil’in’s territory (more precisely on land owned by the 
late Ahmed Issa Abdallah Yassin) as well as marketing and selling condominium units and/or other 
built up areas to the Israeli civilian population, creating a new dense settlement neighbourhood 
therein (i.e. since 2003 the East Mattityahu neighbourhood of the Modi’in Illit settlement, which sits in 
part on confiscated Bil’in’s lands.1924 In doing so, the defendants were claimed to be accountable to 
international law and Canadian domestic law for aiding, abetting, assisting and conspiring with the 
State of Israel in carrying out the illegal purpose of transferring (directly or indirectly) portions of its 
civilian population to the occupied territories, and so assisting in the alleged commission of war 
crimes in the West Bank.  
In this regard, the pleaded sources of legal obligations included: Article 49(6) GCIV which 
prohibits the occupying power from transferring “parts of its own population onto the territory it occupies”; 
Article 1(1) and Article 85(4)(a) API which classifies a violation of Article 49 as a grave breach (thus 
as war crime); Article 8(2)(b)(viii) which sets out that prohibition as a war crime, and Article 25(c) 
ICC Statute. The plaintiffs contended that Israel was in breach of these provisions and the 
defendants were assisting (therefore civilly liable for) in such a violation.1925 They framed this alleged 
participation as a civil wrong by invoking the standards of conduct articulated in the Geneva 
                                                
1923 Superior Court of Quebec, Bil’in (Village Council) and Ahmed Issa Abdallah Yassin v. Green Park International Inc., Green 
Mount International Inc. and Annette Laroche, R.G. No. 500-17-044030-081, 2009 QCCS 4151, Judgment of 18 September 
2009.  
1924 In 1991 large lots of agricultural lands under Bil’in’s municipal jurisdiction were declared “state land” as part of a big 
expropriation project undertaken by the Israeli Civil Administration, which allocated for the construction of the Modin’in 
Illit settlement since 2001. 





Conventions Act and the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act1926 to claim that the defendants 
were liable in tort under Article 1457 of the Civil Code of Quebec, which sets out the basic principle of 
extra-contractual civil liability under Quebec civil law.1927 Apparently this was the first time in 
Canada for plaintiffs instituting a civil claim for war crimes. It is worth noting that that serious 
allegation was highly politically charged, since the personal consent of the Attorney General (i.e. the 
Minister of Justice) or Deputy Attorney General is required for such a prosecution.1928  
The plaintiffs sought only punitive damage and injunctions (against the two corporations and 
their sole director, officers, agents or any other persons under their direction or control) to cease 
immediately all constructions and sales activities in Bil’in, to demolish the buildings in dispute, and 
to restore the lands concerned to their condition prior construction. They also mentioned violations 
concerning freedom of movement and the denial of access to, use of, and control over land 
historically used “for livelihood purposes”. 
A series of motions to dismiss were filed by the defendants, pleading no cause of action, State 
immunity, lack of standing, forum non conveniens, and res judicata. The Québec Superior Court rejected 
most of these motions either in whole or in part; for instance, it refused to grant them immunity 
under the State Immunity Act, ruling that the corporations were alleged to be acting in their own 
capacity and not as agents of Israel.1929 
Remarkably, Justice Louis-Paul Cullen ruled (for the first time in Canada) that the commission 
of a war crime could be the subject of a civil lawsuit in Québec: “A war crime is an indictable offence. As 
such, it is an imperative rule of conduct that implicitly circumscribes an elementary norm of prudence, the violation of 
which constitutes a civil fault pursuant to art. 1457 C.C.Q.”.1930 Furthermore, the Court found that 
knowingly participating in a war crime could potentially lead to civil liability in a Quebec court: “In 
theory, a person would therefore commit a civil fault pursuant to art. 1457 C.C.Q. by knowingly participating in a 
foreign country in the unlawful transfer by an occupying power of a portion of its own civilian population into the 
territory it occupies, in violation of an international instrument which the occupying power has ratified. Such a person 
would thus be knowingly assisting the occupying power in the violation of the latter’s obligations and would also 
                                                
1926 The Geneva Conventions Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. G-3) and the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (S.C. 2000, c. 
24) have enacted the Geneva Conventions and the ICC Statute into Canadian criminal law, and they confer on 
Canadian courts criminal jurisdiction over war crimes committed anywhere in the world. 
1927 Under Article 1457 of the Civil Code of Quebec, “Every person has a duty to abide by the rules of conduct which lie upon him, 
according to the circumstances, usage or law, so as not to cause injury to another”. 
1928 See Geneva Conventions Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. G-3), 3 (4); Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (S.C. 2000, c. 24) 9 
(3). 
1929 See Superior Court of Quebec, Bil’in (Village Council) and Ahmed Issa Abdallah Yassin v. Green Park International Inc., Green 
Mount International Inc. and Annette Laroche, ibid., paras. 119-144. 





become a party to a war crime, thereby violating an elementary norm of prudence”.1931 
Nonetheless, the Superior Court declined jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens, ruling 
that the case had a much closer connection to Israel than Canada.1932 In this regard it is worth 
considering that the appropriateness of the Canadian forum could rely on the defendants’ 
incorporation in the Province of Québec and on the plaintiffs’ arguments that they pursued the suit 
in Canada because doing it in Israel would result in contravening “public order”.1933 In particular, the 
law as applied by Israeli courts would fail to take account of the Fourth Geneva Convention and 
they would declare as non-justiciable the facts of a suit on the legality of settlements in the West 
Bank; to the extent that this would condone the commission of war crimes recognised under both 
domestic and international law, this would be “manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in 
international relations”. Another compelling argument was that filing a civil suit for war crimes to the 
forum whose State is allegedly responsible for such crimes would be basically unjust, above all 
where the legality of State action with respect to war crimes is not a justiciable issue.1934  
The trial judge, however, rejected these arguments. Looking at the jurisprudence of the High 
Court of Justice,1935 Justice Cullen concluded that the cases concerned did not completely close the 
Israeli judicial authorities to Bil’in: according to his own interpretation of this case law, the HCJ 
refrained from applying Article 49(6) GCIV “not because of its unwillingness to adjudicate on its alleged 
violation by reason of the political significance of the matter, but either because it was unnecessary to do so or because 
the HCJ considered that it was not customary international law (contrary to what professor Ben-Naftali states in her 
footnote) and that it had not been incorporated into the domestic law of Israel through appropriate legislation”,1936 
concluding that this is not “manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in international relations” 
under the meaning of Article 3081 C.C.Q.1937 According to the Superior Court of Québec, the 
                                                
1931 Ibid., para. 176. 
1932 Under Article 3135 C.C.Q., “[e]ven though a Quebec authority has jurisdiction to hear a dispute, it may exceptionally and on an 
application by a party, decline jurisdiction if it considers that the authorities of another country are in a better position to decide”. 
1933 In Canada, in a tort action the lex loci delicti is the applicable law, but under Article 3081 C.C.Q., “[t]he provisions of the 
law of a foreign country do not apply if their application would be manifestly inconsistent with public order as understood in international 
relations”. 
1934 In order to support their position, the plaintiffs filed the affidavit of Professor Orna Ben-Naftali, who described the 
judicial policy of Israeli courts to refuse to review the legality of settlements with respect to international humanitarian 
law. Conversely, the defendants filed the affidavit of Israeli attorney Renato Jarach, who substantially agreed on that 
Israeli courts would not review the legality of settlements with respect to war crimes, but highlighting that this was 
because a judicial determination with such broad political aspects should defer to the political process (rather than 
because of a lack of legal tools to give judgment).  
1935 The parties submitted to the Superior Court of Québec three cases in which the HCJ refrain from applying Article 
49 GCIV: HCJ, Ayub v. Minister of Defense, (1978) 606/78, 33 (2) PD 113; HCJ, Dweikat v. Government of Israel, (1979) 
390/79, 34 (1) PD 1; HCJ, Bargil v. Government of Israel, (1991) 4481/91, 47 (4) PD 210. 
1936 Superior Court of Québec, Bil’in (Village Council) and Ahmed Issa Abdallah Yassin v. Green Park International Inc., Green 
Mount International Inc. and Annette Laroche, ibid., para. 288. 





juridical advantage sought by the plaintiffs was procedural: not having to argue before an Israeli 
court that the Fourth Geneva Convention has become part of customary international law (and thus 
part of Israeli law) since the 1970s. The trail judge found that this minor advantage over the 
defendants was not enough to justify an assertion of jurisdiction, in view of other connecting factors 
that “clearly point to the HCJ as the logical forum and the authority in a better position to decide”,1938 and he 
dismissed it.  
In a decision taken on 11 August 2010, the Québec Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the 
incidental appeal filed in October 2009 on the account of forum non conveniens, noting that the dispute 
essentially concerned citizens of the West Bank against corporations operating therein “in compliance 
with the law applicable in the West Bank” and so it would require “a great deal of imagination to claim that the 
action has a serious connection with Quebec”.1939 As regards the competence or jurisdiction of the HCJ, it 
was stressed that under art. 3135 C.Q.Q. the judge who declines jurisdiction is not required to 
designate a specific foreign court, being sufficient to refer to the “authorities of another country”, and that 
“the conclusion of the trial judgment do not rule out the possibility that the dispute be heard if necessary by another 
Israeli court”.1940 As regards the justiciability issue, the appellants had not shown that the trial judge 
committed an error that would justify interference by a higher court.1941 On 3 March 2011, the 
Supreme Court of Canada refused to review the Bil’in lawsuit and dismissed the application for 
Leave to Appeal filed in October 2010.1942  
 
It is worth noting the consistency of this dismissal with another decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada which refused to review a case brought forth by the Canadian Association Against 
Impunity against Anvil Mining Ltd. Previously the Quebec Court of Appeal held that Canadian 
courts lack jurisdiction over actions by Canadian corporations that are committed abroad when no 
                                                
1938 Ibid., para. 335. See paras. 305-335; in paragraph 317 the Court emphasised that “as it is presently framed, [plaintiffs’ 
case] can hardly lead to a just result”: by pursuing the demolition of many houses they had failed to include the “numerous 
owners or occupants ... thereby depriving those persons of the right to be heard, a fundamental tenet on natural justice”; by omitting Israel 
as a party they had bypassed sovereign immunity laws although they were indirectly seeking an “essential finding that 
[Israel] is committing a war crime”; they had not implead the Canadian attorney general or get his authorization, as 
required by Canadian law. 
1939 See Québec Court of Appeal, Bil’in (Village Council) v. Green Park International Inc., Green Mount International Inc. and 
Annette Laroche, R.G. No. 500-09-02-0084-091, 11 August 2010, para. 86. In paragraph 51 it was reaffirmed that the 
plaintiffs’ assertions of an ownership interest in the lands were inconsistent and that the plaintiffs were just seeking a 
judicial “declaration on the policy of the ‘occupying State’”. 
1940 See Québec Court of Appeal, ibid., paras. 62 and 70. 
1941 See Québec Court of Appeal, ibid., para. 79. 
1942 See Supreme Court of Canada, Bil’in (Village Council), Late Ahmed Issa Abdallah Yassin, Basem Ahmed Issa Yassin, Maysaa 
Ahmed Issa Yassin v. Green Park International Inc., Green Mount International Inc. and Annette Laroche, 2011 CanLII 10843 (SCC), 





“real and substantial connection” to activities that occurred within Canadian territory is found.1943  
In that case, the plaintiffs wanted to hold Anvil Mining Ltd. (a Quebec-registered corporation, 
but headquartered in Perth, Australia) accountable for complicity in crimes (including summary 
executions, rape, torture, illegal detention, destruction of homes, and looting) for its “logistical 
support” to the Congolese Army (FARDC) during a massacre of civilians occurred in 2004 near the 
town of Kilwa, which was situated fifty kilometres from the Dikulushi copper mine operated by 
Anvil Mining in 2002-2011.1944  
However, the Court of Appeal found that “Anvil’s activity in Quebec has no connection, directly or 
indirectly, to the ‘complicity’ in committing ‘war crimes’ or ‘crimes against humanity’ during the operation of a 
mine”.1945 According to the Court, the necessary requirements for jurisdiction were not satisfied: 
Anvil Mining did not have an office in Quebec at the time that such abuses occurred; since its 
Montreal office had no involvement in the decisions leading to the business’s alleged participation in 
the Kilwa massacre, the case could not be brought in Quebec.1946 Moreover, the Court of Appeal 
rejected the CAAI’s claim that it could not seek justice and pursue remedy for the victims of this 
massacre in either the Congolese judicial system 1947  or the Australian criminal system: the 
difficulties faced in Australia1948 were deemed not sufficiently compelling to bring its lawsuit in 
Canada under the principle of forum necessitatis, which requires exceptional circumstances such as 
“absolute impossibility at law or practical impossibility” in filing its lawsuit in the other forum.1949 
Even though Justice André Forget of the Court of Appeal found “regrettable to note that citizens have so 
                                                
1943 See Court of Appeal, Province of Quebec, Association Canadienne Contre L’Impunité (CAAI) c. Anvil Mining Ltd., File No. 
500-09-021701-115, Judgment, 24 January 2012, paras. 57-58, 67-68,  
1944 Ibid., paras. 21-26. In particular, Anvil allegedly provided rides to the military to the place of the massacre, 
supplying drivers, trucks and airplanes, fuel, and food. It was claimed that in failing to withdraw the vehicles, Anvil staff 
members “knowingly facilitated (the actions of) the accused … when they committed the war crimes”. Anvil maintained that the 
military requisitioned the vehicles and that it had no choice but to hand them over. 
1945 Ibid., para. 85. 
1946 Ibid., paras. 893 and 104. 
1947 In the DRC the plaintiffs’ difficulty in bringing their claims was mainly due to irregularities within the national 
judicial system, major barriers in lawyers’ access to victims, and threats along with intimidation, see OHCHR, “Report 
of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian 
Law Committed Within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Between March 1993 and June 2003”, 
August 2010, paras. 63, 869, 904, 1068. 
1948 In view of a 2005 documentary by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the Australian Federal Police opened 
an investigation into Anvil Mining’s complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes in the DRC, but in August 
2007 decided to drop it in light of the acquittal of the suspects in the DRC. In order to launch a civil action against the 
company, an Australian law firm representing sixty-one Congolese victims filed a preliminary application to the 
Western Australian Supreme Court to seek the “disclosure of documents”, but the validity of the agreements concerning the 
the lawyers’ representation of the plaintiffs was questioned by the defendant. In the subsequent attempt to return to the 
DRC to reconfirm these agreements, the DRC Government prevented the group of Congolese lawyers from flying to 
Kilwa and gaining access to the victims. This failed efforts along with security concerns for Congolese lawyers led the 
Australian law firm to withdraw from the case. See Requête Pour Autorisation D’Exercer Un Recours Collectif et Pour Être Désignée 
Repréntante, para. 2.206, Association Canadienne Contre L’Impunité c. Anvil Mining Limited, case No. 500-06-000530-101, (2010).  





much difficulty obtaining justice” and expressed “all of the sympathy that must be felt for the victims and the 
admiration that the NGOs’ involvement within the [ACCI] inspires”, his opinion was that “the legislation does not 
make it possible to recognise that Quebec has jurisdiction to hear this class action”.1950 
2.2.2. The petitions before the Israeli Supreme Court 
Before the unsuccessful attempt to hold the two Quebec-registered corporations accountable for 
their conduct on the Bil’in’s land and seek remedies before the Canadian judicial order, the 
complainant (the late Ahmed Issa Abdallah Yassin) submitted four petitions to the Israeli High 
Court of Justice against the Government and the IDF Commander in the West Bank (among other 
respondents).1951 
In particular, the first petition (filed on 5 September 2005) contested that the route of the 
separation wall cut off the village from over half of its municipal lands, based on relevant Israeli 
jurisprudence. The Court decided to order the respondents “to reconsider an alternative to the route of the 
separation fence on Bil’in land which will harm the residents of Bil’in to a lesser extent, and leave the cultivated land 
on the east side of the fence to the extent possible”; it upheld the complainant’s argument that the existing 
one was chosen in support of the construction of the neighbourhood (and not for security concerns). 
Accordingly, an arrangement of the barrier to a route closer to the settlement Modi’in Illit was made 
in July of 2011 (around 25 per cent of Bil’in’s land was returned to it, while other 25 per cent of its 
land has remained behind the wall). Conversely, the second petition (HCJ 143/06 of 4 January 4 
2006) disputed the validity of the activity carried out to construct the settlement neighbourhood East 
Mattityahu and of related building permits under the military orders applied to the occupied 
territories. The Court was asked “to annul the approval for coming into force which the settlement subcommittee 
had granted to planning scheme 210/8/1 in September 2005, and to order action necessary so as to enforce planning 
and construction law in ‘East Mattityahu’”. Green Park International, Inc. and Green Mount 
International, Inc. requested to be joined as respondents and they were approved. The Court 
deliberated that the building permits were unlawful and ordered an interim injunction which 
established the “immediate halt of any building without a building permit”, the “immediate cession of any activity 
to inhabit the buildings” in the zones concerned, and the halt of “all construction work in the zone pursuant to 
building permits”. On 27 August 2007 the second petition was dismissed, since a new version of 
                                                
1950 Ibid., para. 104. 
1951 See HCJ 8414/05, Ahmed Issa Abdallah Yassin, Bil’in Village Council Chairman v. The Government of Israel, The Military 
Commander in the West Bank, Green Park Inc., The Land Redemption Planning and Development Fund, Ein Amin Enterprise and 






planning scheme 210/8/1 was approved for deposit on 15 February 2006 (by the Israeli Civil 
Administration) and came into force on 31 January 2007, and new permits were issued in 
accordance with it. As regards the third petition against the same planning scheme, it was dismissed 
on 5 September 2007 in a decision based on laches, unreasonable delay; to the Court, the 
complainant’s objection should have been raised to the original plan. Finally, a fourth petition 
unsuccessfully sought to repeal retroactively a declaration concerning part of Bil’in’s lands as State 
land. Even though the complainants’ claims were deemed justified (because this declaration of 1991 
was discovered to rely “on false purchase claims” in the course of the litigation regarding the first 
petition), the Court held that the matter could not be decided so many years later. 
2.2.3. The individual complaint before the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
While there was no chance for the plaintiffs to be completely heard by the Canadian judicial system 
insofar as the case was never decided on the merits, accountability and remedial mechanisms in the 
Israeli judicial system did not reveal to be effective. This led the Bil’in Village Council, along with 
eleven village residents, to file an individual complaint to the Human Rights Committee under the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR on 28 February 2013, alleging that Canada has violated “its 
extraterritorial obligation to ensure respect for Articles 2, 7, 12, 17 and 27” of the Covenant.1952 Specifically, 
Canada has allegedly failed to regulate the corporations’ activities adequately so as to prevent 
violations in the occupied Palestinian territory and it has allegedly failed to provide effective 
remedies to hold them accountable for the human rights violations in which they have been 
complicit. 
                                                
1952 HRC, Mr. Mohammed Ibrahim Ahmed Abu Rahma et al. v. Canada, Communication No. 2285/2013, 28 February 2013. 
According to the complaints, the general foundations of extraterritorial obligations under the ICCPR include Article 55 
and 56 of the UN Charter (as under Art. 103 they “take precedence over any over international instruments, including bilateral 
agreements”). In considering the interpretation of Article 2(1) ICCPR (“within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”) the 
complainants refer not only to its General Comment No. 31 (in which the meaning was “within its territory or subject to its 
jurisdiction”, see UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para. 10) but also to its Concluding Observations on 
Israel of 2003, in which the Committee moved away from the effective control test, and, instead, applied the standard 
adopted in the ILC’s Draft Articles of 2001 (i.e. whether or not the act is attributable to a State and is a violation of an 
international legal obligation), stating that “the conduct by [Israeli] authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of 
rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law” 
constitute violations of the ICCPR. See also HRC, Concluding Observations: Yugoslavia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.16, 28 
December 1992, paras. 5, rejecting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)’s denial of 
responsibility for acts outside its territory on the basis of the links between the government of Serbia and Serbian 
nationalists in Bosnia and Croatia, and, instead, it “firmly urged the Federal Government to put an end to this intolerable situation for 
the observance of human rights, and to refrain from any support for those committing such acts, including in territory outside the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia”. See also HRC, Concluding Observations: Iran, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.25, 3 August 1993, para. 
9, condemning “the fact that a death sentence has been pronounced, without trial, in respect of a foreign writer, Mr. Salman Rushdie, for 
having produced a literary work and that general appeals have been made or condoned for his execution, even outside the territory of Iran”. See 
also HRC, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R 12/52, 6 June 1979, para. 10.3 (“it would be unconscionable to 





The articulation of the violations of the aforementioned provisions deserves attention. As to the 
right to freedom of movement under Article 12 ICCPR, the complainants claim the impossibility to 
access their lands used for generations for agriculture, grazing and other livelihood aims, due to the 
settlements built by the two corporations. 
As regards the right to be protected against illegal or arbitrary interference with her/his family, 
privacy, home or correspondence under Article 17 ICCPR, the complainants emphasise a number 
of issues. Firstly, the contested interference (“the building, marketing and selling of housing units to Israel 
settlers by the two corporations”, which are prohibited activities under international law) is argued to be 
unlawful under the meaning of this provision.1953 Secondly, the latter covers interferences stemming 
from State authorities and legal or natural persons.1954 Thirdly, the contested forced eviction from 
agricultural land (as resulted from the construction of Modi’in Illit) is understood as strictly coupled to 
housing as well as essential to the functioning of each family unit, so as falling within the scope of 
“home” as applied in Article 17 (i.e. where an individual resides or carries out her/his work1955) and 
then under the protection contained in this clause. In support of this argument, the interpretation 
given by the European Court of Human Rights (in two cases concerning access to, use of, and 
control over land used for traditional livelihood purposes) is emphasised in the complaint: such land 
was deemed part of a certain cultural way of life within the scope of  “home” and “private life” as 
enshrined in Article 8 ECHR; in the same vein, “a minority’s way of life” was considered “entitled to the 
protection guaranteed for an individual’s private life, family life and home”.1956 
Finally, in view that State authorities are under “the duty to provide the legislative framework banning 
such acts by natural or legal person”,1957 according to the complainants, Israeli authorities issued the 
declarations that resulted in the loss of the title over the lands in question, but it was the two 
corporations that carried out actual possession and use of those lands during the constructions of the 
settlements, thus being engaged in activities that violate Article 17 and Article 7 due to unlawful and 
arbitrary interference with their homes. 
As regards the rights of ethnic minorities to enjoy their own culture “in community with the other 
members of their group” under Article 27 ICCPR, the complainants (as “members of the indigenous 
                                                
1953 HRC, General Comment No. 16: Right to Privacy (art. 17), 9 April 1988, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), para. 3 (“the term 
“unlawful” means that no interference can take place except in cases envisaged by the law. Interference authorized by States can only take place 
on the basis of law, which itself must comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant”). 
1954 HRC, General Comment No. 16, ibid., para. 1. 
1955 HRC, General Comment No. 16, op. cit., para. 5. 
1956 EurCommHR, G. and E. v. Norway, Appl. Nos. 9278/81 and 9415/81, Decision on Admissibility, 3 October 1983, 
D.R. 35, p. 30; ECtHR (4th Section), Noack and others v. Germany, Appl. No. 46346/99, 25 May 2000, Rep. 2000-VI. 





Palestinian population”) contest the destruction of “their culture, including agricultural production and related 
close connection with the land” on account of the constructions of the settlements whose access is barred 
to them. In the same vein, such construction was argued to negate their capacity to enjoy their land 
for economic and cultural aims, putting emphasis on the Human Rights Committee’s view that “the 
rights protected by Article 27 include the right of persons, in community with others, to engage in economic and social 
activities which are part of the culture of the community to which they belong”1958 and that “culture manifests itself 
in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources, especially in [but not 
limited to given this language] the case of indigenous peoples”.1959 Focusing on past applications of Article 27 
to similar situations,1960 another basic issue concerns the dynamic dimension of culture and so the 
protection of livelihood activities that are “central to enjoyment of one’s culture”, whether or not they 
traditionally extend back for generations by nature.1961 Therefore, the complainants claim that the 
interference with the indigenous population’s livelihood based on agriculture (due to the planning 
and construction of settlements in the West Bank) gives rise to violations of Article 27, especially as 
both occupation and settlements violate international law. 
The Human Rights Committee could provide for a pioneering decision on the subject of 
corporate accountability and as regards States’ human rights extraterritorial obligations under the 
ICCPR, especially concerning the duty to regulate the conducts of nationals and home corporations 
acting abroad (as part of the obligation to protect).  
3. Criminal litigation in national legal orders  
3.1. The Riwal Group/Lima Holding B.V. case for corporate complicity in 
international crimes 
On 14 May 2013 the Netherlands Public Prosecutor’s Office decided to discontinue criminal 
proceedings against Lima Holdings B.V. (part of the Riwal Group, a Dutch private rental company 
                                                
1958  HRC, Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984, 26 March 1990, para. 32.2. 
1959 HRC, General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (art. 27), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (1994), para. 7. 
1960 HRC, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3, 2 September 2010, para. 24, in which grave 
concern was expressed on the “inadequate consideration of the Bedouin population in Israel” and the State party was 
required to respect, in the planning efforts in the Negev area, the right to their traditional livelihood based on 
agriculture and ancestral land. 
1961 HRC, Ilmari Länsman et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, 26 
October 1994, para. 9.8 (“With regard to the authors’ concerns about future activities, the Committee notes that economic activities must, 
in order to comply with article 27, be carried out in a way that the authors continue to benefit from reindeer husbandry. Furthermore, if mining 
activities in the Angeli area were to be approved on a large scale and significantly expanded by those companies to which exploitation permits 
have been issued, then this may constitute a violation of the authors' rights under article 27, in particular of their right to enjoy their own 





specialising in the field of vertical transportation) and its managing directors for alleged involvement 
in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, within the meaning of the 
International Criminal Act (Wet Internationale Misdrijven or WIM),1962 on account of its contribution - 
through the provision of mobile cranes and aerial working platforms - to the construction of the 
separation wall around various Palestinian villages and an industrial area nearby the Ariel West 
settlement on the West Bank.1963  
The contested acts were qualified as follows: “large-scale deliberate and unlawful destruction and 
appropriation of property without military necessity” committed against protected persons within the 
meaning of Article 5(1)(d) WIM, which is based on Article 147 GCIV; “transfer, directly or indirectly, by 
the occupying power of part of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” within the meaning of 
Article 5(5)(d) WIM, which is based on Article 49 GCIV; the crime against humanity of persecution 
pursuant Article 4(1)(h) WIM in conjunction with apartheid under the meaning of Article 4(1)(j) 
WIM. The locus delicti of the punishable acts was considered (partly) the Netherlands since the 
natural and legal persons under suspicious lived or resided or had their official seat therein and “the 
contested acts were committed in the Netherlands or in the Dutch scope of these legal persons”.  
The related investigation was opened following the criminal complaint filed in 2010 by the 
Dutch Advocate Liesbeth Zegveld on behalf of a Palestinian human rights organization (Al-Haq) 
and included searches in the company premises and executives’ private homes. After a three-years 
investigation, which reportedly found the company’s contribution to the construction works in the 
occupied territory,1964 the Prosecutor decided not to pursue criminal charges. According to the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, “Dutch companies are required to refrain from any involvement in violations of the 
International Crimes Act or the Geneva Conventions”,1965 and several times in 2006 and 2007 the Ministries 
                                                
1962 Article 2(2) of the 2003 WIM prohibits the commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes by Dutch 
nationals, including companies; it also criminalises acts that amount to complicity in crimes, such as the facilitation or 
the aiding or abetting of crimes. 
1963It was alleged that Riwal participated in the construction of the wall in the Palestinian village of Al-Khader in 2005-
2008, in the Palestinian village of Hizma in 2004-2006, in the Palestinian village of Bruqin in 2008-2010. For the 
complaint, see http://www.alhaq.org/images/stories/PDF/accoutability-files/Complaint%20-%20English.pdf  
1964 The investigation evidenced the following activities: “renting out a crane that was used from 10 through 12 June 2005 in the 
construction of the barrier in occupied territory near Aida; renting out a crane that was used on 27 March 2006 in the construction of the 
barrier in occupied territory near Qalandia; renting out a crane that was used on 3 and 4 April 2006 in the construction of the barrier in 
occupied territory near Rachel's Tomb; renting out a crane that was used on a day in the last week of June 2006 in the construction of the 
barrier in occupied territory near Hizma; renting out two aerial working platforms that were used on 13 June, 2007 in the construction of the 
barrier in occupied territory near Al Khader; renting out one or two aerial working platforms that were used on 27 July 2009 and on 9 
September 2009 in the construction of an industrial site near the settlement Ariel in occupied territory”. See “No further investigation 
into crane rental company”, available at http://www.om.nl/algemene_onderdelen/uitgebreid_zoeken/@160908/no-
further/. 
1965 Under Article 5 of the International Crimes Act, natural persons as well as legal entities within the Dutch 
jurisdiction are required not in any way to be involved in, or contribute to, possible violations of the Geneva 





of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs called Lima to account regarding this matter.  
In affirming that the complex question on whether the contested activities constitute such a 
violation could not be solved with certainty without further investigations, the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office decided not to carry out them and not to prosecute the company and its managing directors, 
in view of various factors. Firstly, “Lima only contributed on a small scale to the building of the barrier and 
settlements” and its effective involvement was “relatively minor”, in the sense that the material 
concerned was used only occasionally and for a few days, at times after its rental to third parties. 
Secondly, Lima has taken far-reaching steps so as to terminate its activities in Israel and/or the 
occupied territories permanently; thus there was a minor danger of repetition (within the Dutch 
jurisdiction) according to the Prosecutor. Thirdly, Lima and its managing directors have been 
affected by the consequences of the proceedings (including the searches of homes and company 
premises and the media attention).1966 Moreover, the Prosecutor’s decision was explained by 
admitting that additional investigations would consume a significant amount of State resources of 
police and judiciary, also noting that “further investigations in Israel would most probably not be possible due to 
lack of cooperation from the Israeli authorities”.  
However, disappointment for the dismissal of this case was expressed. In contesting the impact 
of the claimed construction to the fragmentation of Palestinian communities and the loss of 
privately-owned agricultural lands and olive groves upon which local Palestinians depend for 
income, it was highlighted how such dismissal did not provide restitution for those who remain 
isolated from their land and livelihood; in this vein, the reorganization of the company to terminate 
activities in Israel did not provide an effective legal remedy for victims.1967  
3.2. The Lahmeyer case  
The Merowe dam, located on the Nile River about two hundred miles north of Khartoum (Sudan), 
represents one of the large-scale hydroelectric power projects on the African continent. Began in 
2003 and terminated in 2009, its construction has resulted in affecting approximately between 
50,000 and 78,000 people, mainly the Manasir, Hamadab and Amri communities.1968  
                                                                                                                                                            
Penal Code, both natural persons and legal entities can commit a crime under Dutch law. Accordingly, corporations 
can incur criminal responsibility for participation in violations of international humanitarian law. 
1966 See “Q&A concerning investigation into involvement in construction of Israeli barrier and settlement”, available at 
http://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/internationale/map/concerning/  
1967 See “Prosecutor Dismisses War Crimes Case against Riwal”, 14 May 2013, available at 
http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/targets/accountability/71-riwal/704-prosecutor-dismisses-war-crimes-case-against-
riwal?utm_source=smartmail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=  
1968 For a detailed account of the social, environmental and human rights impacts of the project, see N. Hildyard, 





Lahmeyer International GmbH, based in Bad Vilbel (Germany), was the engineering firm in 
charge of the project planning, construction supervision and commissioning of the whole plant.1969 
While the first of the plant’s water turbines became operational in April 2008, the company 
received the first order for this project in 2001; however, unsuccessful negotiations on relocation 
measures followed the 2002 presidential decree by the Sudanese government that expropriated an 
area of 6364 km2 for the reservoir lake. The inexistence of a resettlement plan even six months prior 
to the arranged start of the construction was acknowledged in the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Report (EIAR) produced by the company in April 2002 and subsequently critically 
reviewed for not having disregarded the World Bank’s international standards concerning 
resettlement and the World Commission on Dams’ Guidelines on writing EIAR for dam 
construction projects.1970 The actual resettlement of the affected groups of population had not taken 
place until two settlement areas behind the Merowe dam were hugely flooded in August 2006 and 
between July 2008 and January 2009 respectively. The forced relocation of thousands of displaced 
people still living there interested zones unsuitable for agriculture and livestock farming by reason of 
poor soil conditions.1971   
On May 3 2010, a representative of the affected inhabitants of the region, together with the 
Berlin-based European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, lodged a criminal complaint 
against two German high-level employees of Lahmeyer with the department of public prosecution 
in Frankfurt.1972 The Prosecutor accepted the case and apparently the investigation is still open. 
Due to the company’s position as construction manager in the whole project as well as the 
defendants’ own position within the company, it was claimed that they ultimately influenced and 
                                                                                                                                                            
2008; E. Failer, M. Mutaz, A. El Tayeb, “Merowe: the largest water resources project under construction in Africa”, 6 
Hydropower and Dams, 2006, 68-73. 
1969 The Sudanese Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources’ Merowe Dam Implementation Unit - renamed the Dam 
Implementation Unit (DIU) - is the project owner. Several institutions provided finance: the Government of Sudan, the 
Peoples’ Republic of China (mainly through the China Export Import Bank), the Kuwait Development Fund; the Saudi 
Development Fund; the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development; the Abu Dhabi Development Fund, the 
Sultanate of Oman, and the Government of Qatar. The project involved a consortium of several companies and 
Sudanese subcontractors, including China International Water and Electric Corp and Harbin Power Engineering Co, 
the French Alstom, and the Swiss ABB. Information available at: 
http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/establishment.html 
1970 See C. Teodoru, A. Wüest, B. Wehrli, “Independent review of Environmental Impact Assessment Report for the 
Merowe Dam Project”, 23 March 2006, EAWAG (the Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology), 
available at : 
http://www.eawag.ch/medien/bulletin/archiv/2006/20060323/Independent-Review-20060323-Short.pdf . 
1971 See the statement, dated 28 August 2007, by the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Miloon Kothari, 
who urged the suspension of two hydroelectric dams until an independent evaluation could be conducted on their 
impacts, after receiving several reports by local communities facing large-scale forced evictions from the area to make 
way for the projects, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=23617#.UzqOsBbd7wx . 
1972 For the English translation of the original criminal complaint and other related documents, see the website of the 





decided on every single construction phases and that they were aware of the threats resulting from 
that project for the local inhabitants’ lives and properties. As “indirect perpetrators” of the “Dam 
Implementation Unit” that commissioned the project, the two employees were accused of being liable 
to prosecution for several criminal offences, particularly by ordering or authorizing the closure of 
the left arm of the river in December 2005 and redirecting the waters through the narrower right 
arm, or, respectively, by refraining from ordering to open the flood spillway in August 2006 at the 
latest.1973  
In particular, they were accused of joint causing the flooding of the Amri settlement areas in 
August 2006 as well as the Manasir areas in 2008 and 2009 (under sections 313(1), 25(2) of the 
German Criminal Code). They were also accused of “joint induction of a flooding, intentionally or 
negligently causing a concrete danger for health and life and of damage to possessions” and to property of 
considerable value (under section 313(2) in connection with sections 308(5), 25(2) of the German 
Criminal Code). Furthermore, they were allegedly criminally liable for abandonment (under section 
221(1)(1) of the German Criminal Code) and for the destruction of buildings (under section 305(1) of 
the German Criminal Code). An additional offence was coercion (under section 240(1) of the 
German Criminal Code) because, when the flooding occurred, they forced the 2,740 Amri families 
to flee their lands and leave behind all their belongings. As for the further offence of criminal 
damage of the property of the Amri (under section 303(1) of the German Criminal Code), according 
to the complainants, “a complexity of actions” damaged the local population massively after they had 
not deferred to the DIU resettlement plans and they were carried out forcibly without prior 
notification or advance warning; the claimed damage included even the animals and moveable 
belongings destroyed or washed away, which did not fall within the lawful expropriation of land. 
Another accuse concerned the killing of approximately 12,000 vertebrate livestock without sensible 
reason (under § 17(1) Animal Protection Act). 
Therefore, defendants’ criminal liability for the acts has been claimed under sections 3 and 9 of 
the German Criminal Code. However, it is still to be established whether the criminal actions (i.e. 
the above-mentioned orders or authorizations) occurred in Germany or in Sudan, or whether the 
                                                
1973 Specifically, according to the criminal complaint, “Failer had the guarantor’s obligation to prevent the flooding given “his 
responsibility for the creation of a high risk situation and his de facto capacities to influence the course of the construction as project manager”. 
Conversely, the executive director Nothdurft had the “surveillance guarantor”’s duty to ensure that the population, 
which had not been resettled and was therefore in danger, would not suffer any harm from the high-risk situation he 
had caused. In fact, since 2005 he had been engaged in the immediate communication of several non-governmental 
organizations about the resettlement and other problems of the Merowe Dam Project, and so he was “sufficiently 
informed and consequently jointly responsible for the coordination of the construction and resettlement measures”. As 
additionally claimed, “the fact that the resettlement took place in spite of missing resettlement measures having been carried out indicates 





aforementioned omission should have occurred in Germany or Sudan.1974 In case the criminal acts 
would be deemed committed on foreign territory (i.e. in Sudan), the applicability of German 
criminal law has been nevertheless asserted under section 7(2)(1) of the German Criminal Code, 
which provides for the prosecution of offenses committed abroad as far as the accused is a German 
citizens and the condition of “double criminal liability” is satisfied, so being the prosecution in the 
German public interest. 
Although still at an embryonic stage, the criminal complaint issued to the State Prosecutor in 
Frankfurt has twofold relevance. It clearly illustrates the significance of States’ exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to make companies operating on a transnational scale liable in their 
home countries, especially when a conflict of sovereignty does not arise insofar as the State decides 
to prosecute criminal actions of its citizens.  
At the same time, it reveals the importance of the due diligence requirement upon business 
enterprises for activities undertaken in dealing with authoritarian regimes which are likely to fail to 
take into account the social and environmental impacts of the planning and implementation of 
infrastructure projects in conflict-affected areas, and which are unwilling or not able to offer 
preventive human rights protection to the affected local communities as well as quick redress to the 
victims of related massive violations. Indeed, Lahmeyer’s inaccurate management of the Merowe 
dam project seem to exacerbate the Sudanese government’s debatable approach to applicable 
international and regional human rights standards: the right to adequate housing (including the 
prohibition of eviction or displacement), the right to food (particularly the availability and access to 
nourishment), the right to health (including the accessibility of the healthcare system and the 
prohibition of the destruction of healthcare infrastructure), the right to property, the right to work, 
the right to security of a person. In this regard, the criminal complaint has shown the lack of any 
comprehensive study independently carried out by Lahmeyer for ascertaining the completion of the 
resettlements, besides considering that the company was not prepared to suspend its activities until 
such completion. 
It is worth noting that an additional attempt to bring justice and provide redress to the 
communities affected by the construction of the Merowe dam (along with a second one in Kajbar) is 
represented by a complaint filed at the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights by two 
                                                
1974 Under § 9, par 1.2. Alt. German Criminal Code, all those locations where the omitted action should have taken 
place constitute the relevant location of the criminal offence; this is generally where the defendant was at the time of the 







activists from the affected groups, represented by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR). 
In the decision to hear the case, taken at its 14th extra-ordinary session (20-24 July 2013), the 
African Commission found worthy of its consideration the alleged violations of several provisions of 
the AfrCHPR, to which Sudan is signatory. Of note, the intricate relationship between ESC rights 
and civil and political rights has been highlighted in the complaint. The concerned communication 
was specifically considered on 10 March 2014, during its 15th extra-ordinary session.1975 The 
various forms of reparation sought on behalf of the affected communities include compensation to 
forcibly evicted individuals, investigation and prosecution of several incidents in which excessive 
force was allegedly used against protesters, restitution of land where available, putting a halt to the 
Kajbar dam and structural reforms of relevant Sudanese laws and policies with respect to 
development projects.1976 
Strategically, this case offers the main African human rights protection mechanism a chance for 
ruling on the States parties’ duty to involve affected local communities in the decision making 
process relating to infrastructure development projects and to ensure proper compensation for those 
affected when undertaking large-scale projects such as hydropower dams. 
4. Concluding remarks 
Access to justice and accountability remain very critical areas in respect to the open question on the 
action to provide States and other actors with the necessary avenues to ensure effective remedy and 
redress for victims of serious abuses committed by, or with the complicity of, corporations in home 








                                                
1975 See AfComHPR, Ali Askouri and Abdel-Hakeem Nasr (on behalf of persons affected by the construction of the Merowe and Kajbar 
Dams) v. The Republic of Sudan (Request for the Addition of two more Complainants), Comm. 452/13. 
1976 See “The Other Side of the Sudan Dams Complaint before the African Commission seeks justice for victims of 
Sudanese dams” and “EIPR launches legal action against Sudan for violations arising from the construction of the 



























































1. The object of this study  
This dissertation has examined the role, function and adequacy of international law to deal with 
civilians’ access to, enjoyment and progressive realisation of, ESC rights as controversially affected 
during and in the aftermath of contemporary scenarios of armed conflict, other situations of massive 
violence, and contexts of occupied territories. The subject has been chosen in the view of significant 
developments occurred in the last decades at the national, regional and international level in 
relation to ESC rights and in the light of basic attention paid to possible implications of a more 
integrated and holistic approach of international law to such complex and changing contexts.  
The question arises as to whether and how the evolution of the international legal framework 
has allowed for ESC rights to be addressed in relation to civilians’ vulnerability, either handling the 
humanitarian consequences or tackling the direct/indirect and short/long-term detrimental effects 
of present-day warfare and administration of occupied territories. This means in particular whether 
and how the applicable international law takes into account such implications and contributes to 
their mitigation.  
The framing of civilians’ ESC rights from an international law perspective raises a number of 
legal issues that have been addressed throughout the research project: which international norms 
have progressively supported developments in the normative content of ESC rights and favour a more 
precise understanding of the nature and scope of ensuing obligations to be addressed for the 
imperative of civilian protection; which international norms have tackled questions of accountability 
for their violations as committed during the conduct of hostilities and its aftermath or the 
administration of occupied territories; which international norms have also advanced the availability 
of remedies to ensure the basic right to effective remedy and reparation for the violations 
concerned.  
In order to answer these questions, this study has investigated the normative responses advanced 





applicable international legal regimes, such as international criminal law and international human 
rights law. This examination has shed light on the role played by a plurality of international norms 
that may interact with one another and reshape the interpretation of the rules representing the 
traditional point of reference to assess the emerging practice. Accordingly, it has confirmed that 
each of these branches represent valuable legal tools enabling to delineate the core substance and 
clarify the uncertain boundaries of outstanding connections between civilians’ ESC rights and 
conflict-affected or occupation-related situations. Indeed, their divergence in nature does not 
necessarily imply their mutual exclusiveness. The main findings of this study are summarised in the 
following sections. 
2. The main findings of this study 
2.1.  
The analysis carried out on the extensive IHL regime has shown that its normative developments 
have marked, owing to gradual codification or evolutionary interpretation, certain steps forward in the 
sphere of ESC rights against the effects of military operations as well as against civilians’ mistreatment 
when in the hands of the enemy, which may include a party to a conflict or an occupying powe1r. 
IHL sets down several obligations on the latter, which ultimately protect individual or collective 
interests of civilians. In doing so, IHL rules address certain components of ESC rights relating to 
health, food, work and employment, family, education, culture, resources, relief assistance, and 
environment. They have a primary importance for ensuring that civilians are not denied, or have 
access to, their basic needs. They have also a certain potential to generate positive conditions for 
peace and restoration of the affected situation, so supporting more generally the progressive 
realisation of ESC rights. However, relevant gaps and weaknesses in the existing IHL regime of 
protection of civilians, the civilian population as such, and civilian objects have emerged in the 
practice of present-day warfare and administration of occupied territories, as detailed hereafter.  
 
The study on the scope of civilian immunity for the safeguarding of ESC rights against the 
effects of military operations and individual acts of violence in warfare has revealed that the law on the 
conduct of hostilities constitutes a basic restraint on armed violence which has economic, social and cultural 





commissions of inquiry or dealt with in judgments) clearly evidence how violations of cardinal principles 
and rules of IHL have resulted in severe civilian losses of access to, and enjoyment of, ESC rights or 
other related consequences (Chapter I). Numerous breaches derive from a lack of inclination to 
respect them, scarce ways and means of enforcement, or ambiguous application in certain 
circumstances. Conversely, the same breaches prove a need to (re)consider the IHL protection of 
civilians in the area of ESC rights regarding either the implementation of such principles and rules or 
their adequacy and effectiveness in contemporary conflicts. In elucidating how they apply in practical 
circumstances, the study suggests a number of basic remarks in this regard.  
(1) First, the emerging acceptance of systematic involvement of the civilian population in hostilities is 
a conduct in radical contrast to the rationale underlying the IHL system, thus not simply compatible or not with 
the principle of military necessity, which in any case gives way to the need to respect binding IHL 
principles. A disturbing trend of adopting conduct contrary to IHL on a reciprocal basis is often 
justified by the parties according to the peculiarities of the theatre of the conflict (e.g. 
overpopulation, promiscuity between military sites and civilian settlements). However this is far 
from the objective character of relevant IHL obligations. 
In particular, military operations carried out in the context of urban warfare must be specifically inquired from 
the perspective of the serious implications they could have for the ESC rights of the civilian population. This remains 
a pressing need. Although such conduct in urban environments cannot classify per se as a violation of 
IHL principles, the latter are easily breached in cases of attacks in the vicinity of civilians or 
protected buildings, especially if carried out in densely populated residential areas, through artillery 
that cannot be aimed accurately and whose power derives from the quantity of fired shells and their 
massive belligerent parties involved. In this regard, the outlining of the applicable IHL rules and 
principles shall base further confidential discourse on compliance with the laws of war. Nevertheless, 
a true appraisal of the gravity of the implications for civilians’ ESC rights during military operations 
appears to require a complementary recourse to concepts and standards pertaining to the evolved 
international human rights law; this may offer promising preventive or remedial approaches to the 
same breaches of operational obligations of IHL.  
 
(2) Second, certain limits of the definition of military objective clearly weaken the protection of ESC rights. 
For instance, dual-use facilities are not identified as a separate category of military objectives and, as 
such, they are subject to Article 52(2) API regardless of any potential challenges of establishing the 





also are vital for civilians, what remains highly problematic is the application of proportionality in 
attack by taking into due account its reverberating indirect effects. Although extensive consequences 
do not automatically mean “excessive” collateral damage, substantial “subsequent-tier” effects on 
civilians also concern the access to, and enjoyment of, the basic rights to health, food, safe and 
drinking water. This issue matters either in related humanitarian crises or beyond the battlefield, 
since de facto certain types of damage only materialise over time or are experienced far from the 
combat zone. In this sense, greater humanitarian considerations in the implementation of the 
proportionality principle may have positive implications in the targeting process on certain core 
dual-use facilities, which is highly likely to cause incidental long-term impacts on ESC rights and 
their progressive realisation. In particular, proportionality may be applied in favour of limiting 
“derivative damage”, also calculated on a cumulative basis, which influences the access to, and enjoyment of, ESC 
rights. Accordingly, an application of proportionality as a real guarantee of civilian protection from 
armed attacks may require taking into account the resonant effects of attacking an object that serves the 
military while it simultaneously plays a vital role for civilians, according to a twofold meaning. Firstly, ‘vital’ 
may refer to what is necessary to the survival of the civilian population, in doing so indicating the urgency of 
protecting the realisation of minimum level of ESC rights. Secondly, ‘vital’ may refer to what is 
functional to the ‘sustainable human development’ of the civilian population, in doing so indicating the value of 
protecting civilians’ opportunity to engage in economic, social and cultural activities. The relevance 
of taking into account this second concept relies on its evolution under international law as the 
primary development paradigm where the human dimension has come to constitute the main 
vector and core element, and on its inevitable implications even in the way of looking at the special 
vulnerabilities affecting civilians during and in the aftermath of hostilities. 
 
(3) Third, certain variables affecting the ability to respect the obligations on feasible precautions (in 
attack and defence) to avoid or minimise the risk of collateral damage done to civilian persons and 
objects may particularly influence an insufficient protection of adequate housing and shelter, healthcare, and 
education. Two recurrent instances in recent military operations concern the location of military 
objectives in urban populated areas as well as the range and accuracy of the weapons used. In 
particular, the toxicities, volatilities and hazards inherent in the chemical white phosphorus shall be 
called into question to ban its use as an obscurant and be supplied with other screening and 
illuminating means. Similarly, the use of weapons such as flechette missiles, DIME munitions, and 






(4) Fourth, the special protection regime provided for certain objects is of basic importance to safeguard specific 
dimensions of civilians’ ESC rights against the effects of warfare. With regard to the prohibition on targeting 
medical unit or medical transports, however, blatant disrespect has still characterised very recent 
armed conflicts.  
As regards objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, significantly the 
prohibition on attacking, destroying, removing or rendering them useless is intended to cover all 
eventualities, including pollution of water supplies by chemical or other agents and the destruction 
of harvests by defoliants. Indeed, this is a corollary of the prohibition of starvation of civilians as a 
method of warfare aimed at weakening or destroying the population, which is established for both 
international and non-international armed conflicts and deemed to be customary in nature in both 
situations. However, a certain complexity of this system calls into question its effectiveness in providing 
protection. Such prohibitions are set out in a way that may obstruct concrete application: they cover 
cases of deliberate denial of sustenance, while other acts hampering the survival of the population 
through incidental damage (even when foreseeable) are left up to the rules prohibiting 
indiscriminate attacks and requiring precautions in attack to prevent devastating collateral damage. 
From an international criminal law perspective, nonetheless, the choice of counting measures of 
severe deprivation of food, water, healthcare and housing in criminal accusations (e.g. the 
contamination of wells and water pumps in the Darfur region) has led to integrate socio-economic 
dimensions in the prosecution of existing crimes (rather than a direct criminalisation of related esc-rights). 
In discussing the aforementioned special regime in relation to two ancient methods of warfare, 
the possibility of severe cumulative effects on the enjoyment of a wide range of ESC rights by the 
civilian population has been emphasised, also in view of relevant practice such as the recent sieges 
employed in the non-international armed conflict in Syria and the prolonged blockade of Germany 
during and immediately after the First World War. Conversely, the atypical case of the Gaza Strip 
has shown how the illegality of a naval blockade may be acknowledged to the extent that its effect 
alongside the closure policy is deemed disproportionate under international humanitarian law or in 
the persistence of unlawful methods of warfare. Furthermore, the damaging dimensions of a 
persistent blockade may lead to (re)affirm the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 
obligation to ensure (to the full extent of the available means) the supply of foodstuff, medical and 
hospital items and others to meet the humanitarian needs of the civilian population, thus providing 
for and permitting free passage of supplies basic for its survival. The combined impact of a blockade 





according to different applicable branches of international law, thus examining several 
inconsistencies with its protected status in respect to deteriorated and regressed levels of realisation 
of ESC rights. 
 
(5) Fifth, as regards civilian objects falling within the category of cultural property, a special regime 
does prohibit its targeting and its use for military purposes but allows immunity to be waived on 
account of imperative military necessity. The determination of what precisely constitutes cultural 
property, however, may be challenging. As the scrutiny of the scope of application of the relevant ius 
in bello framework has shown, two aspects significantly influence this determination: the cultural and 
spiritual value of certain objects are often established according to subjective criteria, and, additionally, within a 
given community the relative importance of an object may change over time as well as under certain circumstances. 
Conversely, the unfortunate consequence of a generous definition of cultural property would be that 
of minimising the protective regime for objects that have a more widely recognised cultural value, 
although existing rules have not been taken seriously in the heat of recent armed conflicts. 
Nonetheless, further perspectives have emerged in examining the IHL ability to address and 
mitigate adverse affects of modern warfare. On the one hand, the targeting, destroying, plundering, 
or any other form of damage to cultural heritage and cultural property have also been deemed to 
impair or nullify civilians’ enjoyment of cultural rights during the conduct of hostilities. In this regard, the 
normative content of the right of everyone to take part in cultural life has been interpreted as 
requiring States to respect and protect cultural heritage in times of war; the same right has been 
understood as closely related to other cultural rights, as inherently linked to the right to education, 
and as interdependent on the right to an adequate standard of living and also the right of all peoples 
to self-determination. On the other hand, IHL provisions describing offences against cultural 
heritage and cultural property in armed conflicts have been integrated into the statutes of several 
international criminal tribunals. In this regard, relevant jurisprudence of the ICTY includes cases related 
to the looting and destruction of cultural and religious institutions, treasures and monuments in the 
conflict-torn context of the Balkans. Significantly, a possible interpretation of the Rome Statute in 
relation to crimes against cultural property may derive, for the first time, after the opened 
investigation into alleged crimes committed on the territory of Mali, as the ICC Prosecutor has 
included “intentionally directing attacks against protected objects under Article 8(2)(e)(iv)” among the war 
crimes for which there are reasonable grounds to believe they have been committed by insurgents 





historical Malian sites have been deemed to violate the special protection of cultural objects 
reflected in Article 53 API, as some of them are inscribed under the UNESCO World Heritage List. 
Nevertheless, the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention remains the most 
valuable and suitable existing international instrument for pursuing war crimes against cultural 
property; particularly in view of Article 15, which defines five “serious violations” as acts 
intentionally committed in breach of these two treaties and requires States parties’ to adopt 
legislation making such acts criminal offences punishable under domestic sanctions, as well as in 
view of Article 21, which requires States parties to adopt measures to supress “other violations” of 
the same two treaties inasmuch as they are committed intentionally.  
 
(6) Sixth, the recognition of an autonomous privileged status to schools buildings on the basis of their 
intrinsic educational, and therefore humanitarian, value to society is arguably pertinent, particularly 
for being first public structures built in new settlements and for determining their essential 
importance to a community’s future growth and development in post-conflict scenarios. Supporting 
such an “integral” protection would imply expanding the focus of existing IHL rules on the conduct 
of hostilities, which should not only limit military forces’ choice of targets but also prohibit both 
attackers and defenders from converting educational buildings for military purposes. In this sense, 
the practice of placing military objectives in school facilities or using them to advance military goals 
would become unlawful, regardless their ordinary functioning and use by civilian students and 
educational staff.  
In view of the alarming escalation of military attacks, the “derivative” and indirect level of IHL 
protection of most educational facilities should be considered quite anachronistic. Indeed, their 
military use, disruption and destruction may result in an absolute denial of students’ right to 
education, creating a serious divergence between international human rights and humanitarian law. 
In this regard, indirect protection may derive from certain human rights provisions since attacks on any 
related structures or materials on which the provision of education depends is likely to violate not 
only the right to education but also the right to freedom from discrimination, the right to private 
property and the right to health as enshrined in human rights treaties. Nonetheless, strengthening the 
IHL protection of education facilities would be in line with the special regime afforded to other categories 
of objects having inherent humanitarian value (i.e. medical establishments) or representing the 
spiritual conscience of a people or community (i.e. religious buildings); this would be also in 






Turning to the widespread impunity for perpetrators of such attacks, international humanitarian 
and human right law are comprehensive enough to empower States’ investigations on situations 
relating to this specific field. Moreover, there is a certain scope to coordinate these legal regimes 
with international criminal law so as to ensure a broader response to education-related violations, 
which also attracts individual criminal responsibility. In particular, certain war crimes, the crime 
against humanity of persecution, the crime of genocide under the ICC Statute may provide 
measures to criminalise military attacks on educational facilities and to protect education itself. A 
number of cases in which the Office of the ICC Prosecutor has conducted investigations and 
prosecutions contain references to crimes that deal with attacks on education.  
2.2. 
The study on the protective scope of occupation law for the pursuit of the livelihood and wellbeing 
of the local inhabitants of occupied territories has revealed how ESC rights represent a significant 
dimension of the traditional concept of welfare of the civilian population (Chapter III). However, this regime 
may not satisfactorily meet the socio-economic and cultural entitlements concerned in 
contemporary situations of occupations. On the one hand, relevant obligations upon the occupant 
remain contingent to contextual factors (such as the intensity of control exercised in the occupied 
territory, the resources available therein, and the temporal dimension of occupation), which may 
require restrictive or expansive approaches to interpret their normative content. In any case, in 
covering a range of the ESC rights of the protected local population, IHL imposes fundamental 
duties that do not have a purely negative nature. Rather, they consist of due diligence obligations on 
the occupier according to its actual capacities and means, though their meaning is not elaborated 
much. On the other hand, the scope of such obligations is influenced by the changed international 
expectations as have arisen by several developments of international law. 
It is reasonable to contend that the conventional division between the law of war and the law of 
peace may no longer be plausible in light of the changes surfaced in modern de facto realities of 
occupation, in which civilian populations may even live an entire lifetime under it or, in any case, 
may end up facing serious damage to the occupied economy as well as to human development, 
environmental consequences and permanent damage on the landscape, and so challenging the 
possibility for their own future generations to benefit from it. Moreover, the traditional international 





adaptation in occupation law to evolve its protective scope concerning the civilian population finds 
in the dual application of international humanitarian law and modern international human rights law 
a valuable perspective to safeguard fundamental rights of civilians living in occupied territories. In 
fact, it may give new substance to the shift in focus regarding the beneficiaries of the “trust” created 
by occupation, expanding and deepening the normative content of the needs, interests and rights of those civilians, 
thus supporting a further departure from the Hague Law as already determined by Geneva Law in 
relation to the protection concerned. As already emphasised, co-application lies on the legal 
principle of the evolution of the law.  
From a de lege ferenda perspective, in view of the now dated codification of this regime, the 
adoption of conventional law, such as a new additional protocol, may be considered so as to make 
the concepts and standards pertaining to the evolved international human rights law of economic, 
social and cultural nature directly applicable.  
2.3. 
The analysis carried out on the evolution of international human rights law has shown a certain 
potential of this developing regime for the imperative of civilian protection in the socio-economic and cultural spheres 
(Chapter IV). This primarily matters in respect to the open issues of developing a contemporary 
understanding of civilians’ needs in such dynamic scenarios and elaborating upon legal validity and 
content of the obligations possibly incumbent on several actors performing crucial roles therein. 
Further, it matters in respect to the issue of facing the challenges of compliance with international 
norms enshrining ESC rights and of international enforcement mechanisms able to supplement and 
support domestic implementations of those norms when national systems do not or cannot pursue 
accountability because they are lacking or fail to function.  
In particular, the application of human rights law may entails a better understanding of distinct 
dimensions of realisation of ESC rights that warrant - or should deserve - more consideration. Indeed, this 
legal regime has a special aptitude to tackle the normative content of the rights to be protected against the conduct 
of military operations or in periods of occupation, clarifying the nature and scope of a range of ensuing State 
obligations (particularly through basic tools such as the concept of progressive realisation or the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination).  
Secondly, this regime may help framing the legality of a variety of controversial actions or measures 
affecting civilians: detrimental impacts may be addressed as stemming from the violations of 





such impacts and relevant obligations  may be revealed.  
A third benefit regards the beneficial provision for enforcement mechanisms to redress breaches concerning ESC 
rights. In the fight against impunity for gross violations of human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, the principle of criminal or civil accountability before quasi-judicial bodies or 
courts has been acknowledged at the universal and regional levels. As to the various possible 
sanctions for violations of ESC rights, a main concern is the aptitude to be adequately efficacious. 
As to the victims, a key issue regards the access to effective remedies empowered to grant reparation 
and to order cessation of such violations. The study has shown that meaningful jurisprudence on 
ESC rights in conflict-affected situations or transitional justice contexts has started to emerge from 
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Conversely, certain possibilities through an institutionalised 
practice of legal interpretation of treaty obligations derive from the new OPICESCR instituting an 
individual complaints procedure, an inquiry mechanism for grave or systematic violations, and an 
interstate complaints mechanism. The third Optional Protocol to the CRC also offers similar and 
complementary procedures that may become mutually supporting for children’s rights violations 
under the CRC and its two Protocols. 
 
The examination of the various procedural issues on the applicability of human rights treaties 
on ESC rights during public emergencies prompted by situations of armed conflict, military 
occupation and post-conflict collapse has confirmed such an applicability, highlighting a number of 
basic remarks.  
(1)  On the one hand, States parties are not generally permitted to suspend the exercise of the rights 
enshrined in such treaties. However, when a situation is suitably severe as to warrant a de facto 
derogation, such a possibility may not be foreclosed provided that the satisfaction of the principles 
and criteria regulating explicitly derogations to human rights treaties is required to the State party 
concerned. In particular, the principle that a hard core of fundamental aspects of ESC rights cannot 
be suspended any time has crucial importance. Moreover, the modalities of derogation have to be 
shaped by the principles of proportionality (measures strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation), non-discrimination, and consistency with the other State obligations under international law, 
which supposedly prevent abusive situations of emergency. Judicial and quasi-judicial monitoring 
bodies have expressed positive views (in addition to less clear opinions) about the non-permissibility 





(2)  On the other hand, the analysis conducted on Article 4 ICESCR and especially on its drafting 
history confirms the view that the absence of an explicit derogation clause is not per se determinative 
of whether suspensions of ESC rights are or not admissible. Nonetheless, the general limitation clause of 
Article 4 alongside the flexibility of the obligations established in Article 2(1) may sufficiently enable a State party to 
respond to extraordinary circumstances such as armed conflict or military occupation. In this regard, a State party 
is allowed to impose no further restrictions on ESC rights than the ones permitted outside such 
situations, since no limitations on ESC rights may be justified on the grounds of an existing armed 
conflict. Accordingly, different conditions (determination by law, compatibility with the nature of the rights, 
and promotion of general welfare as the sole purpose) are necessary to substantiate legitimate limitations on 
the ICESCR, which must also conform to criteria preventing States’ arbitrariness (i.e. the principles of 
proportionality and necessity). As regards the argument that the required compatibility with the nature of ESC 
rights under Article 4 does not permit restrictions touching upon the minimum core obligations of States parties, 
certain implications derive for subsistence rights such as the right to basic food, a basic level of health 
care, clothing and basic shelter as affected by conflict-related settings. More precisely, any policy 
limiting the minimum core obligations corresponding to basic subsistence rights enshrined in the Covenant should be 
deemed not compatible with the very nature of the rights in question, hence it should be considered in violation 
of Article 4. Indeed, restricting the minimum core obligations of basic subsistence rights undermines 
the vital interests of the individuals affected by such contexts, thus reflecting a de facto extinction of 
those rights. Conversely, relevant obligations ensuing from international humanitarian law cannot 
be derogated from, since the latter does not refer to any concept of derogation.  
(3)  The analysis carried out on the conditions under which the treaties on ESC rights may apply 
within or beyond States parties’ national borders has revealed that the textual vacuum and 
ambiguity in relation to their general scope of application makes it problematic to maintain an 
unconditional support for their extraterritorial application within conflict-affected situations. 
However, when a State party is engaged in the conduct of hostilities as well as when it is an 
occupying power or when it acts in post-conflict situations, no a priori reasons make its human rights 
obligations limited to the sovereign territory. The concept of jurisdiction, the notion of international 
cooperation, and the application of economic sanctions or equivalent measures have been shown as three 
distinct aspects which have primary importance for assessing potential legal basis to extend such 
obligations beyond the territorial State (Chapter V).  
In particular, taking into account the progressive understanding of the notion of jurisdiction in the context of 
the State duties on ESC rights (specially in view of the Maastricht Principles) may favour a better 





territorial while broadening the several de facto connections basing the relationship between the affected 
civilians (as beneficiaries of these rights) and the non-territorial States (as corresponding duty-
bearers) acting in such situations. Indeed, the jurisdictional doctrine of effective control over 
individuals or foreign territorial areas may play a crucial role1977 but also be too restrictive, and 
other “less demanding” factual circumstances may prove equally relevant for disputing serious 
impairments of civilians’ basic rights as taking place in conflict-affected scenarios. In this regard, the 
potential of holding a foreign State liable for “necessary” and “foreseeable” consequences resulting 
from its conduct and impinging on the ESC rights of civilians may be argued insofar the proximity 
of its conduct with such impact is found or they are not only remotely connected; as highlighted, 
some regional human rights bodies have confirmed this view. Conversely, extending the scope of 
State obligations on ESC rights to situations in which its joint or separate actions lead it to exercise 
decisive influence or to take measures directly supporting access, enjoyment and progressive 
realisation of ESC rights as entitled to civilians overseas has further potential. This may prove 
particularly relevant for evaluating the international cooperation and assistance provided by the 
foreign State concerned in conformity to international law in multilateral contexts of reconstruction 
and development assistance. 
2.4. 
Among the theoretical and practical grounds funding reliance on modern international human 
rights law as further normative regime contributing to safeguard civilians in the area of ESC rights 
under international law, the greatest potential has been identified in the articulation of its manifold 
relationship with international humanitarian law.  
The option to treat the two regimes as mutually exclusive has become ever more debatable; the 
lex specialis rule appears not to dictate a priori precedence to any body of law anymore, being that the 
matter is rather contexts-dependent or interests-dependent. In this respect these legal regimes may be 
applied and clarified in view of one another (particularly when they afford norms covering common 
fields) according to an approach of “reciprocal-influence” or “cross-interpretation”. The consequent 
                                                
1977 For instance, the practice of several human rights monitoring bodies have offered the chance to examine the 
adequacy of the effective control criterion for clarifying the scope of “jurisdictional capacity” and responsibility of an 
occupying power to safeguard ESC rights of those living in the occupied territories. In particular, the concept of 
jurisdiction has been interpreted via the effective control criterion by focusing on the factual circumstance of its impact on the lives of 
the civilian population living in the territory concerned (e.g. the administration of the population’s civil register, the provision of 
identity documents to civilians, the unilateral administration of entry visa and work permits for non-ID holders in the 





meaning of lex specialis as a tool to interpret norms belonging to distinct branches but interacting in a complementary 
relation entails determining the applicable norms on a case-by-case basis. In the sphere of ESC rights, 
approaching the principle of lex specialis as complementarity of norms may have positive implications 
particularly in situations of non-international armed conflicts and periods of occupation. It is 
reasonable to argue that a constructive coordination in dealing with civilians’ ESC rights may be developed 
between such regimes, either when they concur (for existing overlapping norms within each branch) or 
when they diverge. In imposing concurrent obligations, the extent of their mutual influence may 
vary. Certainly, coordination may provide civilians with a greater degree of protection when these 
regimes deal with different issues concerning the same right: as they do not clash, there is no need to 
favour one over the other or to ascribe to one of the two a special status.  
 
(1) The importance to apply and employ the concepts and standards pertaining to the evolved 
international human rights law of economic, social and cultural nature in situations of armed 
conflict and belligerent occupation has been confirmed in view of significant rationales.  
On the one hand, many IHL provisions protect vital conditions to the enjoyment by civilians of ESC 
rights by dealing mostly with the ways to accomplish efficiency in humanitarian relief supplies, public 
health services, and food security. Conversely, IHL provisions ruling on the relationship between a 
belligerent party and civilian persons/objects under its control have been developed only for 
situations of military occupation, with some limitations however. Nonetheless, a more exhaustive 
IHL protection is afforded to the treatment of public or private property. In any case, IHL 
mechanisms to monitor, implement and enforce the applicable law may as a result be weak. On the 
other hand, human rights monitoring bodies at the universal and regional level have progressively 
given normative content and force to the ESC rights enshrined in human rights treaties, drawing 
basic guidelines to explain how their notions have undergone substantial changes and have widened 
in scope even in conflict-torn contexts, thus “surpassing” international humanitarian law. Indeed, 
human rights violations of persons found in such situations - and independently of their IHL status - 
can fall under their judicial or quasi-judicial scrutiny; generally they have jurisdiction to apply 
human rights law, even in view of IHL, but sometimes the other way around may be provided for.  
In this regard, human rights treaties conferring ESC rights to individuals not only may cover 
subjects scarcely if at all mentioned under international humanitarian law, but also afford “overlapping subjects” 
further normative details not found in the law of armed conflict or merely touched by occupation law. This has been 





the right to education. In this sense, certain obligations flowing from human rights treaties are 
essentially not echoed in IHL rules, which generally encompass the “respect” and “protect” facets of 
ESC rights without determining the “fulfil” facet.  
Furthermore, focusing on scenarios of occupation, modern human rights law is inherently relevant 
and arguably applicable since the occupying power is expected to facilitate the continuation of 
civilian life and the founding of a legal relationship between the civilian population and the 
occupying army. Given its very nature as “midway between war and peace”, belligerent occupation 
brings forth an actual need of re-determining the scope of relevant State obligations. In the area of 
ESC rights, this implies referring to States parties’ minimum core obligations arising from essential levels 
of each right in all circumstances, in addition to the obligations of immediate effect (i.e. taking deliberate 
and targeted steps to guarantee the broadest possible enjoyment of ESC rights under the existing 
circumstances; ensuring their exercise without discrimination of any kind), and the obligations to be 
progressively implemented towards the full realisation of these rights.  
Therefore the analysis carried out has made more debatable the view that international 
humanitarian law provides for sufficient protection of ESC rights beyond conditions having ‘emergency 
connotations’ and for sufficient guidance on substantial needs to ensure healthcare, food and water safety, education 
and labour conditions in contemporary settings of armed conflict, especially those having a non-
international nature, and present-day periods of military occupation. Remarkably, a human rights 
approach to deal with them encompasses significant elements such as the principles of non-
discrimination and equality as well as the entitlements to availability, accessibility, acceptability, and 
quality in the enjoyment of ESC rights. In this sense, the prohibitions of discrimination in 
employment, the prohibitions of discrimination in education and racial discrimination represent 
further issues not addressed under international humanitarian law while being carefully considered 
under human rights law, being that their relevance is recognised for all human beings regardless of 
living conditions. 
Overall, the applicability of modern international human rights law on ESC rights has revealed 
several encouraging implications: influencing the interpretation of relevant IHL norms; clarifying 
elements or elaborating aspects referred to in IHL norms when the latter come to (negative or 
positive) obligations that remain vague in their effects for actual guarantees to civilians; filling 
normative gaps in the scope of protection afforded by IHL; and corroborating the legitimacy of 






(2) Nonetheless, the function of IHL in understanding the ESC rights and ensuing human rights 
obligations is also important to define the relationship concerned. Indeed, direct or indirect references to 
IHL principles and rules have been found in certain practice of human rights monitoring bodies in 
order to refine part of the normative content of ESC rights, such as the right to health, the right to housing, 
the right to food, the right to water, the right to take part in cultural life. Similarly, the unlawfulness of 
conducts not explicitly set out in the human rights treaties concerned has been addressed by taking 
note of further duties stemming from international humanitarian law. In other words, IHL has been 
considered to elucidate, in a complementary way, how the scope of ESC rights may be identified in conflict-
affected contexts. 
Accordingly, in framing the application of ESC rights within the IHL regime their scope may be 
construed to prevent clashes of distinct norms or may be widened to define external bounds of these 
rights. A cross-elaboration upon legal validity and content of binding obligations on ESC rights under both regimes 
thus remains worthy. In this regard, military conduct unlawful under international humanitarian 
law may infer ESC rights violations under human rights law, while military conduct consistent with 
IHL may preclude such violations. Indeed, legitimate restrictions of human rights norms may derive 
either from the aforementioned regime of limitations or from the application of international 
humanitarian law and related military considerations.  
In any case, the ultimate evaluation of whether violations of ESC rights took place would 
depend on the precise situation. In fact, the question as to whether any unlawful conduct under IHL 
necessarily infers a violation of a certain ESC right under human rights law is left open. The 
determination of short-term consequences as well as long-term effects on these rights is needed in 
this regard. Furthermore, military conduct leading to disproportionate or excessive damage or 
destruction of civilian objects necessary to the enjoyment of ESC rights can amount to serious 
violations of IHL and war crimes (e.g. an attack intentionally directed at an educational facility can 
be investigated and prosecuted as war crime under the ICC Statute) but they do not inevitably 
qualify as violations of ESC rights under human rights law, since the latter would require a “causal 
link” with the civilian victims insofar as it protects individuals’ rights (while it is only presumed that 
such damage or destruction affect civilians). Thus, the integration of IHL into the examination of 
the protection of civilians’ ESC rights appears valuable (more than a simple recognition of relevant 
concurrent obligations). It favours a progressive acknowledgment of a de facto impossibility of sorting 
out legal regimes which may afford actual and enhanced protection to civilians insofar as they 





Of note, the mandate of relevant monitoring bodies does not always comprise the authority to 
pronounce on States’ breaches of international humanitarian law. As to the CESCR, the 
possibilities of receiving of individual communications or conducting an inquiry under the 
OPICESCR may become a chance to advance technical examination of the application of the 
ICESCR in armed conflicts and to investigate the relationship between the human rights in 
question and international humanitarian law. As regards fact-finding missions and commissions of 
inquiry, their mandate generally extends to both regimes and may facilitate “reciprocal-influence” 
or “cross-interpretation”. 
 
(3) An element that deserves specific attention is the duration of contemporary conflict-affected and 
occupation-related scenarios. Their short or long terms are likely to influence the extent of potential 
“cross-interpretation” between relevant legal regimes. In particular, a human rights approach to 
civilians’ ESC rights - which generally widen the range and scope of relevant State obligations 
under international law - may prove more suitable to handle the challenges featuring situations of 
persistent armed conflict as well as cases of prolonged occupation, with possible positive effects for 
the conduct of other actors involved.  
2.5.  
There is no doubt that the legal discourse on the protection of civilians may be shaped, to a certain 
extent, by the two soft law norm-setting efforts which have been elaborated within the broader 
attempt of widening the circle of human rights duty-bearers beyond the territorial State and which 
have been explored narrowly for their relevance to conflict-affected situations (Chapter V).  
The Maastricht Principles propose a more conceptual approach to foreign States’ human rights 
obligations in the area of ESC rights, with some potential to impact the work of UN treaty bodies as 
well as judicial bodies in dealing with extraterritoriality and in advancing its elaboration. In the 
same vein, these principles are likely to nurture public understanding and awareness as to the scope 
and nature of such extraterritorial obligations among governments and intergovernmental 
organizations. They may also serve as an instrument for civil society organizations to hold States 
accountable for extraterritorial conduct related to different relevant dimensions of international 
relations (e.g. modalities and consequences of military conduct, international assistance and 






The evolving weight of the UN Guiding Principles as a “set of politically authoritative and socially 
legitimated norms and policy guidance” has had certain implications for State responses to actual and 
potential business-related human rights abuses. As regards the advocated clarification of 
international legal standards applying to businesses’ involvement in gross violations, emphasis is 
appropriately put on the various forms of State extraterritorial jurisdiction which have started to 
function as tools to influence the spectrum of corporate conduct overseas. Nonetheless, a tricky 
aspect is identified in the national jurisdictions’ different interpretations of the applicability to 
business enterprises of international standards prohibiting gross human rights abuses, potentially 
amounting to international crimes. Conversely, as regards the concept of “corporate responsibility to 
respect”, business enterprises are aptly recommended to treat as “a legal compliance issue” the risks of 
causing or contributing to gross human rights abuses committed by third parties in view of an 
expanding theoretical possibility of civil and/or criminal liability. The need for business enterprises 
to consider “additional standards” of international humanitarian law is also explicitly referred. 
2.6. 
However, the final analysis carried out on legal cases in which business enterprises have been 
litigated or prosecuted in relation to allegations of involvement in breaches of international law 
(which directly or indirectly inhibit the exercise of, or adequate access to, ESC rights in conflict-
related contexts) has evidenced certain existing limits of international law (Chapter VI). In fact, the 
evaluation of the emerging judicial approaches to the legal determinations of corporate liability for 
such breaches has shown that national and international judicial mechanisms have not properly 
started to translate the theoretical corporate legal liability into tangible accountability for wrongs 
regarding ESC rights.  
In particular, domestic courts and prosecutors have shown certain disinclination to proceed with 
litigation in cases where a corporation is claimed to have contributed to serious breaches of 
international law by foreign States abroad. Their uncertainty about whether business enterprises are 
bound by international human rights and humanitarian norms has been affirmed when indirect 
connection exists to the assumed violations. Furthermore, courts and prosecutors’ cautiousness to sit 
in judgment that end up touching the activities and policies of foreign States or to become 
embroiled in complex disputes that could have far-reaching political and policy consequences is 
clear. Moreover, a certain hesitation to open domestic courts to litigations related to corporate 





of sovereign immunity laws have been not encouraged from such jurisprudence over alleging 
corporate complicity in breaches of international law by foreign States, which rather favours 
reliance upon non-justiciability doctrines and other non-merits grounds.  
On the one hand, this case law has implicitly evidenced the need for States to continue to 
implement several measures to make sure that private actors under their jurisdiction do not cause or 
contribute to breaches of international law. Similarly, this examination has confirmed the enduring 
need for business enterprises to keep on incorporating self-regulating mechanisms to ensure not only 
compliance with ethical standards and international law but also available effective procedures 
through which affected parties or their legitimate representatives can raise concerns when they 
believe relevant commitments have not been met. 
On the other hand, it is worth highlighting that in conflict-related scenarios judicial recourse 
may constitute an indispensable part of accessing remedy or alternative sources of effective remedy 
are unavailable. In such scenarios claimants who suffer a denial of justice in the territorial (host) 
State and cannot access the courts of the home State (irrespective of the merits of the claim) end up 
substantiating a serious legal obstacle. In this vein, any legal, practical, or procedural barriers 
preventing judicial mechanisms to function effectively raises a question of compatibility with the 
States’ duty to protect against business-related human rights abuses which occurred within their 
sovereign territory and/or under their jurisdiction, or which felt within the sphere of State 
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